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A
Brevard Childs argues for the inner logic of scripture’s textual authority as an historical reality
that gives rise to the material condition by which the church apprehends and experiences God
in Christ. e church’s use of (or by) scripture thus has a larger interiority: the shaped canon
of scripture, Old and New Testaments, is a rule of faith which accrues authority in the church,
through the vehicle of the sensus literalis.
Childs’ work has been misplaced, however. Part one locates it internationally, attend-
ing to the way it has been read in English and German and ﬁnding that it has enjoyed a more
patient reception in Europe than in Britain or North America. To illustrate, Childs’ deﬁnition
of biblical theology is contrasted with that of James Barr. eir diﬀerences over gesamtbiblis-
che theology involve opposite turns toward and away from Barthian dogma in biblical inquiry.
Part two examines Childs on biblical reference, introducing why intertextuality is not
midrashic but deictic—pointing to the res. is coincides with an understanding of the forma-
tion of biblical literature. Childs’ argument for canonical shaping is juxtaposed with Hermann
Gunkel on tradition history, showing “ﬁnal form” to be a deliberate inversion of form critical
principles. Childs’ interest in the Bible as religious literature is then set alongside his studious
confrontation of Judaism, with implications for inter-religious dialogue.
Barr and Childs are compared again in part three, which frames their respective senses
of indirect and direct biblical reference in terms of allegory. Both see allegory at work in the
modern world under certain rules (either biblical criticism or the regula ﬁdei). eir rules
aﬀect their articulations of trinitarian dogma. Finally, Psalm 102 highlights divergences
between modern and pre-modern interpreters. If scripture comprehends the present immedi-
ately, some postures of the church toward the synagogue may be excluded.
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I
In fact … canonical criticism … is simplistic. Basically it has only one idea: the
controlling place of the canon. To others this may fall apart into several conﬂicting
ideas, but to the canonical critic himself it is all one idea. ere is of course complexity
even in the canon, but all that complexity can be dealt with by the one simple idea…
[T]he canonical principle leaves the believer at peace, alone with his Bible.
—James Barr
Criticism of my understanding of canon emerges as a recurrent theme in some of the
responses of my colleagues. It is occasionally claimed that it is imprecise, unanalytical,
and encompasses a variety of diﬀerent phenomena. I feel that the complexity of the
process being described within the OT has been underestimated, and that one is asking
for an algebraic solution to a problem requiring calculus.
—Brevard Childs
Locating the work of Brevard Childs (1923–2007) can be diﬃcult. A great deal has been said
about what he is up to with his “canonical approach,” not all of it sympathetic, not all of it
helpful (critics can of course be either one without being the other). Oen the reconstructed
portrait does not in the least match Childs’ self-presentation. is is nowhere truer than in the
multitudinous detractions of James Barr (1924–2006), who charges that “canonical criticism
[sic] … is simplistic,” that the only thing its several features have in common is that they co-
exist in the same mind.¹ For Barr the term canon stands not for a workable approach to bibli-
cal exegesis, but instead for a hopeless muddle. Childs, on the other hand, maintains against
criticism like this that he would not oﬀer “an algebraic solution to a problem requiring calcu-
lus.”² So which is it? Is the canonical approach a methodological train wreck, or is it a sophisti-
cated attempt to address complicated problems?
In answering this question some have split the diﬀerence. Childs oﬀers important
insights, it is maintained, and yet due to the confusion and unworkability of his program, his
1. Barr, Holy Scripture, 168.
2. Childs, Response to Reviewers, 52.
method must be thoroughly rebuilt. e canonical approach is ﬂawed but can be salvaged. In
the view of this author, however, both the total and partial rejection of Childs’ solution to “a
problem requiring calculus” has been premature. Doubtless his approach has vulnerabilities
and weaknesses—given the complexity of the challenge addressed one could not expect other-
wise. But before criticism can be advanced at this level, it is necessary ﬁrst to have a clear
understanding of the canonical approach’s aims, what problems it identiﬁes, and how on its
own terms these are solved or mitigated. Criticism has at times been so severe that one can
appreciate why Childs in his later work begins to “resist the practice of some immediately to
characterize [his] approach as ‘canonical,’ since the label has only engendered confusion.”³ Yet
in the end he neither abandons the term nor amends his use of it along the lines suggested by
his reconstructors. As a charitable point of departure, then, it will be worth entertaining the
possibility that his durable commitment to canon as a governing framework should not be
construed as obstinacy or inﬂexibility—ironically the typical charge has been that Childs is
labile—but as a knowledgeable embrace of an intricate, knotty subject.
Generally speaking, though, generosity toward constructive work with canon runs
against the prevailing mood. Robert Kra speaks of the “tyranny of canonical assumptions,”
for example. For him, and for not a few members of the Society of Biblical Literature he
addresses, to speak of canon at all is a desperate anachronism. “Historically responsible philo-
logical work, of course, does not pay attention to these boundaries, either as limits … or as
touchstones.”⁴ In a related vein, although involving a scholar one would expect to be more
sympathetic to Childs’ project, those who attended Rolf Rendtorﬀ ’s special session at the
international meeting of SBL in Edinburgh may recall the question and answer period that
followed.⁵ Rendtorﬀ was asked whether the death of the Yahwist (whom he had supposedly
3. Childs, Isaiah, xii. He continues, “I hope that this commentary will be judged on its own merits apart from
any prior concept of what a ‘canonical’ reading ought to entail.” e same request could preface all of his
work now, early as well as late.
4. Kra, Para-mania, 17–18.
5. e paper Rendtorﬀ gave on 4 July 2006, “What Happened to the ‘Yahwist’?: Reﬂections Aer irty
Years,” was made available on the SBL website at http://www.sbl-site.org/Article.aspx?ArticleId=553. Its
content is incidental to the anecdote that follows.
 . :    ’       
killed thirty years prior) would have negative pedagogical consequences. e questioner
explained his worry that, if Childs’ canonical perspective wins the day, students will lose all
the critical tools which have been honed by critical research. Would not the demise of literary-
critical analysis have this result?⁶ Instead of responding directly to the question, Rendtorﬀ dis-
tanced himself from Childs, his “close friend.” First, in his early days Childs was far too invest-
ed in source analysis. roughout his Exodus commentary (1974) we ﬁnd him identifying J
and E. Later, he le source analysis behind and took a dogmatic turn, for the worse, patterned
on Karl Barth. Rendtorﬀ ’s quick retort brought forth a round of applause.
e point is not that Childs was widely disliked—this may or may not be true, and it
would hold little value even if it could be demonstrated. And anyway, personalized feelings to
the side, Childs was himself a sharp critic of the work of other scholars. Rather, Childs is
widely thought to have substituted dogma for a rational method—and therefore to be deeply
confused, or else just dangerous. is can be demonstrated easily from the body of literature
on Childs’ method, and when the charge is made it almost invariably allies with Barr. Rend-
torﬀ ’s quip about Childs’ presumed change on source criticism, for instance, is, willfully or
not, an apt summary of Barr’s take in 1999.⁷ It has become customary to dismiss Childs as
someone who is constantly changing his mind, and who slides with too much ease into dog-
matism. Probably within the guild, and certainly within the literature, there is a strong habit of
incredulity toward the logic and self-presentation of the canonical approach.
Admittedly, development in Childs’ thought is a genuine complication. His corpus has
a cumulative scope. Biblical eology in Crisis (1970) exhibits several unambiguous hallmarks
of the canonical approach, and yet Childs would spend the next twenty-two years completing
the project adumbrated there. As he remarks a decade on, just aer the arrival of his landmark
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (1979),
6. I conﬁrmed the content of J. H. Ellens’ question in private communications, 18 and 31 July 2006.
7. Barr, Concept. In Childs’ Exodus commentary, Barr says it is “surprising to ﬁnd that the analysis into J, E
and P, in great detail down to half-verses and quarter-verses, is still there” (391). In later work, however,
“the importance of canon is beginning to fade and the importance of doctrinal rectitude is beginning to
increase” (396). In point of fact, Childs still speaks of layers in his Isaiah commentary of 2001—maybe to a
surprising extent, depending on a person’s notion of what canonical reading entails.
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Most of the crucial issues such as the relationship of the two testaments and the other
kinds of judgments beyond exegesis which are part of the hermeneutical task, I have not
been able to address directly within the scope of an OT Introduction. [In Crisis] I tried to
cover some of these larger issues. Only aer the book had been published did I realize that
the groundwork had not as yet been carefully enough laid to support a theology of both
testaments. erefore, I decided to reexamine the foundations before pursuing biblical
theology any further.
IOTS could only be part of the reexamination, and here in 1980 he forecasts his next two
major volumes, e New Testament as Canon: an Introduction (1984) and Biblical eology of
the Old and New Testaments: eological Reﬂection on the Christian Bible (1992): “However,
this descriptive task is far from complete. A study of the New Testament from a canonical per-
spective would also have to be executed before one could adequately address the central issues
of biblical theology.”⁸ us the publication of BTONT signals the completion of a personal
goal of long standing.⁹ e challenge is not just that Childs’ work is voluminous, but that it
comprises a coordinated eﬀort. It virtually asks to be read as a corpus.
So the reader picking up some part of this work for the ﬁrst time would do well to
heed the words of one of Childs’ students, Gerald Sheppard: “Childs has shown an ability to
change his mind on issues and approaches over time. Ambiguities or lacunae at later stages in
his work cannot be uncritically clariﬁed by appeal to earlier positions. Yet what persists from
his earlier work may remain presupposed by later formulations.”¹⁰ To take just one instance,
the argument from “midrash” in the early 1970s is an essential component of the argument for
“canonical shaping,” a ubiquitous theme in Childs’ oeuvre. At the same time, the term
“midrash” itself is increasingly rejected. rough the 1980s Childs comes to see it as an exeget-
ical mode that modern Christian exegesis must not imitate.¹¹
en again, care should be taken not to exaggerate this dynamic. Another of Childs’
former students rightly emphasizes major strands of continuity in Childs’ work over years.
Christopher Seitz recognizes “that already in 1970 Childs had laid out the basic deﬁning fea-
8. Childs, A Response [Mays], 199.
9. Christoph Dohmen frames the issue well in his preface to the German translation of BTONT, in Childs,
Einen Bibel, 1:11–14.
10. Sheppard, Childs, 575.
11. See chapter ﬁve for details.
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tures of the approach. ese have been modiﬁed only subtly or in extending eﬀorts as he pro-
ceeded to publish a series of magisterial works on the Old and New Testaments, Biblical e-
ology and the History of Interpretation, including signiﬁcant work in the Book of Isaiah.” Seitz
points to ﬁve instances of “durable and sustained interest” to be found starting with Crisis: (1)
critique of historical criticism, (2) special prioritization of the ﬁnal form, (3) “observations on
the status of the Hebrew and Greek text-traditions,” (4) critical but appreciative attention to
pre-Enlightenment exegesis, and (5) “biblical theological handling of the two Testaments, in
which the Old retains its voice as Christian Scripture, and Biblical eology is more than a
sensitive appreciation of how the New handles the Old.”¹² at Childs’ thought is in develop-
ment to some extent does not make it a moving target.
e time has come for a fresh look at Childs’ approach. His own canon of writing is
now closed, and it includes a phase beyond the one that culminates in BTONT, during which
the last published accounts of Childsian hermeneutics drew their conclusions. Aer
BTONT—a unique eﬀort which itself has rarely been discussed, at least in English—there is a
technical commentary on Isaiah (2001), which Childs feared health issues would keep him
from completing. Reprieves in his illness permitted him to ﬁnish two further projects, e
Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture (2004) and e Canonical Shaping of the
Pauline Corpus (2008). e manuscript of latter had been sent to the publisher just before his
death on 23 June 2007, at the age of 83.
Is there a ﬁgure in the carpet, so to speak? It is of course still too early to gauge what
sort of long-range impact Childs’ work will have. It is now possible, however, to look back at
this library, and to attend to its contours. Patterns do emerge, I suggest, and have a discernible
kind of logic. Nor are these shapes anything like as diﬃcult to trace as those in the ﬁctitious
writings of Henry James’ Hugh Vereker. If one wants it in a single line, for Childs the shaped
canon of scripture, Old and New Testaments, is a rule of faith which in the church accrues tex-
12. Seitz, eological Interpretation, 59.
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tual authority. at is his career thesis, and that, plus its internal implications, plus its relation
to the accompanying criticism, is what this argument will attempt to unpack.
Childs ventured into many cognate ﬁelds over his career. He studied Jewish midrash in
earnest aer completing a PhD in the Old Testament; then upon writing an introduction to
the OT he devoted no less than ﬁve years to researching an introduction to the NT; aer that
he wrote a Biblical eology of both testaments, the ﬁrst and so far the only one of its kind;
and then, before ﬁnally returning to the NT, he gave considerable attention to church history,
working especially on the problem of allegory in Christian exposition of the OT. Given all
this, it will be impossible here to render anything like a deﬁnitive verdict on Childs’ contribu-
tion. I take it that this is greater than sometimes suggested, but my purpose is neither to
defend Childs’ work against all comers, nor to commend it as a panacea. Rather, I hope simply
to open up fresh vistas by taking the debate about its signiﬁcance to less-trodden ground.
In any case, Childs himself freely acknowledges that tremendous diﬃculties attend the
projects he undertook. For example, note what he says about the challenge of writing an OT
eology, which he attempted in 1985:
Seit ihrer Entstehung war es ein Charakteristikum der Disziplin alttestamentlicher eolo-
gie, dass sie immer mit ernsten methodologischen Unsicherheiten zu kämpfen hatte. Ob-
schon sie o als Krone der ganzen Disziplin bezeichnet wurde, sah es so aus, als ob ihre
führenden Vertreter immer wieder einen unsicheren Blick auf andere Gebiete des Unter-
nehemens werfen würden, voller Angst, ob nicht irgendeine neue literarische, historische
oder philologische Entdeckung das Unternehmen gefährde… Nicht nur, dass die Disziplin
locker deﬁniert und in ständiger Revision war, sondern gewisse grundlegende Spannungen
stellen nach wie vor ihre Gestalt in Frage. Ist die Disziplin alttestamentlicher eolgie nur
deskriptiv oder enthält sie ebenso ein notwendiges Element konstruktiver eologie? Was
ist die Beziehung zwischen einer alttestamentlichen eologie und einer Geschichte Is-
raels? Sind ihrer Auauprinzipien historisch, systematisch oder eine eklektische Kombi-
nation beider? Und schliesslich: was ist die Beziehung zwischen jüdischen und christli-
chen theologischen Interpretationen der Hebräischen Schrien?¹³
ese are all questions Childs takes up at various places in his work. Childs admits that it
would be “supremely arrogant” to propose a simple solution to a nest of problems so complex
they seem to inhere in the discipline. Nonetheless, he suggests an approach to Christian scrip-
ture that remembers constitutive features of Christian exposition which to his satisfaction
13. Childs, Jüdischen Kanons, 271–272, my emphasis.
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have not been adequately pursued in the critical or post-critical age. “Ich möchte so in einer
anderen Weise einige dieser quälenden methodologischen Fragen angehen.”¹⁴ At the center of
this approach is a startlingly speciﬁc confession of the lordship of Jesus Christ. ere is a
christological core to Old Testament inquiry, Childs contends, as attested (however oen over-
looked) in the work of Gerhard von Rad, and it constitutes the heart of the larger project of
gesamtbiblische theology, the theology of Old and New Testaments in concert. Sometimes the
sheer diﬃculty of this claim sounds out loudest. “Allerdings bleibt schwer bestimmbar, was es
bedeutet, im Alten Testament einen Hinweis auf Christus zu ﬁnden, und das Ringen mit
diesem Problem führt ins Herz der Biblischen eologie.”¹⁵ Just how should one move from
the verbal or literal sense of the Bible to its true theological substance? Traditional interpreters
do this readily. e capacity has largely been forgotten, however: has it been lost to modern
exegetes forever? If Childs comprehends what is at stake in such “agonizing methodological
questions,” there may be sense in talking about calculus aer all.
e following study falls into three parts. Part one situates Childs’ work as it has been
received in English- and German-speaking academic contexts while at the same time register-
ing Barr’s wide inﬂuence in denouncing Childs’ approach as a thing that falls apart into con-
ﬂicting ideas. Barr’s and Childs’ senses of the desirability of gesamtbiblische theology are then
contrasted as a possible illustration of an English/German language gap. Here Rendtorﬀ (and
an array of others) side with Childs on at least one programmatic issue. Part two turns to the
integrity of Childs’ approach on its own terms. e “inner logic of scripture’s textual authori-
ty,” or the argument for canonical shaping, is introduced as something with a larger interiori-
ty—i.e., it is not a form of biblicism, or a text-immanent reading strategy isolated from theo-
logical questions of truth. For Childs as a Christian, biblical reference, and hence biblical
intertextuality, is not midrashic but deictic. e text of scripture points to its subject matter
(res), which is the one God known in the face of Christ. Next, the same argument is juxta-
posed with two very diﬀerent perspectives. First, Hermann Gunkel underscores a forgotten
14. Ibid., 272.
15. Childs, Biblische eologie, 24. See also idem, Von Rad.
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aspect of research into the genres of biblical literature—namely, the canon—while establishing
a point of reference for the radical inversion of tradition history at which Childs arrives. Sec-
ond, Childs’ early study of midrash, and then his reconsideration of it as a Jewish operation in
the 1980s, is set forth in order to explain the expressly Christian nature of his later move away
from midrash, toward allegory. Part three, ﬁnally, sets the “mystery of Israel,” an awareness of
which spans all of Childs’ work from 1970, in the context of his pursuit of the “mystery of
Christ” in a ﬁgural mode. Since Barr also re-discovers allegory at approximately the same
time, Barr and Childs are again contrasted. ey have diﬀerent rules for allegory (one called
biblical criticism, the other called the rule of faith), and this impinges on their doctrines of the
Holy Trinity, which each in their own way attempts to uphold. As a closing example, a brief
look at Psalm 102 in interpretation gives voice to St Augustine alongside a few modern, criti-
cally informed readers. Does the scope of that text encompass the church present as well as
past? If it does, the way one articulates this reality could have consequences for Jewish-Christ-
ian dialogue along the lines broached at the end of part two.
e outline for this thesis was a long time in coming. I have dealt with the large body
of secondary literature pertaining to Childs’ approach ﬁrst, although many of the issues raised
in chapters one and two call for the fuller discussions in chapter three and following. Hence I
must appeal to the patience of those unfamiliar with the long debate about Childs’ purported
method. is is treated in chapter one with as much economy as the argument allows, but pri-
or to my own account of themes which have been much discussed (and much maligned), in
part two, and of themes which thus far have been little regarded, in part three. Chapter one in
particular could be skimmed without too much loss to readers who have no reason to doubt
that a governing approach to scripture will be a very diﬀerent thing than a particular method
or technique of biblical criticism, and who also do not have strong preconceptions about the
canonical approach’s illogic.
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An important aspect of biblical interpretation which has oen been neglected is the
transmission and reception of a writer’s work into a foreign language.
—Brevard Childs
Attention has sometimes been paid to the way a scholar’s work is transmitted into another
language. Take one example each from systematic theology, New Testament studies and Old
Testament studies. First, in an impressive survey Bruce McCormack traces the way two Ger-
man kenotic christologies (those of the nineteenth-century theologians G. omasius and W.
Gess) were taken up in Britain (in the works of P. T. Forsyth and H. R. Mackintosh), but he
notes that I. A. Dorner’s powerful criticism of omasius and Gess did not immediately follow
them across the North Sea. British theology adopted German kenoticism aer, and largely
ignorant of, a sharp challenge to it in its native Lutheran setting.¹ Second, Markus Bockmuehl
laments an increased parochialism in NT scholarship due to declining linguistic competence.
A generation ago, lip service was still paid to “keeping up” with scholarship in other lan-
guages, even if it was already a custom more honored in the breach than in the obser-
vance. For anyone inclined to the old-fashioned view (still widely held in the natural sci-
ences) that serious scholarly inquiry is at least in principle a global enterprise, it can only
be disheartening to observe how oen footnotes in English remain remarkably untouched
by directly pertinent recent publications in German, French, or Spanish—and vice versa.
Rare is the scholar who bothers comprehensively with the key international publications.²
Positive examples may be exceptions that prove a rule. ird, Hans-Joachim Kraus concludes
the third edition of his history of historical-critical research by urging his European colleagues
to take a more global view, and in particular to heed important new developments in Anglo-
Saxon OT and biblical theology:
1. McCormack, Passibility, forthcoming in McCormack, Humility.
2. Bockmuehl, Seeing, 35. Bockmuehl ﬁnds some comfort in the fact “that at least an Anglophone dialogue
continues despite the accelerating continental dri separating Europe and America in religious, cultural
and geopolitical respects” (36).
Es ist erschreckend, wie stark der historisch-verobjektivierende Distanzierungseﬀekt einer
der Phänomene registrierenden ‘eologie’ die alttestamentliche Wissenscha isoliert und
sie im Gefüge theologischer Forschungs- und Lehrinstitutionen zu einer unwirksamen hi-
storischen Disziplin prägt. Diese Bemerkung sei verstanden als ein weiterer Beitrag zu der
von B.S. Childs und R.E. Clements ins Gespräch geworfenen Behauptung einer Krise der
Biblischen eologie.³
Here in 1982 Kraus sees that a broadened receptivity to foreign input will aid German-
speaking scholars in overcoming a crisis exacerbated by institutionalized isolation.
In their own way all three of these examples point to the challenge diﬀerent modern
language contexts pose to international biblical and theological research. Viewed alongside
the perspectives of a handful of experts in cognate disciplines, then, this chapter’s epigraph
rings true.⁴ More to the point, the desideratum Brevard Childs identiﬁes pertains to his own
work in two important respects. First, attention to the transmission and reception of OT
scholarship in diﬀerent languages, especially the exchange between German and English, is a
signiﬁcant minor theme in Childs’ publications. (Not only these two languages, though they
will be my focus here: late in his career, for instance, Childs appears to have learned Dutch in
order to read W. A. M. Beuken’s four-volume commentary on Isaiah 40–66.⁵) Second, the lin-
guistic borders separating academies has led to a bifurcated reading of Childs himself. As I
will argue, Kraus’ appeal for international dialogue stands at a turning tide in Childs’ recep-
tion. Just as Anglophones begin to tune the “canonical approach” out, many German-speaking
OT specialists increasingly take notice.
To demonstrate both points, this chapter will overview Childs’ tracking of internation-
al trends, then look at the way his work has been read in English, and ﬁnally characterize the
rather diﬀerent way it has been appropriated in German. It will also address a complicating
factor in Childs’ reception on both sides of the Atlantic, which in the introduction was called
the habit of incredulity toward the logic and self-presentation of the canonical approach, and
which is associated with the post-IOTS criticism of James Barr.
3. Kraus, Geschichte³, 559, cf. 557.
4. Childs, Wellhausen, 83.
5. Childs, Isaiah, xii.
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Childs has been called provincial. In 1979 James Smart criticizes Biblical eology in
Crisis for focusing exclusively on the American setting of the crisis. He senses a “failure to set
the American crisis in its full international context which prevents Childs from recognizing
the full character and dimensions of the problem.”⁶ For Smart the problem is international
and the solution has to be so too. If one thing stands out in retrospect, however, it is the ease
with which Childs moves between Continental, British and American academic contexts.
Already in 1970 Childs marks the diﬀerence between Europe and North America, highlight-
ing contours of the crisis unique to the American scene. Smart was mistaken, and his timing
unfortunate. IOTS, which also appeared in 1979, exhibits an uncommonly broad and interna-
tional range of engagement.
Yet the idea that Childs is somehow cut oﬀ from Europe has had other iterations. John
Barton, surveying methods in biblical scholarship, introduces a “Professor B. S. Childs of Yale,
whose antecedents are purely Anglo-Saxon,” as if the fact that Childs conducted his doctoral
studies in Switzerland and Germany in the heyday of the European biblical theology move-
ment did not impact his subsequent research in the least.⁷ Barton was shortsighted to write,
“It is not surprising that Childs has had little following in Germany.”⁸ at circumstance was
changing even as Reading the Old Testament (1984) went to press, and it had changed alto-
gether by the time the popular book was issued in a revised edition in 1996, at which point
Childs’ massive Biblical eology had already been translated into German.
6. Smart, Biblical eology, 29. Cf. Childs, Review of Smart. Barr appears to favor Childs’ account: Concept,
646n26.
7. Barton, Reading, 2. Barton is misguided about what Childs’ antecedents are. He alleges logical antecedents
in structuralist thought (104; this of course has strong Continental roots!) and New Criticism (141, 153),
and he ignores completely probable historical antecedents, those Childs encountered personally at Basel
and Heidelberg in the early 1950s. e situation is made worse by Barton’s attempt “to give some idea of
[Childs’] programme without for the moment going into its antecedents” (80). Barton spends several pages
foregoing unlikely antecedents, which has the eﬀect of severing Childs’ approach from all inﬂuences, real
or imagined.
8. Ibid., 95. Cf. Seitz, eological Interpretation, 84.
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Surely where Childs trained matters as much as where he taught. Aer serving in the
army in Europe during World War II, he began a B.D. at Princeton eological Seminary in
1947. en he spent four years studying at Basel, in which time he also made use of the
Ancient Near Eastern studies program at Heidelberg. To judge by the prefaces to his books,
this was a highly formative period. Baumgartner and Eichrodt guided his doctorate, but
Childs counts many other notables among his “unforgettable teachers,” including von Rad,
Zimmerli, Cullmann, Bornkamm and Barth.⁹ In hindsight, Childs felt fortunate to have stud-
ied in Europe at a time when “the iron curtain which separates the two Testaments in Ameri-
can universities had not yet fallen”¹⁰—or conversely, his training made him “painfully aware
that an iron curtain separated Bible from theology, not just at Yale, but throughout most of the
English-speaking world.”¹¹ Whatever one makes of these variations on a Cold War metaphor,
there can be no doubt that four years on the Continent stayed with Childs aer his return to
America in 1954, and long into his tenure at Yale from 1958.
Childs’ research shows a pronounced interest in the transmission and reception of bib-
lical scholarship in foreign languages, particularly from German to English. Several examples
exist, starting with Crisis. It purposes “to describe the emergence of a distinctive American
way of understanding theology in its relation to the Bible.” e Biblical eology Movement
there “arose largely in response to certain European inﬂuences and continued to reﬂect a close
relationship to the various theological currents abroad,” but, contra Smart, “its peculiar Amer-
ican stamp gave the movement a signiﬁcant shape that distinguished it from its foreign coun-
terparts.”¹² e term “Anglo-Saxon” appears at least once in all ﬁve chapters of the ﬁrst half of
Crisis, and contrasts with the European situation are noted throughout. For instance, discus-
sing Bultmann and the hermeneutical turn, Childs comments on the German situation, then
the American. He sums, “Again, [the debate] is dominated by German theologians whose
9. See the prefaces to Childs’ titles, including Myth, Memory, Exodus, and especially IOTS, NTCI, OTTCC
and BTONT. Cf. Sheppard, Childs.
10. NTCI, xv.
11. BTONT, xvi.
12. Crisis, 13.
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philosophical concepts are rendered into English oen with tortuous results.”¹³ e pattern on
Childs’ account is of partial understanding and delayed uptake of German-language trends
overseas.
Similarly, the article “Wellhausen in English” begins with the line from which this
chapter’s epigraph is drawn. Wellhausen’s work was mediated in the late nineteenth century by
W. Robertson Smith, whose controversial career helps explain the initial mistrust of the Prole-
gomena in Britain, and in diﬀerent ways in America. Six years later, with S. R. Driver’s
Introduction (1891), Wellhausen’s reception in English began to change for the better.¹⁴ In an
ironical twist, however, at the same time Wellhausen was gaining ground abroad, he was com-
ing under heavy attack at home. W. F. Albright later helped bring this critique into English,
laying distinctive emphasis on the idea that Wellhausen was a Hegelian. Yet this assessment
too has oen been “passed on uncritically,” in ignorance of the fact that L. Perlitt challenges
and at a minimum seriously qualiﬁes the Hegelian charge.¹⁵
Another piece from the 1980s, “Gerhard von Rad in American Dress,” makes the argu-
ment that some, especially in North America, take von Rad’s dynamic traditioning process as
a warrant for their “theological liberalism.” Partly “there is a ﬂaw in von Rad’s theology which
has functioned … to blur the Christological center of his theology,” and partly the Anglo-Sax-
on readers blatantly disregard this “center” of von Rad’s work.¹⁶ Again, an article in 1994
makes the point that, between the world wars, “theological debate concerning the Old Testa-
ment was conﬁned largely to the Protestant German-speaking world, and was generally
ignored or misunderstood in the English-speaking world.”¹⁷ And to take a ﬁnal example, in
his penultimate essay (2005) Childs reﬂects on the era of the canon debate.¹⁸ e entire piece
is built around the contrast between English and German scholarship. An earlier German
13. Crisis, 81.
14. Childs, Wellhausen, 84–85.
15. Ibid., 86. See Perlitt, Vatke und Wellhausen, and cf. Childs, Review of Perlitt.
16. Childs, Von Rad, 85, 82.
17. Childs, OT in Germany, 233.
18. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era. Interestingly enough, it is an era he judges to have drawn to a close.
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consensus is ﬁrst brieﬂy summarized. Focus then turns to ways the debate unfolded “within
the English-speaking world” in “a period of virtual silence” on canon in Germany.¹⁹ Next,
Childs sketches the more recent German scene which, despite a few reservations, he evaluates
more favorably.
ere is an enormous gap in this late retrospective however—namely, Childs’ own
research! At one level the omission is tactful, but it raises a pertinent question: where does his
contribution to the canon debate ﬁt? Childs gives hints that his is a minority view in the
American academy,²⁰ and he is evidently happier about trends back in Europe. Furthermore,
he places the work of one of his American advocates, Stephen Chapman, in the German-lan-
guage section of his overview: “although written in English, it arises more out of the German
context.”²¹ is provides a clue about where Childs feels his own scholarship belongs. Chap-
man’s title is set amidst the German debate almost for conceptual reasons, because it rejects
the disjunction between scripture and canon (Sundberg), and so “the focus did not fall exclu-
sively on the historical forces at work in the process, which dominated the English-speaking
debate.”²² A biblical theological dimension was acknowledged as ingredient to the discussion.
If Childs had named his own work in 2005, one might suppose that he would have placed it
on the German side of the ledger. To a far greater extent than Chapman, whose work is proba-
bly a good indicator of the sort of associations “Old Testament at Yale” in Childs’ day ought to
evoke, it can truly be said of Childs that, although written in English—with the notable excep-
tion of his dissertation in 1953 and a handful of articles in the 1980s and early 1990s—his
scholarship arises more out of a German context.
My hypothesis is that Childs’ work on canon actually inaugurates, at least in part, the
new course that the canon debate took in German-speaking contexts just as lines of debate
19. Ibid., 36.
20. Ibid., 32.
21. Ibid., 35, cf. 36, 38 and 40. Chapman does have ties in Germany, though his theological education
occurred at Yale. Christopher Seitz supervised his dissertation (1998), published in 2000 as Chapman, Law
and Prophets.
22. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 38. Chapman, Law and Prophets, 106–110, makes a strong case for the
overlap of “canon” and “scripture.”
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were hardening in Britain and North America. (Kraus, again, is prescient.) Taking a slightly
expanded international view, Childs becomes a middle term in the canon debate. In its posi-
tive inﬂuence, his work exists somewhere between English and German, or more precisely
between phases of the academic work on canon conducted in these languages. In the schema
here I will not follow Childs in distinguishing German from English on conceptual grounds²³
but will diﬀerentiate simply by language of composition.
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James Barr has mounted numerous attacks on canonical hermeneutics. He was not
always so negatively disposed, but as he states in an appendix to Holy Scripture: Canon,
Authority, Criticism (1983), the ﬁrst extended discussion of Childs’ proposals, IOTS became a
tipping point. Barr explains in “autobiographical style” that his response to Childs through
most of the 1970s was sympathetic. Everything changed in 1979. “e eﬀect of Childs’s
Introduction was to convince me that the programme of canonical criticism [sic] was essen-
tially confused and self-contradictory in its conceptual formulation.”²⁴ Barr’s evaluation of the
canonical approach in 1983 raises this charge of incoherence at a variety of points. For one
thing, Childs’ broad use of the key term “canon” masks underlying incompatibilities.²⁵ Anoth-
er issue concerns the status of Karl Barth’s theology, about which Barr is not very sanguine.²⁶
A third involves the relationship of Christian theology to scripture. Childs quite ably describes
the “cracking of the walls” in the biblical theology movement, but he is wrong to think that the
23. Not that this is his custom. e given example is to my knowledge the only one of its kind, and it comes
with the proviso that Law and Prophets was readied for publication during a fellowship at Tübingen.
24. Barr, Holy Scripture, 132, cf. 133. For a similar narrative compare Barr, Concept, 234–235, 393.
25. Barr, Holy Scripture, 147: “the new ‘broad’ use of the term has a very simple value: its meaning is identical
with the position ‘Childs is right.’” e usage should be rejected because “the term is a result of confusion
in Childs’s thinking… us terminology is no accidental factor in the question. e endless repetition of
the word ‘canon’ in canonical criticism is not accident, but necessity: for, as seen from without, the
continual reuse of this word is necessary in order to hold together sets of arguments which would
otherwise fall apart.”
26. Childs does not understand Barth, Barr alleges, but he is quite like Barth in wanting to make his method
“sovereign” (ibid., 146).
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ediﬁce should be rebuilt. Canon delivers “the Grail for which the American Biblical eology
Movement had been the Quest,” and so Childs’ method “continues the older tradition in that
it believes in biblical theology at all.”²⁷ Compounding this, the canon principle is about the
form of scripture and not its content, according to Barr. It therefore abandons the task of the-
ology, which must “say something about God, about his works, about Christ and salvation.
But in order to do this it must take up just that which Childs forbids, a ‘vantage point outside
the text’; for only so is it in a position to make estimative judgements, to make decisions about
truth.”²⁸ Fundamentally, this is why privileging a canonical context makes the Bible into “a
separate cognitive zone,” “a closed system” and “an intellectual ghetto separated from all other
truth by the walls of relevance.”²⁹ If theology restricts itself to the Bible, it surrenders its claim
to truth. Fourth, to Barr’s mind Childs’ argument depends upon that which it rejects. Childs
“contradicts his own deep dependence upon the tradition of critical scholarship… In this
respect his work gives the impression of a fulﬁlment of an inner death-wish of liberal criti-
cism.”³⁰ Fih, by emphasizing the Bible’s ﬁnal form he moves in a direction that resembles
New Critical formalism or structuralism even though he insists, contradictorily, that his out-
look is historical.³¹ e list could go on.
ere are many reason to begin by proﬁling Barr’s case against Childs. Some of his
indictments have an air of plausibility. For instance, can Childs climb the ladder of higher crit-
icism and then pull it up behind him? Or can he use “canon” as a cipher for his entire
approach without admitting imprecision? ese are important questions. For another thing,
Barr has exerted a wide inﬂuence on Childs’ reception, in English and in German. Ernest
Nicholson will not be the only scholar who shares Barr’s distaste for “the strong zealotic legal-
ism” in Childs’ perceived wish to make the ﬁnal form of the biblical text absolute and thereby
27. Ibid., 136, cf. 171.
28. Ibid., 137.
29. Ibid., 168. Hence “canonical criticism … is simplistic. Basically it has only one idea: the controlling place
of the canon.”
30. Ibid., 148, cf. 132–133. ere are later versions of this in Concept (e.g., 48–49, 193, 203, 252n21, 310, 393,
399, 411–412, 433–434) and anticipations in Barr, Childs’ Introduction (esp. 14–15, 23).
31. Ibid., 163, 169.
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to ignore or reject the history of the text’s development.³² I will explore these and other points
raised by Barr throughout this study, with reference to Barr’s work in chapters two and six
especially. e primary reason for introducing his critique at the top, however, is that it
obstructs a fair and measured account of the canonical approach. Barr is of course known for
a critical style as incendiary as it is incisive, and many ﬁnd this to have tarnished his account
of Childs. In a penetrating review of Concept (1999) Jon Levenson observes that “Barr is
harshest on the scholar to whom he refers as ‘my friend Professor Brevard Childs,’” and that
“Barr vitiates his own potentially formidable case against Childs by continually allowing him-
self to be diverted from the great hermeneutical issues to attack Childs for this or that com-
ment, some of them mere obiter dicta.”³³ Something similar could be said of Holy Scripture.
But many who prefer a more “fair-minded” account of canonical hermeneutics, such as that of
Paul Noble, still buy into Barr’s suggestion that Childs does not know his own mind, and so
changes it at whim.³⁴ us to take Childs at his word when he writes of the logic of scripture’s
textual authority would appear to be a non-starter.
In other words, I begin with Barr to cast a shadow of doubt upon his notion of Childs
as an addled method monger whose thought is not just in development, but incoherent. is
portrait has travelled well, helping to establish a precedent for the critical reconstructions
which turn Childs’ proposals into a putatively more coherent method. Is there really no other
kind of logic to the framework as it stands, on its own terms? Barr reached his negative verdict
about Childs long before all the evidence was in (Concept did not really re-open the case, and
there are now three books beyond the three standing between 1983 and 1999). e opinion
has also exerted a considerable Wirkung, even upon more generous courts of appeal.
32. Nicholson, Pentateuch, 267, citing Barr, Holy Scripture, 92. en again, Kugel, Guide, 768n36 ﬁnds this
remark and its citation by Nicholson “odd.”
33. Levenson, Negative, 61–62. He illustrates: “what point does James Barr score against the canonical method
by telling us (in the text, not the notes) that Childs’ indices are so poor that ‘the name of Karl Barth (or,
indeed, my own) is cited in the text at numerous places which have been overlooked in the index’?”
34. For just one recent example see Esler, NT eology, 263, 309n28–29. Barr oen supposes that Childs is
labile (e.g., Holy Scripture, 152–153) and eventually wonders if Childs, in changing from a supposedly
“canonical” outline in IOTS to a thematic one in OTTCC, has not abandoned a canonical approach
altogether (Concept, 397, 422)—though cf. Childs’ explanation in OTTCC (15) or BTONT (101).
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Other treatments of canonical hermeneutics are less ad hominem. Childs’ canonical
method, on the other hand, emerges as thoroughly muddled. Following Barr’s demolition
there is a long line of people who oﬀer their hermeneutical services to Childs, unsolicited, by
reconstructing a less confused canonical method on Childs’ behalf—nevermind that Childs
claims to oﬀer neither a criticism nor a method but an approach. In fact there have been no
fewer than four monograph-length rehabilitations of Childs in English, and one in German.
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e prototype for critically reconstructing Childsian hermeneutics, which appeared
the year aer Holy Scripture, is a direct extension of Barr’s ideas. In 1984 John Barton recom-
mended “that the ‘canonical approach’ of B. S. Childs ought logically to be seen as a form of
structuralism.”³⁵ e suggestion is made in full awareness that Childs presents his develop-
ment in other terms.
ere is not the slightest doubt that the route which brought Childs to canon criticism
[sic] was as he states it. But this still leaves room, so far as I can see, for all the speculations
in chapters 6, 7 and 10 about his literary antecedents. e demise of biblical theology is
the reason why Childs looked for something new. It does not explain, except in the most
general way, the character of what he eventually found.³⁶
Childs cannot be trusted to describe the character of the canonical approach, Barton implies.
One is compelled to look elsewhere to understand the logic of his proposal. Even the outline
of Barton’s book follows out this assumption. Chapter eight, on structuralism, begins, “We
have arrived at structuralism via canon criticism, but it should be said at once that this is a
very winding route, a route possibly never taken before.” Structuralism clearly antedates
35. Barton, Reading, 133, my emphasis.
36. Ibid., 211. is quotation does not appear in the second edition. e revised edition of Reading (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 1996) is in most respects identical to the ﬁrst edition up through Chapter 12,
aer which two chapters are added to bring the survey more up to date. Pagination diﬀerences aﬀect only
the conclusion and end notes. My interest is in the 1984 edition because of its place in the sequence I am
tracing. Even so, the removal of the appendix just quoted has nothing to do with Barton’s reading of
Childs, as if he recanted of “all the speculations.” It was removed in response to James Barr’s review, which
pointed out ﬂaws in Barton’s reading of the demise of biblical theology (xi, revised edition).
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Childs, and Childs himself denies any connection with structuralist theory. e link between
them has to be defended solely in terms of logic: “the order of presentation is not historical,
but logical—and logical within the terms of my own argument, not in a way accepted by the
wider scholarly community.”³⁷
Actually, logic is not a suitable word for the canonical approach le to its own devices,
Barton thinks. He ﬁnds the method “personally attractive,” but “the valid insights that went
into its making [must] be salvaged from the ruins.” Barr’s inﬂuence on Barton at this point is
undeniable but not straightforward. Holy Scripture “should be regarded as the deﬁnitive
demolition of canonical criticism in its present form.” ere is “overlap” with the critique in
Reading.³⁸ However, these acknowledgments (deleted in the second edition) appear in a foot-
note explaining that the book appeared too late to be incorporated into the body of his argu-
ment.³⁹ Strictly speaking, a direct lineage from Holy Scripture to Reading is not warranted. On
the other hand, Barton states at the outset that his “debt to [Barr] will be apparent in practical-
ly every chapter.”⁴⁰ is is quite true. Barton and Barr had been colleagues at Oxford for sever-
al years at that point, and a number of Barr’s riﬀs on Childs appear to have been picked up by
Barton in some way or other.
For instance, Barr and Barton share more than an aversion to fundamentalism. ey
fear that Childs, while not a fundamentalist himself, is liable for aiding and abetting the
fundamentalist cause. Possibly the most illuminating statement occurs in a footnote: the re-
establishment of what the Bible traditionally meant, as against what it originally meant, “is
why Childs’s ‘canonical’ approach causes such anger, especially to those coping with funda-
mentalism: it seems designed to take the Christian, so recently liberated from the bonds of
‘the tradition,’ ‘the canon,’ ‘the ecclesia docens,’ straight back to the Egypt from which he has
come. To such critics Childs seems to be undoing both the Reformation and the Enlighten-
37. Ibid., 104.
38. Ibid., 225.
39. e comment is deleted in the 1996 edition, but the discussion of the canonical approach has not been
revised. See note 36.
40. Ibid., xi.
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ment; small wonder that they treat him harshly!”⁴¹ Elsewhere, of Barr’s “strongly worded sug-
gestion” (in 1980) that Childs will “be quoted by conservative polemicists for the next
hundred years,”⁴² Barton comments that the charge is overly speculative. “Whether funda-
mentalists will indeed draw comfort from Childs I am not qualiﬁed to judge,” he admits. “But
the structure of his arguments bears an interesting analogy to those used by fundamentalists,”
he continues.⁴³ And: “Canon criticism has many formal similarities with fundamentalism.”⁴⁴
e basis of this comparison is also drawn from Barr, who asserts in 1983 that Childs’
argument reﬂects an “inner death-wish.” e same appraisal is visible in nuce in Barr’s review
of IOTS. In lieu of argument, Barr feels, the case is built upon “the contrast between the weak-
nesses and antinomies of historical criticism on the one hand and the virtues of the canonical
reading on the other.” More than that, the “picture painted of [historical criticism] is in fact
very close to the conservative/fundamentalist one.”⁴⁵ Lurking beneath Childs’ polemic, how-
ever, is an ironic dependence upon the results of critical research. us “Childs’ actual opera-
tion … is bipolar.”⁴⁶ Barton adapts this line of attack in 1984. Like fundamentalists, Childs
claims to stand in continuity with pre-critical exegetes. But a major distinction between mod-
41. Ibid., 230n15 = ²265n15. Cf. Barr, Childs’ Introduction, 23 and idem, Holy Scripture, 148.
42. Barton, Reading, 224n7 = ²259n7, citing Barr, Childs’ Introduction, 15. For a response, see Childs,
Response to Reviewers, especially 58.
43. Barton, Reading, 98.
44. Ibid., 99. In Barton’s treatment of redaction criticism it becomes clear that comforting fundamentalists
could be one of the canonical approach’s “hazards” (49). Childs’ discussion of P and J accounts of creation
in Genesis 1 and 2 prepares the way for the Disappearing Redactor (49–51; cf. IOTS, 145–150). e case is
later adduced to show the danger, “a biblical critic’s conjuring trick,” inherent in redaction criticism (and
“canon criticism” to the extent that it is like it): “the redactor of Genesis has so cleverly integrated the two
accounts of creation, ‘J’ and ‘P,’ by inserting Genesis 2:4a, that they no longer read roughly and awkwardly,
and so he has achieved (what one could barely have believed possible) a text which the reader is deceived
into thinking both smooth and consistent” (56–57, my emphasis). Further, this “conjuring trick” gives the
fundamentalists the magic they most desire: “it is not diﬃcult to imagine that the trick we have just
described is particularly dear to the hearts of fundamentalist opponents of non-conservative biblical
criticism, and in their hands it can well become a convenient means of showing that the critics are hoist
with their own petard, or (to give our analogy its last run) that when the magic box that contained the
redactor is opened, not only is the redactor gone, but Moses himself has stepped into his shoes: a very
frightening prospect indeed for a higher critic of any kind” (57, my emphasis.). Barr’s inﬂuence in linking a
fear of fundamentalism to Childs, to a danger latent in his proposals, manifests itself on several occasions
in Reading, not least with the Disappearing Redactor.
45. Barr, Childs’ Introduction, 14.
46. Ibid., 15.
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erns and pre-moderns should obtain. ose in the pre-critical era took the Bible at face value
because another option had not yet been considered. It was simply the way everyone read the
Bible back then. In sharp contrast, fundamentalism and “canon criticism” are oppositional in
essence. In both, a polemical bearing is actually the one deﬁning characteristic. “Neither could
survive the demise of historical criticism, for they draw all their strength from being able to
wage war on it. It is the enemy they love to hate. In both cases the claim to be recapturing a
pre-critical approach is attractive but specious.”⁴⁷ By this logic, both are parasites on criticism,
although for Childs the situation might be still more problematic. e fundamentalist wants
to shut the door on historical critical research, but Childs has le the door ajar.⁴⁸
Central to Reading is the view that genre competence is a (if not the) central occupa-
tion of critical inquiry. It is a question of “reading as.”⁴⁹ Childs, by brooking source criticism
in the ﬁrst place, makes a mess of the genre competence criterion:
One could almost formulate the interpretative principle here as follows: Read all these
texts as if they were written by one author (say, God) at a single sitting; set out what he
must have meant by each of them if he also wrote all the others, and had a consistent pur-
pose in doing so; then delete all references to the author from your ﬁnal statement of their
meaning. We know (from historical criticism) that the biblical texts did not in fact have a
single author; but the meaning they have as a canon is the meaning they would have if
they had had a single author.⁵⁰
“As if.” Note how we have dried subtly from literary competence into the realm of wishful
thinking. e assertion of a unitary canon in a critical paradigm is illogical.
47. Barton, Reading, 99.
48. e point is implicit (ibid., 99): “the canon critic is asking whether the Bible may not have a unity aer all,
just as the fundamentalist is asking whether it might not be right aer all; and it is the ‘aer all’ that deﬁnes
the gulf—widest very oen when it looks least daunting—which separates the modern critic of whatever
persuasion from even the greatest of the pre-critical commentators.” A parallel statement can only apply to
Childs. “It is only aer we have seen how varied and inconsistent the Old Testament really is that we can
begin to ask whether it can nonetheless be read as forming a unity.” Unlike Childs, the fundamentalist
actually thinks the canon is a perfect unity. Source theory does not come into it. On this point, according
to Barton’s reasoning, the fundamentalist position might actually be more logical.
To anticipate, Barr and Barton also believe that the advent of historical criticism (or just “criticism”) is a
true Copernican revolution. See chapter six. As Barton writes here: “All historical-critical work in biblical
studies, it is not too much to say, depends on [authorial intention]. e great, and liberating, achievement
of biblical criticism has been to establish, for a large number of texts, what the original author(s) meant as
against what the text had traditionally been taken to mean by the Church, the synagogue or individual
pre-critical interpreters” (184, cf. 95). is is why Childs threatens to carry us back in to slavery in Egypt.
49. Ibid., 8–29, and esp. 134, 199.
50. Ibid., 102.
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Like Barr, Barton uses a bipolar Childs to deconstruct the canonical approach in other
ways. Childs’ method wants to be old, but it is actually completely new.⁵¹ It wants to bring pre-
critical exegesis back into play, but it refuses to allow “all the old abuses—allegory, harmoniza-
tion, typology, even downright falsiﬁcation of the text”—which he would be “far more consis-
tent” to accept.⁵² Or again, a prime example occurs in the conclusion, where Barton borrows
M. H. Abrams’ well-known diagram of four poles of interpretation. Post-structuralism is read-
er-centric. Structuralism and New Criticism are text-centric. Redaction criticism is author-
centric. But “canon criticism” cannot make up its mind. It looks like redaction criticism some-
times, but its main principles are text-centric. “Canon criticism is, as we saw, superﬁcially like
redaction criticism, … [but] in reality most canon-critical suggestions do not depend on his-
torical investigation at all… Here for the ﬁrst time in Old Testament criticism we have a con-
centration on the text itself [the central node in Abrams’ diagram], rather than on its relation
to other things.” Hence Childs’ “move from redaction criticism is seen in its true light.”⁵³
Childs is conscious that he is making a radical proposal; he is but dimly aware how unlike all
critical Biblical scholars before him he becomes. Taking all his proposals at once, he could not
even be placed on Abrams’ diagram!
e upshot of all this perceived methodological confusion is that Childs must be
“salvaged from the ruins.” Barton is somehow attracted to the canonical approach—possibly
the biggest diﬀerence with Barr—but he cannot accept it on its own terms. In the interest of
logical consistency, the kindest thing to do is to shore up Childs’ inadequacies on his behalf.
He asks, “Is there any way of modifying the method, perhaps giving it a narrower and less
ambitious scope, that would nevertheless do justice to our sense that its innovations are some-
51. Ibid., 100. Cf. 221n3 = ²256n3.
52. Ibid., 84–85, cf. 97. Does he really exclude these things (allowing for a moment that they are not always
abuses)? Barton charges that “Childs’s position would be far more consistent if he were to follow [de
Lubac’s] line of thinking, but his loyalty to Reformation principles about the ‘literal’ sense of Scripture
holds him back, producing incoherence” (223n6 = ²258n6). In fact Childs’ increased openness to
ﬁguration later in his career is perfectly compatible with, and even anticipated by, his early piece on the
sensus literalis, which appeared in 1977.
53. Ibid., 202 = ²241.
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times fruitful, not always perverse?”⁵⁴ In a sense this has become a mantra among certain of
Childs’ readers. Barton’s own answer is to marry Childs to the New Critics (among his sup-
posed Anglo-Saxon antecedents, and with Yale ties), although the dowry becomes yet another
way of problematizing canonical hermeneutics.⁵⁵ Here too one suspects that in the back-
ground lies a suggestion ﬁrst made by Barr, who writes,
canonical criticism would gain in theoretical strength and consistency by such a move [to-
ward critical theory]. Any of these movements—modern literary theory, structuralism,
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics—is based on a far sounder philosophical foundation than the oen
muddled conceptual incoherence of canonical criticism. A really non-historical, literary
study of the Bible on the basis of its shapes, styles and motifs could be very interesting…
e logic of canonical criticism, and especially of its antipathy to older criticism and its
historical interest, seems clearly to go in that direction.⁵⁶
Separated by just a year, Holy Scripture and Reading delivered a quick one-two punch to the
allegedly puzzled face of “canon criticism.” e combined eﬀect was to make a way for several
more critical reconstructions of Childs’ logic. Barton and Barr made it possible to take for
granted that Childs had no coherent method to hand.
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Mark Brett is a subtle thinker, and his “charitable reconstruction” of Childs, Biblical
eology in Crisis?, raises a handful of salient concerns. A discussion of the theological nature
of Childs’ disagreement with representatives of the tradition-historical school is perceptive, if
underdeveloped.⁵⁷ Nuance is evident in his treatment of the relationship of historical particu-
larity to contemporary appropriation, and again in a section on synchronic interpretation.⁵⁸
54. Ibid., 100, my emphasis.
55. Ibid., 158: “New Criticism and canon criticism stand or fall together: they are children of the same literary
culture, even if they have never met. In this chapter I shall suggest that they should probably fall—
encouraged in this by the knowledge that one of them has already fallen.” Of course it could be that a Yale-
style New Criticism lies somewhere beneath Childs’ so-called method—Cleanth Brooks taught in New
Haven from 1947 to 1975—but that would not be the ﬁrst or most likely place to look for antecedents to
the canonical approach.
56. Barr, Holy Scripture, 161–162, my emphasis; cf. idem, Childs’ Introduction, 23.
57. Brett, Crisis?, 96–100. His failure to recognize the extent of Childs’ debt to this tradition shows an under-
appreciation of the German context for Childs’ work, and this despite attention to some of the relevant
literature, by von Rad and Oeming (78, 168n4). Why does von Rad seem to anticipate Childs?
58. Both of these themes feature in his fourth chapter, “Has Childs fallen into Gabler’s ditch?,” to which his
answer seems to be: not necessarily (114).
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Sometimes he defends Childs against unjustiﬁed criticisms, including from Barr and Barton.⁵⁹
e book has a fatal ﬂaw, however, in that it rests uncritically on the premise that Childs’ work
is methodologically inoperable as it stands. Brett follows “Barton’s balanced account,” diﬀering
seriously only on the score of Childs and New Criticism. ere are obvious aﬃnities between
them, he ﬁnds, but “there is a much wider range of literary theories that might be fruitfully
compared.”⁶⁰ (Actually, this departure is something of a necessity because New Criticism had
served as another means to discredit the method.) Brett explains,
Our discussion, as with Barton’s, is not simply an account of Childs’s scholarly intentions.
Nor is it an attempt to evaluate a biblical scholar by “external” criteria provided by the phi-
losophy of interpretation. Rather, there are certain weaknesses in Childs’s methodological
reﬂections which can be charitably reconstructed by comparisons with the inﬂuential
works of Hans-Robert Jauss, Karl Popper and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Childs has received
some unjustiﬁed criticism, and I aim to show how the canonical approach can become a
coherent mode of biblical interpretation.⁶¹
What exactly makes the endeavor charitable is not clear. Brett simply assumes that the logic of
the canonical approach is completely detachable from Childs. “I have drawn from the work of
Childs in a highly selective way, and this ad hoc method of reconstruction ﬁnds its justiﬁca-
tion in the fact that Childs himself has failed to provide a coherent exegetical theory.”⁶² His
whole evaluation of Childs builds upon this somehow self-evident fact.
Brett likewise redraws the portrait of a bipolar Childs. He separates that which is dis-
tinctive about Childs, in his judgment, from that which is confused or confusing. At times we
almost have several people in our hands. One Childs is adamant about the priority of the ﬁnal
form. Another Childs is interested in the history of interpretation. Yet another wants to talk
about the prehistory of collective meanings (streams of tradition, perhaps). But “in these cases
he speaks as an historical critic (usually a sceptical one) and not as an advocate of a distinctive
canonical approach.”⁶³ e resulting picture is one of “exegetical schizophrenia,” for “Childs is
59. Ibid., 117, 145. For a response to the former see Barr, Crisis?, 139.
60. Brett, Crisis?, 5. Brett’s book also had the bad fortune to appear in print the year before BTONT, which
immediately rendered some of its content obsolete (see especially 60–61).
61. Ibid., 5, original emphasis.
62. Ibid., 27. Making an appeal to Holy Scripture, he continues, “is lack of a coherent theory that has turned
out to be one of the major obstacles to a balanced appreciation of his work.”
63. Ibid., 172n20, cf. 66–67.
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constantly switching hermeneutical hats.”⁶⁴ Again, Childs can argue like a “totalitarian,”
hermeneutical monist, but in his better moments the pluralist Childs prevails. Obviously “the
second Childs is to be preferred.”⁶⁵ is is also the thrust of the interrogative recasting of
Childs’ 1970 title. A fragmentary discipline is not a crisis but something a consistent pluralist
ought to embrace.⁶⁶
is strategy has the bizarre result of severing Childs from his argument for the ﬁnal
form in order to provide him with one. With respect to Childs’ claims for a canonical shaping
by the tradents of the Hebrew text, Brett—who does not use the phrase “canon consciousness”
or refer to the formative article of I. L. Seeligmann—tries to show that an interest in the text’s
prehistory cannot coexist with the subsequent use of scripture in the church or synagogue,
and feels that “in this respect some of Childs’s methodological statements are just misleading.
However, this recognition in no way damages Childs’s overall argument [!], since his exegeti-
cal interest does not rest on a reconstruction of the canonical or textual processes. e main
lines of his argument rest rather on a theory of continuous textual usage.” e truly signiﬁcant
interest pertains to “that golden thread of continuous usage which extends to the present.”⁶⁷
Neither does Childs need, however much he might want, to invest heavily in the history of
exegesis, a “logically separable interest.”⁶⁸ All he really needs is a solid theory of continuous
usage (Brett turns to Gadamer’s notion of a classic text) and, to escape the confusions of
“canonical intentionality,” a “theory of relatively autonomous texts.”⁶⁹ Once these are in place
the canonical approach will be freed to be its distinctive, formalist self and can get on with the
business of generating new and interesting readings of biblical material. is is the basic shape
of Brett’s “charitable reconstruction of the canonical process.”⁷⁰
64. Ibid., 68, my emphasis. Barr quotes the latter phrase approvingly (Concept, 392).
65. Ibid., 11, cf. 42, 68, 71.
66. e book’s parting shot is a conscious echo of Barton’s closing sentiment in 1984. Brett says, “Childs wants
to put all our theological eggs in one basket—the canonical approach. It would be more responsible, on the
pluralist argument, to distribute them widely” (167). Compare Barton, Reading, 211.
67. Brett, Crisis?, 64.
68. Ibid., 7, cf. 52–57.
69. Ibid., 26.
70. Ibid., 133.
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In summary, Brett makes no eﬀort to see why Childs might have coherent interests in
the ﬁnal form, its prehistory and its reception history all at once. His justiﬁcation for isolating
diﬀerent nodes of interest, in an ad hoc fashion, derives exclusively from the authority of Barr
and Barton, and his suggestion for salvaging Childs’ method follows Barton’s prototype. e
logical Childs, the Childs we all want but must reconstruct, is the text-immanent Childs. us
“Childs qua historical critic” analyzes one thing, but then the essential Childs forgets this and
“focuses on the communicative intention of text itself without correlating this intention with a
particular historical period, social group or author.”⁷¹ Barton’s inﬂuence, again, is apparent:
the “‘canonical method’ logically implies that the biblical text, or indeed any other text, can be
read without paying any heed to the intentions of authors, compilers or even canonizers. It is
not a sub-type of redaction criticism; it is an attempt to read ‘the text itself.’”⁷²
It is with considerable irony, therefore, that Barr’s review of Crisis? chides Brett because
“he fails to read Childs’s mind rightly.”⁷³ Probably “Childs himself will reject this charitable
approach,” writes Barr, and “the book will not have served Childs very well.”⁷⁴ Barr makes
another very apropos observation. Brett has not considered why Childs does not himself take
his approach in a pluralist or formalist direction more like, say, James Sanders. “us, though
Brett has done very well in analysing many particular exegetical statements and arguments of
Childs, he does not seem to have explained what lies behind them.”⁷⁵ If it seems odd that Barr
should take an interest in Childs’ antecedents—historical as opposed to logical antecedents,
contra Barton—the explanation relates to one thing Barr seems fairly pleased about, that Cri-
sis? “adds to the total impression of incoherence.” For him, what actually lies behind Childs’
ideas explains the confusion. “Most obvious … is the failure of the book to provide any study
in depth of the inﬂuence of Karl Barth… For Barth is not only an inﬂuence but is very likely
71. Ibid., 68–69.
72. Barton, Reading, 102.
73. Barr, Crisis?, 139. Cf. also Moberly, Review of Brett.
74. Barr, Crisis?, 137. Barr changes his tune in 1999. Having then seen Noble’s reconstruction (below), which
is less useful to Barr, he declares Brett’s account “the best discussion published” (Concept, 392).
75. Ibid., 137.
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the source of the antinomies and peculiarities which Brett has so well identiﬁed.”⁷⁶ Barth com-
bined with critical biblical scholarship “could not fail to produce contradictions.” And, repeat-
ing an earlier allegation, “there is nothing diﬃcult in the canonical approach: it is easy to enter
into, indeed simplicity itself, but its incoherences are equally easy to see.”⁷⁷ Barr can hardly
value a reconstruction of logic he does not ﬁnd compelling in the ﬁrst place. But then, neither
does Barr recognize the extent to which he made it possible to disregard Childs’ mind. Nor
does his own answer to the question he rightly asks of Crisis? satisfy, as I will argue in the next
chapter. us a still-outstanding question is whether Childs’ antecedents—let them be
acknowledged, let them not be restricted to Barth—can be treated in a way that accords
Childs’ approach at least a degree of plausibility.
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Paul Noble’s 1995 book improves upon Brett’s in many respects. To start with, it stands
this side of Childs’ magnum opus, and so has to deal with the christological telos of Childs’
work. Noble also sees that Holy Scripture “shows little comprehension of the structure and
goals of Childs’ programme.” Barton, too, “gives an unbalanced construal of Childs’ work.”⁷⁸
And “Brett has not really grasped what Childs’ distinctive ‘interpretative interests’ actually
are”; his account is “an over-hasty dismembering of Childs’ work.”⁷⁹ Noble appreciates that the
treatments of Childs before him are inadequate, and he manages to set the record straight on
some counts. Yet he does not escape Barr’s theory of a bipolar Childs. As with Brett it is deter-
minative for the entire account:
One important theme that keeps recurring throughout the secondary literature, however,
is that Childs’ own methodological foundations are insuﬃcient for the superstructure he
wishes to build upon them; and this has naturally led to various thinkers and schools of
thought being suggested as providing the theoretical underpinning which Childs’ work
needs. In my view this is a potentially valuable way of trying to rectify what is, I believe, a
signiﬁcant defect in Childs’ own presentations of his work. Much of the present book,
76. Ibid., 139.
77. Ibid., 140, original emphasis.
78. Noble, Canonical Approach, 3.
79. Ibid., 6, 175.
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therefore, will also adopt this strategy.⁸⁰
Noble wants to proceed more cautiously than those before him so as not to create another dis-
torted analysis of the essentials of Childs’ program, which should be permitted “to explain
itself on its own terms.” Only aer that has been done will he suggest methodological improve-
ments. Despite his caution the reconstructive aspiration is aﬃrmed—he ﬁnds many tensions
in method, and “these tensions have continued to haunt his later work, and are signiﬁcant fac-
tors in [BTONT] falling some way short of Childs’ goals.”⁸¹ Childs’ vision as Noble under-
stands it needs to be “recast.”⁸²
Noble’s account remains useful in a qualiﬁed sense. For example, it oﬀers a competent
discussion of the literature on Gadamer and Childs. e links between these thinkers are
explored in much greater depth than previously.⁸³ Second, Noble provides a measured orien-
tation to the descriptive task and the diﬀerences between Stendahl and Childs. “Childs’ pur-
pose,” he qualiﬁes, “is not to deny that a distinction can be drawn between the descriptive and
the normative but to relativize it.”⁸⁴ ird, the handling of intentionality in Childs is more
generous and comprehensive. Noble ﬁnds “Childs’ work has received a seriously one-sided
presentation in this respect from John Barton, who focuses almost exclusively upon the anti-
intentionalist strand.”⁸⁵ Even though the language of intentionalist and anti-intentionalist
strands serves a parsing of Childs’ thought to accommodate other ends—Noble prefers to
have an exclusively intentionalist Childs—the presentation correctly draws out both.
80. Ibid., 7.
81. Ibid., 7.
82. Ibid., 369.
83. Ibid., 235–253, 254–271, 282–289, 328. In addition to Brett, earlier discussions include those of Scalise,
eological Basis and Fowl, Childs (more indirectly, see Oeming, Gesamtbiblische, which treats Gadamer
and von Rad and also makes reference to Childs—though see below). Further analysis of Childs and
Gadamer could be illuminating but is not integral to this study.
84. Noble, Canonical Approach, 23, cf. 30. Noble cannot see any diﬀerence between Stendahl and Childs in
practice, though one wonders whether he has reckoned adequately with Childs’ purpose in not making
Stendahl’s two questions paradigmatic (e.g., in Noble’s summary, “(i) What did the biblical writers believe?;
and, (ii) What ought we to believe?” [336, cf. 369]). Barr fails even to acknowledge Noble’s discussion of
Childs and Stendahl (Crisis, 189–190, 202 [cf. Levenson’s review], 206, 379–380, 414), but others have been
fully persuaded by it (Esler, NT eology, 263–265).
85. Noble, Canonical Approach, 50.
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Still, the book is not as successful at representing Childs’ interests as one would hope.
Regarding authorial intent, Noble concludes that “Childs ought therefore to maintain a consis-
tently intentionalist stance.”⁸⁶ Noble argues for an objectivist hermeneutic which must be
moored in intentionalism lest it dri into indeterminacy—and for him this is a problem that
needs correcting in Childs and Gadamer alike. Childs is misguided not to take sides in
debates about the author—and in this basic sense Noble agrees with Barton and Brett. (Like
Noble, Barton is more of an intentionalist. He thinks Childs would have been more consistent
to go in a direction like Brett’s, but this is not really a course he recommends. at is, against
Brett, Noble and Barton seem to agree about the priority of authorial intent, but Noble choses
a “strand” to reconstruct that he actually thinks will work. Barton’s reduction of Childs to an
anti-intentionalist is ironic.) Yet as Stephen Chapman puts it, “What Noble fails to realize is
how these claims ﬁt together in a distinctive manner within Childs’s hermeneutics—i.e. that
for historical reasons both kinds of claims must be made.”⁸⁷ Could it be that Childs’ approach
has is own kind of logic here? Like those before him, Noble does not entertain this possibility
long enough.
Noble’s reconstruction has its share of outright failures as well. e idea of a labile
Childs creates very unlikely pictures of his development. In one case, Childs has “ﬂuctuated
considerably” on the place of historical criticism in his program. In an early article (“Interpre-
tation in Faith,” 1964) Noble ﬁnds strong statements for the place of historical research in a
faith perspective. ere are hints of the same in Crisis, only “now more muted.” Surprisingly,
in IOTS “all such reservations seem to have disappeared.” But then NTCI “reintroduces doubts
about the inherent soundness of critical tools.”⁸⁸ Such extreme dithering from publication to
publication is far-fetched, evocative of the caricatures drawn by Barr and Barton, and built on
a dubious use of the evidence. Sometimes a narrative like this justiﬁes Noble’s methodological
86. Ibid., 328.
87. Chapman, Reclaiming Inspiration, 173n28. Is it really the case, as Noble maintains (Canonical Approach,
352), that one must choose between intentionalist objectivism or ﬁdeism? On the closely related issue of
inspiration, Noble’s presentation of Childs’ position (208, 219–253 [esp. 299], 340–353) has likewise now
been surpassed by Chapman’s.
88. Noble, Canonical Approach, 58.
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intervention on Childs’ behalf.⁸⁹ At other times it leads to a premature dismissal of Childs’
work. BTONT is a case in point. From the start we are told that the volume “falls a long way
short” of Childs’ goals.⁹⁰ But how does he know this? In addition to the idea that tensions of
method “haunt” his work, Noble perceives a failure to inaugurate the Old Testament as a wit-
ness to Christ, one of Childs’ basic goals for biblical theology. His culminating work “still
seems to have made little progress towards setting the reading of the Old Testament as Christ-
ian Scripture on a methodologically sound basis. And likewise, therefore, he has made little
progress towards hearing the two Testaments as co-witnesses to the one divine reality.”⁹¹ It is
doubtful that Noble gets to the heart of the “pan-canonical” problem, however.⁹² Discussion of
the OT in the NT stalls out in a fairly superﬁcial question of whether Paul’s “midrashic” exege-
sis amounts to more than eisegesis.⁹³ Noble’s own recommendation merely trivializes the chal-
lenge of hearing Christ in the OT: “Of course, the human authors could not, of themselves,
have written proleptically of Christ; but positing God as the ultimate author of the canonical
books provides the necessary epistemological underpinnings.”⁹⁴ Very brieﬂy this is attempted
with Isaiah 53, in which Noble seems to need “genuine foreknowledge of the future,” speciﬁ-
cally Christ’s passion, rather than merely “a general presentiment of a coming Messiah,” entail-
ing a much stronger account of inspired divine authorship than Childs gives—though the
exegetical details are of secondary importance “since we are concerned with methodological
principles rather than with the actual interpretation of Isaiah 53.”⁹⁵ Lacking the full sense of
how much Childs struggles with exactly this question (in 2001 and 2004), for which Noble
cannot be faulted, one can still judge that his alternative is just a little too convenient.
89. Ibid., 35–36, 37.
90. Ibid., 76, cf. 7.
91. Ibid., 73, and see all of 65–76. On the face of it these claims constitute a non sequitur.
92. Ibid., 302. Cf. Barr’s adaptation of the German term “gesamtbiblische” a few years later.
93. E.g., see ibid., 305 (did Paul hear the intent of the OT or not?) and 158 (if midrash is not legitimate for us,
why is it acceptable for the Chronicler or for Paul?).
94. Ibid., 345.
95. Ibid., 205–206. Again: “Only divine authorship could account for the meanings Childs wishes to ﬁnd in the
Bible” (206).
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Another deﬁciency is the absence of any account of the scholarly context for Childs’
work. No mention is made of the tradition out of which BTONT arises. Barr’s point about Cri-
sis? has not been addressed. In addition to a few scattered references to von Rad, one slight
exception is an adjudication between Childs, Barr, Pannenberg and von Rad on the interrela-
tion of “fact” and “interpretation.” e shaping of the traditioning process is also mentioned in
passing, but it simply does not suﬃce to dismiss Childs’ critique of von Rad in a few lines.⁹⁶
Further, though Noble (contra Brett) rightly aﬃrms Childs’ interest in the motives behind the
canonizing process, he cannot oﬀer an accurate critique when he shows no awareness of
where and how Childs develops the argument for the ﬁnal form’s shaping.⁹⁷ How can Noble
suggest that Childs become “more ﬂexible in his account of the tradition-process” lest, enter-
ing as he would need to “contemporary debates about the traditions behind the canonical
text,” he should ﬁnd himself with “a daunting historical-critical mountain to climb,” as if no
engagement with this very debate had ever been attempted?⁹⁸ Still most disappointing are
Noble’s occasional attempts to improve Childs with Childs’ own resources. An eﬀort to
connect the Testaments typologically calls on Hans Frei.⁹⁹ And Barth is praised as a more
exemplary exegete of the OT as Christian scripture (not because of his exegesis per se, but
because of the methodological issues Barth raises).¹⁰⁰ Noble is aware that Childs interacts with
these ﬁgures, but the impression given is of the thinnest contact.
e Childs who emerges, in short, is a great assembler of proposals—the canonical
principle above all—who desperately needs a methodology. Crisis was beset by problems of
method. ese went underground during a phase of descriptive work (1979, 1984) but resur-
faced when Childs returned to writing theologies:
e full range of issues, however, is taken up again in the canonical eologies; moreover,
their nature is such that the argument has to be carried mainly by the exegetical studies of
96. As before, the perceived need here is for “some kind of doctrine of ‘inspiration.’” Ibid., 140, 143.
97. Ibid., 179–180, 183 (cf. 146–7, 152–155). Is Childs’ argument for the priority of the ﬁnal form really
“transcendental”? Tellingly, I. L. Seeligmann (see chapter ﬁve) is referenced nowhere.
98. Ibid., 186–187. Contrast IOTS.
99. Ibid., 306–327. “Clearly there are a number of ideas [in Frei’s Eclipse] which are potentially of some value
for a canonical approach to biblical interpretation” (309).
100. Ibid., 76–80, cf. 345–347.
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the biblical texts rather than by the methodological discussions. As we have now seen,
however, this quickly leads to the previously unresolved methodological problems resur-
facing again. In view of this, therefore, is is not going too far to say that Childs’ pro-
gramme is currently in a state of crisis: It has long-standing methodological problems that
greatly hinder its implementation, and which it has made little progress towards
resolving.¹⁰¹
Despite a variety of advances in some particulars, Noble’s reconstruction is still of a piece with
Brett’s and Barton’s. Childs’ most important antecedents are ignored or discounted; his pro-
gram is inoperable as it stands. e canonical approach is an approach and not a brand of crit-
icism (at last!),¹⁰² but it lacks a method as much as ever before.
In a way, though, Noble is right that Childs does not have a method. Of course, Childs
oen speaks of the methodological, or more commonly, the hermeneutical issues at stake, but
as he explains clearly in the preface to NTCI, “In the end I would rather speak of a new vision
of the text rather than in terms of method.”¹⁰³ Later we will look at how canon entails a rule of
faith for Childs—at least as early as 1970 (chapter six). e point for now is simply: lacking a
set methodology is not the same thing as lacking an approach. Terminological distinctions
between criticism and approach, between method and vision, turn out to matter quite a bit in
Childs’ case. e assumption that they do not participates in an old and tired bias that Childs
does not know his own mind.
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For the sake of completeness we can include W. J. Lyons’ Canon and Exegesis, which
makes few advances in the evaluation of Childs’ corpus. Lyons declines to comment on Isaiah,
so it is not much more up to date than Noble’s study.¹⁰⁴ Positively, the rule of faith is added to
101. Ibid., 77, cf. 174, 313, and passim. Or as he sums up later, “As a methodological investigation, this book has
been primarily concerned with the genuineness of Childs’ programme”—genuineness for Noble being a
question of whether “it is methodologically equipped to do all that a theology ought to do” (361–362). e
enterprise is, with modiﬁcation, “on the whole, methodologically defensible” (359).
102. On the habit of calling Childs’ program “canon criticism” against his wishes, see especially Barton,
Reading, 221n3 = ²256n3: the phrase “canon criticism” is “hard to resist” as, seemingly, an emblem of
Childs’ continuity with method-mongers past and present.
103. NTCI, xvii.
104. Lyons, Canon, 32.
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the mix,¹⁰⁵ and comments on the sensus literalis and referentiality go a little way beyond Brett
by holding ostensive reference and historical background in tension.¹⁰⁶ An eﬀort is made to
redeﬁne biblical theology in terms more favorable to Childs, interacting with Barr’s Concept.
Some recourse is made to German scholarship. is, however, has little impact on how Lyons
locates Childs’ contribution. Ebeling’s call for a biblical theology of both OT and NT is rightly
seen as relevant, though it almost appears as if Ebeling were the only impetus behind
BTONT.¹⁰⁷ ere is an account of Childs’ Ausbildung,¹⁰⁸ yet for some reason the ﬁgures in
Europe under whom Childs learned a profound interest in problems of biblical theology play
almost no role in Lyons’ discussion. Finally, Lyons shows that his book belongs with the other
reconstructions: “like many others, I have tended to pick and choose among Childs’s many
fruitful suggestions, discarding those that I have deemed unhelpful.”¹⁰⁹
Sometimes it seems as if Lyons does not feel another reconstruction is necessary.
When detailing several aspects of “canon” Lyons defends Childs against an “appearance of
weakness” le by previous treatments.¹¹⁰ “Although the interplay between these … elements
has caused considerable confusion for both Childs and his critics, it may also be responsible
for much of the strength of Childs’s canonical approach.”¹¹¹ Later he tries to show how the fact
that Childs’ hermeneutics have “virtually always been regarded as requiring reconstruction” is
not a setback: “this lack of development to Childs’s hermeneutics does not necessarily mean
that his approach is thereby rendered indefensible or in need of severe reconstruction if it is to
survive. e question is, can Childs’s language and concerns be explained and justiﬁed by a
particular hermeneutical approach without any substantive change in its self-conception or
praxis?”¹¹² Implicit, however, is the standard view that Childs lacks a mature hermeneutical
105. Ibid., 8, 28. Unsurprisingly, he ﬁnds that “a confusions exists in Childs’s work as to the correct usage of this
term.”
106. Ibid., 69.
107. Ibid., 34.
108. Ibid., 25–26. e year of Childs’ birth (1923) is incorrectly given.
109. Ibid., 32.
110. Ibid., 45.
111. Ibid., 42.
112. Ibid., 82, original emphasis.
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framework. Lyons thinks he can “leave the essential contours of Childs’s work intact”¹¹³ by
rejecting the “objectivist” approach of Noble in favor of the “perspectival hermeneutics” of
Stanley Fish. “e ﬁnal consequence of accepting a Fishian hermeneutic for the canonical
approach is that Childs’s set-one terminology—that relating to ‘objectivity’—must be recast in
terms sensible to the kind of language which can be used to describe a consistent set-two for-
mulation of the canonical approach, to dress the canonical approach in ‘perspectival’
clothes.”¹¹⁴ Like the rest, Lyons takes what he likes and leaves the rest.
For Lyons the technique has an extremely subjective outcome. Frequently he speaks of
“my” canonical reading. is plays out exegetically in a bizarre intrusion of “my ‘feminist’
problem” in the Sodom narrative, and in a psychologization of Abraham in Genesis 18.¹¹⁵
Coupled with his praise of perspectivalism, results like these leave this reader in serious doubt
about whether Lyons has done justice to the “self-conception” of Childs, as professed. Lyons is
almost aware of this limitation. Surprised at his exegesis, he writes: “Perhaps it is a case of
being too close to one’s own work, of liking its results too much.” And his ﬁnal comment on
Childs begins: “In many ways I like what I have found exegetically in the canonical approach
of Brevard Childs.”¹¹⁶ He also reveals how he ﬁnds himself “in the rather embarrassing posi-
tion of oﬀering a new reading based upon a canonical approach to the biblical texts.”¹¹⁷
ankfully, it is not necessary to ascribe the embarrassment to Childs.
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Barton, based on a sense that Childs’ “innovations are sometimes fruitful, not always
perverse,” wondered how Childs’ method could be made less ambitious, recommending (with
113. Ibid., 85.
114. Ibid., 122, cf. 95. But see also Noble, Canonical Approach, 57, 206–218.
115. Lyons, Canon, 266, 208, cf. 272–273. As he explains, “e strongest justiﬁcation for my rejecting the
coherence of Abraham was not originally its obviousness as a reading of the text, but rather my personal
discomfort with the implications of the readings of Ben Zvi and von Rad for subsequent texts, for the
whole canonical text itself ” (273).
116. Ibid., 275.
117. Ibid., 269.
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Barr) a route that he himself was not much inclined to follow. He thus sent many of those
interested in canon oﬀ searching for a method to the madness.¹¹⁸ Barr asserted meanwhile
that it was mostly just madness and reinforced the pattern of reading Childs against Childs.
eir combined eﬀorts in 1984 and 1983 spawned a persona whose mind is indeed divided,
even fractured. But the Childs who needs treatment for an aﬀective disorder or schizophrenia
lives in an ungainly body of secondary literature. And that Childs, I suggest, is largely a work
of ﬁction, a Frankenstein hatched in an unhappy dream that lingers in daylight much longer
than it should. e several reconstructions of Childs’ hermeneutics all share in the view that
something in the canonical approach is perverse, even when they do not use Barton’s exact
language, because they proceed to excise whatever in Childs’ approach does not suit the
desired method. None answer the questions Chapman puts to Noble—how the putative inten-
tionalist and anti-intentionalist strands might “ﬁt together in a distinctive manner within
Childs’s hermeneutics,” or why “for historical reasons both kinds of claims must be made”—
and thus none oﬀer readings of Childs that qualify as charitable in the usual sense of the word.
Naturally there are other readers who do not see the need to oﬀer Childs their charity.
(Some may feel rather in his debt.) ese could be set forth here in parallel to the trend
detailed above. To take one example, Christopher Seitz and Childs have informed one anoth-
er’s work on Isaiah. Seitz dedicates his study of Isaiah 36–39, Zion’s Final Destiny, to three hon-
ored teachers, one of whom is Childs, even as the book reconsiders Childs’ main work on Isai-
ah up to that point (Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis, 1967).¹¹⁹ Childs in turn dedicates his
commentary of 2001 to Seitz and does not hesitate there to probe and challenge the thesis in
Destiny. Developments like this will not be outlined in detail, however, for a couple of reasons.
First, as the present example illustrates, the work of these readers can be closely bound up
with Childs’. It makes less sense to treat them as detachable phenomena. Moreover, the way in
which they qualify as “readings” in the ﬁrst place is less straightforward. Destiny attempts to
118. Examples could be multiplied. For one of the ﬁrst, see Morgan, Madness?, 92.
119. Seitz, Destiny, x: “Ironically, much of Childs’s own later work on canon has had a decided inﬂuence on the
sorts of questions and modiﬁcations I have proposed here, vis-à-vis his original work.”
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extend Childs’ work—it is not an attempt to give an account of canonical hermeneutics as
such. Some pieces ﬁt the bill a little better.¹²⁰ But none of this quite matches the scale of the
reconstructions. Also, these readers tend to accept that a canonical approach will have intri-
cate operations, perhaps on the order of calculus, which just makes it harder to summarize.
Finally, the work of Anglophones more sympathetic to Childs’ articulation of his
approach informs this study, but at another level than Barr’s demolition, or the subsequent
reconstructions of Barton, Brett, Noble and Lyons. If contributions from scholars like Shep-
pard, Seitz, Chapman and Kavin Rowe of North American, and Walter Moberly, Nathan Mac-
Donald and Neil MacDonald of Britain, are less conspicuous, it is not because their many
publications have been excluded from consideration. I trust that the impact of this latter
group, amongst whom one might wish to draw ﬁner distinctions, will be visible throughout.
Nor can the extent of Childs’ more positive reception be restricted to a catalog of those who
might be counted among Childs’ closest allies. Rather, my purpose has been to denude the
structure that reinforces the predominant, dismissive way Childs has been read in English.
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Childs’ reception in German is no more uniform than his reception in English. Some-
thing of the range can be seen in two installments of Wissen, C. H. Beck’s slender paperback
series, both of which appeared in revised 3 editions in 2006. Christoph Dohmen’s introduc-
tion to the Bible and its exegesis builds upon the view that, for an appreciation of “der literar-
ischen Eigenart biblischer Literatur ist das … ema des Kanons von entscheidender Bedeu-
tung.”¹²¹ In contrast, Christoph Levin’s short introduction to the Old Testament illustrates the
durability of the old project of reconﬁguring the biblical literature according to its historical
development. ough it has unquestionably always been received as Holy Scripture, history
rather than canon more nearly captures its true signiﬁcance. “Man entdeckte und entdeckt
120. Seitz has work in this category, including, interestingly enough, an overview of the canonical approach in
German: Seitz, Approach, I. AT. (Klaus Baltzer is another teacher to whom Destiny is dedicated.)
121. Dohmen, Auslegung, 15.
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immer neu die Diﬀerenz zwischen biblischer Geschichtsdarstellung und tatsächlich
geschehener Geschichte.”¹²² In a particularly striking counterpoint, Dohmen’s and Levin’s
treatments of the canonical formulae in Ecclesiastes 12:9f highlight the extent of their dis-
agreement. Dohmen gives evidence that a centuries-long process of growth is drawing to a
close. Instead of the “Ergänzungen und Fortschreibungen” typically found in “Traditionsliter-
ature,” a postscript (or to be precise, a pair of postscripts) indicates an awareness of the canon’s
border and function. “Die Intention dieses Nachwortes ist deutlich. Der kritische Querdenker
Kohelet soll in die klassische biblische Weisheitsliteratur eingeordnet werden.”¹²³ Levin also
cites Ecclesiastes, selecting from 12:12 a slogan for his evaluation of canon: “Of the making of
many books, there is no end.” Standing atop his book’s ﬁnal chapter, “Die Unabgeschlossenheit
des Alten Testament,” the verse introduces a retort to the topic surveyed in the previous chap-
ter, “Der Abschluß des Kanons.” Not surprisingly, he rejects dogmatic understandings of
scripture’s authority. e Christian “Inspirationslehre” constitutes a tendentious falsiﬁcation of
the meaning of the literature’s growth and has been among “der größten Hindernisse der his-
torischen Bibelkritik.”¹²⁴
Dohmen’s argument—it is more than a simple survey of options available to exegetes—
begins with a consideration of how the Bible, a book made of books, came to be regarded as
the book of books. Essential to this theme is the question of canon. When deﬁning the term,
Dohmen recognizes that canon was not used in unambiguous conjunction with the collection
of Holy Scripture until at least the 4 century . Yet he observes that the ﬁrst appearance of
this usage postdates the concept it came to signify; “vielmehr hebt der Begriﬀ auf die Funktion
ab, Maßstab oder Norm der Bücher und Buchsammlungen zu sein, die schon vorliegen und
mit wechselnden Begriﬀen wie Schri, Heilige Schrien/Bücher, Miqra, Gesetz, Tora, Propheten
122. Levin, AT, 123–124, my emphasis; cf. 21. Levin continues, “Die Bibel ist aber kein absolutes, sondern ein
historisches Buch” (124). Why these must be stark alternatives is not wholly clear. e threat of
fundamentalism may necessitate an ongoing “Streit um das Alte Testament” for Levin.
123. Dohmen, Auslegung, 14. For Dohmen’s distinction between Traditionsliteratur and Autorenliteratur see
11–12.
124. Levin, AT, 121.
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bezeichnet werden.”¹²⁵ On his reading the late appearance of the term itself explains why, in
critical research, “die Frage nach dem Kanon über lange Zeit als mehr oder weniger auss-
chließlich historische Fragestellung behandelt worden ist.” Dohmen continues: “Erst in den
vergangenen vier Jahrzehnten sind die Fragen des Kanons aufgesprengt und durch die
nordamerikanische Kanonforschung aus ihrer Eingrenzung auf das Feld des Historischen
befreit worden, so daß heute allgemein anerkannt wird, daß die Probleme des biblischen
Kanons nur noch im Gespräch zwischen biblischer, historischer und systematisch-theologis-
cher Forschung zu behandeln sind.”¹²⁶ Doubtful as this statement is as a characterization of
the general outlook, it is noteworthy in a couple of respects. e implicit recognition that the
North American debate outpaced the German discussion is remarkable in itself. Also, though
the analysis can in no wise qualify as a consensus, Dohmen points to the reopening of a ques-
tion strict historical study was supposed to have closed. History was not rejected in itself,
however: a later dogmatic term has, for Dohmen, plausibly been shown not to be anachronis-
tic, but to suit its subject matter.
Childs and Sanders are the only people named in the context of the North American
discussion. at Childs’ work is more formative for Dohmen, suggested already by his use of
“canonical approach” instead of “canonical criticism,” becomes undeniable in his enumeration
of the most important two aspects of canon. First, canon pertains to the growth of the litera-
ture. Second, canon pertains to the closure and ﬁnal contours of the literature. Both aspects are
closely related, and in fact Sanders is criticized for emphasizing “Form”—the Bible’s produc-
tion—to the exclusion of its “Funktion für eine Gemeinscha.”¹²⁷ Plainly, the claim that study
of the Bible’s production belongs together with the product itself is a hallmark of Childs’ work.
B. S. Childs kommt in seinen Arbeiten zu der Einsicht, daß der Kanonbegriﬀ nicht auf die
späten Festlegungen des Umfangs der normativen Schrien begrenzt werden kann, son-
125. Dohmen, Auslegung, 20.
126. Ibid., 21.
127. Ibid., 23. Dohmen explains, “denn das, was uns als Kanon begegnet, ist ja nicht zu lösen vom Gedanken
des Maßgeblichen und Richtungsweisenden, was der Aspekt des Kanons als normative Sammlung von
Schrien und Sammlung normativer Schrien zum Ausdruck bringt.” Dohmen’s equation of form with
formation, and function with reception, recalls, but should not be identiﬁed with Childs’ appropriation of
form-critical terminology. See chapter four.
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dern daß es sich beim Kanon letztendlich um etwas handelt, das in den Schrien selbst an-
gelegt ist und nicht von außen herangetragen wird. Was Childs hierbei in den Blick ge-
nommen hat, ist das, was Traditionsliteratur ausmacht, nämlich die Haltung der
Tradenten, die die Literatur sammeln, fortschreiben und weitergeben. Da dies konstitutiv
für einen späteren Kanon ist, schlägt Childs eine Terminologie vor, die den Begriﬀ des Ka-
nonischen auf das Gesamte anwendet und dabei zwischen zwei Aspekten unterscheitet:
Der Verschriung und Tradierung auf der einen Seite—bezeichnet als “kanonischer Pro-
zeß”—und dem Abschluß dieses Prozesses auf der anderen Seite—bezeichnet als
“Kanonisierung.”¹²⁸
As much as anything to be found in the literature thus far, this summarizes well the core of
Childs’ argument. Canon is not an extrinsic concept because one ﬁnds the judgments that
gave rise to the term in the writings themselves. And Dohmen is persuaded that this oﬀers a
more comprehensive explanation of the formation of biblical literature than the strictly his-
toricist one.
Wissen’s format permits no footnotes and few references, which apart from making the
series palatable to non-specialist readers also forces authors to select only the most essential
literature. For one Old Testament professor Childs’ recovery of canon orients the entire dis-
cussion. For another, Childs’ work is not even on the map. In Levin’s case the historical-critical
paradigm endures as the best explanation of the received text, largely a jumbled product of
historical accident. e literature’s growth “lief meist ohne Regeln ab.”¹²⁹ With surprising
transparency his analysis operates according to an archaeological metaphor, oen tried: “Weil
die gegebene Überlieferung im Grundsatz unantastbar war”—that is, until the critical era—
“ist der Ausleger in der glücklichen Lage, wie ein Test-Archäologe arbeiten zu können. Wenn
er jüngere Schichten abträgt, darf er erwarten, jeweils auf ein älteres, intaktes Textbild zu
stoßen.”¹³⁰ Hence he unravels original threads from secondary developments (variously
termed “artiﬁcial,” “tendentious,” “embarrassing,” and on at least half a dozen occasions “ﬁcti-
tious”), frequently pointing out underlying ANE parallels as though the hermeneutical payoﬀ
128. Ibid., 22, my emphasis. Compare the earlier, more detailed comments in Dohmen and Oeming,
Kanontheologie, 19–25.
129. Levin, AT, 25. e process is compared to a snowball. “Einmal ins Rollen gebracht, gewinnt der Schneeball
mit jeder Umdrehung eine neue Schicht” (25). And why does the process stop? “Der Schneeball mußte
irgendwann zur Ruhe kommen” (26).
130. Ibid., 26.
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there were self-evident.¹³¹ At one point the Exodus decalogue is cited, but truncated according
to a possible ur-form.¹³² Levin should not be faulted for not registering a counter-position like
this one articulated in 1974: “Ultimately the use of source and form criticism is exegetically
deﬁcient if these tools do not illuminate the canonical text. Gressmann likened literary criti-
cism to an archaological excavation in which no responsibility is felt by the scientist for
rebuilding the mound. e analogy is inappropriate and highly misleading. e text under
study is not only a record of history, but—even at its minimal formulation—a piece of litera-
ture with its own integrity.”¹³³ His remit here does not permit it. Still, his general introduction
demonstrates the remarkable extent to which a major critique of the long-dominant devalua-
tion of canon—which in Dohmen’s words has recently “zu einem der wichtigsten emen der
Bibelwissenscha avancierte”¹³⁴—has fallen on deaf ears. Levin remains utterly unpersuaded.
Dohmen’s and Levin’s overviews mark two poles in reception of the “North American”
canon debate in German-language scholarship. Dohmen may be right to say that the canoni-
cal approach is acquiring “Raum und Bedeutung.”¹³⁵ Yet it is undoubtedly true that one still
ﬁnds business as usual in other quarters. Below I will attempt to sketch the way Childs’ work
has crossed back over the Atlantic to an environment in which he once studied (though much
changed since 1950, needless to say). Before proceeding, a ﬁnal point of Levin’s is worth
emphasizing. He writes, “Die Bewahrung der Schri geschah ja nicht um ihrer selbst
131. Ibid., e.g. 23, 35, 45, 52, 56, 58, 75–6, 104. Discussion of a psalmic theme culminates in a telling phrase: it
“ist religionsgeschichtlich keineswegs originell” (39).
132. Ibid., 66. Hence the “decalogue” is reduced to Exodus 20:2–3, 5a, 13–17a. Such probabilities and
possibilities are oen hazarded.
133. Childs, Exodus, 149.
134. Dohmen, Auslegung, 88. Dohmen’s rebuttal of the usual criticism of the canonical approach is on target, in
my view: “Von hierher ist auch ersichtlich, daß einer der häuﬁgsten Kritikpunkte an diesem Ansatz der
kanonischen Schriauslegung, er sei ahistorische oder gar fundamentalistisch, weil er bei der vorliegenden
Endform des Bibeltextes einsetze, völlig fehlgeht. Der Ansatz kanonischer Schriauslegung ist der
Versuch, die literarhistorischen Besonderheiten der biblischen Literatur mit ihren theologiegeschtlichen in
Verbindung zu bringen” (91). at Levin appears to accept the standard critique, on the other hand, is
suggested by his closing comments (Levin, AT, 123–124). Honoring the “Aulärung” as the decisive shi
for biblical exegesis, and taking up the cause against fundamentalism, are unmistakably Barr-esque themes
(key works on which appear either exclusively in German [Barr, Bibelkritik] or in translation [Barr,
Fundamentalismus]).
135. Dohmen, Auslegung, 88.
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willen.”¹³⁶ But this is precisely the issue at stake. Is the Bible’s function as Holy Scripture
intrinsic to the biblical text itself, or is it a perverse imposition? It is not by accident that
Levin, like Gunkel before him (see chapter four), ﬁnds in the Old Testament “die Anfänge der
Wissenscha.”¹³⁷ And this brings us up against one of the most fundamental issues posed by
Childs’ scholarship. What, to continue the anthropomorphism, does the text want? Crudely,
does it want criticism, or dogma? is issue will occupy us again, especially in chapter six.
    
One periodization of biblical interpretation declares that until it “came of age” in the
1980s, North American biblical scholarship was characterized by a “connoisseurship of pre-
mier German criticism.”¹³⁸ e characterization seems accurate enough through the post-war
period. Exactly when and how Northern America went its own way, and whether this turn
was salutary, would be diﬃcult to establish. Did the direction of inﬂuence ever reverse? at
scholarship on the Continent should play catch-up with scholarship across the Atlantic by no
means follows, and probably has not been the rule—if anything, one might speak of a new
period of international dialogue.¹³⁹ But with Childs, as H.-J. Kraus’ 1982 appeal to his col-
leagues to pay heed to developments in the English-speaking world anticipates,¹⁴⁰ the case can
be made that German-speaking biblical scholars were for once beholden to North America.
So it happened that the editors of a ﬂedgling Jahrbuch für Biblische eologie dedicated an
entire volume to the topic of canon in 1988, to apprise its readership of developments abroad.
Introducing the volume, G. Stemberger and I. Baldermann explain: “Wir nehmen die im
deutschsprachigen Raum kontrovers geführte Diskussion zum Anlaß, unsere Leser auch mit
der Diskussion dieses Problems in den USA vertraut zu machen. Sie hat sich dort insbeson-
136. Levin, AT, 24, my emphasis.
137. Ibid., 31, original emphasis.
138. Olbricht, 20th Century, 556.
139. Transatlantically, Rendtorﬀ has been an important ﬁgure. More recently and from the other side, Christine
Helmer’s eﬀorts deserve special mention. In addition to translations, a recent bilingual volume stands out:
Helmer and Petrey, eds., Interpretation. On canon, see also Helmer and Landmesser, eds., One or Many?.
140. See the introduction, above. Kraus is referenced in Rendtorﬀ, Bedeutung, 3 (= Canon and eology, 46).
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dere an den esen von Brevard S. Childs entzündet,” above all over his thesis “daß die Kanon-
bildung nicht eine späte kirchliche Setzung ist, sondern ‘a consciousness deep within the liter-
ature itself.’”¹⁴¹ In at least one area, then, the direction of inﬂuence reversed.
     
“As far as I can see, German-speaking discussion has yet to take up the theological
problem of the canon.”¹⁴² Rendtorﬀ ’s judgement—correct for the time being, in 1982 (the date
in the foreword)—was overtaken almost immediately, not least by his own work. e same
Introduction which contains this remark makes tentative steps toward its undoing, for as he
said in a guest lecture at Yale around the same time, in reading Childs’ Introduction “it was as
though the scales fell from my eyes.”¹⁴³ Rendtorﬀ is the ﬁrst to seriously advocate the new per-
spective of canonical hermeneutics in Germany.
From a later perspective one can appreciate just how formative his encounter with
IOTS was. In his farewell address at Heidelberg, delivered 19 July 1990, Rendtorﬀ reﬂects on
his four decades at the university since his arrival as von Rad’s ﬁrst doctoral student, in 1950.
Each decade has a corresponding focal point. In the 1950s “history” was the watchword. In the
1960s key historical hypotheses began to crumble, but Rendtorﬀ ’s attention had been pulled
elsewhere by—this is his language—a decisive encounter with Judaism. During the 1970s he
participated actively in the demolition of the old history-centric consensus, though in retro-
spect he views that “splendid era” with “a degree of nostalgic melancholy.”¹⁴⁴ e 1980s, ﬁnal-
ly, saw the importation of canon to Germany:
In the 1970s a debate had developed in the United States about the question of the Old
Testament canon. At ﬁrst it hardly attracted any notice in Germany. I myself came across it
in the ﬁnal phase of my work on an introduction to the Old Testament, to which I had at
last addressed myself. (It had already been planned in the 1960s but had continually fallen
victim to the circumstances and needs of the times.) e most important book in this de-
141. Baldermann et al., eds., Biblischen Kanons, 5.
142. Rendtorﬀ, Introduction, 291. I was unable to acquire a German copy (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener,
1983) for comparison.
143. Seitz, eological Interpretation, 84. Seitz remembers that Rendtorﬀ actually had Childs translate this
remark for the audience, to Childs’ own embarrassment.
144. Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 216.
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bate was Brevard Childs’s Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (1979), which
drew me inescapably into the discussion. I very soon had the impression that in method-
ological approach what this book oﬀered was not merely a variant of previous treatments
of the Bible; it was a genuine alternative.¹⁴⁵
ese four foci summarize well the shape of Rendtorﬀ ’s career. His early historical work is
transformed by a “decisive event: my encounter with Judaism.”¹⁴⁶ en, into a period of disso-
lution, came IOTS, which brought a new orientation to the theological problem of canon.
Rendtorﬀ ’s next remarks in the Heidelberg farewell problematize the relationship of these two
eye-opening insights, however. Canon must square with the hope for a common Jewish-
Christian theology. He explains, “I sometimes think that this could perhaps be the most
important task for the years remaining to me: to make a contribution to this discussion, and
to help free the Hebrew Bible from the captivity into which it was brought when it came to be
labeled merely a preliminary step, now superseded and overcome, on the way to the Christian
Bible.”¹⁴⁷ By the time he completes his canonical OT eology it is clear that canon, as per-
ceived in Childs’ work, is not quite compatible with the “discovery” of Judaism.¹⁴⁸
ree questions arise. How did Childs transform Rendtorﬀ ’s perspective initially?
What understanding of canon did Rendtorﬀ develop for his own enterprise? And why did this
eventually lead Rendtorﬀ to distance his vision of biblical theology from Childs’? I will
address the ﬁrst question immediately but hold back two and three for the next chapter.
e justly famous Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch begins with
a crystal-clear statement of its thesis. Wellhausen’s literary-critical method and Gunkel’s form-
critical, transmission-historical method, customarily supposed to be complements, are in fact
opposed from the outset. e former separates the sources that make up the Pentateuch. e
latter “takes its point of departure not from the ﬁnal form of the written text of the Penta-
145. Ibid., 217. e paragraph’s conclusion: “e debate about [canon] is now being vigorously pursued in the
United States, and among us in Germany too the contributions of people who have come alive to it are
increasing.”
146. Ibid., 116. For a sampling of early work see Rendtorﬀ, Gesammelte.
147. Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 218. Compare “Toward a Common Jewish-Christian Reading of the
Hebrew Bible,” 31–45 in the same collection.
148. “Discovery” is his word. “Das wichtigste theologische Ereignis der zweiten Häle dieses Jahrhunderts ist
die Entdeckung des Judentums für die christliche eologie” (Rendtorﬀ, Bibel Israels, 97).
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teuch, but from the smallest, originally independent, individual units, and traces the process
of their development right up to their ﬁnal written form.”¹⁴⁹ Von Rad and Noth undertake
major studies of the last stages of the process, with diﬀerent results; but while both agree that
the task is to analyze the entire course of the tradition, neither one has carried out the study in
practice. Gunkel on the other hand investigated the smallest “units” but neglected to trace
their incorporation into the entire Pentateuch. us Rendtorﬀ aims to “close the gap in the
study of the history of the origin and growth of the Pentateuch.”¹⁵⁰ He performs a “crosscheck”
of the reigning documentary hypothesis and ﬁnds grounds to reject it. If one starts where
Gunkel does and then traces the growth of the tradition from small units all the way through
to the ﬁnal form, “one does not encounter the ‘sources’ in the sense of the documentary
hypothesis.”¹⁵¹ Literary-critical analysis as such is still valid, even necessary, but the result it
was believed to have won stands no longer.
Given the way Wellhausen’s method is measured against Gunkel’s, it comes as some-
thing of a surprise that Rendtorﬀ ’s Introduction calls for a fresh analysis that starts with the
“texts themselves.” True, oﬃcially it still “follows the approach founded by Hermann
Gunkel.”¹⁵² But a new emphasis on the ﬁnal form surfaces occasionally which, just a few years
prior, is simply nowhere to be found. Sometimes it looks as if Rendtorﬀ ’s aspiration is still to
write a history of the tradition.¹⁵³ Elsewhere, with nods to Childs, he notes that the Bible has
functioned authoritatively in its received form, as a canon. He lodges a complaint that “the
ﬁnal form of the individual books as they now are, and of the Old Testament as a whole, are
hardly taken into account.”¹⁵⁴ ere is also an acknowledgment that a theological understand-
ing of canon is not entirely congruent with tradition-history as typically practiced: “opposi-
149. Rendtorﬀ, Transmission, 11 = ügP, 1.
150. Ibid., 32 = ügP, 19.
151. Ibid., 179 = ügP, 148.
152. Rendtorﬀ, Introduction, ix. See chapter four, below.
153. Ibid., 80: “e exegete must now be concerned to trace developments from the beginning of the formation
of the tradition to the ﬁnal form of the text as we have it today.”
154. Ibid., 129.
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tion” with a canonical approach “could and must” be overcome.¹⁵⁵ at various perspectives
are to be held together can be seen in the very structure of the book. Part one canvases the his-
tory of Israel (the OT as a “source”), part two the Sitz im Leben of the OT literature, part three
the biblical books in their ﬁnal shape. A recognition is dawning, though, that goes beyond the
knowledge “that the form-critical approach is not enough to explain the origin of the books of
the Old Testament” (i.e., that material lost its connection with the traditional Sitzen in Israelite
society as it was theologically shaped).¹⁵⁶ In a clearer formulation a decade later: canon
“means ﬁrst of all a change of direction in the line of sight.” Canonical interpretation centers “on
the text in its now existing form, the wider complexes take on greater importance”¹⁵⁷—as
opposed to the small original units (Gunkel), or to all detectable phases from the tradition’s
beginning to its end (Rendtorﬀ in 1977).
at said, it is not hard to see why IOTS so immediately struck a chord. A few remarks
near the end of Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem point to the study’s theological impli-
cations. Rendtorﬀ concludes “that clearly deﬁned theological intentions were at work in the
arrangement of these larger units.” Moreover, “the theological intentions of the preliminary
stages of the Pentateuch as a whole are most clearly grasped in these larger units.”¹⁵⁸ ere are
successive layers of intentionality, so one would probably want to speak of theologies in the
plural. Yet a late layer is uncovered that intends to transmit the Pentateuch as a single, intact
unit. A “deuteronomically stamped layer of reworking is the ﬁrst and, according to our exam-
ination so far, the only one which unambiguously views the Pentateuch as a whole and will
have it understood as one great coherent complex.”¹⁵⁹ An intentionalist hermeneutic, in other
words, is compelled to reckon with the Pentateuch as a whole at some point. In a sense, then,
the step to Rendtorﬀ ’s position aer IOTS is not enormous. His Introduction’s ﬁnal chapter, on
155. Ibid., 130.
156. Ibid., 127, and see all of Section 7 there.
157. Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 143, my emphasis; cf. 27–28.
158. Rendtorﬀ, Transmission, 189 = ügP, 157–158.
159. Ibid., 196 = ügP, 164; original emphasis. Rendtorﬀ is unwilling to state whether this deuteronomic layer is
responsible for the basic shape of the Pentateuch or is a reworking of a received unit.
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canon, summarizes: “One of the most important insights here is that the shaping of the bibli-
cal books in their present form is usually not the result of chance or of thoughtless and
uncomprehending redaction, as was oen supposed by earlier historical-critical exegesis, but
that quite deliberate forces of shaping were at work which were oen guided by a speciﬁc and
oen very pointed theological purpose.”¹⁶⁰ Pages earlier Childs is commended in the strongest
terms for stressing this point in conjunction with the further point that the canonical form of
the books “have become the normative basis of the religious life of the Jewish—and later also
the Christian—community.” (Rendtorﬀ ’s phrasing is notable in light of the distance he will
later put between himself and Childs.) In short, Childs’ “demand” in IOTS entails an adjust-
ment across the entire ﬁeld: “e ﬁnal form of the Old Testament books and the theological
intentions expressed in them must be taken seriously in quite a diﬀerent way from what has so
far been the norm in Old Testament scholarship.”¹⁶¹ is judgment reaches even to Rend-
torﬀ ’s earlier views in 1977.
We will pick up other aspects of Rendtorﬀ ’s contribution to canonical theology in
chapter two. e point for now is simply that IOTS catches Rendtorﬀ ’s attention in a major
way in the early 1980s and thus he represents Childs’ ﬁrst signiﬁcant inroad in Germany.
 :     
Excluding reviews of IOTS by the likes of Smend and Zimmerli,¹⁶² Manfred Oeming
attempted the ﬁrst account of Childs’ hermeneutics from within the German-language context
as part of his Bonn dissertation, ﬁrst published in 1985 with the title Gesamtbiblische eolo-
gien der Gegenwart: Das Verhältnis von AT und NT in der hermeneutischen Diskussion seit Ger-
hard von Rad. An epilogue to the second edition (1987) adds a cautionary note on the chal-
lenge of reading scholarship across national and linguistic borders, which in Oeming’s case
applies above all to Childs. “Wer sich mit ausländischen Beiträgen beschäigt, muß in seiner
160. Rendtorﬀ, Introduction, 290.
161. Ibid., 129–130.
162. Smend, Questions and Zimmerli, Rez. Childs.
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Beurteilung sehr vorsichtig sein, da er die Kontexte häuﬁg nicht gut genug überblickt, in
denen diese Arbeiten stehen.”¹⁶³ He (rightly) proceeds to make judgments as best he can
despite this hurdle, but his conclusion about Childs is incautiously sharp.
Oeming relies heavily on the review volumes of 1980, and his critique mostly just
rehearses the English-language discussion of Childs up to that point.¹⁶⁴ He tells the familiar
story of a turn from history to dogmatism, which amounts to a dereliction of duty.
Aus der Sorge um die theologische Verantwortung der historischen Exegese und dem Ver-
such, die historische Kritik gleichsam von innen her zu heilen, wird mehr und mehr eine
Geringschätzung der historischen Arbeit. Gleichzeitig nimmt der Dogmatismus zu, mit
dem der Kanon als die Lösung aller gegenwärtigen Probleme behauptet wird… Es handelt
sich bei der zweiten Phase des canonical approach um eine dogmatische Flucht aus den
Schwierigkeiten des historischen Geschäs in einen in seiner Bedeutung maßlos über-
schätzten positiven Kanon.¹⁶⁵
Further, one hears that Childs has inadvertently given arch-conservatives and fundamentalists
an alibi, that “canon” is being used in far too many diﬀerent senses to be useful, that as a solu-
tion to all problems an appeal to the ﬁnal form is too simple, and that “canonical intentionali-
ty” is a “mystic phrase” (so Barr). Oeming also has doubts about how well-suited a canonical
approach is to the contemporary, pluralist world. Here he ventures one of his least careful
judgments, against Childs’ prioritization of the MT as the vehicle to Jewish scripture: at the
root of this, he thinks, could be “einer gut amerikanischen Hochschätzung des Positivismus.
Nur was man Schwarz auf Weiß in Händen hält, der empirisch vorliegende Endtext, ist von
sicherem Wert…”¹⁶⁶ Childs’ response to the whole account is therefore not surprising: “Mein-
er Meinung nach verfehlt M. Oemings jüngste Analyse meines kanonischen Zuganges …
völlig den Sinn meiner Darlegungen.”¹⁶⁷
163. Oeming, Gesamtbiblische, 269.
164. Cf. HBT 2 and JSOT 16. Holy Scripture is not cited in Oeming’s ﬁrst two editions, but Barr’s 1980 review,
and Smend’s and Knight’s which have some similarities, set the tone. Smart, Biblical eology also features
in the discussion.
165. Oeming, Gesamtbiblische, 195–196 (= ³204–205), my emphasis. e phrase with “dogmatische Flucht” is
repeated in closing (209 = ³216) and is picked up by others (e.g., Barr, Concept, 505 and especially Brunert,
Psalm 102, 72, on which see chapter seven).
166. Oeming, Gesamtbiblische, 208 (= ³215). Oeming fails to appreciate what “vehicle” suggests for the MT; the
Hebrew text preserved by a Jewish community is a starting point, not a destination in the name of
positivism. See IOTS, 97.
167. Childs, Endform, 248n6.
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On the other hand, Oeming and his wife Christiane translated BTONT into German
shortly aer it appeared in English.¹⁶⁸ M. Oeming has invested further research into the prob-
lem of the Christian Bible’s unity despite its two parts, too. Yet a third edition of Oeming’s dis-
sertation (Das AT als Teil?, 2001), which is accompanied by later essays, merely updates refer-
ences in some footnotes and is otherwise identical to the initial account of Childs’ approach. A
few newer presentations of canonical hermeneutics, including Noble’s, are listed in an expand-
ed bibliography, but neither these, nor Childs’ own mature statements in BTONT, have been
integrated into the discussion. Regrettably, a dated account plagued by the misunderstandings
of Childs which came of age in the 1980s has been freshly bound and propagated.
     
A competent and recent survey of German discussions of Kanonhermeneutik makes it
unnecessary to provide another here. Barthel (2007) frames his topic this way:
“Kanonhermeneutik … ist die Reﬂexion der besonderen Verstehensbedingungen und -prob-
leme, die dadurch gegeben sind, daß die biblischen Schrien die Gestalt und Funktion eines
Kanons, d.h. einer (relativ) abgeschlossenen Schriensammlung mit normativer und / oder
formativer Funktion für die Glaubensgemeinscha(en), haben.”¹⁶⁹ at the author can deﬁne
a ﬁeld of shared interest this way suggests developments rather diﬀerent to those in the Eng-
lish-speaking world, and indeed, he indicates that Childs rather than Sanders has le a bigger
impression in the German reception of American studies of canon.¹⁷⁰ ough there are of
course dissenting voices in German, a signiﬁcant trend to emphasize the constructive exegeti-
cal and theological implications of canon surfaces in a debate alive to concerns which appear
more marginal in the English-speaking world. It is also noteworthy that Barthel numbers
168. Childs, Einen Bibel (1994, 1996), n.b. the foreword in 2:9–12. Most of the work would have been
undertaken while M. Oeming taught at the University of Osnabrück. Others there at some time or other
had more minor involvement in the project: G. Steins translated the chapter on Genesis 22 as a sample for
the publisher, and C. Dohmen provided the foreword to the ﬁrst volume.
169. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte, 5. In the same volume cf. esp. Janowski, Kontrastive Einheit. I
discuss one problems with Barthel’s taxonomy at the end of chapter four.
170. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte, 11. In contrast, Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 36 senses that
Sanders quickly became the theological spokesperson for most in the English-speaking debate.
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among the few anywhere who recognize the advantage to Childs in pursuing a canonical
approach rather than a criticism or a method, and that his broad deﬁnition of canon actually
serves him at precisely this point.¹⁷¹
Less well documented is the way Childs gained an audience in Europe just as interest
in his research was cooling in Britain and North America. IOTS received the attention of no
less that two review volumes in English in 1980.¹⁷² By comparison BTONT was almost not
reviewed at all (undoubtedly the most substantial response came oﬀ Rendtorﬀ ’s desk).¹⁷³ en
in a 2002 volume containing about thirty essays under the title e Canon Debate, Childs’
position went almost completely unrepresented.¹⁷⁴ Astonishingly, that tome’s introduction
asks, “With such a long delay in the church’s use of the term ‘canon’ to describe a closed body
of Christian scriptures, one may well ask why there was an emergence of ‘canon conscious-
ness’ in the church of the fourth century C.E. and little evidence of it before?”¹⁷⁵ It is as if the
authors are unaware of what by that point had almost become a truism in the German litera-
ture, picking up on an argument made by Childs in the ﬁrst instance and preeminently in
IOTS, that a consciousness of canon lay deep within the formation of the literature.¹⁷⁶ Instead,
most contributors share the will to impose a moratorium on all talk of “canon” in the biblical
period, because of the term’s anachronism. In stark contrast, a 2007 collection of more than
twenty essays on canon, Der Bibelkanon in der Bibelauslegung: Methodenreﬂexionen und
Beispielexegesen, does not once defend the Sanders/McDonald position.¹⁷⁷
171. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte, 10, 14.
172. JSOT 16 and HBT 2.
173. Most were only a few pages in length. ree exceptions in English are Brueggemann, Against the Stream,
Bauckham, Biblical eology and Seitz, Not Prophets. Cf. Rendtorﬀ, Rezension Childs, the reply in Childs,
Witness to Christ? and also my discussion in chapter six.
174. e editors explain that minority voices were invited but could not participate (McDonald and Sanders,
eds., Canon Debate, 17), but their title remains sadly ironic.
175. Ibid., 13, my emphasis. Childs borrows Kanonbewußtsein from I. L. Seeligmann but is responsible for
bringing it into wider usage, especially in English. See chapter ﬁve.
176. See Dohmen and Oeming, Kanontheologie, 23, Janowski, Kontrastive Einheit, 45 (citing Steins, Kanonisch
Lesen, 53) and a host of other places, though contrast Frankemölle, Frühjudentum, 74–75.
177. Representatively, see Steins’ discussion in Ballhorn and Steins, eds., Bibelkanon, 114–117, as well as my
review of the collection, Driver, Review of Bibelkanon.
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So if 1980 is the high water mark of Childs’ reception in English, the tide in German
discussions was then only beginning to rise. roughout the 1980s Childs repeatedly wrote or
had translated pieces that only ever appeared in German, oentimes alongside other essays
exploring the value of canon from sympathetic perspectives. e ﬁrst was a short overview of
diﬀerences in biblical theology on the American scene (1981).¹⁷⁸ en there were two “catch
up” volumes, in 1987 and 1988, the latter of which included a report on the state of the ques-
tion in North America by P. D. Miller.¹⁷⁹ Both lead oﬀ with pieces by Childs. Another is
included in the important 1995 collection Eine Bibel—zwei Testamente, edited by C. Dohmen
and T. Söding. Slowly, Childs’ work began to exert a Wirkung on a slice of Continental biblical
scholarship, and with few exceptions the trend seems to have been the inverse of patterns in
Britain and Childs’ home country alike, even though canon questions stayed at the fore.
A number of those writing in German with an interest in the hermeneutics of canon
have internalized and perhaps extended some of Childs’ arguments—above all, that canoniza-
tion proper is not (wholly) an extrinsic imposition on the biblical literature—but subsequently
appear to have turned in new directions of their own. Dohmen, for instance, who was instru-
mental at Osnabrück for a time and was among the ﬁrst in Germany to read Childs in earnest,
now has an Exodus commentary (2004) with only a faintly discernible relation to Childs’ of
1974.¹⁸⁰ No doubt that is much as it should be. Or to take another example aﬃliated with
Osnabrück, Georg Steins has been particularly successful at galvanizing another generation of
interest in canon—a generation which did not need to work quite so hard to bring (a minority
voice in) the North American canon debate into German. Without wishing to detract from
this achievement, my ﬁrst purpose under the next heading will be to show how a pattern
178. Childs, Diﬀerenzen.
179. Q 167/4 and JB 3, in which note Miller, Amerikanischen Diskussion.
180. us far only Dohmen’s second volume is in print. Childs’ commentary is referenced occasionally, though
it may anticipate Dohmen’s more in its structure, its attention to Wirkungsgeschichte or its appreciate use of
Benno Jacob than in exegetical particulars. (Childs recounts how in 1964 he found a rare copy of Jacob’s
Exodus commentary in Jerusalem, secured a microﬁlm copy, and brought it back to Yale, where he used it
extensively in his own commentary of 1974—decades before Jacob’s was published in English translation
[1992] or its German original [1997]. See further Childs, Benno Jacob, and the section on Jacob in chapter
ﬁve, below.) Still, cf. Dohmen, Exodus 19–40, 87–88, 130, 214, 217, 347.
 . :    ’       
established at a handful of British institutions, that of reconstructing Childs’ allegedly incoher-
ent method, likewise made its way to Germany. Barthel terms it the “Methodisierung des
kanonhermeneutischen Ansatzes.”¹⁸¹ 
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Characteristically, reconstructions of canonical hermeneutics split over how to ﬁx
“canonical intentionality.” Barton and Brett make Childs into an anti-intentionalist, whereas
Noble contends that he would do better as an intentionalist. With Steins, the pendulum
swings back in the formalist direction of the ﬁrst two studies: Childs’ problematic intentional-
ism can be remedied with literary theory. Steins welcomes the fact that in the North American
discussion canon “ist also nicht ein primär historisch-deskriptiver Terminus, sondern wird
zur hermeneutischen Zentralkategorie,”¹⁸² but in outlining his distinctive canonical-intertextu-
al reading winds up arguing with the other reconstructors, against Childs, that it is hermeneu-
tically irresponsible to leave the matter of authorial intent open.¹⁸³
By 1999, the year in which Die “Bindung Isaaks” im Kanon (Gen 22): Grundlagen und
Programm einer kanonisch-intertextuellen Lektüre went to press, it was easy enough to defend
hermeneutical amendments to the canonical approach on Childs’ behalf from a consensus in
the English and German literature alike, namely, that no canonical method exists. Steins
begins with what may be the ﬁrst essay to spell out the implications of Barr in 1983 combined
with Barton in 1984: “ere is little if any methodological clarity concerning how one is to
study the Bible canonically.”¹⁸⁴ He then cites German literature to the same eﬀect. Some of the
most important input in the latter category comes from Norbert Lohﬁnk, whose title essay in
Eine Bibel—zwei Testamente suggests that the need to keep the Old Testament alongside the
181. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte, 15, cf. 24.
182. Steins, Bindung, 10. Cf. now Steins, Kanonisch Lesen and Steins, Anamnese.
183. Chapman, Reclaiming Inspiration, points out that restricting exegesis to authorial intent, as Noble does,
would “fully undermine Childs’s approach” (173). e same is true for the inverse move, here. In Childs’
approach both poles are needed.
184. Steins, Bindung, 11, Steins’ emphasis, citing Morgan, Madness?, 84.
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New “fordert, um verstanden zu werden, gesamtbiblische Intertextualität.”¹⁸⁵ Intertextuality is
lied up as a way of approaching the unity of a pluriform Bible.
Entstanden sind beide [Testamente] selbstverständlich aus vielen Büchern. Doch die Frage
ist, ob es dabei geblieben ist. Es gibt in beiden Büchergruppen eine bei allen Variationen
doch so stabile Anordnung und darüberhinaus so viele literarische Verstrebungen, daß
man mit mehr rechnen muß als nur einer Reihe von in sich selbständigen Büchern. Beide
Kanones bilden in sich geschlossene Sinngefüge. Das wird erst in unseren Jahren durch
die Forschung nachgewiesen, scheint aber schon genügend gesichert zu sein. Damit ents-
teht innerhalb der beiden Büchergruppen eine neue, intensivere Art von Intertextualität.
Das hat beträchtliche Folgen für den Sinn der einzelnen Bücher, ja der einzelnen Aussagen
in ihnen. Die Konsequenzen sind kaum schon gezogen.¹⁸⁶
Sound method is what the new talk of canon urgently requires,¹⁸⁷ and Steins’ Habilitation
attempts to tease out what consequences such a “neue, intensivere Art von Intertextualität”
could have for biblical interpretation. If not yet at the “gesamtbiblische” level, Steins’ use of
terminology from Lohﬁnk’s essay is clearly an appreciative expansion of it applied to an
important test case in the Pentateuch; so “konturierte Intertextualität” becomes a key phrase in
the proposed canonical intertextuality.¹⁸⁸ us some of Childs’ most sympathetic German
readers are persuaded about the unworkability or nonexistence of his so-called method.¹⁸⁹
Steins is careful enough to recognize that Childs declines to work out an exact method.
In words italicized as they are cited in Bindung, Childs says, “In the end, I would rather speak
of a new vision of the text rather than in terms of method.”¹⁹⁰ Like Noble and others, however,
Steins, who comments that this statement “verrät eine Ambivalenz; die ‘Vision’ beschreibt das
faszinierend Neue, aber auch das (noch) Schemenhae,”¹⁹¹ concludes prematurely that Childs’
185. Lohﬁnk, Eine Bibel, 75. Further conﬁrmation of this link is found in Steins, Bibelkanon, which begins with
a nod to Childs for putting canon on the agenda, but then quotes almost two full pages from Lohﬁnk’s
essay before sketching the proposed methodology in fourteen theses.
186. Lohﬁnk, Eine Bibel, 79.
187. Ibid., 80: “Die Entwicklung einer diﬀerenzierteren eorie wäre sowohl für den ‘systematischen’ (an
Sachfragen orientierten) als auch für den ‘exegetischen’ (Texte entlanggehenden) Teil der eologie
dringend erfordert.”
188. Ibid., 79; cited Steins, Bindung, 23, Steins’ italics, and cf. 232–233. Lohﬁnk, following Braulik, Bahnlesung,
favors a reform in the Catholic liturgy that (re)introduces a ﬁrst reading from the Torah before a second
OT reading outside the Pentateuch. Liturgy would thus commence with Torah, as in Jewish liturgy, and
culminate in Gospel, as in Christian liturgy.
189. Cf. also Dohmen’s remarks in Dohmen and Stemberger, Hermeneutik, 175.
190. NCTI, xvii.
191. Steins, Bindung, 12.
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approach, as such, is inadequate. Familiar concerns are raised about intentionality and unity
versus diversity, but on the whole a supposition reinforced by literature now in two languages
permits Steins to say that while Childs brokers insights about the hermeneutical value of
canon, his work must be leveraged with a suitable theory of canon before it will yield divi-
dends.¹⁹² In order to render the “apparitional,” Steins augments canon with Intertextualität, in
dialogue with M. Bakhtin and J. Kristeva, and Lektüre, with U. Eco and W. Iser. In this manner
Childs is once again reproved for unclear thinking about authorial intent. Steins ﬁnds him
stuck between a production-oriented and a reception-oriented approach. If canon stays in the
ﬁrst camp, how is it more than a mere shiing of emphasis within traditional historical-criti-
cal concerns? If in the second, how can the dynamic process of its reception ever truly get oﬀ
the ground? “Allein im zweiten Fall kommt der Kanon als normative Vorgabe für einen oﬀe-
nen Rezeptionsprozeß zur Geltung.”¹⁹³
But the tension is not so easily resolved, as Bindung itself demonstrates. Reception ori-
ented theory should make the best sense of what transpires in reading,¹⁹⁴ and even though
“das Maß des Gebens is nicht das Maß des Nehmens,”¹⁹⁵ it would still appear to align with the
production of the biblical text, on Steins’ understanding, since in redactional activity “der
Fokus nicht die Vergangenheit, sondern die Gegenwart und die Öﬀnung für zukünige
Rezeption ist.”¹⁹⁶ Accordingly, Steins’ method has two initial steps. First, identify and describe
the presence/attendance (“Anwesenheit”) of each hypotext (e.g., Gen. 12, 21; Ex. 19-24; Dt. 8;
Lv. 8f/Ex. 29; Dt. 12; Ex. 3-4) in the hypertext (Gen 22). Second, assess how the hypotexts illu-
minate the meaning of the hypertext.¹⁹⁷ Yet Steins limits the text-text links permitted in a
competent reading of Gen 22 in revealing ways. To begin with, he constrains hypotexts to the
192. is reconstructive maneuver lies at the heart of the proposed canonical-intertextual reading: ibid., 2, 11,
16, 27–31, 36, 73–75, 130–132.
193. Ibid., 27.
194. Ibid., 45–83. See also Steins, Bibelkanon, 188.
195. H. Blummenberg’s aphorism, cited Steins, Bindung, 215.
196. Steins, Bibelkanon, 192.
197. Steins, Bindung, 100. On 233 Steins suggests a third step: “Frage nach der Sinnkomplexion für den
Hypertext.” is involves Lohﬁnk’s contoured intertextuality, seemingly a kind of canonical tectonics in
which geographic plates or zones contextualize intertextuality. Cf. 102.
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Pentateuch.¹⁹⁸ Beyond that, abstract thematic links are also excluded. For example, Jon Leven-
son’s discussion of child sacriﬁce in connection with Ex. 22:28b is disallowed because it lacks
“lexematische Übereinstimmungen” with Genesis 22.¹⁹⁹ As a rule, unless explicit parallels can
be found, candidates for thematic intertextual Anwesenheit in the hypertext are rejected.²⁰⁰
eoretical considerations push Steins to forego problems of authorship and diachron-
ic textual dependencies, and yet they seem to reenter through a back door. Aer carefully
delimiting intertextual constellations surrounding the Akedah, Steins ponders how his results
interface with text-genetic concerns. “Von einer kanonisch-intertextuellen Lektüre eines
Textes, wie sie im vorangehenden Abschnitt in acht Einzelstudien dargelegt wurde, führt kein
direkter Weg zu Einsichten in die Genese des Textes.”²⁰¹ But then it may still be possible to
detect something of the intertextualizing of the author in the intertextualizing of the reader.
Steins writes:
Am plausibelsten lassen sich meines Erachtens die in den kanonisch-intertextuellen Lek-
türen entdeckten Übereinstimmungen damit erklären, daß der Autor von Gen 22 bewußt
auf diese Texte angespielt hat. Die aufgewiesenen Text-Text-Relationen sind, zumindest
größtenteils, auch vom Autor intendierte Relationen. Gen 22 ist geradezu ein Paradebeis-
peil für einen intertextuell arbeitenden Autor, der seinen Text gewissermaßen herausent-
wickelt aus einem schon groß ausgebauten Pentateuch.²⁰²
Although Steins aims to be more consistent than Childs by stepping fully into a reception ori-
ented process, he may not be quite so fully in this arena as he supposes.
en again, Steins’ reconstruction of canonical method is the only one to which Childs
troubled to respond. Childs begins by aﬃrming some points of agreement, and though he
goes on to push back on a number of other issues, ultimately deciding that Bindung lacks a
198. Space is a constraint (ibid., 134), yet little direction is given about how one extend the Akedah’s
intertextuality beyond the Pentateuch.
199. Ibid., 184; cf. Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 142.
200. Cf. the heavy qualiﬁcations on Gen. 21’s Anwesenheit in Gen. 22, Steins, Bindung, 147–163, esp. 162. A few
thematic links do sound through (210), but the restrictions tend to undermine expansive claims made in
theory, e.g.: “Im Auau stets neuer Text-Text-Relationen wird der Hypertext immer wieder neu unter
dem Einﬂuß der verschiedener Hypotexte beleuchtet” (226).
201. Ibid., 214. If one only permits text-links that an author introduced, one ceases to be a reader and becomes
instead a “Quellenforscher” (215).
202. Ibid., 217, my emphasis. Given the number of intertextual links, he deduces, Genesis 22 was probably one
of the last elements of the Pentateuch to be composed.
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theological corrective to its borrowing of theory—“how does the sacred canonical text of a
community of faith relate to Steins’ general theory of reception?”²⁰³—he seems to have taken
this treatment more seriously than the previous four. (ere are good indications that Steins
has worked to sharpen his proposals in light of Childs’ criticism, too, even though he remains
committed to the need for canon-hermeneutical method. A re-description of canonical-inter-
textual reading as anamnesis, reminiscent of lectio divina, aims to clarify the function of read-
ing in a community of faith.²⁰⁴) Even more signiﬁcantly, there may be a second wave of inter-
est in canon in the German-speaking world, one which is increasingly preoccupied with the
controversies surrounding methodology. Steins’ programmatic work is cited in well over half
of the score of essays in the recent volume Bibelkanon, and it begins to look like a harbinger of
another generation of hermeneutical reﬂection on and exegetical application of insights deriv-
ing from canon.²⁰⁵
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What is at stake in authorial intent for Childs? On numerous occasions he has been
told to discard the notion, but he has not done so. Resisting the suggestion in Bindung, Childs
writes, “When Steins’ theory of intertextuality eliminates the privileged status of the canonical
context and removes all hermeneutical value from any form of authorial intent, an interpretive
style emerges that runs directly contrary to the function of an authoritative canon which con-
tinues to serve a confessing community of faith and practice.”²⁰⁶ But then neither can Childs
take the thoroughgoing intentionalist advice of Paul Noble. Canonical intentionality includes
the concept of canonical loosening, by which biblical texts are sometimes intentionally re-
addressed to wider audiences and future generations. Hosea is a good example.²⁰⁷ Future gen-
203. Childs, Critique, 176.
204. Steins, Anamnese, 129: “einer kanonisch-intertextuellen Lektüre wäre missverstanden, wenn es als Spielart
einer werkimmanenten oder holistischen Auslegung begriﬀen würde.” I will nonetheless contrast Steins’
emphasis on text-text relations with Childs’ prioritization of text-res relations in chapter three.
205. See Driver, Review of Bibelkanon.
206. Childs, Critique, 177.
207. Pronouncements in the North are enlarged to include Judah (Hosea 6:11), and the marriage to Gomer is
rendered metaphorically so as to be applicable to a future generation (Hosea 4:15, 12:11). “But a
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erations of the faith are right to read Hosea’s prophecy in light of the present. e biblical text
is time conditioned, but it is not intended to be a prisoner of the past.
Eventually Childs is happy to refer to the text’s in-built actualizing dynamic as a form
of “intertextuality” or “ﬁguration”—the language is sometimes interchanged—but not if the
historic dimension of canonical shaping is obliterated.
e role of intertextuality served as a means by which the coherence of the developing
canonical corpus was sustained. By intentionally signaling a linguistic aﬃnity between the
past, present, and future, a substantive coherence was developed. is shaping of the text
by the community was deemed constitutive for its authority. Of course, once the canonical
corpus reached its relative stability, the text as religious Scripture continued to generate
new intertextual relationships, but the distinction between text and ﬁguration was main-
tained, at least in principle.²⁰⁸
Perhaps the best way to identify this bedrock intentionality is as the sensus literalis. According
to Childs, “both synagogue and church assigned a unique value to the text’s plain or literal
sense. Implicit thereby was the concern to maintain some form of authorial intent” (he quali-
ﬁes that this “is not an apology for authorial historicity, but for the hermeneutical signiﬁcance
of the designated writer”). us “Torah was assigned to Moses; the Gospel in its four-fold
form to designated Evangelists. Figurative meanings were not rejected, but subordinated to
the literal sense.”²⁰⁹ e canonical approach cannot be reduced to a Schleiermacherian quest
for the mind of biblical authors, but nor does it discard all forms of intentionality. e recon-
textualization of individual traditions into a larger corporate tradition introduces meaning
that, strictly speaking, may not have been intended at every step along the way. Yet the trans-
formation of meaning that occurred as the canon approached its ﬁnal form did not wholly
sublimate text into meta-text, or letter into spirit.
Whatever force drives the process of canon formation is the same one that makes itself
felt on modern hermeneuts. If things work as they should, this literal/textual/authorial
pressure alters the conceptualities which readers inevitably bring to bear on the text. eory
generation later, to a diﬀerent people and situation, Hosea’s realistic language was understood
metaphorically” (IOTS, 379).
208. Childs, Critique, 177.
209. Ibid., 177.
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has enriched biblical interpretation in the past, but it needs a “theological corrective” from the
received text. omas Aquinas is a good example, as Childs explains in BTONT:
It is unlikely that any modern biblical scholar would be tempted to imitate omas’ appro-
priation of Aristotle. Yet the basic hermeneutical issue at stake turns on the fact that no
modern biblical theologian can function without some other conceptual framework.
Much of the modern search for the recovery of only internal biblical categories has been
extremely naive. Rather the crucial hermeneutical issue turns on how well one can hear
and understand the biblical witness even through the time-conditioned human categories
which each interpreter has inherited or adopted. A study of omas is invaluable in seeing
to what extent the author was able to adjust his philosophical perspective to the uniquely
biblical message and in the process, cause his own alien categories actually to serve toward
the illumination of the biblical text.²¹⁰
As he puts it in 2003, adderssing Steins, in cases like omas’ “new theories were constantly
being altered and radically transformed in the light of the powerful theological coercion exert-
ed from the biblical text itself.”²¹¹ Or so goes Childs’ theory of theory.
Many will remain unsatisﬁed with Childs’ handling of theoretical problems. Reviewers
of Struggle oen judge the chapter on postmodern interpretation to be a disappointment
(rightly in my view), and the critique of canonical intertextuality (against Moberly and Frei as
well as Steins) will raise the eyebrows of anyone who has dabbled in literary theory. Does this
weakness detract from Childs’ many other hermeneutical, biblical theological reﬂections?
Probably yes, but then again perhaps not very much. e task of holding on to a form of intent
while yet recognizing that texts acquire new signiﬁcance as they cross contexts requires a good
measure of subtlety already. ere may be ways of negotiating the diﬃculties associated with
the Bible’s authorship and reception without having a highly technical theory of reading. Nor
is methodological reﬁnement a self-suﬃcient good—Childs would not have been well-served
by a hermeneutic that was overly raﬃniert. And amongst those with an interest in writing a
theology of the entire Christian Bible, there is wide agreement that the project, if it is not
impossible, demands a pretty exacting set of special considerations.
210. BTONT, 41–42.
211. Childs, Critique, 175.
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C      
(     
  )
e term “biblical theology” can be used in a wide variety of diﬀerent ways… Barr
distinguishes between biblical theology and other theologies, such as “doctrinal” or
“philosophical theology” … but if a theology is meant that comprises both the Old and
New Testaments, Barr likes to speak of “pan-biblical theology,” with which he picks up
on the title of Oeming’s book (1985). In German discussion, however, the term Biblische
eologie is used primarily in precisely this sense as theology of the whole Bible.
—Rolf Rendtorﬀ 
On the narrow topic of text criticism Childs once expressed his hope to reviewers of IOTS
that “discussion would take seriously the full force of the canonical argument which has been
mounted rather than simply to assume the validity of the older critical model in which we
have all been trained.”¹ Barr took the latter part of this statement as emblematic of Childs’ atti-
tude to historical-critical method more generally, and he objected. Childs “must speak for
himself… I would not say that I was so ‘trained.’ What many or most of my generation were
trained in was the atmosphere of the biblical theology movement, which Childs has described
and analysed so well.”² Once again Barr’s remarks tell us as much about Barr as they do about
Childs. Here too they raise a question about what diﬀerence it might make where a scholar
was trained. Can that really matter?
Childs of course trained at Basel and Heidelberg under a generation of Old Testament
scholars who capitalized theologically on tradition-historical research. Later he strove to over-
come limitations he eventually perceived in their work, appreciating their theological
brilliance while criticizing the method to which their theology had been fused. Childs’ per-
spective changed aer his return to America, and his work since at least 1970 aims to be at
1. Childs, Response to Reviewers, 59, cf. IOTS, 84–106.
2. Barr, Holy Scripture, 130.
once a critique and an extension of the insight of his teachers.³ e Glasgow-born Barr, on the
other hand, took a ﬁrst degree in classics at the University of Edinburgh (his studies were
delayed by service as a pilot in the Royal Navy) and then a B.D. in the Old Testament in 1951.
Ordained in the Church of Scotland, he ministered for two years in Tiberias, Israel, before
taking an academic post in the New Testament at Presbyterian College, Montreal. He returned
to Edinburgh to become Professor of Old Testament there from 1955–1961. Subsequently he
taught at a number of other institutions, including at Oxford from 1976–1989. Barr is less
forthcoming than Childs about who his mentors were. e case will be made that one forma-
tive inﬂuence on Barr was his Edinburgh colleague T. F. Torrance, Professor of Church Histo-
ry from 1950–1952 and of Christian Dogmatics from 1952–1979. Torrance, who among other
things worked to bring Karl Barth into English, had a strongly negative impact on Barr.
ese circumstances appear to aﬀect Barr’s understanding of Childs and perhaps to
account for one gap between English-language and German-language scholarship. As another
test case for the theme of chapter one, that the reception of an author’s work in another lan-
guage is a neglected aspect of biblical interpretation, we will look now at how Barr and Childs
understand biblical theology, and what their understandings of it have to do with conceptions
of the same in German literature. As the epigraph anticipates, the argument will be that Barr is
out of touch with a dominant current in the German discussion of biblical theology, and that
Childs is not. I do not for a moment suggest that Barr has no contact with German debates—
Barr’s Old and New (1966) was translated into German the next year, and Fundamentalism
(1977) within ﬁve years. Rather, my thesis will be that Barr misunderstands Childs in part
because he is not sensitive to the context out of which Childs’ biblical theological eﬀorts arise,
and that in contrast, Rendtorﬀ (among others) points to a home for Childs’ work. is chapter
3. “As a young student who had fallen under the spell of von Rad, I shared with many others the conviction
that his brilliant method held the key to a proper understanding of the OT… Yet [in the next generation]
much of the excitement which his early post-war lectures evoked had died… Slowly I began to realize that
what made von Rad’s work so illuminating was not his method as such, but the theological profundity of
von Rad himself. e same observation holds true for Wolﬀ and Zimmerli. I am convinced that no
amount of methodological reﬁnement will produce a quality of interpretation which that generation
achieved whose faith in the God of Israel was hammered out in the challenge to meet the Nazi threat
against the life of the church” (Childs, A Response [Mays], 208).
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makes a highly focused comparison of three large volumes, Childs’ Biblical eology (1992),
Barr’s Concept (1999) and Rendtorﬀ ’s Canonical Hebrew Bible (1998, 2001, ET 2005), all set
against a slightly wider discussion. e governing purpose, though, is to locate BTONT
internationally.
.   
From one perspective Childs’ BTONT is a pioneering book. Some have even gone so
far as to call it sui generis. Rendtorﬀ, despite disagreements on other fronts, can say, “Es gibt
bisher nur eine einzige wirklich ausgearbeitete ‘Biblische eologie,’ nämlich die 1992
erschienene von Brevard Childs.”⁴ e culmination of some twenty-two years’ labor on Childs’
part, BTONT is the ﬁrst answer to a call long sounded within the German-speaking academy.
Eichrodt set about his Old Testament eology with an awareness of a “unitive fact,” that
something “binds together indivisibly the two realms of the Old and New Testaments—diﬀer-
ent in externals though they may be.”⁵ For him a further step is required to examine the
“essential coherence” of Old and New.⁶ With still more clarity, von Rad appended these lines
to the end of the fourth edition of his eologie des AT:
[Es] zeichnet sich aber ein noch ferneres Ziel unseres Bemühens ab, nämlich das einer
‘Biblischen eologie,’ in der der Dualismus je einer sich eigensinnig abgrenzenden eo-
logie des Alten und des Neuen Testaments überwunden wäre. Wie sich eine solche bibli-
sche eologie dann darzustellen hätte, ist noch schwer vorstellbar. Es ist aber ermuti-
gend, daß sie heute immer lauter gefordert wird.⁷
Quoting part of this same passage, H.-J. Kraus concludes the second edition of his history of
critical research similarly, asking in 1969, “Wird ein Weg gefunden werden, auf dem die Spal-
tung überwunden werden kann? Das ist jetzt die Frage.”⁸ Writing a little later still, H. G.
Reventlow is less optimistic. “A ‘biblical theology’ has yet to be written. e way towards it is
4. Rendtorﬀ, Bibel Israels, 102.
5. Eichrodt, eology 1:26.
6. Ibid., 1:31.
7. Von Rad, eologie, ⁴2:447. See below for a discussion of text-critical issues.
8. Kraus, Geschichte², 509.
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not only one of high hopes; it is also beset by a good deal of scepticism.”⁹ Yet as Rendtorﬀ so
neatly articulates, in 1992 Childs rendered statements like these “obsolete.”¹⁰
Yet Barr contests the notion that biblical theology should be a gesamtbiblische enter-
prise in the ﬁrst place. Again, despite a variety of diﬀerences, von Rad, Kraus, Reventlow, and
Rendtorﬀ agree with Childs at a very basic level: “Biblical eology is by deﬁnition theological
reﬂection on both the Old and New Testament.”¹¹ Barr, however, contests Childs’ deﬁnition on
the grounds that it does not “accord with most modern usage in English.”¹² He allows that the
phrase has tended to have a more restricted meaning in German usage, for what he prefers to
call “pan-biblical theology” (a phrase drawn from the title of Manfred Oeming’s Gesamtbiblis-
che eologien der Gegenwart).¹³ Deﬁning terms this way might have its place in an overview
of distinctively American or British views on biblical theology. But because Barr does not ade-
quately reckon with Childs’ international focus, his terminological restriction of biblical theol-
ogy to its English usage has serious consequences for his evaluation of BTONT.
To be sure, there are diﬀerences in German understandings. It is just that from the
outset, Barr’s analysis of the concept of biblical theology relativizes, and even inclines against,
the one context where Childs’ contribution most naturally ﬁts. Barr calls the closing paragraph
of von Rad’s second volume “pathetic,” supposing it to contain “words of apparent despera-
tion.”¹⁴ Which paragraph does he mean? D. M. G. Stalker’s translation (Edinburgh, 1962–
1965) has a text critical problem of some complexity here. Based on the second edition of von
Rad’s eologie des AT (Munich, 1957–1960), it adds a postscript that looks forward to—but
does not match—the updated fourth German edition (Munich, 1962–1965). Recensionally,
the translation is just slightly prior to the revision, and as others have observed, the fourth edi-
tion introduces substantial changes not reﬂected in the English. Although Stalker’s translation
9. Reventlow, Biblical eology, vii.
10. Rendtorﬀ, Bibel Israels, 102n25: Reventlow’s claim is “überholt.”
11. BTONT, 55.
12. Barr, Concept, 1, my emphasis; cf. 180. He appears to misjudge Rendtorﬀ somewhat on this count (444).
13. Ibid., 641n3, 497.
14. Ibid., 510, 427.
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includes a new postscript which von Rad must have supplied, and though a preface to the
translation anticipates the changes of the fourth edition (2:ix), the concluding lines of Stalker’s
edition (2:428–429) reﬂect a diﬀerent Vorlage than what I have quoted in German, above. Barr
responds to the English version, where the ﬁnal sentiment concerns the need to diﬀerentiate
biblical theology proper from mere history of Old Testament religion.¹⁵ He thus neglects
something that will become more central in the revision. Even so, the need for gesamtbibliche
theology is also emphasized at the end of the English version: “only when Old Testament the-
ology takes this ﬁnal step to the threshold of the New Testament, only when it makes the link
with the witness of the Gospels and the Apostles perfectly openly, and when it is able to make
men believe that the two Testaments belong together, will it have the right to term itself a the-
ological undertaking, and therefore ‘Biblical theology.’”¹⁶ Once again a project equal to
BTONT in scope and ambition is being called for and anticipated.
us Barr’s reading of von Rad mirrors his dismissive evaluation of Childs. Barr is as
well read in German OT scholarship as anyone in the Anglo-Saxon world, probably better
than most. He is aware that “writing a biblical theology” has a fairly technical meaning on the
Continent that is not always shared elsewhere. Yet he stands far enough outside that context
that a typical German usage of biblical theology is of minimal importance to him. By contrast,
the deﬁnition according to which BTONT is written is so naturally assumed by Rendtorﬀ that
he can say, “Es gibt bisher nur eine einzige wirklich ausgearbeitete ‘Biblische eologie.’” Not
only does Childs tend to inhabit a very diﬀerent scholarly context than Barr; Childs’ work has
been received diﬀerently on that basis. Rendtorﬀ accepts BTONT as a Biblical eology on its
own terms. James Barr does not. Again, Barr supposes that Childs’ work reveals a “failure to
converse with the past development of biblical theology itself.”¹⁷ But that all depends on how
one conceives of the development of biblical theology. Ironically, a move that was meant to
15. In addition to pages 510 and 427 in Concept, see especially 111. Cf. also Rendtorﬀ, Lohﬁnk, Barton,
Albertz and others in JB 10. e relationship between history of religions and the biblical witness has a
long and thorny history which extends back to Gunkel, as Werner Klatt illustrates. See his Klatt, Gunkel,
especially 77, 80, 189.
16. Von Rad, eology, 2:428–429 (Stalker’s translation).
17. Barr, Concept, 426.
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bring terminological clarity has obscured the degree to which Childs is dependent upon, and
responding to, a well-established tradition of what biblical theology is thought to mean.
e contrast between Barr and Childs can proﬁtably be taken a little further. Barr is
highly skeptical about the very possibility of “pan-biblical” theology. For him, “‘biblical theol-
ogy’ has clarity only when it is understood to mean theology as it existed or was thought or
believed within the time, languages and cultures of the Bible itself. Only so can its diﬀerence
from doctrinal theology, from later interpretation, and from later views about the Bible be
maintained.”¹⁸ “eology exists only in the minds of persons,” he continues, and establishing
the sequence and development of people’s theologies is an historical task.¹⁹ Barr grants that
texts can express theology, but only when they do so explicitly, and in this sense most of the
Bible does not itself contain theology.²⁰ Drawing out theological aspects of biblical texts is a
legitimate, perhaps a necessary, undertaking. But quite apart from whether it is advisable or
possible to seek out a holistic picture of the theology of the New or Old Testaments on their
own, it is simply inconceivable to expect a coherent presentation of the theology of the entire
Christian Bible. “When taken as wholes” the two individual testaments “are not congruent,
nor even closely analogical.” Hence Barr feels that between OT and NT scholarship is an
“intrinsic separateness”; he recommends “that this should be accepted, rather than that vast
amounts of further energy be poured into a task that has proved to be neither necessary nor
salutary.”²¹
Little wonder that Childs’ Biblical eology is “a fundamentally biblicistic illusion” on
Barr’s reading.²² e terminological relativization of “pan-biblical” theology has the eﬀect of
ruling Childs’ project out by deﬁnition. If this sort of thing were ever allowed, it would have to
fall under the domain of dogmatics, not biblical theology.²³ “us the striving of biblical the-
18. Ibid., 4, my emphasis.
19. Ibid., 214.
20. Ibid., 248, 251; cf. 226–227, 242, 244–252, 376. is could be one of the places “Barr momentarily deﬁnes
his subject out of existence” (Levenson, Negative, 59), though it depends on what Barr means by theology.
21. Barr, Concept, 186–187.
22. Ibid., 252. at Childs is in view is made explicit in the footnote, 668n21.
23. As Barr explains, it is not a question of whether theologians should take an interest in the Bible. Obviously
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ology to establish coherence and unity, even if it is viable up to the level of the entire Old Tes-
tament or the entire New Testament, involves essentially doctrinal questioning if it is to be car-
ried up to the level of the entire Bible, and the eﬀect of this is to put into question the
existence of biblical theology as an operation independent of doctrinal theology.”²⁴ In sum,
Barr has a pair of commitments that make it almost impossible for him to take BTONT seri-
ously. First is his commitment to the complete restriction of exegesis to what was thought by
individuals in biblical times. Second is his commitment to a strict separation of the discip-
lines—Old Testament from New Testament, exegesis from dogmatics, historical theology from
normative theology. Both relate to what Barr takes “theology” to be, and to why scripture has
only a very indirect bearing upon it.
Childs on the other hand pursues a holistic account: “Biblical eology is by deﬁnition
theological reﬂection on both the Old and New Testament.” e formation of the canon parti-
cipates in the function of the ﬁnal form. Canon proper is integral to the life of the church and,
mutatis mutandis, the synagogue. Modern critical disciplines illuminate aspects of how the
canon came together, how it functioned and continues to function as authoritative scripture.
Dogmaticians study the same subject matter, tackling related problems in parallel as their spe-
cialization allows, in a “division of labour.”²⁵ And biblical theology attends to the discrete wit-
nesses of the one Christian Bible such that the various canonical voices are not obscured:
e basic hermeneutical problem of the Bible, therefore, is not adequately formulated by
using the terminology of unity and diversity. e oneness of scripture’s scope is not a rival
to the multiple voices within the canon, but a constant pointer, much like a ship’s compass,
ﬁxing on a single goal, in spite of the many and various ways of God (Heb. 1.1), toward
which the believer is drawn… e recognition of the one scope of scripture, which is Jesus
they do. “e question is whether there is, or should be, a ‘biblical theology’ which seeks to bring together
the entire biblical witness, or large portions of it, as a sort of intermediate activity between normal exegesis
of individual texts and the regulative decision-making of doctrinal theology. at is quite a diﬀerent
question” (ibid., 242).
24. Ibid., 376, my emphasis.
25. BTONT, 370: “In terms of the aforementioned division of labour, those scholars trained in dogmatic
theology are oen better equipped to pursue in detail the nature of God’s being, especially in light of the
modern challenges to the biblical witness from various forms of philosophy. Yet is is an equally important
responsibility of Biblical eology to assure that the reﬂection on the being of God remains integrally
related to his redemptive action within human history for the sake of Israel, the church, and the world.”
On the same page Childs criticizes Barr’s essay on “e eological Case against Biblical eology,” which
appears in the ﬁrst FS for Childs.
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Christ, does not function to restrict the full range of the biblical voices. It does not abstract
the message, or seek to replace a coat of many colors with a seamless garment of grey.²⁶
As with von Rad on Childs’ reading, there is a christological center which focuses the unity. A
similar sentiment is found in Eichrodt as well: “at which binds together indivisibly the two
realms of the Old and New Testaments—diﬀerent in externals though they may be—is the irrup-
tion of the Kingship of God into this world and its establishment here. is is the unitive fact
because it rests on the action of one and the same God in each case.”²⁷ Disagreements
notwithstanding—and of course there are many—Childs shares with his teachers a commit-
ment to a christological core that uniﬁes biblical theology. It is a unity of the subject matter to
which study is directed, God in Christ, that makes reﬂection on the entire Christian Bible
essentially centripetal.
I will revisit some of these diﬀerences from another angle in chapter six. Meanwhile,
we can contrast the relationships Barr and Childs have to the work of Karl Barth.
  :   
Barr celebrates the idea that Karl Barth has no theory of biblical theology. Barth had
no need of it for the business of dogmatics, according to Barr, and positively rejected eﬀorts to
“induce the totality of the biblical witness.” Barr quotes the Church Dogmatics:
erefore a biblical theology can never consist in more than a series of attempted approxi-
mations, a collection of individual exegeses. ere can never be any question of a system
in the sense of Platonic, Aristotelian or Hegelian philosophy… How can we expound it ex-
cept by surrendering ourselves to the recollection…? Biblical theology (and self-evidently
dogmatics too) can consist only in an exercise in this surrender, not in an attempt to in-
duce the totality of the biblical witness.²⁸
Barr then quotes N. Wolterstorﬀ on Barth for support: “e unity of the Bible does not consist
in a uniﬁed theology or world-view. ere is … ‘no Christian view of things,’ ‘no biblical the-
26. BTONT, 725.
27. Eichrodt, eology, 1:26, original emphasis.
28. CD 1/2, 483–484, quoted in Concept, 244, and cf. 414. Would Barth thus reject dogmatics also? What is
elided in the penultimate sentence is also suspect. e full question reads, “How can we expound it except
by surrendering ourselves with them to the recollection, their recollection, and to the expectation, their
expectation?” is is actually a statement in favor of the unity of the two testaments in their witness to
Christ. One looks ahead, the other back.
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ology.’ e unity of the Bible consists—so Barth insists—in the unity of its content, in the fact
that all its parts point, in one way or another, to Jesus Christ.”²⁹ Barr’s conclusion is that these
lines prove Barth “clearly does not provide a basis for biblical theology.”³⁰ Dogmatics is some-
thing totally diﬀerent. Childs “upholds what he thinks to be Barth’s viewpoint” but is blind to
“Barth’s rejection of biblical theology as a mode of procedure.”³¹ Yet this is a dubious reading
of Barth and Childs alike. It is hard to imagine how Barr fails to see that concern for “the unity
of Holy Scripture” drives the entire section from which he quotes, where Barth states that bib-
lical “exposition is trustworthy to the extent that it not only expounds the text in front of it,
but implicitly at least expounds all the other texts, to the extent that it at any rate clears the way
for the exposition of all other texts.”³² us “the on the whole irreversible distinction between
the two witnesses is again completely relativised by the unity of its object.”³³ Obviously Childs
and Barth do not share identical agendas. But somehow Barr’s lengthy treatment of biblical
theology nowhere confronts the fact that for Eichrodt, for von Rad, for Childs, and indeed
also for Barth, the central reason for positing a unity between the testaments is christological.
is is a strange oversight. Furthermore, for these several gesamtbiblische eologien, contra
Barr, a strict separation between dogmatics and exegesis is therefore untenable. Any division
of labor arises from other exigencies.
It is not clear how much all this has to do with Barr’s “training,” or his formative inﬂu-
ences, but it seems likely that Barr’s time at Edinburgh le its stamp, and one cannot but won-
der how much his interaction with T. F. Torrance shaped his overwhelmingly negative view of
Barth.³⁴ Torrance is punished time and again in e Semantics of Biblical Language, as much
29. Divine Discourse, 68, quoted in Concept, 244.
30. Concept, 244–245.
31. Ibid., 245.
32. CD 1/2, 485, my emphasis.
33. CD 1/2, 482. Nearby one ﬁnds a clear analog to Childs: “When we have to do with Scripture, i.e., canonical
Scripture, the Scripture which the Church has deﬁned and we in and with the Church have recognised as
canonical, when we have to do with Holy Scripture as witness, in fact the witness of divine revelation, we
have to do with the witness of Moses and the prophets, the Evangelists and the apostles… e Old and the
New Testament both have as their distinctive feature to attest in the one case the Messiah who is to come,
and in the other the Messiah who has already come” (481).
34. I am told that T. F. Torrance’s brother, J. B. Torrance, led the young Barr to Christ at a bus stop (personal
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as or perhaps even more than T. Boman, J. Pedersen or N. H. Snaith, and yet he emerges there
as one about whom Barr had a change of heart. It is surprising to learn that Barr collaborated
with Torrance on the Church of Scotland’s special commission on baptism, which draed an
interim report (1955) that was corporately revised by Barr among others and forwarded to the
General Assembly (1958).³⁵ But by 1961 the interim report had become a parade example of
the abuses of linguistic evidence in theological argumentation.³⁶ In a footnote Barr distances
himself from the committee. “I myself was associated with the production of this document
… but would now disagree with much in its approach, which in my opinion does not suﬃ-
ciently depart from the methods of the Interim Report. is latter report contains numerous
examples of the kind of misinterpretation of language which is criticized in this book.”³⁷
Indeed, it is almost as if something happened behind the scenes of the Church of Scotland
commission that precipitated Barr’s devastating analysis.
What is more, Barr seems to imply that the ultimate blame lies at the feet of Karl
Barth,³⁸ with whom Torrance studied in Basel, and whose own pamphlet on baptism a decade
before (ET 1948) was undoubtedly part of the impetus for Torrance’s inquiry through the
Church of Scotland from 1953.³⁹ Yet in 1961 Barr reacts not so much to Barth’s well-known
study, but to Torrance’s reworking of it in Edinburgh, in and for the church in which Barr
himself is a minister. Only this personal dimension explains how a relatively minor in-house
report on baptism acquired such a high proﬁle in Semantics.
And yet Childs raises questions about Barr’s reading of Barth, as we will soon see. He
also raises questions about Torrance’s. “It is a little frightening when you see some of Barth’s
students trying his method and coming up with something else. Aer reading a few of Tor-
communication with Alan Torrance, 21 May 2008).
35. Torrance, Interim Report and see the introductory note in Torrance, Study Document.
36. Barr, Semantics, 5–6, 140–144, 262, 279. To this can be added a long list of Torrance’s missteps: 106, 120,
129–136, 149–156, 161, 171–175, 198, 204, 254, 259, 264, 277–279.
37. Ibid., 141.
38. Ibid., 156, 188, 277–279. Here Barr does not diﬀerentiate between Torrance and Barth, but rather posits a
close identiﬁcation.
39. Barth, Taufe (ET Barth, Baptism), cf. M. Barth, Sakrament?.
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rance’s exegeses, there were problems in Barth that I have never seen before.”⁴⁰ It is obviously
well beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the ways Barth has been brought into the English-
speaking world, but Childs suggests that distorting factors come into play once more. Childs
knew Torrance at Basel, but their friendship does not prevent him from drawing a critical dis-
tinction between Torrance and Barth.
e main point is that Barr’s treatment of biblical theology in Concept cuts him oﬀ
from an important aspect of the venture where it has most oen been taken up. For this rea-
son one should be suspicious of his claim that “Childs comes closer to the conservative
Barthian tradition which has been powerful in certain circles in the Anglo-Saxon world.”⁴¹
Very likely this is the Barthian tradition Barr knows best, and distrusts most, but it is certainly
not the tradition which mediated Barth to Childs. In Barr’s favor, Barth may not call himself a
“biblical theologian,” and there can be no doubt that the terminology is strictly speaking
anachronistic when applied to Calvin or Luther. But when Childs claims “Barth’s exegesis is an
exercise in Biblical eology,”⁴² or something similar for pre-critical exegetes, is he really just
“reading his own concepts into their minds,”⁴³ as Barr insists? To defend a reading of that sort,
one would ﬁrst want an accurate picture of Childs’ conception of biblical theology. And this
should probably include an account of Childs’ formative years on the Continent.
  :   
Much has been made of the link between Childs and Barth, not just by Barr. Too oen
this has been colored by a distaste for Barth, such that Childs becomes guilty by association.
e one extended study of Childs and Barth to date, by Charles Scalise, was never published,
40. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 35; cf. 32 concerning Barr on Barth.
41. Concept, 408–409.
42. BTONT, 589.
43. Concept, 414.
    
and unfortunately it is not as illuminating as it might have been.⁴⁴ Scalise does point to a
probable source for Childs’ idea that canon ≈ rule. Barth writes:
“Canon” means “rule,” i.e., the “rule of truth,” and most signiﬁcantly this conception was
originally connected with the dogma as well as the constitution of the texts which are rec-
ognized to be holy. e Church cannot “form” it, as historians have occasionally said with-
out being aware of the theological implications.⁴⁵
is important connection, which Childs begins to explore in Crisis, will occupy us more in
chapter six. Scalise also draws attention to a Yale colloquium on Barth convened in January
1969, a month aer Barth’s death. Childs contributed, as did Hans Frei. A recording of that
session was transcribed, and handful of hard copies were circulated.⁴⁶ Following Scalise, there
has been a tendency to treat Childs’ remarks more formally than the setting suggests, as
though they constitute a proper academic article. In fact his paper at the colloquium has a
conversational tone, and it brims with personal reminiscences of Childs’ student days. Given
the timing one could hardly expect otherwise.
Childs tells a simple narrative. He came to Basel to study Hebrew with Baumgartner,
not to hear Barth, although he and the other “Bible men” listened to Barth. ey formed a sort
of “Biblical phalanx” and sat in the back when he lectured: “we came well-equipped with our
Hebrew and Greek. And we would check his references and coach each other and sort of make
fun of Barth’s exegesis. Barth occasionally, when he got to the section, would look over at this
phalanx and say, ‘Not that I don’t know all about J, E, D, and P,’ and then would go on as if he
44. Scalise, eological Basis, argues that Childs’ canonical approach “is in large measure an extension of the
theological hermeneutics of Karl Barth. For Childs the historical critical meaning of Scripture is
subordinated to its theological meaning as discerned from the pattern of its theological shape. Childs’
theological strategy, like that of Barth, enables the recovery of continuity with precritical interpretation,
while incorporating the results of modern historical study” (197). ree main themes in common are:
emphasis on the Bible as witness; opposition to existentialist hermeneutics (Barth : Bultmann :: Childs :
Sanders); rejection of anthropocentric theology (122). Scalise’s thesis (for a more readily available
condensation see Scalise, Childs and Barth) is plausible, though it lacks insight and nuance. Very little
diﬀerentiation is made between Childs and Barth, for example—almost none whatsoever beyond what
Childs himself says about where he departs from Barth.
45. KD, I/2, 524; CD, I/2, 473. Cited ibid., 66 (cf. Scalise, eological Basis, 81; for an earlier discussion of
canon and the regula ﬁdei see KD, I/1, 103; CD, I/1, 113), though in fact Childs himself cites this passage
in CD with his ﬁrst use of the phrase “rule of faith” (Crisis, 105n7).
46. ere are copies at Yale and Princeton; none made it to public libraries in the United Kingdom, however.
My thanks go to Christopher Seitz for supplying me with a photocopy.
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couldn’t care less.”⁴⁷ Barth’s personal charisma, and his facility with languages, won no con-
verts from the Bible students, but he disrupted some of their prejudices about dogmatics as a
second-class ﬁeld. And yet, Childs says, “perhaps what I’m saying is a confession of the sins of
my youth. Because I do have a change of heart, for various reasons.”⁴⁸ Barth’s work is not per-
fect, but it survives. It has something still to teach.
For Childs, looking back, Barth’s work survives despite the fact that many supposed to
have been working in a Barthian way have become “hopelessly outdated.”⁴⁹ ere are still big
problems in Barth’s work, but somehow he never went in for things like Heilsgeschichte or the
Hebrew mentality, which made others vulnerable. Some of what Barth got right sounds
remarkably like a description of the canonical approach: “Barth always complained that one
could not get behind the text, that one could not come at Scripture from a context other than the
Canonical context as it had been received by the Church, that there was no neutral position from
which one could start and then somehow make a bridge from neutrality to commitment.”⁵⁰ Or:
“Barth allows you to read the text from diﬀerent contexts. It seems to me that he is always interest-
ed in diﬀerent ways of studying it. But he continues to insist that ultimately the context from
which theology has to be done is the context of Scripture—Old and New Testament—in the
Canonical context.”⁵¹ Barth’s exegesis may be suspicious. Sometimes it seems to be.
And yet it seems to me it’s the fact that Barth wants to go through the text, to the reality,
that the text becomes a transparency, that the walls that separate the Apostle from the
reader are dissolved, and one then begins to confront the reality itself—and for Barth there
can be no antiquarian interest. And that means that Barth has the tendency always to
move down, to move through, and talk about the transparency. Very soon one is wrestling
with the realities of Grace, and Judgment, and Nature and Grace—all the rest of these
things—and that remains a problem. It seems to me this may be somewhat of an overstate-
ment, but it is true that the kind of work he does is of such a diﬀerent genre that for one
who has been trained in the traditional critical way, it does seem that wherever Barth
starts, he ends up in these massive theological statements and most of us have trouble fol-
lowing him.⁵²
47. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 30.
48. Ibid., 31.
49. Ibid., 31. Childs names “Wright and Anderson and Rowley, or Richardson or Hunter or Cullmann and
Filson.”
50. Ibid., 32.
51. Ibid., 33.
52. Ibid., 33–34.
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Problems remain, yet to Childs in early 1969 it seems “we still have much to learn from this
word he leaves,” namely, “that dogmatics continues to be corrected by exegesis. So, exegete.”⁵³
Also noteworthy in the present discussion are a few oﬀ-hand remarks about Barr’s crit-
icisms of Barth. “James Barr’s recent book on interpretation Old and New says it’s one of the
most chilling things in the whole Dogmatics to read that Barth says in 1948, Perhaps a time
will one day come when dogmaticians will be able to depend on Biblical scholars. en he
says, Already we had Kittel, already we had Hoskyns on John. How could he possibly say
that?”⁵⁴ Childs does not go into criticism of Barr’s understanding of revelation, but he states,
“I wonder again whether Barr really understood what Barth was doing.”⁵⁵
Another factor with Childs and Barth is the work of Frei. is of course refracts Barth’s
thought in its own way,⁵⁶ but it is also no accident that Childs and Frei, colleagues at Yale for
so many years, have been connected in the literature. So far the most relevant primary source
has been entirely overlooked, however.
e Yale colloquium ended with a discussion period. e panelists speak oﬀ the cuﬀ,
and Childs’ and Frei’s remarks address several pivotal issues with delicious clarity. Frei
advances his idea of the biblical text as a narrative universe (in line with the later Barth, he
suggests), whereas Childs counters that the text needs to be read as a transparency. In church
history, perhaps in Barth, in exegesis today, Childs states, “I don’t see how you can avoid a
dialectic between text and reality, in some sort.”⁵⁷ (Frei’s Barth is hardly more Childs’ than
Torrance’s Barth is.) Yet at this early date, ﬁve years before Eclipse, still on the eve of Crisis,
what stands out most is the strong agreement between Childs and Frei on the problem of the
literal sense. In view of the long chain of disagreements between Childs and Barr, particularly
over the letter and the spirit (chapter six), part of the dialogue stands to be quoted at a little
53. Ibid., 35.
54. Ibid., 32. Childs paraphrases Barr, Old and New, 96n1 (which is citing KD, III/2, vii; CD, III/2, ix), cf. 12,
90–96, 102, 181–182.
55. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 34.
56. Two outstanding recent studies of Frei are: Dawson, Figural Reading and Higton, Public eology.
57. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 56. See chapter three.
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length. A student asks the panel whether it would be possible to access Barth’s genius in a
more exegetically controlled way. Childs speaks up ﬁrst.
CHILDS: Well it seems to me for the last twenty or thirty years people have been trying to
combine the orthodoxy of Barth with the historical-critical approach. It seems to me that
this enterprise has now come to an end and has proven unfruitful—that you are now at
the turn of the road, you have to go either right or le; that the type of move that said
Barth is right in seeing theological dimension, but now we have to take history more seri-
ously and bring in the whole baggage—I don’t think this can—
In other words, I’m suggesting that the problem is far deeper than this. It’s a problem that
certainly didn’t just arise with Barth. (And much of what I’ve learned about this has come
from talking with Hans Frei.) But it has oen bothered and puzzled me. You see, when you
read Calvin, he ﬁghts against the whole medieval tradition by saying it’s the sensus literalis
that counts—it’s the literal sense—and you have page aer page against the whole church
dogma. But then you read Calvin on the Old Testament, and here’s Jesus Christ and Jesus
Christ. How could it possibly be? And everybody just says that Calvin is just inconsistent.
It seems to me that this doesn’t at all touch the heart of the problem: that for Calvin, the
sensus literalis IS Jesus Christ. And it was only when you have the eighteenth century
identiﬁcation of the literal sense with the historical sense that you’re just hopelessly lost.
And it seems to me that it’s something along that line—that we’ve just been unable to un-
derstand what Barth is doing.
FREI: at’s right.
[Julian] HARTT: Would you mind repeating that?
CHILDS: It sounds better in German, though.
STUDENT: Is it something we can do today?⁵⁸
is is a pregnant exchange. Here in 1969 Childs sees that theological compromise with the
historical-critical approach is doomed (e.g., in the work of his teachers). He knows this partly
because of a contrast between traditional exegesis and modern critical exegesis which can be
captured in a sound-bite: for the Reformers, the literal sense of the Old Testament was Christ.
Frei’s explanation of the shi (“at’s right”)—in the Enlightenment the literal sense came to
be identiﬁed with the historical sense, and thus to exclude Christ—will soon be argued in
detail in the ﬁrst three chapters of Eclipse, but already Childs has bought into the thesis. at
the letter of the Old Testament should connect to Christ directly sounds counterintuitive
today, even to a trained professional (Hartt), and the challenge to see the forgotten relation-
ship will continue to animate Childs through the ﬁnal phases of his career. Although biblical
theology is not mentioned, one can easily extrapolate to Childs’ later mandate that a theology
58. Ibid., 52–53. Frei says “Sure” and then steers the conversation in another direction.
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of the entire Christian Bible must have a christological center (one place von Rad, Barth and
Childs all agree). Finally, while I could only guess at what exactly sounds better to Childs’ ear
in German, the cryptic addition highlights how deeply his thinking about such matters is
informed by wide reading in that language.
To sum up, from clues like these one gathers that Barr and Childs each had a change of
heart about Barth somewhere early in their academic careers but subsequent to their doctor-
ates at Edinburgh and Basel, respectively. eir turns are not quite mirror images. Barr sharply
rejected an ethos associated with Barth via T. F. Torrance at Edinburgh. is appears to have
transpired aer his student days, possibly during his ﬁrst appointment in Old Testament in
which time he served on a special Church of Scotland commission on baptism and completed
his discipline-transforming Semantics. Childs knew Barth ﬁrsthand at Basel but sat in his lec-
tures with a “Biblical phalanx” that disputed his exegesis. Back in America, however, having
experienced and studied the failure of the biblical theology movement, he reconsidered, con-
cluding that Barth, despite some lasting problems, kept an important traditional perspective
more or less intact—call it the necessary christological condition for biblical theology. Childs
also perceived that others who worked in Barth’s name were not nearly so immune to Barr’s
searching critique of 1961. Whether or not diﬀerences in training have anything to do with it,
geography does seem to have been a factor in the gap that opens up between Barr and Childs.
Suﬃce it to say that they have very diﬀerent Barths in mind when it comes to the unitive
scope of biblical exegesis, and that Barr’s has more to do with Torrance.
. ’ 
It was argued in chapter one that Rolf Rendtorﬀ changed his exegetical focus on the
process of transmission to a focus on the ﬁnal form because of an encounter with Childs’
IOTS—the book provoked a change of direction in the line of sight. I also suggested that
Rendtorﬀ ’s interest in Judaism, which stems from the 1960s, conﬂicts at some level with
Childs’ understanding of canon. at leaves two issues to address here. (1) What understand-
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ing of canon did Rendtorﬀ develop for own enterprise? And (2) why did this eventually lead
Rendtorﬀ to distance his vision of biblical theology from Childs’?
(1) Rendtorﬀ reads Childs against his own set of concerns, of course, the most evident
being his transformative discovery of Judaism. rough the 1980s, as he fashions canon into
his own paradigm, Rendtorﬀ looks for resources with which to develop the link between
canon and Judaism. In a paper delivered in Jerusalem in August 1981, Rendtorﬀ ’s critique of
the usual historical-critical procedure, his concern that Christian exegetes recover the Jewish
exegetical tradition, and “the extremely exciting discussion” sparked by Childs are all merely
juxtaposed.⁵⁹ Rendtorﬀ does not continue to draw on Childs’ thought much beyond this,
however. He looks instead to his esteemed teacher, Gerhard von Rad.
Rendtorﬀ ’s 1989 essay “Old Testament eology: Some Ideas for a New Approach”
illustrates the shi. A survey of models prior to von Rad reveals that OT eologies typically
follow outlines derived from dogmatic or systematic considerations. Von Rad’s eology, how-
ever, broke the trend. As von Rad puts it, “we must submit ourselves to the sequence of events
as the faith of Israel saw them.”⁶⁰ Von Rad begins with creation despite his view that it was
neither old nor the primary saving event in Israel’s history. us, according to Rendtorﬀ, “we
can talk about a ‘canon-related’ survey.” But as a signiﬁcant footnote explains, the scare quotes
around “canon-related” ﬂag “an anachronism inasmuch as the discussion about the theologi-
cal signiﬁcance of ‘the canon’ only started very much later, and since von Rad himself was not
thinking here about the ‘ﬁnal canonical form’ of the texts, as is the case in the most recent dis-
cussion.”⁶¹ Aer an initial reorientation, von Rad’s input displaces Childs’.
Rendtorﬀ ’s reasons for transferring his new-found interest in ﬁnal form exegesis to
von Rad, a ﬁgure who anticipates Childs’ canonical approach in a qualiﬁed way (chapter four),
can only be guessed at. Rendtorﬀ was a student of von Rad and will have appreciated how
much Childs learned from their teacher. In terms of the substance of his own convictions,
59. Rendtorﬀ, Rabbinic, 30 (= Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology,18).
60. Von Rad, eology, 1:120 (= ⁴1:134), cited in Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 9
61. Ibid., 9. He is forced explain why von Rad deviates from this template with the prophets (10).
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Rendtorﬀ in the 1980s is attracted to R. Smend’s defense of “eologie im Alten Testament,”
that is, the OT’s theological meaning understood chieﬂy as the intent of biblical authors or
editors.⁶² is aﬃrmation puts a little distance between Rendtorﬀ and Childs, for whom bibli-
cal theology “is not conﬁned simply to a historical description of the original author’s inten-
tion,”⁶³ although this would not necessarily push Rendtorﬀ toward von Rad. e best one can
say is that Rendtorﬀ and Childs alike lay claim to von Rad’s legacy but revise it diﬀerently.
e heart of Rendtorﬀ ’s program is striking in its simplicity. His canonical retooling of
von Rad in 1989 is precisely the one that drives his OT eology, Canonical Hebrew Bible: von
Rad’s “new approach” is named on page one, and the ensuing account understands itself as “an
eﬀort in running through the canon from its ﬁrst to its last verse to allow the texts to speak in
their present form.”⁶⁴ Hence Childs’ inﬂuence on Rendtorﬀ amounts to an initial reorienta-
tion, a call to recognize the living function the ﬁnal form in communities of faith, and to fol-
low it. Beyond this the only emphasis imported from Childs is the history of exegesis, though
this has a distinctive ﬂavor, too. Wirkungsgeschichte for Rendtorﬀ is far more exclusively con-
cerned with the history of Jewish exegesis.
(2) Rendtorﬀ ’s 2006 comments in Edinburgh (recall the introduction) cover two main
aspects of his diﬀerentiation from Childs, sharpened especially by BTONT in 1992, both of
which emerge in the ﬁnal pages of CHB. First, Rendtorﬀ worries that Childs is still so invested
in source criticism that he barely manages to give a “canonical” reading of the text at all. In
62. Ibid., 143–144, cf. 12 (in the 1989 essay cited above). Rendtorﬀ and Smend agree, against von Rad, that OT
theology is not later extrapolation based on the “facts” of the credo. Rather, the collective overview is a
late, deuronomic/deuteronomistic phenomenon (Smend, eologie im AT, esp. 111–112). Hence theology
exists within the OT, but at a secondary or even tertiary level. eology, Smend emphasizes, is “historisch
ein verhältnismäßig spätes Produkt” (116). e late theological intention Rendtorﬀ ﬁnds in the Pentateuch
is not far from Smend here, though he is less willing to accept Smend’s continuation of Wellhausen’s
distinction between Israel and Judaism (Canon and eology, 144). Still, he can later say that
“Deuteronomy is perhaps the most theological book in the Hebrew Bible” (CHB, 74). Rendtorﬀ also
recognizes that Smend’s interest in canon, such as can be found in the opening pages of Smend,
Entstehung, is diﬀerent in kind to what Childs proposes (Rendtorﬀ, Introduction, 129). See also Smend,
Questions.
63. BTONT, 7–8. Childs’ entire discussion of Ebeling’s classic essay on biblical theology (1–9) stands in sharp
contrast to Smend’s aﬃrmation of biblical theology in the narrowest sense—“was das Alte Testament
enthält”—using Ebeling’s very words (Smend, eologie im AT, 116, citing Ebeling, Wort, 86 [= Ebeling,
Meaning, 94]).
64. Rendtorﬀ, CHB, 413. Before translation the work appeared as: eologie, Bd. 1 and eologie, Bd. 2.
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BTONT more words are spent on a description of the P and J accounts of creation than on
“the eﬀect of the joining of the sources into a continuous narrative.”⁶⁵ Childs is not canonical
enough! (ough note how long this is aer 1974.) Second, Childs is believed to have inappro-
priately yielded to dogmatic considerations. Early on, in the 1980s, Barr’s invective against
Childs is noted but not much regarded. Rendtorﬀ occasionally says that the attack has the
character of “a religious war.” ough voicing misgivings about “some dogmatic-sounding for-
mulations,” he indicates that his “sympathies are on the side of Childs.”⁶⁶ By CHB Barr’s
attacks have clearly received more attention. A ﬁnal and very oblique comment on the link
Childs wants to forge with dogmatic theology simply refers the reader to three chapters in
Barr’s Concept which problematize that eﬀort. (e second of these traces Childs’ alleged dog-
matism back to Barth.) IOTS may have opened Rendtorﬀ ’s eyes to the importance of canon,
but in contrast, BTONT seems to lead into an impasse. A core conviction of the latter volume
is “diametrically opposed” to what Rendtorﬀ envisions.⁶⁷ “It is of crucial signiﬁcance that the
church maintained Israel’s Bible unchanged,” Rendtorﬀ explains.⁶⁸ at the point is actually
directed against Childs, who oen makes a similar sounding argument, emerges only later,
when Childs is criticized for writing of an Old Testament “transformed” by the New. “For the
maintenance of the ‘Scriptures’ in the form in which it was transmitted in the Jewish faith
community is precisely an essential element of continuity between the Old and the New Testa-
ments.”⁶⁹ But such comments are little developed in CHB.
Fortunately, Rendtorﬀ ’s article-length review of BTONT oﬀers a more complete expla-
nation. Beginning with an acknowledgment of the book’s uniqueness,⁷⁰ the review is oen
65. BTONT, 113, cited by Rendtorﬀ, CHB, 722. A “dependence on the dominant literary-critical classiﬁcation
stands in the way of the express interest in a ‘canonical’ overview” (723). Lurking nearby is the thesis of
Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem, perhaps. When priestly elements are mentioned at all in CHB, it
is as a “priestly layer” (42) rather than a source. But Rendtorﬀ overlooks Childs’ more subtle claim that
“[t]he J material functions on the level of ﬁgurative language, once-removed now from its original literal
sense” (BTONT, 113).
66. Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 195, cf. 171.
67. Rendtorﬀ, CHB, 755.
68. Ibid., 749, my emphasis.
69. Ibid., 755.
70. Cf. Rendtorﬀ, Bibel Israels, 102, cited above.
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appreciative. At the same time, Childs is “eher konservativ” for his treatment of creation in
Genesis 1–2.⁷¹ It seems Childs has become almost as problematic a canonical reader (one who
proceeds from the from ﬁrst verse to the last?) as von Rad himself.⁷² Again, and more impor-
tantly, Rendtorﬀ objects to BTONT because of its understanding of Judaism. It builds on “bes-
timmten dogmatischen Voraussetzungen”—christology above all, as a strategy for broaching
the unity aspect of canon—that separate it decisively from a Jewish understanding.⁷³ “An
dieser Stelle muß ich die Rolle des Berichterstatters aufgeben, denn ich habe Schwierigkeiten,
Childs’ Position zu verstehen.” Rendtorﬀ ’s explanation is telling:
Über die Frage der “Arbeitsteilung” zwischen den theologischen Disziplinen kann man
verschiedener Meinungen sein; ich stimme Childs zu, wenn er sagt, dies sei eher eine Fra-
ge der Strategie als eine Grundsatzfrage, wenn ich auch selbst die Aufgaben anders bes-
timmen würde. Was ich nicht verstehen und nicht akzeptieren kann, ist der Vorbau dog-
matischer Entscheidungen vor die exegetische Analyse. Vor allem verstehe ich auch
inhaltlich nicht, was es heißt, daß das Alte Testament Zeugnis von Christus ablegt. Ich be-
streite überhaupt nicht, daß es theologisch legitime Weisen gibt, das Alte Testament mit
dem Neuen zusammen als christliche Bibel zu lesen und dabei die christliche Bibel als
Ganze vom Christusereignis her zu deuten. Aber dadurch wird doch das Alte Testament
selbst nicht zum Christuszeugnis.⁷⁴
When Rentdorﬀ resumes this theme at the close of the review, it becomes clear just how close-
ly bound his objection to dogmatic (= christologizing) readings of the OT is to his work for a
rapprochement with Judaism. He names two ways in which he cannot follow BTONT. First is
in the prioritization of dogmatic over biblical theology. “Daß das Alte Testament Christus
bezeugt (nicht einen kommenden Messias, sondern Jesus Christus), verstehe ich nicht. Eine
Hermeneutik, die grundlegende historiche Sachverhalte ignoriert, ist mir nicht nachvol-
lziehbar.”⁷⁵ It is hard not to think that the second objection gives the ﬁrst all its teeth. Childs
71. Rendtorﬀ, Rezension Childs, 362. e details are almost identical to what will appear in CHB. It is
doubtful whether Rendtorﬀ has seen to the bottom of the “ﬁgurative” reading being suggested.
72. Ibid., 360–363. Rendtorﬀ is right to puzzle over the historically chronological treatment of the NT—Paul
before the Gospels. It may even be fair to call that section of BTONT “eine Art theologische
Literaturgeschichte des Urchristentums” (363). Yet one must still try to answer why this belongs in
BTONT, and in what sense it qualiﬁes as “canonical” on Childs’ understanding. When Rendtorﬀ says he
attempts “viel konsequenter ‘kanonisch’ zu arbeiten, als Childs in diesem Buch tut” (369), it is a question
of what each means by “canonical” in the ﬁrst place.
73. Ibid., 364.
74. Ibid., 365.
75. Ibid., 367.
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thinks biblical theology is “ausschließlich eine christliche Disziplin.” But what about the possi-
bility of Jewish biblical theology? “Für mich ist dies ein ganz entscheidender Punkt. Ich
bemühe mich, niemals Aussagen über das Alte Testament zu machen, die von einem Juden
nicht nachvollzogen werden könnten.” Christians will of course come to the text with diﬀerent
questions than Jews. “Aber meine Antworten, d.h. meine Auslegung des Textes müßte für ein
Juden verständlich und akzeptabel sein.”⁷⁶ I submit, therefore, that Rendtorﬀ ’s later reaction
against Childs’ so-called Barthian dogmatism stems ultimately from his own theological com-
mitment to a certain theology of the church’s relationship to Jewish scripture. is and not
“history” is closer to the heart of why he feels BTONT threatens the “Integretät” of the Old
Testament.
In chapter ﬁve I will attempt to account for Childs’ own complicated relationship with
what he calls the “mystery of Israel.” e question is fraught. By no means do I wish to trivial-
ize its complexity, either for Rendtorﬀ or for Childs, or as an issue in its own right. Still, with
respect to Rendtorﬀ ’s understanding of Childs on the matter—as a kind of “reading” of
Childs, which is of course not the limit of Rendtorﬀ ’s contribution⁷⁷—insuﬃcient attention
has been paid to how the literal sense functions for Childs, how it can be extended through
ﬁguration, and what all this has to do with his claim that the unifying referent of both testa-
ments is Jesus Christ. Rendtorﬀ ’s work does not supply a suﬃcient account or critique of
Childs, including in the restricted domain of Childs’ relationship to Judaism.
76. Ibid., 368.
77. Rendtorﬀ ’s dedicated labor in the area of Jewish-Christian merits study. He has invested a career in
Leviticus (above all see Rendtorﬀ, Leviticus) and has posed forceful theological questions: “Does the
interpreter consider the pre-Christian (i.e., Jewish) meaning of the text to be theologically relevant or
not?” (Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology, 14). He is adamant that “a clear distinction must be made between
the interpretation of the Old Testament in its canonical framework—that is, under the presuppositions and
conditions of its development up to the close of the canon—and its appropriation by the Christian church,
especially since that church has become an exclusively Gentile one; so that the Old Testament has been
introduced as canonical document into a religious society which came into being only aer the close of
this canon and on its foundation” (ibid., 117). Yet assuming for the moment that it is possible to cleanly
separate interpretation from appropriation, one wonders just how the OT has continuing relevance for the
church on these terms (beyond awakening it to its fraternity with the synagogue), or how the OT witness
connects with that of the NT. Or, it may be self-evident to Rendtorﬀ what the contemporary relevance of
Pentateuchal legal material is (CHB, 650), but I doubt whether many in the church today would take the
same view. (Similarly, Gerstenberger, Review of Rendtorﬀ, asks why so little use is made of the “Ziel”
rubric in the Leviticus commentary.)
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Moreover, one can ﬁnd reason to doubt how well Rendtorﬀ manages to represent the
work of his mentor, von Rad. As von Rad concluded his seminal essay on typology, backing
away from his earlier harsh review of W. Vischer’s controversial book, Das Christuszeugnis des
Alten Testaments: “So muß also—um endlich das umstrittene Wort zu nennen—wirklich von
einem Christuszeugnis des AT gesprochen werden.”⁷⁸ At issue is how the Old Testament can
retain its distinctive voice as a pre-Christian witness, and at the same time function as the Old
Testament, as the foundational part of the two-part Christian Bible. e matter is not easy.
Yet in closing it is striking to note that Rendtorﬀ, despite increasing disagreement with
Childs and perhaps an increased regard for Barr’s portrait of Childs as a Barthian, still recog-
nizes Childs’ deﬁnition of biblical theology as quite appropriate to at least one scholarly con-
text. “Barr likes to speak of ‘pan-biblical theology,’” he notes. “In German discussion, however,
the term Biblische eologie is used primarily in precisely this sense as theology of the whole
Bible… And this is how the term is being used here.”⁷⁹ In this Rendtorﬀ appears to me to rep-
resent a strong current in the German discussion.⁸⁰ Disagreement about the status of the Old
Testament as Christian vis-à-vis Jewish scripture notwithstanding, the domain of biblical the-
ology is much as Childs understands it. What more urgently needs exploring is the modern
Christian Old Testament scholar’s ambivalence about Christ and the witness of the scriptures
of Israel. Von Rad hesitates but in the end aﬃrms the Christuszeugnis, and in his own way so
does Childs.
78. Rad, Typologische, 33 (= Rad, Typological, 39). On this question compare Rendtorﬀ ’s “Christological
Interpretation as a Way of ‘Salvaging’ the Old Testament? Wilhelm Vischer and Gerhard von Rad,” 76–91
in Rendtorﬀ, Canon and eology.
79. Rendtorﬀ, CHB, 751.
80. As Ebeling’s 1955 essay attests (ET Ebeling, Meaning), there have long been two main currents in the
deﬁnition of “biblical theology.” If Smend, followed by Barr and Barton, represents one (see note 62),
Janowski, One God, shows that the other is alive too. Rendtorﬀ may actually have feet in both streams.
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As the realistic narrative reading of the biblical stories broke down, literal or verbal and
historical meaning were severed and literal and ﬁgural interpretation, hitherto
naturally aﬃliated procedures, also came apart. Figural reading had been literalism
extended to the whole story or the unitary canon containing it. But now ﬁgural sense
came to be something like the opposite of literal sense.
—Hans Frei
Part two of this thesis takes its title from a piece Childs wrote in 1996, on the way to his Isai-
ah commentary, which argues that biblical intertextuality arises as a forward looking exten-
sion of a text or as a retrospective enrichment of traditional language and rests in either case
“on the same inner logic of Scripture’s textual authority.”¹ If one can understand what Childs
means by this, one is well on the way to an understanding of his entire project. Exploration of
the inner logic of scripture’s textual authority drives IOTS, NTCI, Isaiah, Corpus, and a num-
ber of less substantial eﬀorts as well. And there is indeed a kind of logic to this thinking
despite a large body of secondary literature committed to the illogic of canon in Childs’ own
operation.
is key phrase does not capture all the hallmarks of Childs’ approach. As this thesis’
sub-title indicates, it needs to be combined with another phrase which we shall explore in part
three; Childs defends the formal logic of scripture’s authoritative function in the church, on
some analogy with its function in the synagogue, within the mystery of Christ. But I am get-
ting ahead of things. ere may be a sense in which one can appreciate what Childs means by
“inner logic” without recourse to his wider interpretative apparatus. e way scripture devel-
ops, its formation, could entail a certain use quite apart from what we know about its actual
1. Childs, Retrospective Reading, 376.
subsequent use by historic faith communities, even if this way of talking about the Bible
already begins to sound vaguely Protestant. Childs employs “inner” here in a way analogous to
the expression “inner-biblical exegesis,” an accepted phrase that on closer inspection also
kicks up tensions and ambiguities. e argument for canonical shaping, which derives in com-
plicated ways from a meditation on Jewish midrash, can be separated from other aspects of
Childs’ work, and will be in some of the discussion that follows, but if it were le in isolation,
imagined as the sum total of the canonical program as has been considered with some of
Childs’ readers, considerable attenuation would result.
us the ﬁrst and last thing to say in part two is that the inner logic of scripture’s textu-
al authority has an outer logic as well. Appeal to strictly inner-biblical logic of the Old Testa-
ment is usually not enough to settle the exegetical conundrums an interpreter confronts. And
yet none of this obstructs the route many people follow in taking scripture to be the proper
court of appeals in such matters—that is, in receiving scripture as scripture. To muddy the
waters, there is another sense in which what I have just called the outer logic has a broader
inner logic, too. We will revisit this suggestion at the end of chapter ﬁve.
At present I will set forth the reasoning behind Childs’ resistance of purely inner-bibli-
cal, non-referential hermeneutics. Something compels him to move “beyond the textual,”² and
this leads him to reject, at least in part, the programmatic theories of Hans Frei and Georg
Steins, among others. Since Childs has oen been thought to be up to something very like
what Frei does with biblical narrative, this chapter will help eﬀect a transition from common
misperceptions of “canon criticism,” the burden of part one, to a more probing account of
exactly how this approach ruled by canon restricts and enables Christian biblical exegesis in a
critical age. e argument has three stages. Aer ﬁrst complexifying the idea of a “Yale
school,” it will contrast Childs’ assessment of the canonical process with that of Steins. en it
will diﬀerentiate Childs from Frei on how canon functions according to its literal sense, while
at the same time identifying important agreements between Childs and Frei. Over and against
2. Childs, Critique, 183.
 . :    ’       
a more critically informed usage of “intertextuality,” it will broach Childs’ idea that intertextu-
ality, rightly considered, is a subset of ﬁgural reading.
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In a jointly authored essay on “Story and Biblical eology,” Bartholomew and Goheen
follow the convention of classifying theological and philosophical interest in narrative geo-
graphically—the Yale school, the Chicago school, the California school—and declare a prima-
ry interest in the Yale school associated with Hans Frei and George Lindbeck. In the same
piece, however, the authors recognize that Childs himself contests the conclusion of the so-
called Yale school, and they opine that it would be better to split the diﬀerence between Yale
(excluding Childs) and Chicago. In this way the storied world of the Bible can attach to the
real world; narrative theology needs to plug in to ontology and history.³
But for Childs a crux arises in the wake of a radical change in the perception of biblical
reference wherein the historical world dris apart from the history-like world of the Bible.
Once these two realities diverge—that is, with the rise of biblical criticism—all biblical inter-
pretation enacts some form of response. People can give minimalist or maximalist accounts of
biblical history, or can transpose meaning into another (idealist) register, but it became
impossible to take the correspondence of biblical narrative and its ostensive historical referent
for granted. is circumstance was of course detailed in Frei’s e Eclipse of Biblical Narrative
(1974), and as was seen in the last chapter, Childs accepts Frei’s basic account of the change to
the Bible’s literal sense in the shi from precritical to critical interpretation no later than 1969.
Also at that early date, at the Yale colloquium for Barth, Childs keeps his distance from Frei’s
narrative prescription. In the discussion session panelist Robert Johnson states, “So, from the
3. Bartholomew and Goheen, Story, 146, 154, 162. e authors ﬁnd Barr’s early emphasis on story more
helpful, but it may be doubted whether he, like them, would “wish to privilege the ﬁnal form of Scripture
as we have it, and … maintain that in this ﬁnal form all the books, in one way or another, are closely
connected to God’s unfolding story” (160).
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point of view of what Hans is arguing, what [Barth’s] really talking about is not the historical
context but the literary context.” is is Childs’ rebuttal:
at’s where Hans and I diﬀer somewhat. I move in a little diﬀerent direction here. In oth-
er words, it seems to me that there are problems when you get—I would agree fully with
Hans when he’s combatting those historical critics who would want to go behind the text,
but it’s interesting when you begin to deal with the narrative text, as a context. One has to
keep in mind that the early church, in the controversy with Judaism, took quite a diﬀerent
move. Where the Jews were saying, read the text! read the text!, the Christians said, there’s
something behind the text. It’s what the text points to, namely: Jesus Christ. And there was
a dialectic between the reality and the text.
It seems to me, what buttresses this from getting into the kind of ontology you’re talking
about is the scope of the canon: namely, the reality which is in dialectic with the text, de-
ﬁned by its canonical context. I don’t see how you can avoid a dialectic between text and
reality, in some sort.⁴
e discussion continues between Johnson, Frei and a student, who asks about Frei’s sense of
story. Childs then sides with Johnson and declares “that the new hermeneutic is not only mis-
taken, but is one colossal cul de sac.”⁵ Frei’s diagnosis is correct, but even from Crisis Childs
searches out medicine more eﬀective than the self-contained world of biblical narrative. For
him the eclipse Frei describes so well provokes a dialectic that involves the canon, its scope
and the divine referent which is identiﬁed by, but not identical to, its text.
As oen as Childs has been harangued for a Yale aﬃliation with New Criticism, it is
regrettable that his lucid diﬀerentiation from Frei was not more widely known until much lat-
er. Barr, for whom “[t]heology as a mode of understanding comes into existence only when
one moves out of the plane of the text itself and begins to ask about the extrinsic realities to
which the text refers,” might have found a little common ground.⁶ Even Brett, who had the
beneﬁt of Excursus III in NTCI,⁷ makes a complete muddle of Childs on biblical reference by
arguing that he has two diﬀerent and incompatible theories of reference. One is a theory of
historical background in the text’s prehistory. e other is a theory of theological reference.
4. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 56.
5. Ibid., 57–58. Presumably he means New Criticism. Frei appears to retreat aer this: “I don’t know at that
point [that it all coheres in story] how much I’m reading myself into Barth. But yes, I think that’s it” (59, cf.
62).
6. Barr, Holy Scripture, 102. is is felt to be a point against Childs, for whom, according to Barr, the text is a
“closed system” and thus a “ghetto” (168). Cf. Barr, Concept, 416.
7. “e Canonical Approach and the ‘New Yale eology,’” NCTI, 541–546. Cf. now BTONT, 18–22.
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Because he tends to privilege the latter, it would be more consistent to drop the former and
adopt the methodology of New Critical formalism.⁸ Yet although Childs, like Frei, thinks an
exclusive concern for meaning as historical reference gets biblical exegetes into trouble, the
critical problems of positivity do not go away if they are evaded.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that Anglophone readers treat Childs’ source-criti-
cal analysis as either a liability or a disposable interest. If Frei’s analysis of the situation in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century is right, responses to the split between explicative
meaning and historical reference took on diﬀerent proﬁles in England and Germany. In Eng-
land the main focus was on externalist accounts of reference, on raw historical fact (e.g., did
geology conﬁrm the ﬂood of Noah?). Eighteenth century Germany stayed closer to “the
broader hermeneutical issue of the meaning of biblical texts. Unlike the English discussion of
the fact issue, which had by this time become completely mired in the external evidence ques-
tion, the German scholars’ procedure was therefore almost exclusively internal, i.e. literary-
historical.”⁹ It may be that this variation in the history of ideas has more recent iterations, in
which case Childs’ education could have instilled in him a way of talking about biblical refer-
ence that is more German than English, so to speak. If so, then it would be no surprise to
learn that amongst Childs’ readers (chapter one), it is mainly the Germans who can be
brought into serious dialogue with him on the issue canon formation. e next section will
contrast Childs and Steins on the genesis of the ﬁnal form. ere are a number of correspon-
dences despite Steins’ recommendation to move in a formalist direction.
8. Brett, Crisis?, 31–47. He acknowledges some separation from Frei (174n8) but discounts it by concluding:
“synchronic ﬁnal form readings cannot use diachronic reconstructions without lapsing into confusion”
(46).
9. Frei, Eclipse, 56. Cf. 218: “In Germany, in contrast to England, there was a strong, continuing interest in
the Bible not only as true or false report but in addition as a large series of written sources with their own
literary history, an interest augmented by the hallowed tradition of belief in the text’s inspiration. In the
pursuit of such matters, the narrative features of many of the biblical writings were not ignored, and
interest in them was strengthened by the developing quest for a manageable view of the Bible’s unity
through the development of a single history traced in its pages.”
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An important thing to recognize about Childs’ use of the term canon is how it serves
in his work as a “cipher,” a shorthand expression with which “to encompass the various and
diverse factors involved in the formation of the literature.”¹⁰ In BTONT at least, looking back
at his Introductions to the Old and New Testaments, this is how he claims to have used
“canon” and “canonical.” Childs lists several factors in the way the the biblical “material was
transmitted through its various oral, literary, and redactional stages by many diﬀerent groups
towards a theological end” that, consonant with the tradents’ concern “to maintain a norma-
tive function [of the traditions] for subsequent generations of believers,” belong under one
umbrella. As a cipher, canon
was, above all, useful in denoting the reception and acknowledgment of certain religious
traditions as authoritative writings within a community of faith. e term also included
the process by which the collection arose which led up to its ﬁnal stage of literary and tex-
tual stabilization, that is, canonization proper. Emphasis was placed on the process to
demonstrate that the concept of canon was not a late, ecclesiastical ordering which was ba-
sically foreign to the material itself, but that canon-consciousness lay deep within the for-
mation of the literature. e term also served to focus attention on the theological forces
at work in its composition rather than seeking the process largely controlled by general
laws of folklore, by socio-political factors, or by scribal conventions.
“Canonical,” adds Childs, “also included … a theological extension of its primary meaning” in
that the ﬁnal form of the text is normative for living, contemporary communities of faith
whose members aﬃrm the canon still today, in line “with the faith community of the original
tradents. e modern theological function of canon lies in its aﬃrmation that the authorita-
tive norm lies in the literature itself as it has been treasured, transmitted and transformed—of
course in constant relation to its object to which it bears witness—and not in ‘objectively’
reconstructed stages of the process.”¹¹ Canon is about the parameters the biblical tradition
acquired in history, and which it continues to exert in its established form.
10. BTONT, 70, cf. Childs, On Reclaiming, 5. A similar point is made by Chapman, Canon Debate. ough I
question whether the introduction of “cipher” is a substantial departure from Childs’ earlier usage of
canon, it is at least a clariﬁcation in view of Barr’s criticism of 1983.
11. BTONT, 70–71.
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Many have denied that all this constitutes one thing. In a fairly typical move aer
Barr’s Holy Scripture, Steins parses Childs’ use of canon into ﬁve aspects. Into a block quota-
tion of the above passage from BTONT he inserts the following numbers:¹² “Canonical” refers
to (1) a faith community’s reception of authoritative traditions; (2a) the process by which the
traditions were assembled along with (2b) the resulting stabilized body of literature—showing
that “canonization proper” was not “basically foreign to the material itself, but that canon-con-
sciousness lay deep within the formation of the literature”¹³; (3) “the theological forces” driving
the process; and (4) how the tradition continues to be normative today. A striking thing about
this particular way of carving up the process of canon formation is that it runs against the
grain of Childs’ talk of a single “cipher.” By making (2a) distinct from (2b) Steins drives a
wedge between two factors, the canonical process and canonization proper, between which
Childs posits the closest identity.¹⁴ e smoking gun here is that (2b) has not been made (3).
Steins has to be at least implicitly aware that his parsing of the process contradicts the logic of
Childs’ own proposal. Just how deep does a Kanonbewußtsein lie deep in the formation of the
biblical literature?
Childs’ imprecision, Steins believes, stems from his terminology and needs mending.
He summarizes his problem with BTONT:
In der bisweilen opak wirkenden “erweiterten” Verwendung von “Kanon” bei Childs
lassen sich zwei grundlegende Sichtweisen unterscheiden, die ich als semiotisches Konzept
und als funktionelles Konzept von “Kanon” bezeichnen und im folgenden erläutern
möchte. Um alle seines Erachtens wichtigen Aspekte von “Kanon” zu integrieren,
verbindet Childs eine Bedeutungstheorie des Kanons mit einer Funktionstheorie und
wechselt je nach Bedarf die Ebenen ohne explizite Hinweise.¹⁵
A more controlled use of the term canon should diﬀerentiate between two senses:
Kanon (1) = Kanon als (der kanonisierte) Text (der Bibel) und
Kanon (2) = Kanon als Metatext (Metasprach/metalinguistischer Rahmen).¹⁶
12. Steins, Bindung, 13.
13. Steins italicizes Kanonbewußtsein when citing the German translation.
14. One could concede that the German translation of BTONT leaves the riven sentence slightly more open to
dissection. e German reads, with Steins’ numbering and italics, “(2a) Der Begriﬀ schloß auch den
Prozeß ein, durch den die Sammlung entstand, (2b) und der sie bis zu ihrem letzten Stadium der
literarischen und textlichen Stabilität führte, was dann Kanonisierung im eigentlichen Sinne bedeutet.”
15. Ibid., 14.
16. Ibid., 14.
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By way of clariﬁcation, Steins calls on the semiotics of G. Aichele. Every attempt to close down
the meaning of a text merely results in further commentary. e unending process of expan-
sion and deferment of meaning can be arrested, however, by the canon’s closure. Canonization
proper involves ﬁrst identifying the accepted text, then ﬁxing the text’s wording. But these
activities are extrinsic to the text: “Beides sind extrinsische Vorgänge, liegen nicht im Text
selbst, sondern werden an den Text herangetragen.” Closing the canon naturally involves the
work of a community, those for whom the meaning of the text is a concern, and what they
attain thereby is “[eine autoritative] Begrenzung des Sinns” which frames the region within
which the text’s meaning may be sought. “So wird die interpretatorische Kreativität angeregt
und zugleich begrenzt.” us the extrinsic act of canonization creates a metalinguistic frame
within which intertextual play occurs, enabling interpretation within a boundary. e frame-
work metaphor (“Rahmen”) includes encapsulates pair of pivotal concepts, play area (“Spiel-
raum”) and border (“Grenze”). One speaks to the function of canon (its “Funktionstheorie”),
which is to terminate the endless process of commentary becoming scripture requiring fur-
ther commentary, while the other addresses the meaning of canon (its “Bedeutungstheorie”),
the sense readers make of scripture once it becomes a closed, “selbstreferentielles System.”¹⁷
e proposal for canonical-intertextual reading enlists other theoreticians, but their
incorporation by Steins need not detain us. Does Aichele help solve the putative confusion in
Childs? In fact I think he exacerbates it. Had his deﬁnition of canon been taken on board
without modiﬁcation, the resulting program would have been almost the polar opposite of
Childs’.¹⁸ Aichele holds that “the demand for commentary that is provoked in the written sto-
ry is endless. e concept of canon arises from the need to end this endless demand by com-
pleting the uncompleteable story. e canonizing of a text is the ﬁnal and greatest attempt to
overcome utterly and even to eliminate the physical dimension of the text.”¹⁹ On this view
17. Ibid., 15, summarizing Aichele, Sign, 127–139.
18. Aichele’s semiotics leads to a more radical sense of canon than Steins’, as evidenced by the former’s more
thoroughgoingly Kristevan sense of the word intertextuality (ibid., 14), which marginalizes the canon as a
normative collection of texts. Aichele’s classiﬁcation of theology as a subset of ideology (15) calls into
question the very aﬃrmation of the biblical canon as a distinct and normative collection of literature.
19. Ibid., 127. On eliminating the “body” of the biblical text see Boyarin, Eye; idem, Intertextuality; idem,
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canon (2b) has a merely accidental relation to canon (2a). Aichele sees the canonical process
as inevitably centrifugal, whereas for Childs it is centripetal. e process is intrinsic to the
product.
In Steins’ case the disagreement with Childs is less stark. In chapter one I noted the
inﬂuence of Lohﬁnk (in that “man mit mehr rechnen muß als nur einer Reihe von in sich
selbständigen Büchern”). As Steins himself puts it in an essay on Chronicles and the closing of
the Hebrew canon, “Daß ‘Kanonisierung’ nicht nur ‘Auswahl und Zusammenstellung autorita-
tiver Schrien’ bedeutet, sondern sich ‘im Text’ niederschlägt…, wird in der Regel nicht genü-
gend beachtet.”²⁰ But it is diﬃcult to emphasize a move toward canonization within the bibli-
cal tradition and at the same to insist that canonization proper is an extrinsic, aer-the-fact
decision. is is a big part of the reason Childs keeps Steins’ (2a) and (2b) together. We can
reﬁne the contrast by comparing what Childs and Steins make of the “midrashic” technique of
the Chronicler. Is Steins’ emphasis on an extrinsic canonization counterbalanced by an aware-
ness of thick, inner-biblical processes?
   
In “Torabindung und Kanonabschluß” (1996) Steins favors of an internal aspect of
canon formation. “Kanonisierung ist nicht nur ein äußerlich deklarativer Akt, mit dem
Auswahl und Anordnung der normativen Schrien festgelegt werden; sie hat—wie die neuere
Kanonforschung herausgearbeitet hat—auch im Text selbst einen Niederschlag gefunden.”²¹
ere is an ambivalence here that will become more pronounced in Bindung; canonization is
partly an external act, if not wholly so. For the time being Steins heralds Childs as an ally in
emphasizing the canonical shaping at work in the text.²² Speciﬁc to Chronicles, Steins argues
Radical and esp. the perceptive critique in Dawson, Figural Reading.
20. Steins, Torabindung, 213–256, 250n150.
21. Ibid., 213. I will focus on this essay, but cf. the far more comprehensive study the year before: Steins,
Abschlussphänomen.
22. A footnote claims an allegiance that will become problematic within three years: “Der ‘kanonische Prozeß’
(‘canonical process’) als je neue Aneignung und Aktualisierung der biblischen Traditionen ist zu
unterscheiden von der ‘Kanonisierung,’ mit der dieser innerbiblische Prozeß beended wird. Zum
‘kanonischen Prozeß’ als entscheidendem Faktor der ‘Schriwerdung’ vgl. B.S. Childs, Introduction (1979)
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that, as with earlier tradents except on a much larger scale, the Chronicler attempted “einer
Zusammenführung und Fokussierung verschiedener Traditionsstränge.”²³ But if at ﬁrst this
statement seems compatible with Childs’ treatment of Chronicles in IOTS, a handful of paral-
lel judgments indicate a slight departure.
For Steins the Chronicler synthesizes “der disparaten Traditionen der älteren kanonis-
chen Bücher.”²⁴ Similarly, the formula “law, prophets, and other writings,” ﬁrst found in Sir-
ach, indicates that the third grouping (in some contrast to the ﬁrst two) is “eine Sammlung
formal und inhaltlich disparater Werke.”²⁵ e observation that the writings are in a greater
state of ﬂux than the law and prophets receives special comment:
Ist man durch die Einsichten in den Formierungsprozeß der ersten beiden Kanonteile da-
rauf aufmerksam geworden, daß der Kanon von inner her wächst und Ab-
schlußphänomene im Text selbst zu ﬁnden sind, sich Kanonbildung also nicht in einem
äußeren deklarativen Akt vollzieht, dann drängt sich die Frage nach einem analogen Vor-
gang für den dritten Teil auf. Für diesen Kanonteil stellt sich das Abschlußproblem zudem
in besonderer Weise: Wie sollte eine derart disparate Sammlung abgeschlossen werden?²⁶
His own answer is that the Chronicler attempts to draw the disparate writings together, and so
begins to close down the endless-seeming proliferation of commentary. It is a recapitulation
and summary of the history of Israel held in both previous mini-canons, particularly the law.
Chronicles focuses and clariﬁes what it means to be Israel in light of Torah. “Das letzte Buch
des dritten Teils bindet so diesen Teil an die beiden vorangehenden zurück und eröﬀnet eine
torazentrierte Gesamtsicht des dreiteiligen Kanons.”²⁷
To retroject terminology from 1999, the function of Chronicles is part of canonization
proper—the arresting of the growth of the tradition. But Chronicles came to be interior to the
canon. Why then is the mechanism it enacts extrinsic? e reason seems to be that the tradi-
77–79” (Steins, Torabindung, 216n14). e essay anticipates other themes pursued in 1999. It is
“[m]ethodisch wichtig” to maintain distinctions between the historical emergence of the canon and “der
Herausbildung einer Kanontheorie,” between the fact that a group collected the canon and the subsequent
reception of the same, and between a stabilized selection and ordering of scripture and the ﬁxing of the
text’s form (Ibid., 247, my emphasis).
23. Ibid., 246.
24. Ibid., 246.
25. Ibid., 247.
26. Ibid., 250.
27. Ibid., 251.
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tion to which it refers is “disparate.” e Chronicler overcomes something centrifugal by ﬁat.
Within the closed canon one observes a jostling, a will to subdue the more basic momentum
towards disunity. So today the meaning of Chronicles is apprehended within the borders it
helped frame, but its inertia toward still more commentary is what excites the reader’s play in
the resulting “selbstreferentielles System.” e canonical metatext provides for the growth of
ever new text-text relations.
e contrast with Childs is subtle but basic. For Childs in IOTS, the Chronicler adapts
the tradition using a kind of “midrashic method,”²⁸ adjusting and realigning his diverse tradi-
tion. But
the Chronicler bears witness to the continuity of the obedient response within the history
of Israel. Because God did not change his will, demanding one thing of his people earlier
and something diﬀerent later, there emerged a common proﬁle of the faithful within Is-
rael. ere is a family resemblance in their praise and thanksgiving, in prayers and laments
which extends throughout all ages. e Chronicler shaped his material to highlight the
continuity within the community of faith.²⁹
Seemingly, Aichele among others leads Steins to emphasize what texts bury;³⁰ Childs aﬃrms
instead an intrinsic continuity in scripture on the basis of its extra-textual referent. Childs
cannot help agreeing that the Chronicler’s material has “disparate parts,” or that he labors to
“reconcile the diﬀerences.”³¹ ere is much to say about how the tradition is transformed,
expanded, harmonized, omitted, and above all shaped. But a deeper insight ﬁres Childs’ liter-
ary and historic perception “that canon-consciousness lay deep within the formation of the lit-
erature.”³² He writes, “At times the process of harmonization is quite unconscious and appears
as almost a reﬂex from a concept of canon.” And: “It is important to notice in the process of
harmonization that the Chronicler did not for a moment feel himself at liberty to change his
28. IOTS, 654.
29. IOTS, 655.
30. Aichele, Sign, 129: “canon functions in the same way that genre does, burying the incoherence of the text
and reinforcing belief that a complete message has been received.” But as Eagleton, eory, 69, cautions,
frequently “the plurality and open-endedness of the process of reading are permissible because they
presuppose a certain kind of closed unity which always remains in place: the unity of the reading subject,
which is violated and transgressed only to be returned more fully to itself.”
31. IOTS, 648.
32. BTONT, 70–71.
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text at will, as commentators have tended to imply. In fact, such an assumption is totally for-
eign to a sense of canon.” He exercised “creativity only within certain boundaries.”³³ His har-
monization stemmed from an “aim to establish an inner harmony of all his sources.”³⁴ Like-
wise his supplementation of the material shares “a canonical concern that the full extent of the
normative tradition be represented”—“these expansions reﬂect a critical, theological
process.”³⁵ So too with typology. “e Chronicler used the method to draw out elements of
ontological continuity within Israel’s history.”³⁶ In shaping the historical material paradigmati-
cally, “the Chronicler’s attempt to document the correspondence between action and eﬀect is
an essential part of his concept of God’s revelation through the prophets which is contained in
a body of authoritative scripture.”³⁷ By searching out “a family resemblance”³⁸ in this tradent’s
community of faith, Childs ﬁnally aligns himself with the theological judgment of Chronicler—
he steps into the canon (4) of Steins’ parsing. Because “the Chronicler speaks to the ontologi-
cal question and faithfully testiﬁes to the unchanging reality of the One God,”³⁹ God becomes
the tradition’s center of gravity. As scripture’s true referent and scope, he brings its message
into focus without obscuring its polyvalence.
Near the top we saw that the function of canon for Childs ultimately “lies in its aﬃr-
mation that the authoritative norm lies in the literature itself as it has been treasured, trans-
mitted and transformed—of course in constant relation to its object to which it bears witness.”⁴⁰
is get at why, broadly speaking, the Chronicler’s “midrashic” activity is a point of agreement
between Steins and Childs, but its programatic, hermeneutical or theological signiﬁcance is
not. It is only by moving through the literal sense to a level beyond the textual that Childs can
address the unity and diversity of scripture in terms other than “der gemeinsame Nenner der
33. IOTS, 648.
34. IOTS, 649.
35. IOTS, 650.
36. IOTS, 651, my emphasis.
37. IOTS, 653.
38. IOTS, 655.
39. IOTS, 655.
40. BTONT, 71, my emphasis.
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verschiedenen Stimmen.”⁴¹ is is the thrust of his ubiquitous appeal to the Bible’s “scope,”
“res,” “Sache,” “witness,” and so on. In the end even Barton begins to mark the diﬀerence:
“When Childs talks of the ‘ﬁnal form’ of the text he does not mean the text as a uniﬁed aes-
thetic object, but (Barth-like) as the communication of the word of God… e question is
not: what does the ﬁnal form mean as a literary unity?, but: what word of God is communicat-
ed through this passage?”⁴²
  ,  
Chapter ﬁve will look at why Childs moves away from the language of “midrash”
between IOTS and Isaiah. e point I wish to illustrate now is that Childs’ interpretation of
what he will prefer to call “canonical shaping” does not change over his career even though his
terminology for the phenomenon shis. e process behind the ﬁnal form, like the ﬁnished
product itself, is chieﬂy about pointing or witnessing. It has more to do with text-res relations
than text-text relations.
Childs make a major reaﬃrmation of the argument for canonical shaping in his last
major exegetical work on the Old Testament. “Retrospective Reading” (1996), a dense and
important expression of Childs’ career thesis, anticipates the argument of the Isaiah commen-
tary (2001) and is cited there more than any other of Childs’ works. e essay concerns not
just the misapplication of “midrash” to inner biblical exegesis by modern scholars, but an
“entire projection of textual expansion” which goes by other names as well.⁴³ As an alternative,
in Isaiah Childs detects a consciousness “already deeply embedded in the earlier tradition” (I.
L. Seeligmann).⁴⁴ In addition, he observes, “Prophetic authority is related to the function of
the biblical text. e text is the tradent of authority in establishing a link with speciﬁc
41. Steins, Bindung, 73. When Steins says the “interpretatorisch relevante Bezugspunkt ist der Text” (95), he
introduces strictures on the sensus literalis which the canonical approach cannot abide. Childs, Critique,
176 thinks Steins collapses text and commentary. Instead, but equally problematic for Childs’ approach,
Steins collapses text and referent.
42. Barton, Canonical Approaches, 201.
43. Childs, Retrospective Reading, 370.
44. Ibid., 373, cf. 362.
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prophetic ﬁgures.”⁴⁵ e text itself is ﬁgurative or intertextual, and in its formation it acquired
and “continues to exert a coercion” on readers.⁴⁶ at the literature of the Hebrew Bible was
conﬁgured around persons (Isaiah, David, Solomon, Moses) can be ignored, and oen has
been ignored. But in this case “it is not the Bible that is being interpreted.” Put diﬀerently, “the
concept of ﬁnal form is closely connected with the issue of readership.”⁴⁷ ere are of course
readers who do not identify with the community of faith in ancient Israel. en again, there
are those who understand themselves to be included in the future generations of Israel, for
whom her scriptures form a lasting testament.⁴⁸
Whatever else one might wish to say about the Isaiah commentary itself, the work
stands in remarkable continuity with Childs’ earlier ventures. It forms a coda to the arguments
that culminated in IOTS, and yet it seriously dates some of the criticism of that book, which
oen focused on Childs’ treatment of the prophet Isaiah. In 2001 one ﬁnds the same accep-
tance of the critically discovered layers, a similar eﬀort to press beyond entrenched factions to
the le and right, and an unshaken conviction that the many hands involved in shaping the
book leave a product better characterized as “accumulated experience” than as colliding inten-
tionalities or voices.⁴⁹ Perhaps the single biggest change from 1979 to 2001 is that an interest
in the textualization of oral tradition, and even with the “unity” of the book, had overtaken
the ﬁeld.⁵⁰
As in the discussion of Chronicles in 1979, in Isaiah, midrash, or if not quite that
something roughly like it, is an acknowledged dynamic in the shaping of the tradition. Yet the
45. Ibid., 375. For Childs, unlike Barr, the sensus literalis of biblical prophecy still holds good even though in
the critical era text and prophet have dried apart.
46. Ibid., 376.
47. Ibid., 377.
48. What kind of reader is involved could make a world of diﬀerence to what gets interpreted, and who. For a
recent New Testament perspective see Bockmuehl, Seeing.
49. Isaiah, 228, cf. 3.
50. is is partcularly true of ird Isaiah. For instance, see Steck, Tritojesaja, as well as the criticism of Steck
in Lau, Schrigelehrte Prophetie. An important precursor of this trend is Barth, Jesaja-Worte, esp. 305–309.
Childs himself is most energized by Beuken and appears to have learned Dutch in order to read Beuken’s
four volume commentary on Isaiah 40–66 (on Isaiah 33, it is suggested, Beuken rivals Gunkel [Isaiah,
245]; see Childs’ index for bibliography, including articles in translation).
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function of inner-biblical citation in ird Isaiah is largely deictic, not midrashic. Whatever
schrigelehrte Prophetie we see is not exclusively or even primarily oriented to the textual.
Instead, it testiﬁes to “an encounter with actual historical realities, albeit seen in the light of
the divine. is dimension dare not be ﬂattened simply into a type of learned scribal activity
dealing exclusively with literary texts.”⁵¹ Intentional intertextuality in ird Isaiah “is deictic—
that is, pointing, identifying—rather than midrashic.”⁵² Childs’ interpretation of the evidence
of redactional activity accommodates his emphasis on scripture’s res, Sache, or subject matter.
Canonical shaping is central to the coercive force Isaiah acquires; its text becomes the indis-
pensable form in which its message pressures the church and in each generation facilitates
new, textually mediated encounters with the one true God.
.     
Intertextuality in Steins’ proposal for kanonisch-intertextuelle Lektüre is a surrogate for
“sehr enge traditionelle” means of connecting biblical texts such as “Analogie,” “Exempel,”
“Typologie” and “Überbietung,” to which one should not revert without serious methodologi-
cal reﬂection on the hermeneutics of the canon.⁵³ Like the call for a sophisticated theory, this
displacement of ﬁguration by intertextuality may go back to Lohﬁnk. In the same place where
the demand for theory is said to be pressing Lohﬁnk writes, “Wie eine entsprechende theo-
retische Hermeneutik aussehen würde, wäre erst Schritt für Schritt zu erarbeiten. Ich kenne
keine vorhandenen eorien, die diesem Ansatz entsprechen und zugleich auf exegetischer
Erfahrung aufruhen würden. Im Endeﬀekt hatte wohl auch die eorie vom mehrfachen
Schrisinn nicht genügend Atem.”⁵⁴ ese are almost oﬀ-hand remarks, and neither Lohﬁnk
nor Steins say why intertextuality must be an alternative to multiple senses in the canon, or
why the traditional strategy for conﬁguring scriptural unity has insuﬃcient breath.⁵⁵
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52. Isaiah, 445, cf. 442, 479.
53. Steins, Bindung, 128.
54. Lohﬁnk, Eine Bibel, 80.
55. But cf. Dohmen, Vielfachen Schrisinn, 16–26, 29–30, 59, 61, 66–67. Note that Steins, then as Dohmen’s
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In his response to Bindung Childs tries to distinguish two types of intertextuality,
midrashic and allegorical. “e diﬀerences between the two interpretive approaches greatly
aﬀect how one understands the role of intertextuality within the Bible. My aim is to argue that
much exegetical and theological confusion arises when the distinction between the two
approaches is not recognized.”⁵⁶ He refers brieﬂy to Jewish scholarship focused the way
midrash has “a highly developed understanding of intertextual referentiality,”⁵⁷ and then con-
tends that Christian intertextuality, as a subset of allegory, traditionally depends upon a quite
divergent understanding of biblical reference:
midrash and allegory, in spite of large areas of overlap, are two very distinct and diﬀerent
interpretive strategies, reﬂecting very diﬀerent hermeneutical understandings of how in-
tertextuality functions. While midrash works at discerning meaning through the interac-
tion of two written texts, allegory—I am using the term in its broadest sense—ﬁnds
meaning by moving to another level beyond the textual. It seeks to discern meaning by re-
lating it referentially to a substance (res), a rule of faith, or a hidden eschatological event.
Christian exegetical use of intertextuality moves along a trajectory between promise and
fulﬁllment within a larger christological structure.⁵⁸
Steins’ work on Genesis 22, according to Childs, and similarly the exegesis of a British advo-
cate of canonical interpretation, Walter Moberly,⁵⁹ fails to account for the unique way inter-
textuality operates in a Christian setting. It is not that allegory is superior to midrash, but that
allegory, and under it a restricted aspect of the ﬁgurative technique called intertextuality, has
been more central in Christian theology for good reason.
is is not the place to unpack diﬀerences in Jewish and Christian ﬁguration on
Childs’ understanding—for that see chapters ﬁve and six, respectively—although we can recall
that his 2001 commentary on Isaiah leaves room for an aﬃrmation of proto-midrash in the
post-exilic period while also claiming that intertextual reference in ird Isaiah is deictic,
pointing to another level beyond the textual, rather than midrashic. Perhaps the prophetic
book’s shaping provides a warrant for both techniques. In the more limited intra-Christian
assistant, compiled the bibliography.
56. Childs, Critique, 183.
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58. Ibid., 182–183.
59. Ironically, Moberly is the person Steins criticizes for reverting to “enge traditionelle” categories, above. Cf.
Moberly, Akedah; idem, Key and more recently idem, Bible, eology, Faith.
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debate about ﬁguration, if that is what it is, it is useful to turn once again to Frei. Why is his, in
the critique of intertextuality that contests Steins’ proposal in the ﬁrst instance and then
Moberly’s related work on the Akedah, the third and ﬁnal name adduced of persons having
“moved in a direction which for Christian theology can only end in confusion”?⁶⁰
In his ﬁnal essay (2005) Childs endorses a modiﬁcation to Frei’s thesis in Eclipse. For
Neil MacDonald, Frei’s characterization of the literal sense in pre-critical exegesis is correct,
but his description of its transformation under the pressure of the Enlightenment is better
described as an epistemic shi than a change in the way biblical narrative is read. Formerly
basic beliefs became non-basic beliefs in the critical era.⁶¹ But Childs’ depiction of the literal
sense and its attenuation aer the Reformation period aligns very closely with Frei’s, and
Eclipse augurs the recovery of ﬁgural extensions of the literal sense that Childs will incline to
more and more throughout the latter half of his career. In addition to Childs’ remarks at the
1969 Barth colloquium, compare Frei’s statement from 1974:
the confusion of history-likeness (literal meaning) and history (ostensive reference), and
the hermeneutical reduction of the former to an aspect of the latter, meant that one lacked
the distinctive category and the appropriate interpretive procedure for understanding
what one had actually recognized: the high signiﬁcance of the literal, narrative shape of
the stories for their meaning. And so, one might add, it has by and large remained ever
since.⁶²
with Childs’ statement from 1972:
I am convinced that when the Reformers spoke of the literal sense of the Biblical text as
normative (sensus literalis) they had in mind the canonical sense and not a hypothetical
projection of what scholars thought originally happened.⁶³
and from 1977:
e impact of the new approach which drove a wedge between the biblical text and its ref-
erence brought an immediate and profound eﬀect on the interpretation of the sensus liter-
alis. Among the Reformers the identity of the literal and historical sense had been as-
sumed and the terms sensus literalis and sensus historicus were oen interchanged. In the
new approach the identity of the terms was also continued, but the historical sense now
60. Childs, Critique, 184.
61. It was a change “from a ‘faith seeking understanding’ paradigm to what may be termed a ‘faith requiring
justiﬁcation’ one” (MacDonald, Illocutionary, 324). e piece is referenced in Childs, Speech-act, 384. I
myself am not persuaded that MacDonald’s analysis of Eclipse does justice to the problem, or that his
emendation works as a simple overlay.
62. Frei, Eclipse, 12, my emphasis.
63. Childs, OT Scripture of the Church, 721.
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determined its content. e historical sense was construed as being the original meaning
of the text as it emerged in its pristine situation.⁶⁴
as well as from 2000:
e distinction between the so-called literal sense and the ﬁgurative/allegorical cannot
correctly be deﬁned in terms of historicity… Rather, the heart of the problem of allegory
turns on the nature of referentiality of the biblical text.⁶⁵
Here again we come to the heart of the matter for Childs, and there is considerable overlap
with Frei’s critique of meaning-as-reference, or the restriction of literal meaning to ostensive
reference. Frei’s analysis also underpins the ﬁgural proposals of Frei and Childs alike. To quote
Eclipse again, “As the realistic narrative reading of the biblical stories broke down, literal or
verbal and historical meaning were severed and literal and ﬁgural interpretation, hitherto nat-
urally aﬃliated procedures, also came apart. Figural reading had been literalism extended to
the whole story or the unitary canon containing it. But now ﬁgural sense came to be some-
thing like the opposite of literal sense.”⁶⁶ It seems to me that the “or” between story and canon
permits ﬁguration to be taken in two directions. Its renewal can be stipulated either on the
narrative shape of the Christian Bible, which with a few additions and qualiﬁcations is Frei’s
preference, or, by importing a more historical view of shaping and a somewhat diﬀerent
understanding of biblical reference, on scripture’s canonical shape. In both cases the literal and
the ﬁgural become natural allies again.
What diﬀerences exist between these two related sorts of ﬁgural reading in the critical
or post-critical age? ree, which I will state brieﬂy with the help of J. D. Dawson’s impressive
analysis of Boyarin, Auerbach, Frei and Origen in 2002, are of special importance. An initial
diﬀerence between Childs and Frei turns on the relationship of the Testaments. For Childs the
relationship between Old and New is irreducibly dialectical, in historical and intertextual
respects, but “Frei frames the relationship between the two testaments using the comprehen-
sive category of story rather than meaning. e image, appropriate to narrative, is linear rather
than vertical.”⁶⁷ Second, closely related, Christian appropriation of the literal sense is distin-
64. Childs, Sensus Literalis, 89.
65. Childs, Allegory, 6–7.
66. Frei, Eclipse, 6–7, my emphasis, cf. 2.
67. Dawson, Figural Reading, 164.
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guished from the foundational place of the peshat in Jewish midrash for both Childs and Frei,
though on dissimilar grounds.⁶⁸ For Frei, instead of narrowly concentrating on individual
words, the literal sense in Christian theology is caught up into a wider narratological or sto-
ried universe.⁶⁹ In that context the gospel’s literal sense ﬁtly renders Jesus Christ while yet pre-
serving His unique identity. For Childs, Jewish exposition in midrash centers on text-text rela-
tions, whereas Christian biblical theology needs text-res relations. Canon has a historical,
horizontal dimension (canonical shaping in terms of the process and the ecclesial function of
its product, the ﬁnal form), but the vertical dimension is paramount.⁷⁰ ird, Childs parts
company with Frei on whether or not ﬁguration is ultimately to be distinguished from allego-
ry. Because of a close reliance on Auerbach’s account of ﬁgural reading, Frei perceives allegory
as “a fundamental threat to the form of ﬁgural interpretation he wants to advance.”⁷¹ ough
“history” is a proximate concern to Frei, this move is a holdover from the desire to protect his-
tory which was prevalent in the short-lived movement to recover ﬁgural reading in the mid-
twentieth century. Childs on the other hand develops a proposal for ﬁgural reading that
rejects this strained distinction and in the end is happy to live with the consequences—“call it
allegory” he concedes in 2004.⁷² When Frei says of the sensus literalis that “the descriptive
function of language and its conceptual adequacy are shown forth precisely in the kind of sto-
ry that does not refer beyond itself for its meaning, as allegory does, the kind of story in which
the ‘signiﬁed,’ the identity of the protagonist, is enacted by the signiﬁer, the narrative sequence
itself,”⁷³ Childs simply cannot agree. In precisely this sense there remains a purpose for Chris-
tian allegory.
68. Born in Breslau to Jewish parents, Frei (1922–1988) was at ﬁrst educated in Germany but then sent in 1935
to a Quaker school in England, where he became an Anglican. In 1938 he was joined in exile by his
parents, now in America, where he completed his education (Higton, Public eology, 16–17).
69. Dawson, Figural Reading, 171–172. Cf. Frei, Types, 123–124 and idem, Literal, 73–74.
70. Despite its emphasis on the Christian story, Childs’ appeal to a rule of faith is not to be identiﬁed with
Frei’s sense of an overarching narrative. Yet more like Frei, the purpose of ﬁguration for Childs is to catch
up the reader in a textually mediated mystery of Christ. See chapter six.
71. Dawson, Figural Reading, 186, cf. 183–183. Cf. Frei, eology, 168–169; cf. also Auerbach, Figura and
idem, Mimesis.
72. Struggle, x. is decision is informed by research into allegory’s deployment in historic Christianity.
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e peace Childs makes with allegory will be explored more fully in chapter six. It is
necessary ﬁrst, in the remainder of part two, to say more about the inner logic of scripture’s
textual authority. I close with a pair of suggestions in the meanwhile—one about literal bibli-
cal reference, and another about Christian ﬁgural reading.
Chapter two showed that Karl Barth is, however problematically, a middle term
between Childs and Frei. It would be impossible here to settle the question of where Barth
comes down on literal reference—on Childs’ side, or Frei’s, or neither. Yet in an essay dedicat-
ed to Frei, George Hunsinger would appear to suggest that Childs comes closer to Barth’s con-
ception on this score. “In his actual exegetical or hermeneutical practice, Barth sought to be
guided by the sensus literalis in the sense that he did not ﬁnd the meaning of the text in a sub-
ject matter accessible independently of the text. His reading of scripture led him to assume a
ﬁttingness in the relationship between signiﬁer and signiﬁed, that is, between textual depic-
tion and intratextual as well as extratextual subject matter. However, intratextuality was, for
Barth, never an end in itself, but was rather the bearer of extratextual semantic force. Intratex-
tuality without extratextuality would merely aestheticize the subject matter.”⁷⁴ On this under-
standing Barth presses beyond literalism and expressivism, by means of analogy, such that
scripture’s reference is truthful, extratextual, and a matter of exegesis. God is utterly diﬀerent
than us, and yet mysteriously, the text’s witness to the divine referent is somehow not other
than the meaning of the biblical sentence itself.
Lastly, a crucial point of contact between Childs and Frei is scripture’s capacity to
order the lives of its readers, or in Frei’s language, to “render” its addressee: “rough the
coincidence or even identity between a world being depicted and its reality being rendered to
the reader (always under the form of depiction), the reader or hearer in turn becomes part of
that depicted reality and thus has to take a personal or life stance toward it.”⁷⁵ Childs does not
think that we can make the same identiﬁcation of subjects within the text’s compass—histori-
cal, vertical, doctrinal, applicative—that Calvin made. (In fact he critiques Calvin for deﬁning
74. Hunsinger, Beyond Literalism, 221n8.
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the sensus literalis too broadly, as will be seen.) But he agrees that the biblical text, in its
received shape, is an instrument without which Christian faith languishes. e two testament
canon properly rules the life of the church. With similar reasoning Seitz, who writes of ﬁgura-
tion and the eclipse of biblical prophecy,⁷⁶ emphasizes the antique notion of providence. If the
Bible addresses or even renders history ordered by a providential hand, its readership may in
the end require some brand of ﬁguration. In his words, “e challenge of our day is how to see
in Jesus’ death and raising actions truly in accordance with the scriptures of Israel. For that, we
shall need to return to typological and ﬁgural senses once more keenly available in the
church’s handling of the ‘literal sense,’ before such a sense was conﬂated with the ‘historical
sense.’”⁷⁷
76. Seitz, Prophecy and Hermeneutics, 75.
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C  — : 
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Ursprünglich haben die ältesten [Gattungen] … eine ganz bestimmte Stelle im
israelitischen Volksleben besessen, von dem sei einen wichtigen Teil darstellen, und eben
deshalb, weil sie nicht auf dem Papier, sondern im Leben bestanden haben, sind auch
ihre ältesten Einheiten so kurz gewesen, entsprechend der geringen Aufnahmefähigkeit
der alten Hörer. —Hermann Gunkel
Beginning in the pre-exilic period, but increasing in signiﬁcance in the post-exilic era, a
force was unleashed by Israel’s religious use of her traditions which exerted an inﬂuence
on the shaping of the literature… Israel deﬁned itself in terms of a book! e canon
formed the decisive Sitz im Leben for the Jewish community’s life, thus blurring the
sociological evidence most sought aer by the modern historian.
—Brevard Childs
Now for something completely diﬀerent. Frei makes a useful point of comparison with
Childs because of their proximity on the hope for the renewal of Christian ﬁgural reading and
on the instrumentality of scripture’s ﬁnal, textual form—though with signiﬁcant diﬀerences on
both counts. Childs and Gunkel agree on neither, and Gunkel provides an especially dramatic
counterpoint on the dispensability of the canonical text. In keeping with our focus on the reli-
gious signiﬁcance assigned to the Bible’s shaping and development, such as the midrashic
activity of the Chronicler or schrigelehrte Prophetie in Isaiah (problems Frei simply does not
touch), and yet equally in contrast to recent trends appreciating the textualization of biblical
traditions, Gunkel believes the genres of the Old Testament have their provenance “nicht auf
dem Papier, sondern im Leben.”¹ Juxtapose the view of Childs, who consciously inverts
Gunkel’s method, contradicting the usual form critical account in form critical terms: the
canon itself became the setting for the life of the people, the community of faith.² e decisive
1. RGG², 3:1679.
2. IOTS, 78, cf. 61–62. I am aware that Gunkel ought not be identiﬁed with the “form criticism” or “tradition
criticism” of his successors. On these terminological diﬃculties see Blum, Formgeschichte, 32–33, esp.
33n2, and 37n15; Berger, Formgeschichte, 19–27. Also see the epilogue to this chapter.
question from Childs’ perspective is whether or not the biblical literature is more than an arti-
fact of Israel’s religious history. Does it transcend the circumstances behind its creation and
provide the Sitz for a community’s life of faith? But then the opposition between Gunkel and
Childs should not be overdrawn. As Childs remarks, “In one sense, I have simply extended the
insights of the form critical method which called for an exact description of the material’s lit-
erary genre.”³ is use of form criticism to talk about the ﬁnal form speaks of adjustment
within a discipline, reform from the inside. As I will argue below, Childs has actualized more
than one of Gunkel’s impulses, including especially the privileging of Israel’s life which con-
ventionally or traditionally has been bound up with scripture. A residual memory of the
canon’s function in Christian discourse pervades Gunkel’s work. More native to his idiom, one
could also speak of the historical workings of providence. So despite appearances Gunkel and
Childs share a little theological common ground, if not enough to establish a truce.
Childs seeks to turn critical biblical scholarship upside down (or right-side up,
depending). For the simple reason that Gunkel typiﬁes and informs this tradition his work
repays consideration here. Aer ﬁrst setting out his “religion” in the context of his deprecia-
tion of the assembling of biblical literature (the canonical process), I will take a retrospective
glance at the fate of the project he believed would one day supplant biblical theology. en an
epilogue will paint a backdrop for the turn toward canon aer Gunkel. Primarily Childs’ IOTS
is in view, though it is ﬁtting to include the tradition-historical theology of Gerhard von Rad.
.  ’ 
“Much of nineteenth-century biblical criticism was not an adventure in impiety but
turned on assumptions about the nature of revelation and its (tenuous) relationship to the
canon (as a literarily shaped and coherent theological product).”⁴ is observation suits
Gunkel eminently. Piety is of supreme importance to him, and in this he stands with both feet
3. Childs, Response to Reviewers, 52.
4. Seitz, Figured Out, 28–29.
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ﬁrmly planted in the nineteenth century. He is also a believer in providence and revelation,
though of a highly naturalistic order (his criticism of supernaturalistic exegesis is sharp). It is
common to treat Gunkel’s methodological innovations as if they had no connection to his reli-
gion, but unsurprisingly, his method and personal commitments are closely intertwined, and
possibly inseparable. Oen enough religious conviction appears to drive his method and not
the reverse. Consider as a prime example Gunkel’s appraisal of the formation of biblical litera-
ture in the Old Testament.
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For Hermann Gunkel (1862–1932) the literary history of Israel falls into three general
stages: the pre-literary age of folk-tales (through ca. 750); the literary age which culminates in
the great literary personalities (“die großen Schristellerpersönlichkeiten,” ca. 750–540); and
subsequently the epigones.⁵ Israel’s literary history consists in the history of genres (Gattun-
gen), several instances of which “haben eine ähnliche oder dieselbe Geschichte erlebt.”⁶ Sim-
ple, short, “pure” genres were originally situated in the lives of the people. ey existed “nicht
auf dem Papier, sondern im Leben,” and were attached to highly speciﬁc situations. At this
primitive stage the Israelite had developed neither a strong sense of his individuality nor yet
much ability to comprehend long units of narration.⁷ Eventually, however, a strong impulse to
record creative achievements arose in Israel, and thus “literature” in the proper sense was
born. is facilitated the development of longer units, such as the Joseph saga. “Without a
doubt, this dri towards length indicates that the times had grown more literary.”⁸ At the same
time collections of smaller units were compiled. e noteworthy persons here are “die großen
5. Klatt, Gunkel, 180; cf. RGG², 3:1679.
6. RGG², 3:1678–1679. e ﬁrst edition of the entry contains many of the same statements, but in less
compressed form. See RGG¹, 1:1193.
7. Cf. here “Israel’s Literary History,” Gunkel, Water, 34: “Just as we see the development of our children’s
minds in the gradually increasing amount that they can take in at one time, so we can trace one feature of
the growth of civilization in the gradual increase of the literary units in Israel.” e essay originally
appeared as “Die Grundprobleme der israelitischen Literaturgeschichte,” Deutsche Literaturzeitung 27
(1906): 1797–1800, 1861–1866, was reprinted in Reden und Aufsätze, 29–38, and also appears in English
translation in What Remains of the Old Testament and Other Essays, 150–186.
8. Gunkel, Water, 35.
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Schristeller, die sich der altertümlichen Gattungen bemächtigen,” but who also through the
mixing and transformation of older genres achieved “höchst individuelle Worte.”⁹ e author
of Job and above all the great literary prophets deserve to be named in this context. Ultimately
the “Erforschung dieser großen Schristeller ist die Krone der Literaturgeschichte Israels.”¹⁰
ereaer decay settled in. e third and ﬁnal age belongs to the epigones, who “counterfeit
the masters [die Meister nachahmen].”¹¹ In this period styles and genres are still being mixed,
though more than before, and collections are being extended, but the crowning spirit has
departed. (In another place Gunkel calls this development “the tragedy of Israelite litera-
ture.”¹²) At long last “die Sammlung der Sammlungen, der Kanon, entsteht.”¹³
Within this arc of achievement and then decline are several smaller peaks and valleys.
e advance of writing technology wrests an oracle or story from life itself, depositing it on
paper. As compositional skill increased, longer and longer narratives could be complied,
sometimes with pleasing results. Occasionally an individual author stepped forward to make
his creative spirit felt. So although the road to the ﬁnal form is beset by ineptitude, complica-
tions in detail set Gunkel apart from the sheer atavist. His belief in progress is as strong as his
love of the original.
As an outworking of this, in methodological formulations Gunkel is driven to two per-
spectives that resist integration. On the one hand, he emphatically aﬃrms the full history of
tradition, stating in his seminal Schöpfung und Chaos (1895, ET 2006): “I hold it to be
methodologically objectionable to investigate only the beginning of a thing and to ignore the
subsequent, oen more important and more valuable, history of the same.”¹⁴ is is the ﬁrst of
9. RGG², 3:1679.
10. RGG², 3:1679.
11. RGG², 3:1679.
12. Gunkel, Water, 36. e full quotation parallels the the RGG article well: “Finally we come to the tragedy of
Israelite literature. e spirit loses power. e genres are exhausted; imitations begin to abound.
Redactions take the place of original creations. Hebrew ceases to be the living language of the people. By
this time the collections are grouped together into larger collections. Finally, the canon took shape.”
13. RGG², 3:1679.
14. Gunkel, Creation and Chaos, xxxix = vi. (Henceforth I will give the page numbers for Schöpfung und
Chaos, and later, the German original of the Genesis commentary, aer the = sign.)
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his “controlling principles.” His inquiry goes well beyond a sourcing of biblical material in its
putative Babylonian birthplace. Instead, he writes, “I have also explained the particular ways
by which these materials were taken into Israel and re-formed.” Hence
the creation narrative, although of Babylonian origin, nevertheless ﬁrst gained its particu-
lar meaning in Israel. us, I believe myself to be protected against misunderstanding, as if
perhaps by proving that Israel did not lie outside the realm of world culture, I deny the
particularity of Israelite religion and, in turn, lead to the destruction of the belief that in
this history God has revealed himself in a special way.¹⁵
Is Israel’s religion truly unique in the ANE, or is Gunkel merely paying his dues to a conserva-
tive orthodoxy? Undoubtedly the latter element is present, but Gunkel’s personal piety rests on
a genuine if awkward conviction about the revelatory value of the Old Testament. Further,
while he is most interested in the state of a tale just aer Israel adapted it, his ﬁrst principle
still requires him to trace the growth of Israel’s tradition throughout its entirety history.
A second principle ﬁnds clear expression in Creation and Chaos too. Contending with
the view that the history of a thing can be more important than its origin is the idea that as
material changes hands its original signiﬁcance is forgotten, or willfully suppressed. In a word,
it is the problem of darkening. Genesis 1, for instance, is “a faded myth.”¹⁶ e struggle of Mar-
duk against Tiâmat was transformed, to be sure, but a polytheistic ring from the original still
comes through.¹⁷ Similarly within Israel, later generations lose touch with a story’s vital
meaning in earlier times.
It is in the very nature of oral tradition, when passing oh-so-tenaciously from generation
to generation, that it is subjected to certain ﬂuctuations. Such omissions, additions, dis-
placements, which later generations have imposed on the ancient materials, are revealed in
the present codiﬁcation of the tradition. ey are revealed by the fact that the continuity of
the narrative, which formerly had been uninterrupted, currently exhibits some obscurities
or peculiarities! Or they are revealed by the fact that certain features, features which had a
proper meaning at the time of their origins, are nether intelligible from the present context
nor are they able to be considered as ‘generally’ intelligible. ey are, therefore, viewed as
strangely brief and incomprehensible! Just as the age of a painting may be recognized by the
15. Ibid., xl = vi.
16. Ibid., 80 = 117.
17. Gunkel wonders here about the superiority of Genesis 1 over the Marduk myth: “do we have the right to
value Genesis 1 totally diﬀerently than we value any other ancient myth? … Might even the Judaistic-
supernaturalistic piety understanding of God which is assumed in Genesis 1 appear to our piety not to be
the highest thing? Notwithstanding that, it does continue to exist! In Genesis 1 we are able to discover
again the God in whom we believe! All other cosmogonies are, to us, only interesting antiquities” (ibid., 80
= 118).
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degree of “darkening” which presently characterizes it, so too is the antiquity of the tradition
recognized by such “darkenings.” In any examination of a tradition this “darkening” has to
be brought into play. e ultimate object of the investigation, however, is to reconstruct
the original context and to indicate the basis of its alteration, i.e., to write the history of the
tradition!¹⁸
is principle can be summarized as follows. Because the history of tradition as it has been
preserved shows evidence of darkening, the historian must restore single traditions to their
original vibrancy. Unlike the art restorationist, however, “the present codiﬁcation of the tradi-
tion” (the unhappy state of the canon) puts some serious reconstruction work at the historian’s
feet. Many units with aesthetic integrity are encased in later, larger blocks. Or to extend
Gunkel’s metaphor slightly, the ﬁrst small images grew dim naturally with the passing of time
but were disﬁgured further by incompetent artists who puttied them into a rough mural.
One principle leads Gunkel to investigate positive developments in traditions; the oth-
er urges an inquiry that runs against time, that seeks actively to unwork it. Supposing these
two concerns are not mutually exclusive, and quite possibly they are not, the tension in
method calls for resolution in a set of decisions about where one ﬁnds the stuﬀ of tradition
intact—if not in the ﬁnal form, then trapped within or lurking beneath—and how. Ostensibly
Gunkel adjudicates the tension with “history,” but on closer inspection religious and cultural
values play a vital part in his decision-making process. In what follows the particulars of this
truism will be shown in Gunkel’s position on the collection and development of the prophetic
literature, the Pentateuch, and the Psalter. Along the way it will be possible to get a sense of
one take on the religious signiﬁcance of canon formation.
 
Gunkel’s negative evaluation of canonization proper sounds out loudest with the
prophets. For him these great men attest the triumph of individual personality over the style-
bound custom that dominated the ancient world. “Here in Israel something characteristic
took place that was unknown elsewhere in the Near East: the individual came to the fore.
18. Ibid., 163–164 = 256, my emphasis. I have corrected the translation at one point. e translator rightly
terms this “a classic statement of traditio-historical methodology” (xxxiv).
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Powerful personalities arose, grasped by the storms of the age, trembling with passion, who,
touched by the deity in secret hours, attained the sublime courage to proclaim the thoughts
that they—they completely alone—perceived within themselves.”¹⁹ In order to fully appreciate
the individuality of the prophets, it is necessary to get a picture of the styles and genres they
used, to restore prophetic discourse to its original life setting.
e prophets were not originally writers but speakers. Anyone who thinks of ink and pa-
per while reading their writings is in error from the outset. “Hear!” is the way they begin
their works, not “Read!” Above all, however, if contemporary readers wish to understand
the prophets, they must entirely forget that the writings were collected in a sacred book cen-
turies aer the prophets’ work. e contemporary reader must not read their words as por-
tions of the Bible but must attempt to place them in the context of the life of the people of
Israel in which they were ﬁrst spoken.²⁰
Gunkel then obeys his ﬁrst principle, sketching the development of prophecy. e earliest
prophets, such as Elijah or Elisha, did not write at all. Later ﬁgures including Isaiah and Amos
did not write at ﬁrst, but “these men increasingly resorted to writing [because] times had
changed.”²¹ Gradually fragments were assembled, by the prophets or their students, though no
thought was given to the possible long-term signiﬁcance of such “primitive collections”: “they
thought only of momentary results and not at all of later generations. ey were convinced
that their prophecies were not related to a distant future but that they would soon be ful-
ﬁlled.”²² Mixed as these collections were with anonymous oracles, and guided only by a con-
cern for the immediate, one can understand how for Gunkel the textualization of prophecy
obscured both the prophet—Isaiah the man—and the original setting (Sitz) of his speech.
“Not until Ezekiel are things diﬀerent: this man, accustomed as priest and jurist to scrupulous
order, and convinced that his prophecies about Israel would be fulﬁlled only aer centuries,
19. Gunkel, Water, 86. On the emergence of the prophetic personality see here also 118–119, 128–130. is
essay ﬁrst appeared as “Die Propheten als Schristeller und Dichter,” in Die Propheten (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1923) 34–70. An earlier English translation is found in David L. Peterson, ed.,
Prophecy in Israel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 22–73.
20. Ibid., 87, my emphasis.
21. Ibid., 89.
22. Ibid., 90.
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wrote what was the ﬁrst book of prophecy.”²³ Generally speaking, however, Gunkel feels we
must reckon with “the deplorable condition in which our prophetic books are found.”²⁴
 
A comparable overview of pentateuchal literary history can be found in the lengthy
introduction to Gunkel’s Genesis commentary (1901, ET 1997).²⁵ As in Creation and Chaos he
aﬃrms the biblical material’s full history, starting outside Israel. e foreign origin of a legend
must be observed, yet it can be even more important to attend “to what Israel made of it, or to
the history it underwent in Israel.”²⁶ In Genesis too the history of Israel’s religion is not always
a tale of progress. Darkening, compounded by the changing spirits of later times, occurs as
legends and sagas are handed along. is circumstance alone mandates research into a story’s
original setting. Legends can be appreciated even in their present state, yet “only one who
holds them up to the light of their original understanding can perceive their brilliant colors.
To him, they appear as small glittering and shimmering works of art.”²⁷ So again there is an
ambivalence about the growth of the tradition: pre-literary jewels have to a considerable
extent been ruined, or at least buried under the text, yet tracing the historical development of
a textualized tradition is part of the biblical critic’s task.
Gunkel’s notion of cultural progress, governed almost entirely by the metaphor of a
child’s development into mature adulthood, complicates matters further. Early masterpieces
are short, for instance, because early Israelites lacked the mental powers to compose or con-
sume longer narratives. Yet even as, facilitated by the advent of writing, cognition improved,
the people tended to lose their grasp of tradition. “We oen have the feeling that we are,
indeed, in a position to reproduce the attitudes of the old legends to a degree, but that the cur-
23. Ibid., 91, my emphasis. See now Seitz, On Letting a Text, reprinted in Seitz, Prophecy and Hermeneutics.
24. Gunkel, Water, 91. Eventually the prophetic spirit departed. Gunkel, Creation and Chaos, writes of the
“author of Daniel,” that “undistinguished successor who venerates the old even when he does not
understand it” in a manner “typical of the decadent spirit of his time [für den Geist der Epigononzeit].”
ough an author, the “man is no prophet” (213–214 = 335).
25. For another account of Gunkel on the Pentateuch’s literary history cf. Nicholson, Pentateuch, 41–43.
26. Gunkel, Genesis, lviii = lxviii.
27. Ibid., xlii = xlix.
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rent narrators did not correctly perceive these attitudes.”²⁸ Gunkel speaks as an adult with full,
scientiﬁc knowledge. He speaks as an individual, a “man” who appreciates when Männer
(though in Genesis not yet Einzelpersönlichkeiten) rise above the undiﬀerentiated primal col-
lective.²⁹ He speaks as an aesthete with the sensibilities to know when the standard achieved is
“relatively closer to modern art.”³⁰ But he also speaks as one who yearns for a lost spirit of
childhood.³¹ “We join them”—the adults recounting Israel’s old stories, but the children above
all—“and listen along.”³²
Weirdly, almost as oen as he mentions the culturally underdeveloped but bright-eyed
children of Israel Gunkel refers to “our children.” Typically the direction of analogy runs from
present to past. “Like our children,” for example, the ancients were content to hear the same
stories over and over.³³ Or:
e child looks wide-eyed at the world and asks, “Why?” e answer it gives itself and
which initially satisﬁes it may be very childish, very incorrect, and yet, if it is a spirited
child, captivating and touching, even for adults. Ancient peoples also raise such questions
and answer them as well as they can. ese questions are also usually the same we ask our-
selves and seek to answer in our scientiﬁc [wissenschalichen] disciplines. What we ﬁnd
here, then, are the beginnings of human knowledge, of course only minor beginnings, but
as beginnings still worthy of respect. At the same time, however, they are especially touch-
ing and charming to us, for in these answers ancient Israel expressed its most intimate atti-
tudes, clothing them in the colorful garment of poetry.³⁴
“We” is to Israel as parent to child. e analogy can reverse temporal direction, too. At one
point Gunkel remarks that “our peasants [unsern Bauern]” reﬂect the ancient situation still
today.³⁵ Gunkel’s paternalism ranges from the ancient people (Volk) of Israel to his own Volk.
28. Gunkel, Genesis, lvii = lxvii.
29. At the earliest times narrators were faithful to the tale because “ancients, quite in contrast to moderns, do
not need to exercise their personalities by altering and innovating” (ibid., lvi = lxv). e view aligns with
his position, contra Wellhausesn, that Genesis 1 is not a free construction of the author.
30. Ibid., xliv = li. e Joseph cycle, which merits the distinction “novella,” is his parade example.
31. Werner Klatt’s admirable biography of Gunkel relates a telling anecdote told by H.-J. Kraus. According to
Kraus, during Gunkel’s last Christmas dinner with students at Halle, in 1931, Gunkel said “er habe sein
ganzes Leben nach seinem verlorenen Kinderglauben gesucht” (Klatt, Gunkel, 99n51).
32. Gunkel, Genesis, xxvii = xxxi.
33. Ibid., xxix = xxxiv: “the ancient period was satisﬁed with very minor creations which hardly ﬁlled a
quarter hour. When the account had ended then, the imagination of the hearer is sated and his powers of
comprehension are exhausted. At most, we may imagine that when the story ends, the hearers, like our
children, may have wanted the same account once more.” Cf. Gunkel, Water, 12, 34.
34. Gunkel, Genesis, xviii = xx.
35. Ibid., xxxvii = xliii.
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In this mode he appeals to the “evangelical church and its commissioned representatives” to
handle their new awareness of Genesis’ legendary character with tact. “Genesis reports many
things that contradict our advanced knowledge.”³⁶ Distressing as it may be “for the child who
cannot yet distinguish between reality and poetry if one tells him that his beautiful narratives
are ‘not true,’” the news should not be hidden. Anyway, a childish comportment “would be
unseemly for a modern theologian,” and it would make true, “historical understanding of
Genesis impossible. is awareness has already become common among the historically
trained such that it cannot be suppressed. It will surely—it is inevitable—reach our people
[unser Volk]. We are concerned, however, that it be oﬀered to them in the proper spirit.”³⁷
 
Gunkel’s zeal for poetry ﬁnds a natural expression in his study of the Psalter.³⁸ It con-
tains remarkable declarations of thanksgiving and praise, which though known elsewhere in
the ANE come to unique expression Israel.³⁹ As in Genesis, some psalms reﬂect Israel’s
gradual turn from myth to legend. Prophetic inﬂuence can also be seen. “e heart of the
pious Israelite thrills when he thinks of the time that is to come.”⁴⁰ Finally, the law is in evi-
dence, though its arrival is not a welcome development. Luckily, “[i]t was only very rarely and
36. Ibid., ix; German, x. Unlike William Robertson Smith a few decades before, in a diﬀerent setting, the
orthodoxy Gunkel countered was more in line with Wellhausen than not. He stood at some remove from
the “Babel-Bibel” controversy (Berlin, January 1902), which had a diﬀerent tenor than the circumstances
surrounding Smith’s dismissal from Aberdeen in 1881, though no doubt the ethos leading up to it hangs
somewhere in the background. See Klatt, Gunkel, 99–103, 70–74.
37. Gunkel, Genesis, xi = xii–xiii, cf. xxvi = xxx. I have modiﬁed Biddle’s translation, which renders “unser
Volk” as “the people.”
38. Gunkel wrote poetry, and it is not by accident that he makes poetry central to true religious feeling. Klatt
gives examples, including this lament for the forgotten book 4 Ezra. “Ich fand dies alte Buch, im Schutt
vergraben,” it begins. “Die Herzen, die es einst geliebet haben,” their ashes are scattered to the winds of
history. Gunkel praises the book’s “Menschheit,” thinks on the profound “Volkes Schmerz” that inspired it,
and concludes with a plea, addressed to the apocryphal book, to whisper to human hearts once more:
“Nun hebe wieder an die alte Weise, / Und wo do Herzen ﬁndest, rede leise.” Klatt, Gunkel, 38–39.
39. Gunkel, Water, 137: “e Israelite hymn has borne the fairest of blossoms. e Babylonian and Egyptian
hymns consist mainly of a lifeless enumeration of divine attributes. Even some of the hymns in the Bible
are trite enough, but there are many majestic hymns that throb with power and life.” is essay ﬁrst
appeared in Die Christliche Welt 36 (1922), serially (nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7).
40. Ibid., 139.
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not till a late period that enthusiasm for the Law found its voice in the hymns,”⁴¹ though on
the other hand late stages saw a turn from corporate worship to personal devotion. Psalms
contain the entire range of Israel’s life.
At times one hears the pleas “of a people that refused at all costs to bow to the fate that
providence had laid upon it” and simply asked “Why?”⁴² At others, one senses that the mantle
of the prophets themselves has been put on. In the Psalter at large, “Israelite piety thus oscil-
lates between two extremes: … the lament of the people and the hope of the prophets.”⁴³
Gunkel comments less positively about the royal psalms. ey show an unbecoming “extrava-
gance” and exaggeration in view of their humble setting in the court of a petty king. Still, the
type is borrowed from Israelite neighbors, and it improved considerably under Israelite care:
“On the whole, judged by our standards, the religion of the court is largely ‘Byzantine’; but
when compared with the court songs of all the other ancient kingdoms of the ancient Near
East, it is much more moderate and sane.”⁴⁴ Gunkel holds his highest praise for the individual
expression attained in some psalms. “e gravest error made by students of the Psalms is that
they have completely misunderstood this personal poetry and have taken the living ‘I,’
meaning the poet himself, as a mere ﬁgure of speech meaning the people.”⁴⁵ In actual fact, he
maintains, it is the religion of the individual that undergirds the psalter and infuses the com-
munal religion there with its life. “ese personal songs are more precious to us than the
songs of public worship. We have to excise and omit a great deal from the songs of public wor-
ship before we can use them for our own needs. Many of these personal songs—though not
all—we can make our own as they stand. ey are ‘the Psalter within the Psalter.’”⁴⁶ At times a
psalm even “transcends itself.” In the penitent’s prayer for a pure heart, Psalm 51:10, “the idea
41. Ibid., 140.
42. Ibid., 142.
43. Ibid., 144–145.
44. Ibid., 148.
45. Ibid., 149. Mowinckel, Psalms, 1:46, counters this point.
46. Gunkel, Water, 150.
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emerges that goodness in humanity must be the work of God. is is the culmination of the
religion of the Psalms.”⁴⁷
So today the Psalter serves us best where the expression of religion and piety is highest.
Unlike Genesis the most admirable phase is fairly late. In the very last period, however, the
individualist spirit yielded to impurity and calciﬁcation. “Especially in the later period, when
the poetic genres became more and more literary, a great deal of mixture took place and the
structure became more complicated… Ultimately, naive religion was invaded by a rational
reﬂection that ﬁnally destroyed it. at is what we have in Psalm 119 and in the noncanonical
Psalms of Solomon.”⁴⁸ What all this implies about the canonical Psalter’s ﬁnal form is clear
enough. Gunkel concludes,
On the one hand, it is utterly impossible for us to use the entire Psalter in Christian wor-
ship, although earlier times may have so used it. e modern mind has found in it so
much that is alien and even repellent that we have long been compelled to make selections
for use in church and school and home. On the other hand, we should be careful not to go
too far in this direction. We must remember that the Psalter is not a contemporary book
and therefore cannot possibly voice modern thoughts and feelings… Whoever earnestly
studies these poems will not fail to ﬁnd many passages that give perfect expression to true
religion, and generations still to come will humbly bend the knee on this holy ground and
learn from the Israelite psalmists how to pray.⁴⁹
As with the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature, the principle of selection is whatever
inspires “true religion.” is is how one discerns the canon within the canon.
’  
Religion, conservative by nature, is particularly conservative in worship, according to
Gunkel. “Practices are much more tenacious than concepts.” us the cult is prone to keeping
practices alive which dimly reﬂect their original signiﬁcance. “In many cases, we too, whose
worship withstood a powerful puriﬁcation in the Reformation and again in Rationalism, do
not, or only partially, understand the original meaning of what we see and hear in our church-
es.” is comment is revealing if enigmatic. What does true worship consist in for Gunkel?
47. Ibid., 157.
48. Ibid., 161, my emphasis.
49. Ibid., 161–162.
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e beginnings of an answer can be read indirectly oﬀ the ancient situation. ere too a
puriﬁcation of understanding takes place in some etiological legends. Gunkel’s explanation
gives the child-adult trope another turn as well: “Ancient Israel considered the origin of many
such cultic practices. Although adults, deadened by familiarity, no longer note the unusual
and incomprehensible, they will be stirred from their rest by the children’s questions. If chil-
dren see their father performing all manner of unusual practices at the Passover feast, and—
this is expressly indicated (cf. Exod 12:26; 13:14)—ask, ‘What does that mean?’ one should tell
them the Passover story.”⁵⁰ In like manner legends were developed to explain religious cus-
toms, ancient landmarks and sites of worship (e.g., Genesis 19:1, 16:7, 28:10, 32:33). Etiology
marks the beginning of historiography, which is central to the puriﬁcation of dead religion.
“Wir haben in diesen Sagen die Anfänge der Religionsgeschichte.”⁵¹
True science and true religion are thus two sides of the same coin. On one side the
concepts of God encapsulated in the legends of Genesis are “naive.” On the other, this analysis
is oﬀered in a spirit of “piety and love.”⁵² e fusion of these perspectives is evidenced in the
way Gunkel professes, in the scholarly third person, belief in transcendent providence: “We
believe God works in the world as the quiet, hidden, basis of all things. Sometimes, his eﬃcacy
can almost be apprehended in particularly momentous and impressive events and persons. We
sense his reign in the wondrous interrelationship of all things. But he never appears to us as an
active agent alongside others, but always as the ultimate cause of all.” Of course the God of
Genesis oen appears as a physical presence. He is encountered not as the prophets encounter
him, “in ecstasy,” but in physical speech and action. Presented with such crude views “we hesi-
tate to believe them.”⁵³ But then Israel stands out among her neighbors in the ancient Near
East. Whereas other religions remained polytheistic, Israel, despite having polytheism just
beneath the surface of its oﬃcial narrative, inclined to monotheism almost from the begin-
ning. And Israel rapidly progressed toward more elevated, ﬁtting conceptions of providence,
50. Gunkel, Genesis, xx = xxiii.
51. Ibid., xxi = xxiv, my emphasis.
52. Ibid., xi = xii. e word here is “Pietät” rather than “Frömmigkeit.”
53. Ibid., x = xi.
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toward a doctrine “we” would be much less reluctant to aﬃrm. “us, through many interme-
diate states, Genesis moves from a crass mythology to a belief in providence very attractive to
us moderns.”⁵⁴ In this and other respects “Genesis reﬂects the struggle higher religion fought
for Israel’s soul.”⁵⁵
e puriﬁcation in concepts of God is a clear marker of E being later than J, for exam-
ple. Neither J nor E attains the distinction of literary personality (Schristellerpersönlichkeit),
or even of intentional personality. ey are mere “Sammlern.” e sheer “variety [of material
adapted] demonstrates that the legends of E, and even more so of J, do not bear the character-
istic of a speciﬁc period, let alone of an individual personality, but that the collectors essential-
ly took them as they found them.”⁵⁶ In a sense these schools are the ﬁrst epigones; they “are
not masters but servants of their material.”⁵⁷ But there is more to the story. J and E also exhibit
“ﬁdelity.” “ey infused the legends with their spirit.” From the “uniﬁed diction” which they
impart to their collections we sense a “spiritualization of the legend material” that contributes
to a “higher religious and ethical superiority” when contrasted with the “other ancient peo-
ples”: “us we may imagine the collectors, towering above their people [Volk], with the
intention of elevating them by their ideals through the collection of legends in a great work.”⁵⁸
Small, bright lights from the pre-literary stage have darkened but nonetheless shine through
the work of these collectors. ey are perhaps kindred with the precocious children who ask
what Passover means, and through them higher religion wins a battle.
By all rights P, who clearly does bear the characteristic of a speciﬁc period, ought to
come oﬀ even better. J and E “only loosely heaped up the received building stones; P, however,
erected a uniﬁed structure according to his tastes.”⁵⁹ But P is seriously downgraded in
54. Ibid., lix = lxix.
55. Ibid., lxi = lxxi.
56. Ibid., lxxi = lxxxii–lxxxiii.
57. Ibid., lxxiii = lxxxv.
58. Ibid., lxxiii–lxxiv = lxxxv. “So dürfen wir uns die Sammler denken, als ihr Volk weit überragend, mit der
Absicht, es durch die Sammlung der Sagen in einem großen Werke zu den Idealen emporzuheben, die
ihnen selber vorschwebten.”
59. Ibid., lxxxii = xcvii.
 . :    ’       
Gunkel’s total calculation. Why? P appears to descend from the stunted father administering
Passover rites to his children. P’s “is the spirit of an orthodoxy ambivalent to history.”⁶⁰ He
“has the tone of prosaic learning, indeed, oen in the style of legal documents.” And he is
“painfully precise and exemplarily orderly, but he, like many other scholars, was not gied
with a feeling for poetry.”⁶¹ He is far too fond of structure. “is order-loving man encased the
colorful legends of the ancient period in his gray schemata.” At his touch the legends of old
“lost all their poetic fragrance.”⁶² What is lost, in the ﬁnal equation, is genuine personal piety.
P’s poetic failure, concomitantly a failure to understand the historical nature of his material,
stems from a religious failure. Hence this “author’s religion is characterized by the fact that he
says almost nothing about the personal piety of the fathers [die persönliche Frömmigkeit der
Väter]… e religion he knows consists of regulation of practices.”⁶³ J and E clung to “vital
legend” as best they could, but by P’s time, Gunkel reasons, “a massive spiritual revolution
must have occurred in the meanwhile, a revolution that created something entirely new in the
place of the old folk tradition recorded in the legends.”⁶⁴ is had its perks. “P’s concept of
God is higher, more developed than in the ancient legends. Nevertheless, P stands far below
these ancients who, although they did not yet know the ‘ecclesiology’ of Jerusalem, knew what
piety is.”⁶⁵
So too in “our churches” Gunkel feels called to the double task of purging ignorance
and preserving or restoring the youthful piety it masks. (is dynamic mirrors the two-part
thrust of his methodology.) Rationalism and the Reformation each play a part in the necessary
60. Ibid., lxxxii = xcvi.
61. Ibid., lxxx = xciii, my emphasis.
62. Ibid., lxxxi = xciv, cf. lxxiv = lxxxvi.
63. Ibid., lxxxii = xcv.
64. Ibid., lxxxiv = xcvii. For Gunkel the change must have been provoked by the exile. See lxxxiv = xcviii: P is
credited with “the beginnings of ‘world history’” but criticized for falsifying it. Gunkel then contrasts the
“piety of the patriarchs” with the (less desirable) “piety of the Babylonian Exile.”
65. Ibid., lxxxiii = xcvi. Gunkel thinks P’s history of the turn to a higher concept of God is “childish,” however
(lxxxii = xcv): “Nor may we fail to mention that this viewpoint of P—that Yahweh ﬁrst revealed himself
very generally as ‘God,’ then somewhat more speciﬁcally as El shaddai, and only at the end by his proper
name—is still very childish. e actual history of religion [Geschichte der Religion] does not begin with the
general and develop toward the concrete, but, to the contrary, it begins with the most concrete and only
slowly and gradually do people learn to comprehend the abstract.”
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puriﬁcations, but since religious practice breeds tenacious habits, the best hope for worship
may be to move praxis in a more conceptual direction. In short, “a vital, truly historical under-
stand of the history of Israel’s religion” is indispensable for Gunkel,⁶⁶ and it could well be that
the cultural project which strives for this understanding has become nothing less than true
religion itself. e closing remarks of Gunkel’s introduction to Genesis illustrate this possibili-
ty. “Israel produced great religious reformers who created a comprehensive unity in religious
spirit from the dispersed traditions of their people. But it did not produce a Homer. is is
fortunate for our scholarship,” and thus, “because there was no great poetic whole and the pas-
sages were le in an essentially unfused state, we are able to discern the history of the whole
process.”⁶⁷ Genesis lacks formal and poetic unity, and yet it rivals “the greatest creations of the
human spirit.” It participates in the “inner unity that uniﬁes all the variety” of other great cre-
ations, such as cathedrals, the state, or Faust. ese are of course human creations. “One will
be unable, however, to prevent the pious observer who has reached this conclusion from rec-
ognizing this unity in the variety of the history of Israel’s religion as the providence of God
who once spoke childishly to children and then maturely to adults [zu Männern männlich].”⁶⁸
us Gunkel, with this bizarre fusion of 1 Corinthians 13 and turn of the century German
protestant liberalism, stands ready as one of the prophets of old for the service of his people
and his God.
ere is a vast divide running through the canon for Gunkel: a darkening of sagas
removed from life and collected on paper, a massive revolution in religion between J/E and P,
an invasion of rationalism between the spirit of individual poets and the epigones who praised
the law, a deplorable textual tangle that separates the ﬁery prophets from the books that
wrongly carry their names. Proper piety needs to jettison the false adulthood of Israelite legal-
ism, and to rediscover the childlike, pre-textual, naive but pure religion of the ancients. us
the canon must be unmade for the sake of religion. But then the brave youth of the ancients
66. Ibid., lxxx = xciii.
67. Ibid., lxxxvi = xcix.
68. Ibid., lxxxvi = c.
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and the passion of the ﬁrst reformers also has to be combined with Gunkel’s advanced, sci-
entiﬁc learning, and this compels him to refashion the canon, or at least its spiritual equiva-
lent, in his own day. Unreconciled with his indiﬀerence to the ﬁnal form is his thoroughgoing
preference for Israelite religion over all other religions of the ancient Near East. Almost with-
out exception Israel’s reworking of ANE material is “much more moderate and sane.” But then
what if the modern biblical critic is not one of the tradition’s master distillers? Or, what hap-
pens when the wheels fall oﬀ the cultural/religious project in which the unity of Israel, cathe-
dral domes, Goethe, humanity’s collective spirit, and the state, can all be earnestly invoked in
the same breath? Gunkel’s profound ambivalence to canon has been noticed in the literature
once or twice before, yet it is not widely recognized (at least not in English). I will therefore
conclude this section by developing the point in a little detail.
Gunkel was adamant that Religionsgeschichte did not mean the history of all religion,
but of the biblical religion. He strove against the “Schranken des Kanons” maintained by
church dogma, to be sure. And he wanted to rescue pseudepigraphal books (such as 4 Esra)
from disrepute. If one could bringing a wider history into daylight one could at last conceive
of “die gesamte Geschichte der israelitisch-jüdisch-urchristlichen Religion als Einheit.” Yet
Gunkel was anxious when some pushed further than he intended: “zugleich aber tat man im
Geiste Tür und Tor auf, um alles Ausländische, woraus sich irgend etwas für das Verständnis
der Bibel ergäbe, mit Freuden einzulassen: auch dies in starkem Gegensatz gegen die Vergan-
genheit, die gegen das Nicht-Biblische vielfach gleichgültig oder gar voreingenommen gewe-
sen war.”⁶⁹ e conceptual unity oﬀered in history not a unity of world religion; rather the
unity sought is of the “Israelite-Jewish-Christian” religious trajectory. e point is made with
perfect clarity in 1922. “Wenn wir also damals ‘Religionsgeschichte’ auf unser Banner
schrieben, so dachten wir nicht an eine ‘Geschichte der Religionen,’ sondern an eine
Geschichte der biblischen Religion.”⁷⁰
69. Gunkel, Christliche Welt, 153–154.
70. Gunkel, Richtungen, 66; cited in Klatt, Gunkel, 27 (cf. all of 26–28).
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Hence the ﬁrst methodological principle in Creation and Chaos, that the full history of
a thing must be pursued because subsequent developments can be as or more important than
origins, has a strong proviso in it. Gunkel may feel the need “to be protected against misun-
derstanding” given the way he challenges the traditional dogmas; yet he certainly does not
“deny the particularity of Israelite religion” and does, in his own way, support “the belief that in
this history God has revealed himself in a special way.”⁷¹ Klatt describes the situation forcefully.
“Die babylonische Religion erscheint in Schöpfung und Chaos nur in einer negativen Beleuch-
tung, und Gott scheint mit Israel doch eine besondere Geschichte gehabt zu haben.” He also
rightly discerns that, although Gunkel would seem to aﬃrm truth in all religion, “liegt hier ein
Problem, für dessen Lösung … Gunkel auch in den folgenden Jahren und Jahrzehnten nicht
genügend systematische Kra besaß.”⁷²
By removing a vital function of the canon to history Gunkel only exacerbates the prob-
lem of the biblical tradition’s unity. A more traditional doctrine of providence would of course
aﬃrm God’s activity in the whole of human history, but Creation and Chaos insists on a more
radical theology in a history-of-religions mode. “eologisch gesehen, fordert Gunkel hier
eine religionsgeschtlich ausgerichtete eologie, die Oﬀenbarung Gottes nicht versteht als ein
isoliertes Handeln Gottes an einem bestimmten Volk oder einzelnen Personen in diesem
Volk, sondern die das Handeln Gottes in der gesamten Menschheitsgeschichte als Oﬀen-
barung, d. h. die Menschheitsgeschichte als Oﬀenbarungsgeschichte begrei.”⁷³ Were there
torches of light in Babylon and Egypt? Yes. And yet the brightest lights of the ANE burn in
Israel, and are picked up, somehow or other, in Christianity.⁷⁴ e history attested in the
Christian canon, though it must be reordered, and though it continues beyond the established
borders into apocryphal texts, is the one history into which all other ancient history runs. To
use Klatt’s word, Gunkel copes with the disconnect between canonical and ostensive history
71. Gunkel, Creation and Chaos, xl = vi, my emphasis.
72. Klatt, Gunkel, 77.
73. Ibid., 80.
74. Gunkel was not particularly clear about the relation of Israel to the Church, or to Judeo-Christian culture
in the West. Klatt contends that Gunkel’s approach to Christ amounts to a ﬂight to mysticism (ibid., 99).
 . :    ’       
by setting history on a “gradient” (Gefälle) that slopes toward canon.⁷⁵ Gunkel never arrives at
the ﬁnal form, of course, since for him the spirits which it attests live in history, not on paper.
But this move raises a troubling question:
Indem Gunkel eine … literaturgeschichtliche und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung
der Heiligen Schri fordert mit dem Ziel einer geschichtlichen Darstellung, ist einmal der
Gefahr gewehrt, daß durch die kritische Analyse der Kanon von innen her aufgelöst und
eine Einheit der biblischen Bücher nicht mehr auszumachen ist, sondern nur noch eine
Vielfalt von Quellen und religiösen Anschauungen. Die Einheit der Heiligen Schri wird
zurückgeführt auf die hinter ihr liegende Geschichte. Damit kommt aber nun … die Frage in
Sicht, worin diese Geschichte ihre Einheit hat, m. a. W. es wird die Frage nach dem Gefälle
dieser Geschichte virulent.⁷⁶
Where indeed does the history behind the biblical text ﬁnd its unity? How does one know
which history, or whose, is canonical? And anyhow, what of the subsequent history in which
the “paper” exercised its inﬂuence over later generations? Is this not also, for a text and its
people, a kind of life?
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As for the issue discussed in chapter two, the relationship of the Christian Bible’s two
testaments, for Gunkel “kommt die gesamtbiblische theologische Problematik hier überhaupt
nicht in Sicht.”⁷⁷ In point of fact he believed that biblical history of religions would take the
place of the thing called biblical theology. is did not transpire. In this section, as a way of
tracing the aerlife of this aspect of Gunkel’s project, I will drill down through four editions of
a single article as it appears across the four editions of the reference work Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart (RGG), in 1909, 1927, 1957 and 1998.⁷⁸ When Gunkel had it, in the
second edition, it bore the title “Biblische eologie und biblische Religionsgeschichte, I. des
75. Ibid., 80: “Betrachtet man das ‘Gefälle’ der Geschichte nur recht, so fällt die Unvergleichbarkeit der
Oﬀenbarung Gottes im Volke Israel mit etwa in Babylonien oder Ägypten, so sehr auch dort wahre
Gotteserkenntnis vorhanden gewesen ist, erst richt sinnenfällig ins Auge.”
76. Ibid., 189, my emphasis.
77. Ibid., 192.
78. ese are the publication dates only of the four volumes in question.
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AT.” So the question is, in almost a century of Old Testament scholarship, how has the rela-
tionship between these two undertakings shied?
We may begin with Gunkel. In 1927 he writes of the inability of the traditional, dog-
matically ordered biblical theology to bring the “lebendige, aus dem Herzen kommende Reli-
gion” of the Old Testament to expression. Among the “großen religiösen Personen” the
prophets above all have been neglected, not through the fault of the researchers themselves
but due to a ﬂaw in the very nature of the old approach. e dogma of inspiration ﬂattened
the collected biblical material, shoehorning it into a uniﬁed systematic account which good
scholarship has increasingly shown to be incompatible with the history of biblical religion.
“Die Erscheinung, die unser Geschlecht erlebt hat, wonach die B. . durch die ‘Religions-
geschichte Israels’ ersetzt wird, erklärt sich also daraus, daß an Stelle der Inspirationslehre
jetzt der Geist der Geschichtsforschung zu treten beginnt.”⁷⁹ Gunkel predicts that study of the
history of Israelite religion will replace biblical theology in the foreseeable future, and he
believes that the term “Religionsgeschichte,” despite occasional misuse, encompasses far more
appropriately the outlook of biblical research. He concludes by washing his hands of a chal-
lenge raised for dogmatic theology: “In welchem Sinne auch bei dieser religions-
geschichtlichen Betrachtung der biblischen Religionen von Oﬀenbarung zu reden ist, wird die
Dogmatik zu handeln haben.”⁸⁰
Accordingly, the tasks of biblical research are oriented to religion instead of literature.
OT Bibelwissenscha is obligated to discover the meaning of the collected scriptures (“der in
der Bibel gesammelten Schrien”). Because the present text includes errata, a preliminary task
is basic text-criticism. Second, scholars must compare, evaluate and array the biblical material.
is, in a word, is the domain of “Bibelkritik.” ird, the terminal aim of biblical scholarship is
to write “eine Geschichte des Volkes Israel auf allen seinen Lebensäußerungen.”⁸¹ Israel’s his-
79. RGG², 1:1090–1091. Childs actually quotes the last sentence in BTONT, 6. His translation: “e recently
experienced phenomenon of Biblical eology’s being replaced by the history of Israelite religion is to be
explained from the fact that the spirit of historical investigation has now taken the place of a traditional
doctrine of inspiration.”
80. RGG², 1:1091.
81. RGG², 1:1073.
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tory can be further divided into history of culture, or of politics, but ultimately, one should
aspire to history of religion. “Seine höchste Aufgabe ﬁndet der Forscher sodann in einer
Geschichte der Religion und Sittlichkeit Israels, dem Ersatz der früheren ‘Biblischen eolo-
gie.’” But again, for Gunkel it is not just any history, but the “biblische Religionsgeschichte”
which must replace biblical theology. e history of religion centers the Old Testament.⁸² A
further but peripheral task involves the “Schritum Israels.” is has been treated as literary-
history, oen in the genre of Introduction, though the history of the various literary genres
might, Gunkel suggests, be a more fruitful approach in future. Yet Israel’s religious life—life as
opposed to literature—remains the proper focal point.
In the ﬁrst edition of RGG (1909), for which Gunkel’s editorial input was preemi-
nent,⁸³ Bruno Baentsch wrote the equivalent article. It got ﬁled under “Bibelwissenscha: I.
AT, D. Biblische eologie,”⁸⁴ and it might as well have been written by Gunkel. e “großen
religiösen Persönlichkeiten” of the OT are “die eigentlichen Träger der israelitischen Reli-
gion.”⁸⁵ e old biblical theology is criticized (better to speak of Israelite religious history),
dogma’s exclusion of apocryphal and pseudepigraphical texts lamented, revelation set right as
a gradual historical process, systematics ruled out of bounds.
Nur so gewinnen wir ein wirklich geschichtliches und lebendiges Verständnis von den
einzelnen religiös-sittlichen Anschauungen und Ideen, die uns immer als Glieder eines
geistigen Organismus entgegentreten, wie von den einzelnen Perioden des religiösen
Lebens in Israel und der Entwicklung der israelitischen Religion überhaupt. Darum ist an
die Stelle der “Biblischen eologie” mit Recht die “Religionsgeschichte Israel” getreten.⁸⁶
Religious history is even named the “Krone” of all OT sub-specialties. Baentsch had died in
1908, and Gunkel borrows (or possibly plagiarizes) some of the article’s verbiage in the second
82. RGG², 1:1074. “Alle andern alttestamentlichen Disziplinen sollen dieser Aufgabe dienen: eine Forderung,
die aus der Natur des AT, in dem die Religion der eigentliche Mittelpunkt ist, ebenso hervorgeht, wie sie
zugleich dem Bedürfnis des Glaubens entspricht.”
83. For an overview of Gunkel’s involvement in RGG¹ and RGG², see Klatt, Gunkel, 87–90. e suggestion
there is that Gunkel’s reputation was less secure during work on the ﬁrst edition.
84. RGG¹, 1:1194–1197. Childs interacts with Baentsch’s work on Exodus (1903) in 1974, where it tends to
represent the standard critical view. Later Childs remarks: “Baentsch’s companion volume to Gunkel’s
Genesis has long provided a solid, if uninspiring, handling of the technical problems of the Hebrew text”
(Childs, OT Books, 39).
85. RGG¹, 1:1195.
86. RGG¹, 1:1196.
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edition. Apart from the addition of a few distinctives, Gunkel’s most important change was in
amending the title to reﬂect how biblical theology was not really the subject matter, that the
history of Israelite religion was being championed as its surrogate.
ree decades on, in RGG³ (1957), Gunkel’s title was kept verbatim, but the content of
the entry was entirely rewritten by Johannes Hempel. e piece reﬂects a new awareness that
biblische eologie had not in fact died, and that it did not easily coexist with biblische Reli-
gionsgeschichte. In Hempel’s view “hat der Umschwung der theologischen Lage seit 1918,
insonderheit die Betonung der Verwurzelung der ganzen Schri in der Oﬀenbarung des einen
Gottes in Jesus Christus (W. Vischer) und die Erkenntnis der Unmöglichkeit, Wahrheitsfragen
durch rein geschichtliche Forschung zu lösen, zur Forderung einer Neubelebung der B..
neben der Religionsgeschichte geführt.”⁸⁷ e copulative between theology and the history of
religion stayed intact, but a new generation of confessing Christians in Germany had power-
fully challenged the historicist hegemony. eir oﬀensive made Gunkel’s prognostication
about the fate of biblical theology appear much less inevitable.
By the fourth edition (1998), “Biblische eologie” is a distinct entry again, as in 1909,
but for the ﬁrst time in the history of RGG it is discussed as a viable topic in its own right.
Bernd Janowski, whose contribution addresses exegetical (rather than “Fundamentaltheolo-
gisch”) aspects of the pursuit, acknowledges an as yet “ungeklärte Nebeneinander von (reli-
gions-)hist. Methodik und normativem Anspruch.”⁸⁸ e history he details speaks to tortuous
developments in the ﬁeld aer Gunkel. Continuing in the historicist spirit, some began to
emphasize commonalities in the tradition to counteract the stress on diﬀerences (Eichrodt,
Köhler). Others sought to meet somewhere between OT theology and religious history
(König, Sellin, Fohrer). Only with von Rad did a bona ﬁde “Neuorientierung der Disziplin”
commence. His OT eology cast “die Frage nach der Korrelation von Oﬀenbarung und
Gesch. zu ihrem hermeneutischen Prinzip” in a fresh light.⁸⁹ Even though the relationship
87. RGG³, 1:1256. See further Hempel, AT und Religionsgeschichte.
88. RGG⁴, 1:1548.
89. RGG⁴, 1:1547.
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between history of religions and biblical theology remains uncertain, Janowski can speak of
the Christian (not necessarily Jewish) concern for the unity of scripture, the pertinence of
“Geltung (Verbindlichkeit der Schri)” over against “Genese (Entstehung der Überliefer-
ungsvielfalt),” the signiﬁcance of normative disciplines as such—all in a way unthinkable in
Gunkel’s time, and for that matter in Hempel’s. Of the several tasks enumerated for biblical
theology, one is of particular note at present:
Der Entwurf einer B hat von der Existenz und der Anerkennung eines aus den beiden
Testamenten bestehenden bibl. Kanons auszugehen. Inwieweit für eine gesamtbibl. eol.
das Faktum des Kanons relevant ist, ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, daß ein theol. bes-
timmtes Verhältnis beider Testamente zueinander schon für die Entstehung des christl.
Kanons vorauszusetzen ist… In diesem Vorgang wird deutlich, daß das NT sich von seiner
eigenen Schrihermeneutik her gar nicht als von der Lektüre des AT unabhängier Kanon,
der additiv neben das bereits abgeschlossene AT gestellt wurde, versteht, sondern zusam-
men mit jenem ersten Teil—dem später und aufgrund dieses Vorganges so genannten
“AT”—die eine zweigeteilte christl. Bibel sein will.⁹⁰
Such an intricate aﬃrmation of the potential unity of the entire Christian Bible, made in terms
of its ﬁnished character and its historical development, is an index of just how bewildering
and complex the historical and theological problem of the canon has become since Gunkel.
Whether this way of thinking has any promise for the future is naturally a matter of debate.⁹¹
Janowski, for one, ﬁnds grounds for hope.
. :   
Aer Gunkel the form critical method won surprisingly broad support. Gunkel’s
sweeping religious-historical aesthetic was quickly le behind, however, and as E. Blum
explains, methodologically Formgeschichte underwent a “narrowing, which was to mark the
disciplinary discourse for generations.”⁹² Dibelius and Bultmann may have been aware of the
90. RGG⁴, 1:1548, my emphasis. In English translation see further Janowski, One God.
91. Against Childs’ biblical theology, a comparably important attempt (if not quite as unique) from the history
of religions side would have be Albertz’s in 1992. His much discussed history was translated from German
to English with similar dispatch, and it was heralded as the hoped-for replacement of biblical theology,
though of course the “gesamtbiblische theologische Problematik” does not come within its purview.
92. Blum, Formgeschichte, 37.
— :    
initial departure—certainly Gunkel was—but it was easily forgotten.⁹³ Albrecht Alt, for exam-
ple, more strongly emphasizes the pre-literary oral context, and he strives to tighten up the
methodological sloppiness of previous eﬀorts. He wants to uncover the “real origins of
Israelite law” and feels that the newer form- or genre-critical approach “has not yet been
applied as consistently as it ought to be.”⁹⁴ So Gunkel’s sometimes vague appeal to Gattungen
gave way to “a downright ‘mandatory’ relationship between ‘form or genre’ and ‘content.’”⁹⁵
us “vor allem” Alt seeks out the “ältesten und reinsten Ausprägungen nach Form und
Inhalt.”⁹⁶ One distinctive of Gunkel’s approach that becomes muted here is the later textual
history of a tradition. Another, which fades almost as a consequence, is the tacit concern for
canon. Alt notes a “contradiction between the fragmentary state of the literary material and
the unity demanded by the theory [of canon],” but he merely problematizes the older literary-
critical handling of the issue.⁹⁷ He is thus relatively subdued on the question of the triumph of
Israelite religion over rival cultures in the ANE.⁹⁸ Compared with Gunkel, in the search for
the tradition’s “Wurzeln im Leben” Alt operates with a far more detached interest in the roots
themselves.
In a later day Klaus Koch comments on the theological signiﬁcance of form criticism.
e apology that follows sits atop a section entitled “Kanon und biblische Literaturgeschichte.”
Up to this point my task has been to enquire into the principles of form-critical research,
but now I shall try to tackle paths which have been so far little frequented. It concerns
what we might call the keystone to the construction of form-critical exegesis, the theologi-
cal consequences. Most Old and New Testament scholars working from a form-critical
standpoint do not consider the points which I now put forward, and as a rule no one ap-
pears to be interested in them. However, the longer I work with form criticism, the more I
93. Ibid., 36, citing Bultmann, Synoptischen Tradition, 4.
94. Alt, Origins, 86 = Alt, Ursprünge, 284–285.
95. Blum, Formgeschichte, 41. Buss, Form Criticism, 404, feels Alt represents an extreme position.
96. Alt, Ursprünge, 285 = Alt, Origins, 88.
97. Ibid., 81 = Alt, Ursprünge, 278–279.
98. On the other hand, casuistic law originally had an extra-Israelite provenance (now Canaanite rather than
Babylonian) involving “secular justice” in a single tribe; apodictic law, however, was a creation unique to
Israel, “a sacral action involving the whole nation” of confederated tribes (Alt, Origins, 125 = 324). e
“clash” between secular and sacred “is typical of the whole history of Israel, which manifested for centuries
a tension that is essentially due to the encounter of a young people newly come to nationhood and an
ancient and alien culture” (131 = 331). But this is a far cry from the “struggle higher religion fought for
Israel’s soul.”
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feel that these additional (and perhaps ﬁnal!) problems can no longer be evaded, even
though few people other than Gunkel have touched on them.⁹⁹
Koch realizes that Gunkel is just inconsistent on the canon’s literary history. “On one side he
dismisses the late period as the time of the epigones, and on the other he emphasises the theo-
logical importance of the post-biblical writings of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha.” Yet he
“never lost sight of the fact that the Old Testament was not simply a compendium of Israelite
national literature.”¹⁰⁰ is points to a larger hermeneutical (and dogmatic) issue which
requires further thought.
We must ask not only the reason for such an exhaustive investigation of individual units
but quite simply the motive behind any interpretation of the sacred writings [die schlichte
Frage nach dem Ziel der Auslegung der Heiligen Schri überhaupt]. Is an interpreter’s work
ﬁnished with his study of the individual text? Is it enough, as is oen said today, to extract
the kerygma from biblical pericopes? Or must the interpreter seek further for a relation
between the individual passages and the books, between the Old and New Testaments and
the Bible as a whole?¹⁰¹
at was in 1964. At that time Koch believes that “a literary history along the lines of the one
planned by Gunkel is urgently needed, if form criticism is to have any point at all,” and from
where he sits he can see a few promising steps by the likes of Noth, von Rad, Rendtorﬀ and
Lohﬁnk.¹⁰² From the present perspective, however, Koch’s most important insight is that
Gunkel’s work, through a deep antinomy, raises the canon question in a way the subsequent
methodological discussion largely forgot. And apart from Klatt,¹⁰³ very few others have made
the connection.
  
Of course Childs, who reviewed Klatt’s work on Gunkel the year it appeared (1969),¹⁰⁴
did take up the canon question. His sights were aimed at a bigger target than Gunkel—indeed,
99. Koch, Growth, 100 = Koch, Formgeschichte?, 110, my emphasis.
100. Ibid., 102–103 = 113–114.
101. Ibid., 104–105 = 116.
102. Ibid., 105 = 116.
103. Klatt makes a few salient criticisms of Koch’s discussion here: Klatt, Gunkel, 190. Yet Klatt credits Koch for
introducing him to the problem that he eventually took up in his dissertation (7). Koch did not guide the
dissertation, but the foreward to Growth thanks a Mr. Klatt for assisting with proofs and the index.
104. Childs, Review of Klatt. His comments are brief but favorable: “Seldom has this reviewer read a more
informative and thoroughly enjoyable book” (508).
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they were aimed at historical critical method as such—but he worked out his critique from
within especially the form critical tradition associated with Gunkel. is is not to say that
Gunkel would inevitably have agreed with Childs that “the concept of canon was a corollary of
inspiration,” or that the canon “set the boundaries within which God’s voice was heard.”¹⁰⁵
Rather, the point is that for Gunkel inspiration did have a corollary, if less obviously associated
with its erstwhile companion, revelation, and it entailed distinct boundaries on the arena
within which God’s voice was heard. Revelation did occur, aer a fashion. And yet like Koch,
Childs’ protest four decades later, in 2005, rings true: “to suggest with some that the theologi-
cal importance of the canon has recently been overemphasized is a gross misunderstanding.
e opposite is nearer the truth.”¹⁰⁶ e canon’s historic purpose has proved enormously diﬃ-
cult to comprehend in the wake of the atomizing done by source and form critical investiga-
tions, and more recently, the mortgaging of canonical boundaries (internal and external) to
tradition-historical processes. e surprising thing about Gunkel’s work in hindsight is how
such borders, despite an internal conﬂict between religious atavism and the progressive
reforms of higher religion, stay vaguely intact.
To those familiar only with the portrait of Childs given in the literature, it may be just
as surprising to learn of the extent to which Childs’ understanding of the canonical process
accepts the messiness of the ﬁnal form, in line with a state of aﬀairs Gunkel emphasizes. In
IOTS Childs hopes “to enter into a post-critical era.”¹⁰⁷ But post-critical does not mean post-
historical. “e term canon has both a historical and a theological dimension.”¹⁰⁸ Childs deals
with these two dimensions in a dialectical fashion, treating them as separate but intimately
105. Childs, Speech-act, 381. I choose the article not quite at random. It is Childs’ last, and it shows clearly that
an interest in the “form” and “function” of scripture never leaves him (cf. 384–385).
106. Ibid., 380.
107. IOTS, 16.
108. IOTS, 58. e literary history in ancient Israel was broader, the canonical history narrower. “e former
process resulted in innumerable forces such as laws of saga, the use of inherited literary patterns of prose
and poetry, the social setting of diverse institutions, the changing scribal techniques etc., whereas the latter
process was much more closely deﬁned by those forces which aﬀected the literature’s evaluation,
transmission, and usage. Although non-religious factors (political, social, and economic) certainly entered
into the canonical process, these were subordinated to the religious usage of the literature by its function
within the community” (61).
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related processes in the canon’s development. For him any eﬀort to patch the tattered authori-
ty of the canon without addressing the historical problematics is rejected as a “theological
construct” because the “recognition of the complex history of the growth of the Old Testa-
ment literature did more than anything else to bring about the collapse of the older dogmatic
understanding of the canon.”¹⁰⁹ us history has to be ingredient in the theological dimension
of canon Childs wants at long last to address. And history teaches that the older dogmatic
understandings were inadequate. “For theological reasons the biblical texts were oen shaped
in such a way that the original poetic forms were lost, or a uniﬁed narrative badly shattered.
e canonical approach is concerned to understand the nature of the theological shape of the
literature rather than to recover an original literary or aesthetic unity.”¹¹⁰ Something very like
Gunkel’s aesthetic in Genesis is implicitly aﬃrmed—though Childs does not speak of “dark-
ening,” oen the original setting of a tradition has been “blurred”—and in this Childs’
instincts are quite unlike those of Auerbach, or under his tutelage, Frei. (Alter is just beyond
the horizon.) e unity of the ﬁnal form is emphatically not an aesthetic unity in IOTS, or for
that matter anywhere else in Childs’ corpus.
One begins to sense how much Childs’ early immersion in form criticism aﬀects his
formulation of a canonical approach.
Why should one stage in the process be accorded special status? Were not the earlier levels
of the text once regarded as canonical as well, and why should they not continue to be so
regarded within the exegetical enterprise? Is not the history which one recovers in the
growth of a text an important index for studying Israel’s development of a self-understand-
ing, and thus the very object of Old Testament theology? Having been trained in the form-
critical method, I feel the force of these questions and am aware of the value of the
approach.¹¹¹
On what basis then can a critically informed scholar speak of the integrity of the ﬁnal form?
“e reason for insisting on the ﬁnal form of scripture lies in the peculiar relationship
between the text and the people of God which is constitutive of the canon.”¹¹² is is both a
109. IOTS, 60.
110. IOTS, 74, my emphasis.
111. IOTS, 75. Cf. the more traditional use of form criticism in, e.g., Memory, 34, 46.
112. IOTS, 75, cf. 41.
— :    
theological and a historical judgment (and, we might add, though the history behind the text
is Childs’ primary focus in 1979, it is not the only kind of history that counts: there is also the
history of scripture’s Wirkung). e peculiar relationship between God’s text and God’s people
begins well within the biblical period, Childs argues, and the series of decisions made in that
formative period were meant to be come binding on future generations of Israel. Childs says
his “Introduction attempts to oﬀer a diﬀerent model for the discipline from that currently rep-
resented. It seeks to describe the form and function of the Hebrew Bible in its role as sacred
scripture for Israel.”¹¹³ ere really should be no doubt that Childs writes as a Fachmann in an
established tradition, for that tradition.
But if Childs does not feature in the histories of form criticism (Buss hardly mentions
his work, and virtually never aer 1970), it may be due to the fact that he turns it on its head.
“Beginning in the pre-exilic period, but increasing in signiﬁcance in the post-exilic era, a force
was unleashed by Israel’s religious use of her traditions which exerted an inﬂuence on the
shaping of the literature… Israel deﬁned itself in terms of a book! e canon formed the deci-
sive Sitz im Leben for the Jewish community’s life, thus blurring the sociological evidence
most sought aer by the modern historian.”¹¹⁴ Paper, contra Gunkel, was accorded religious
signiﬁcance. e textualization of the tradition did not create a barrier to life, but rather
placed a text at the very heart of true religion in Israel.
To bring Frei’s Eclipse back into the mix, faced with a choice between canon and “true”
history, Gunkel made the wrong choice. “Scripture bears witness to God’s activity in history
on Israel’s behalf, but history per se is not a medium of revelation which is commensurate with
canon.”¹¹⁵ Gunkel was right to a point. Unlike the Reformers, in the post-Enlightenment era it
became impossible “to assume the coherence of text and historical reference” and “the biblical
interpreter was forced either to be critical, anti-critical, or postcritical, but the pre-critical
option has been forever lost.”¹¹⁶ Gunkel has no diﬃculty extending the biblical history right
113. IOTS, 16, my emphasis.
114. IOTS, 78, cf. 61–62.
115. IOTS, 76.
116. Childs, Vitringa, 98.
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into his own historical moment. But as Childs reads the history of the discipline, by the nine-
teenth century “scholars who pursued historical criticism of the Old Testament no longer
found a signiﬁcant place for the canon. Conversely, those scholars who sought to retain a con-
cept of canon were unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for historical criticism. is is the polarity
which lies at the centre of the problem of evaluating the nature of Old Testament Introduc-
tion.”¹¹⁷ Just so in the scholarly venture “to describe the development of the Hebrew literature
and to trace the earlier and later stages of this history … there always remains an enormous
hiatus between the description of the critically reconstructed literature and the actual canoni-
cal text which has been received and used as authoritative scripture by the community.”¹¹⁸ Or
as I have argued above, such a hiatus exists within Gunkel’s very own reading of the history of
biblical literature, and to a considerable degree it confounds his methodological formulations.
e poles of biblical and real history have come apart, though in a strange way for Gunkel
they are still in the same orbit.
It would be a long time aer Gunkel until the study of biblical forms (genres) troubled
with scripture’s ﬁnal form again. By then so many other factors will have changed that one
could well ask whether the approaches have all that much else in common.
   
A great deal has been made of the relationship of Childs’ work to von Rad’s. ere is at
least one dissertation on the topic exclusively.¹¹⁹ In published literature lines of continuity and
discontinuity have been developed by a variety of scholars. Oeming’s study of 1985 draws out
some implications. Steins puts forward a comparison focused on Genesis 22.¹²⁰ Some have
suggested that the new interest in canon properly begins with von Rad. Rendtorﬀ makes this
117. IOTS, 45. Gunkel had no love for the genre Introduction, but the history of it that Childs tells here has
wider implications.
118. IOTS, 40.
119. Hartzfeld, Two Methodologies. Von Rad’s “method” is preferred (210). is work suﬀers from a weakness
common to all studies of Childs in the 1980s and early 1990s, namely, that one of the most important
pieces of “data” (BTONT) was not available. It also buys into an overly restricted deﬁnition of “canon” (20,
108n48).
120. Steins, Bindung, 5, 122–125, 175.
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move distinctly, as was seen in chapter one. Janowski asserts that he achieved a “Neuori-
entierung der Disziplin” (above)—undoubtedly true—and in a recent volume he edited on the
hermeneutics of canon, J. Barthel speaks of the “kanonhermeneutische Debatte seit Gerhard
von Rad.”¹²¹ Others have been less quick to subsume Childs’ work under that trajectory.
Nicholson, for instance, points to the following classic statement of von Rad’s, part of which
Childs cites in IOTS:
e Hexateuch in its present form arose by means of redactors who heard the peculiar tes-
timony of faith of each document and considered it binding. ere is no doubt that the
present Hexateuch in its ﬁnal form makes great demands on the understanding of every
reader. Many ages, many men, many traditions and theologies, have constructed this mas-
sive work. Only the one who does not look superﬁcially at the Hexateuch but reads it with
a knowledge of its deep dimension will arrive at true understanding. Such a one will know
that revelations and religious experiences of many ages are speaking from it. For no stage
in this work’s long period of growth is really obsolete; something of each phase has been con-
served and passed on as enduring until the Hexateuch attained its ﬁnal form.¹²²
us ends Nicholson’s survey of pentateuchal research in the twentieth century, which decides
against Childs that “[t]o concentrate upon the ﬁnal stage is to foreshorten what was a long
process of reﬂection, debate, and not infrequently controversy in the history of the communi-
ty of faith.”¹²³ is betrays an imprecise understanding of what is actually claimed in IOTS, yet
it represents another common judgment—that in essential respects Childs does not improve
upon von Rad, and may actually take a step backwards. In Britain, a more appreciative and
nuanced discussion of Childs with an eye to von Rad may be found in the writings of
Moberly.¹²⁴
Childs himself has a bit to say about von Rad (one of his “unforgettable teachers”). Of
the passage just cited, for instance, he quickly admits that von Rad is right about the “layering
of tradition” in Genesis, but he criticizes him for a failure “to reckon seriously with full impli-
cations of the canonical process on the traditioning process.”¹²⁵ (Incidentally, that the charge
121. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte. He qualiﬁes this somewhat—see below.
122. Von Rad, Genesis [ET¹], 27 = von Rad, Genesis⁵, 19–20. e italicized line (in translation) is cited in IOTS,
157. Childs reviewed two editions of the translation, in 1962 and 1974.
123. Nicholson, Pentateuch, 268. is take on the canonical approach has been inﬂuenced by Barr; cf. Childs’
response in Struggle, 320–321.
124. E.g., Moberly, Bible, eology, Faith, 1 and passim.
125. IOTS, 157.
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has at least some justice is immediately seen in von Rad’s preference for the term Hexateuch. It
is odd that Nicholson can conclude a book about the Pentateuch with a remark suggesting the
very designation of ﬁve books is wrong, or has proximate importance.) One could go so far as
to say that a major component of IOTS is its running critique of von Rad’s (among others’)
understanding of the canonical signiﬁcance of actualization (=Vergegenwärtigung),¹²⁶ in place
of which Childs defends a once-and-for-all actualization in the ﬁnal form:
it is constitutive of the canon to seek to transmit the tradition in such a way as to prevent
its being moored in the past. Actualization … is built into the structure of the text itself…
e usual critical method of biblical exegesis is, ﬁrst, to seek to restore an original histori-
cal setting by stripping away those very elements which constitute the canonical shape.
Little wonder that once the biblical text has been secure anchored in the historical past by
“decanonizing” it, the interpreter has diﬃculty applying it to the modern religious
context.¹²⁷
An indirect but extensive conﬁrmation of this point may reside in a study conducted under
Childs’ guidance at Yale in the late 1970s. J. Groves’ Actualization and Interpretation in the Old
Testament gives a thorough account and critique of actualization in von Rad’s work, and at
several turns one senses the hand of the supervisor.¹²⁸ Outside IOTS, Childs’ next most
important title here is probably “Gerhard von Rad in American Dress” (1986), which com-
mends Groves’ analysis and argues that many of the complexities of von Rad’s method and
theology have been lost in translation. is helps explain the way his work “has been accom-
modated to the ideology of American theological liberalism,” but then there is “a ﬂaw in von
Rad’s theology which has functioned in both [sic] American, British, and European theology
to blur the Christological center of his theology.”¹²⁹ Von Rad rightly holds to this center; he
does not recognize the extent or interpretive signiﬁcance of the transformation that took place
later in Israel’s life in the textualization of its tradition.
Especially following BTONT, a further aspect of Childs’ critique of tradition history
has been carried forward in numerous publications by Seitz. He mounts an argument about
126. Childs, Memory, 81.
127. IOTS, 79.
128. Yale dissertation of 1979, published in 1987 as Groves, Actualization (see esp. 103–163).
129. Childs, Von Rad, 85.
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the nature of Christian scripture in its received, two testament form which calls for a retention
of the canonical border between Old and New. One title captures the problem with von Rad’s
work from this perspective especially well: “Two Testaments and the Failure of One Tradition-
History.”¹³⁰ It also gets at why Childs and Seitz diﬀerentiate the canonical approach from those
following von Rad who take up tradition history as a way of uniting the testaments.¹³¹
More recently Seitz has turned his attention to a study of the hermeneutics of biblical
prophecy.¹³² It contains a careful reading of a passage in the sixth edition of von Rad’s Genesis
commentary, revised just before his death in 1971. Von Rad considers F. Rosenzweig’s sugges-
tion that R, the ﬁnal redactor of the Pentateuch, should stand for Rabbenu, “our master.” e
OT theologian is drawn to this Jewish aﬃrmation of a composite ﬁnal form, with a depth
dimension intact, yet he pushes back by insisting that for Christian readers Jesus Christ is the
true master.¹³³ Seitz concludes:
It was unnecessary, and indeed somewhat confusing, for von Rad to speak about Jesus
Christ in contrast to some other sort of “master.” Indeed, one could just as easily say that
the access Jesus Christ gives those outside Israel, in the Christian church, is an access to
“our master” as reﬂected in the ﬁnal form of the text, seen now from the perspective of the
post-Easter faith. ere need be no theological distinguishing of Jesus Christ as the
bringer of the Old Testament to the Gentile Christian church and the Old Testament in its
ﬁnal literary form. Indeed, this form preserves a composite character constrained within
the ﬁnal literary shape. e New Testament’s hearing of the Old occurs with reference,
therefore, not to a critically delineated tradition-history, but to the Old Testament’s ﬁnal
form, a form which Rosenzweig sought to honor when he spoke of the ﬁnal form of Gene-
sis as bequeathed to us—Jew and Gentile—by Rabbenu (our Master).¹³⁴
e way this analysis tacks about von Rad’s late attraction to the ﬁnal form recalls the course
plotted by Childs in 1979, 1986 and elsewhere. Christ is aﬃrmed in the Old Testament’s literal
sense, a deliverance independent of what the New Testament makes of the Old (by its discrete
130. In Seitz, Figured Out, 35–47. Cf. also “e Historical-Critical Endeavor as eology: e Legacy of
Gerhard von Rad,” in Seitz, Word, 28–40.
131. H. Gese, P. Stuhlmacher and H. Hübner are recurring examples. (R. Hays is indicted with similar charges.)
In incipient form see Childs, Biblische eologie, 23, and cf. BTONT, 70–79.
132. A piece oﬀered at the Heidelberg symposium for von Rad, Seitz, Prophecy and Tradition-History, now
contributes to a more comprehensive argument in Seitz, Prophecy and Hermeneutics (2007). Childs had
just read a dra of this book when I interviewed him in Cambridge, 5 April 2006. He enthused that it was
the best work on von Rad he had seen in the English-speaking world.
133. Rad, Genesis [ET²], 42–43. Moberly, Bible, eology, Faith, 143 discusses the same passage, as does Barton,
Canon, 41; cf. Steins, Bindung, 21n48.
134. Seitz, Prophecy and Tradition-History, 44–45 = idem, Prophecy and Hermeneutics, 177.
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witness, in Childs’ language). Von Rad rightly perceives the scope of the Old Testament wit-
ness but misunderstands the way in which that witness is handed to the church. In prophetic
terms, it is not the case that “Israel’s history with God thrusts forward violently into the
future,” from Old to New.¹³⁵ What the church receives from Israel, in material form, is not
diﬀerent from Jewish scripture, although of course the ways in which church and synagogue
appropriate (or are appropriated by) the scriptures of Israel are very diﬀerent indeed. As Seitz
puts it in another context, “It remains meaningful that the terms ‘Old Testament’ and ‘Tanak’
are both postbiblical terms. Both require a commitment to a subsequent theological literature.
Neither goes straightforwardly back to the scriptures of Israel without argument and
defense.”¹³⁶ We will take up Childs’ own wrestling with like questions in the next chapter; for
now, note how Seitz’s, which is very close to it, declines to follow the gesamtbiblische recipe
cooked up by von Rad.
In conclusion, two points need to be emphasized about von Rad’s bearing on Childs’
canonical proposal. First, to the banal observation that Childs’ theological approach to scrip-
ture has a good deal more in common with von Rad’s than Gunkel’s, caution warns against
making too direct an identiﬁcation. In a limited way Nicholson and Seitz speak together
against Rendtorﬀ ’s anachronism of transferring insights about canonical, ﬁnal form exegesis
from Childs to von Rad. To be sure, there are anticipations of Childs’ theology in von Rad’s,
but one wants to be sure about exactly what these are, and to leave room for departure and/or
innovation on the part of the latter. Barthel’s decision to track the “kanonhermeneutische
Debatte” from von Rad is at best misleading.¹³⁷ Childs’ approach hopes to turn Gunkel upside
135. Rad, OT eology, 2:332, cited Childs, Von Rad, 83. For Seitz’s discussion the recurring phrase “violently
thrusting forward” see Seitz, Prophecy and Hermeneutics, 21, 50–51, 73, 98, 111, 117, 248.
136. Seitz, Figured Out, 43.
137. Barthel, Kanonhermeneutische Debatte, 3: “wenn von Rad selbst das hermeneutische Problem des Kanons
in seiner eologie des Alten Testaments nicht eigens reﬂektiert hat und deshalb nur bedingt als Referenz
für eine kanonische eologie in Anspruch genommen werden kann, liegt eine solche Reﬂexion doch im
Gefälle einer gesamtbiblischen eologie.” is quite rightly rejects Rendtorﬀ ’s transference of canon from
Childs to von Rad, and I am appreciative of von Rad’s gesamtbiblische precedent, but BTONT aims to break
with his model exactly at the point where one decides how to move from OT to NT, a step von Rad never
fully took. Moreover, it was Childs and not von Rad who did most to bring canon to the attention of the
German debate (chapter one).
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down, and in profound ways it would invert basic commitments of von Rad as well—not least
to a unifying tradition-historical trajectory. As the introduction to IOTS states,
Having experienced the demise of the Biblical eology movement in America, the disso-
lution of the broad European consensus in which I was trained, and a widespread confu-
sion regarding theological reﬂection in general, I began to realize that there was some-
thing fundamentally wrong with the foundations of the biblical discipline. It was not a
question of improving on a source analysis, of discovering some unrecognized new genre,
or of bringing a redactional layer into shaper focus. Rather, the crucial issue turned on
one’s whole concept of the study of the Bible itself. I am now convinced that the relation
between the historical critical study of the Bible and its theological use as religious litera-
ture within a community of faith and practice needs to be completely rethought. Minor
adjustments are not only inadequate, but also conceal the extent of the dry rot.¹³⁸
Childs goes clear back to the foundations of form critical research, and beyond. In the same
decade in which Koch scratches his head and wonders if anybody else in the guild remembers
the Ziel of the exposition of Holy Scripture as such, Childs begins to rethink completely how
academic study of the form and function of biblical texts relates to its received form and its
ongoing function in actual, living communities of faith and practice. Koch suggests that tradi-
tion history is ready made for theological application, and obviously there are those today
who subscribe to a derivative model. Childs is not one of them. Part of my purpose in study-
ing Gunkel in this chapter is to illustrate the radical extent of Childs’ counter-proposal.
Second, following from this, the critique nonetheless comes from within a recognized
tradition. Another way to say this is that Childs was not so critical of von Rad while at Heidel-
berg and Basel. If, as he says at the Barth colloquium in 1969, he experienced a change of
heart aer returning to America (from where he saw the dissolution of the broad European
consensus he knew), to some degree he must also have broken ranks with that “biblical pha-
lanx” from his student days. Childs recollects hearing von Rad’s famous 1952 lecture on typol-
ogy. “I was sitting somewhere near Barth, and it seemed to me that there were some of the
most glorious lectures I’d ever heard—so crystal clear and all. When he ﬁnished, Barth turned
around in a half-sleepy way to the person behind him and said, ‘Ich habe ihn gar nicht ver-
standen,’ which seemed to me appalling, and I felt like saying, ‘Herr Professor, I can explain it
all to you.’” Yet reconsidering Barth meant reconsidering von Rad, too: “in the years that have
138. IOTS, 15.
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passed, the more I read over that article, the more I wonder, perhaps Barth didn’t understand
it because it wasn’t quite as clear as I had thought.”¹³⁹ Like von Rad, Childs will think hard
about typology (chapter six); but from no later than Crisis he consciously pulls away from von
Rad, in how he approaches ﬁguration and in a host of other respects.
is is not to say that Childs’ broke with his training altogether. e point is rather
that he comes to seek reform. is shi can be seen in the way Childs’ early work on form
modulates into a concern to describe the ﬁnal form. Surely there are echos of von Rad in
Childs’ form critical study of 1962. It speaks of the actualization of cultic tradition in a way
that will become problematic: “e great acts of the tradition are not removed in past time,
but recharged with energy they become again a present event.”¹⁴⁰ Similarly, the relative weight
of oral tradition (as against its textualized aerlife) is greater than it will be before long: “How
can one accurately trace the development of a term in a living oral tradition solely on the basis
of chance occurrences on the literary level?”¹⁴¹ And Childs quotes von Rad, with approval, to
this eﬀect: “If we want to go a step farther, instead of working with proof texts, it is necessary
to throw light on the speciﬁc cultic tradition which lies behind the single statements and to
arrange them from the point of view of the history of the tradition.”¹⁴² But then other state-
ments in 1962, seen from a post-IOTS vantage, presage a very new application of form criti-
cism. “e role of actualization underwent a process of transformation.”¹⁴³ At many points an
old tradition inherited from the cult is given “new meaning,” a “new role” in a “new context.”
In one case “[a]n expansion of the form away from its cultic origin” emerges.¹⁴⁴ In another,
Childs rejects an interpretation that posits an adaptation of a hymn (Psalm 77) for a cultic fes-
139. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 30. e lecture in question is Rad, Typologische. One of Childs’ very ﬁrst
articles comes somewhat closer to von Rad here (Childs, Prophecy and Fulﬁllment, esp. 262).
140. Childs, Memory, 63. It is a word study, too: Childs will take Barr’s criticism to heart in future work.
Memory also comes up for criticism in Groves, Actualization.
141. Childs, Memory, 34.
142. Von Rad, Gerechtigkeit, 238, cited in translation in Childs, Memory, 34n1. e essay was shortly translated
in full as von Rad, Righteousness (there 256).
143. Childs, Memory, 76.
144. Ibid., 44. A more chastened appreciation of the way von Rad explores the change in function of traditional
language across its history can be seen as late as 1987: Childs, Death and Dying.
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tival. One could almost speak of a general loosening of texts from their origins. Childs also
insists “that there are no avenues to the history of which the Bible speaks except through the
Scripture’s own testimony to these events.”¹⁴⁵ And even more obviously counter to an under-
standing current in Gunkel’s time: “Redemptive history is not merely a reﬂection of Israel’s
piety—a Glaubensgeschichte.”¹⁴⁶ Or ﬁnally, “biblical events have the dynamic characteristic of
refusing to be relegated to the past. e quality of this reality did not remain static, but
emerged with new form and content because it identiﬁed itself with the changing historical sit-
uations of later Israel.”¹⁴⁷ One begins to appreciate why E. Gerstenberger, who revisited Childs’
early form critical work in preparation for remarks at a memorial session in his honor, con-
cludes that durable threads of continuity run right back to the beginning of Childs’ publishing
career.¹⁴⁸
All this raises the question of continuity and change in Childs’ work. ere are two
major turns, in my judgment, the ﬁrst of which has just been outlined. Somewhere in the late
1960s Childs reorients his study of biblical forms toward the ﬁnal form. is entails taking
steps away from von Rad and the tradition-historical school at large. Extensions and reﬁne-
ments notwithstanding, the (two testament) canon question remains determinative from Bib-
lical eology in Crisis.¹⁴⁹ e second turn, enclosed within the ﬁrst, concerns what Childs
calls the “mystery of Israel.” It is to that which we now give our attention.
145. Childs, Memory, 88.
146. Ibid., 89.
147. Ibid., 88, my emphasis.
148. SBL San Diego, 18 November 2007.
149. Seitz, eological Interpretation, 59 correctly ﬁnds several deﬁning features of the canonical approach in
place by 1970. See the introduction.
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Old is to New Testament not as Tanak is to Talmud. Instead, the concept of a literary
canon, based on a covenantal relationship, is extended to a secondary, literarily
distinctive deposit whose formation and rationale is developed on analogy to the ﬁrst,
with a new covenantal relationship at its heart. e testaments are, of course, diﬀerent,
and they bear witness to the one subject matter of them both, in diﬀerent ways. ‘Tanak
to Talmud’ may actually be more akin to what Gese means by ‘tradition-history,’ strictly
speaking. —Christopher Seitz
By 1967 Childs’ waning conﬁdence in orality’s prioritization over textuality in tradition-his-
torical research leads him to reconsider the status of midrash. Gunkel felt it was “to Well-
hausen’s undying credit” to have exposed the “character” of P,¹ and he almost certainly would
have agreed that Wellhausen got the true measure of the Chronicler as well, whose midrashic
activity conﬁrms his as the age of the scribes. Midrash, Wellhausen concludes,
is the consequence of the conservation of all the relics of antiquity, a wholly peculiar artiﬁ-
cial reawakening of dry bones, especially by literary means, as is shown by the preference
for lists of names and numbers. Like ivy it overspreads the dead trunk with extraneous life,
blending old and new in a strange combination. It is a high estimate of tradition [Hoch-
schätzung der Überlieferung] that leads to its being thus modernised; but in the process it
is twisted and perverted, and set oﬀ with foreign accretions in the most arbitrary way…
Within this sphere, wherein all Judaism moves, Chronicles also has had its rise. us
whether one says Chronicles or Midrash of the Book of Kings is on the whole a matter of
perfect indiﬀerence; they are children of the same mother, and indistinguishable in spirit
and language, while on the other hand the portions which have been retained verbatim
from the canonical Book of Kings at once betray themselves in both respects.²
Childs’ last major form critical study (in the traditional sense), Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis,
evaluates diverse biblical accounts of the invasion of 701, including three in II Kings 18–19 (A,
B¹, B²) and the Chronicler’s harmonization of these traditions in II Chronicles 32. Childs ﬁnds
that Wellhausen’s characterization of the latter “has wrought much havoc,”³ and he gives an
1. Gunkel, Genesis, lxxx = xciii.
2. Wellhausen and Smith, History of Israel, 227 = idem, Geschichte Israels, 223.
3. Assyrian, 107n4. e passage stayed with Childs. He mentions it in 1996 (Childs, Retrospective Reading,
alternative account of what he is content to call “the midrash of the Chronicler” on Kings.⁴
Not unlike B², Chronicles presents an idealized piety. Hezekiah is “a model of faith in God.”⁵
But the designation “legend” does not adequately describe the later portrait because the text
does not rework oral tradition:
A basic characteristic of the account is its dependence upon written sources. is is not to
suggest that the Chronicler’s only source was Kings… Rather, the point being argued is
that the compiler of II Chron. 32 had the Kings account available to him as a written
source. e thesis of an alleged reference to temple records, which were independent of
the book of Kings in its Dtr. redaction does not do justice to the Chronicler’s text. is de-
pendence on a written source at once distinguishes the Chronicler’s account from those of
Kings. Both B¹ and B² were dependent on oral tradition which they then reworked in
diﬀerent ways.⁶
is distinction is what makes it appropriate to speak of midrash in the Chronicler’s case. “By
midrash we mean a speciﬁc form of literature which is the product of an exegetical activity by
a circle of scholars interpreting a sacred text. Essential to the midrash is an attempt to eluci-
date a written source.”⁷ It would not be wrong to speak of Schrigelehrten, but the sphere and
spirit of their activity must not be distorted. Are they really epigones? At stake is the quality
and religious/theological signiﬁcance of their exegetical activity.
Very shortly Childs will combine this emphasis on the textualization of oral tradition
with a dogmatic point about the authoritative form in which scripture functions: he will speak
of scripture’s textual authority. All the work that follows Assyrian reinforces the historical and
incipiently theological analysis there. As he writes in 1990, “If in early Israel the transmission
and actualization of Israel’s sacred tradition occurred in the context of the cult, increasingly in
the late pre-exilic and post-exilic periods Israel’s tradition was given a written form and trans-
mitted by scribal schools… ere was a growing tendency toward the textualization of the tra-
dition.”⁸ is historical observation always remains part of the bedrock of Childs’ ruled,
canonical approach.
370) along with a few of Wellhausen’s latter-day manifestations.
4. Assyrian, 121.
5. Assyrian, 106.
6. Assyrian, 106, my emphasis.
7. Assyrian, 107.
8. Childs, Generation, 360.
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Early in its development, however, Childs’ work toward a restoration of canon was
more closely allied with midrash (so called) than it would be in time. Footnoted in 1967 is I. L.
Seeligmann’s seminal “Voraussetzungen der Midraschexegese”, from which Childs will borrow
the term Kanonbewußtsein for the “canon conscious” exegesis inside scripture found in
Chronicles and elsewhere. Childs adapts the concept for his own purposes, eventually pursu-
ing its outworking across the entire canon of Jewish scripture, but at ﬁrst it is not clear that
there will be any substantial departure from Seeligmann. In 1972 Childs defends “a form-criti-
cal understanding of midrash” and argues on that basis for signiﬁcant parallels between the
Tannaite and Old Testament periods.⁹ He adjudicates the newer work on midrash ﬁrst cited in
1967—S. Sandmel fails to distinguish the direct literary dependency of parallels from material
that simply shares an oral tradition (e.g., Gen 12 and 20), and so casts too broad a net for
midrash; A. G. Wright, on the other hand, deﬁnes midrash so narrowly that he cannot
connect a description of its known form with its function, which was to “actualize” a canoni-
cal text in a new situation (ideally text will also exegete the present)—evidently agreeing with
Seeligmann, against Sandmel and Wright, that to study inner-biblical midrash is
to trace the forces which were exerted on the interpretation of the Bible by what has aptly
been described as “the consciousness of canon.” Whereas Gunkel and his school felt that
such institutions as cult in early Israel were the dominant sources for the tradition-build-
ing process, it is becoming increasingly clear that the formation of a sense of authoritative
Scripture unleashed another set of forces which then tended to operate according to laws
quite distinct from those at work in the development of oral tradition. e study of the de-
velopment of midrash should be signiﬁcant in attempting to describe the nature and im-
pact of these new factors on the composition of the Bible.¹⁰
Again, “midrash is, above all, an interpretation of a canonical text within the context and for
the religious purposes of a community.”¹¹ And in fact Seeligmann and Childs share in the
mid-twentieth century consensus about the fundamental diﬀerence of oral as versus textual
9. Childs, Midrash, 52. He concludes, “Although the early biblical parallels to full-blown rabbinic midrash
are oen only remotely connected, there is enough similarity between the two to speak of proto-midrashic
forms within the Old Testament” (58). Still, Childs is leery of ﬁnding midrash too early in the Old
Testament. e year before he criticizes the “tendency among some scholars to project the midrashic
method back into the pre-exilic period without adequate discrimination” (Childs, Psalm Titles, 149).
10. Childs, Midrash, 53.
11. Ibid., 49. Chronicles’ relationship to Kings is plied as a test case for both Sandmel and Wright.
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stages of biblical tradition,¹² even when the language of a “set of forces” that was “unleashed”
by Israel’s late use of scripture distinctly anticipates Childs’ mature formulations.
In addition to the hegemony of form critical assumptions, a second important variable
shis rapidly in the 1970s. Wellhausen’s disparagement of midrash, as ivy over a dead tree, will
shortly cease to be the default view among critical OT scholars. In Crisis Childs assumes that
“a midrashic approach … is foreign to the present critical age,”¹³ and in 1971, in another sig-
niﬁcant interaction with Seeligmann, thinks that “[o]bviously there can be no direct adapta-
tion of the midrashic method.”¹⁴ He is interested in the hermeneutical implications of inner
biblical exegesis, wants to defend it against the likes of Wellhausen,¹⁵ but he does not imagine
that critical scholars could propose a revival of the paradigm. From 1972, however, James
Sanders would make the positive value of midrash in Christian exegesis of the Old Testament
contested territory for Childs.¹⁶
Once the possibility is suggested it will remain true for Childs that there can be no
direct application of midrash today, in the modiﬁed sense that the method ought not be
employed in Christian exegesis. is chapter will show that Sanders helps prompt a shi
emphasis in Childs’ terminology, from midrash to “canonical shaping” (and from criticism to
approach),¹⁷ but this is not the turn in Childs’ understanding of the “mystery of Israel” to
which I alluded at the close of the previous chapter. Much like von Rad or Gese, Sanders’ pro-
posal is typically handled as part of an in-house debate about the nature of Christian scripture.
In point of fact, already in 1971 Childs believes his study of midrash points to an alternative to
12. E.g., Genesis 12, 20 and 26 remain at an oral stage: Seeligmann, Midraschexegese, 153. e consensus was
seriously challenged by ompson, Historicity and especially Van Seters, Abraham, in 1974 and 1975.
13. Crisis, 117.
14. Childs, Psalm Titles, 149.
15. Ibid., 149: “midrashic—or proto-midrashic—exegesis is not some post-biblical ‘Jewish distortion,’ but part
of the biblical tradition itself, and must be taken seriously as such.” As in Assyrian, the call is to a fair and
neutral description: “Categories such as annal, legend, midrash should carry no theological bias, whether
positive or negative” (124).
16. Sanders, Torah and Canon, followed by idem, Adaptable.
17. In fact “canonical shape” occurs early, too, in Exodus, and at least once in Crisis: “Historically Judaism was
the bearer of the Old Testament traditions and the instrument through which the traditions received their
ﬁrst canonical shape” (121). is is an indication that the terminological adjustment away from “midrash”
in the 1970s does not reﬂect a substantive change in Childs’ position.
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the tradition-historical school with respect to the relationship of OT and NT: “midrashic
interpretation oﬀers a pattern of exegesis which diﬀers fundamentally from the prophecy-ful-
ﬁlment pattern exploited by von Rad and others. A theological analogy is directed not primar-
ily to the typological unfolding of a future-orientated tradition, but rather to the exploring of
an area which has been staked out by means of a sacred text. History has retained its impor-
tance, but in the transformed state of being canonical history.”¹⁸ Like Gunkel, if to a lesser
extent, von Rad does not reckon with the full signiﬁcance of the tradition’s movement away
from cultic contexts to its scriptural, i.e. textual, context. It is simply that aer Sanders, des-
ignating this insight as “midrash” becomes problematic.
Moreover, as Crisis labors to articulate the year before, Childs aims to provide a better
foundation for Jewish-Christian dialogue than tradition history, one that maintains both
Christian and Jewish distinctives, or at least holds them in tension. By recognizing that the OT
has more than a Christian faith context, the Christian exegete “is made aware of the fact that
the Old Testament does not ‘naturally’ unfold into the New Testament. It does not lean toward
the New Testament, but the Christian interpretation within its new context is fully dependent
on the radically new element in Jesus Christ.” at Jewish interpretation oen goes in a diﬀer-
ent direction reminds Christians of the extent to which the Old is transformed by the New,
and yet the need for “dialogue with Judaism in relation to a common text” confronts the
church with “the mystery of Israel.”¹⁹ But still the “oﬀense” of the New Testament, which “lays
claim to the Scriptures of Israel and hears in them testimony to the rejected Messiah of
God,”²⁰ remains vital to Christian hope in the Triune God. Right from the beginning, then,
Childs’ study of midrash in the Old Testament countenances the possibility that Israel’s history
and its scriptures do not “thrust violently forward” into the New. Regarding Jewish scripture,
another set of post-biblical literature now seems every bit as likely a development.
18. Childs, Psalm Titles, 150.
19. Crisis, 122.
20. Crisis, 218. Note that sheerly as a matter of historical description in 1970, the church “employed diﬀerent
exegetical skills” than the synagogue in that “allegory and typology replaced midrash” (106). But now see
the developments described below, in chapter six.
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All these basic points—the re-prioritization of textual over oral transmission in the
formation of Jewish scripture, a consequently higher regard for midrash (proper or in incipi-
ent form) than had been the case among critical OT scholars for most of the twentieth centu-
ry, the radical and transformative newness of God’s self-revelation in Christ attested in the
NT—all remain stable commitments in Childs’ work from 1970 onwards. Aer turning form
criticism upside down, the next biggest shi in Childs’ thought has to do with just how the
form and function of the New is unlike the Old, worked out vis-à-vis Judaism’s ongoing claim
to Israel’s scriptures. e way Seitz puts it in 2001 is very close to where Childs ends up:
Old is to New Testament not as Tanak is to Talmud. Instead, the concept of a literary
canon, based on a covenantal relationship, is extended to a secondary, literarily distinctive
deposit whose formation and rationale is developed on analogy to the ﬁrst, with a new
covenantal relationship at its heart. e testaments are, of course, diﬀerent, and they bear
witness to the one subject matter of them both, in diﬀerent ways. ‘Tanak to Talmud’ may
actually be more akin to what Gese means by ‘tradition-history,’ strictly speaking.²¹
e crucial question is what limits obtain, if any, on the analogy between the formation and
rationale of New upon Old. For a time Childs remains open to the idea that the NT is a kind
of (proto-)midrash on the OT, granting that it will sometimes make moves very unlike
midrash proper.²² But this changes dramatically somewhere in the mid-1980s. To pose the
turn as starkly possible, an assumption Childs makes easily in 1970—“the New Testament’s
reading of one Old Testament passage through the perspective of another text … is a typical
midrashic technique”²³—stands in dramatic contrast to this statement from 1988: “Das Neue
Testament ist kein Midrasch zum Alten Testament”!²⁴ e primary burden of this chapter is to
account for the reversal. Since the decision is controversial, I will air a number of possible
objections before continuing.
21. Seitz, Figured Out, 43.
22. E.g., Moses’ slaying of an Egyptian in Exodus 2 is read in Acts 7 as a “pattern of unbelief.” Moses becomes
a type of the rejected Christ, a negative analogy “that would be unthinkable for the midrash” (Crisis, 175,
cf. 168–171).
23. Crisis, 116.
24. Childs, Biblische eologie, 22.
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Despite some superﬁcial similarities between Sanders and Childs, it is proper to distin-
guish “canonical criticism” from a “canonical approach” already on the basis of they way each
deﬁnes the relationship of the Christian Bible’s two testaments. Sanders: “Canonical criticism,
for the Christian, sees the Bible in terms of Scripture, not primarily in terms of testaments.”
e attendant view that “Scripture has its proper Sitz im Leben in the believing communities
which are today’s heirs of those who formed and shaped it in antiquity” allows scripture to
have a place in the church, which allied with the paradigm seen through comparative midrash
provides for the dynamic adaptation of tradition to changing social circumstances.²⁵ is of
course is a far cry from Childs’ position that “a force was unleashed by Israel’s religious use of
her traditions which exerted an inﬂuence on the shaping of the literature” with the result that
“canon formed the decisive Sitz im Leben for the Jewish community’s life.”²⁶ e community is
located in the book, not the reverse.
Childs concludes a late (2005) critique of Sanders’ hermeneutics this way: “I would
further argue that the role of Jewish midrash which is central to Sanders’ hermeneutical pro-
posal is incompatible with the New Testament’s understanding of the authoritative function of
the Old Testament, which has been continually transformed by the Spirit into the law of
Christ.”²⁷ is is an extraordinarily complex claim, and one likely to provoke disagreement.
On Childs’ deﬁnition of canon, as established testament rather than as ﬂexible scripture, why
should he decide for the rule of canon over and against midrash, especially when something
like proto-midrash can be seen in the formation of Hebrew scripture itself?
25. Sanders, Canon and Community, 69.
26. IOTS, 78, cf. BTONT, 70–71.
27. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 34.
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 
Childs does not make a reasonable decision at all but changes his mind at whim. Barr
states, “I have spoken as if canonical criticism [sic] is one united position, but of course it is
not: it is more like a current of opinions running in roughly the same direction and containing
certain recognizable elements of agreement as well as many diﬀerences.”²⁸ Barr is not drawing
a contrast between the proposals of Childs as versus Sanders; rather, Childs on his own is
incoherent. For instance:
e Introduction, discussing the titles or superscriptions of the Psalms, says that these
remove the Psalms from their older cultic context; … they move the emphasis to the inner
life of the Psalmist and give an access to his emotional life. ‘Far from tying these hymns to
the ancient past, they have been contemporized and individualized for every generation of
suﬀering and persecuted Israel.’ But Childs himself had published, a decade earlier, an ex-
cellent study on these same titles… But this very ﬁne article contains very little, in its more
technical and detailed analysis, that can be said to foreshadow or justify the interpretation
oﬀered in the Introduction.²⁹
One should not bother too much with the tension between canon and midrash because, Barr
would suggest, Childs simply drops midrash in later work without any discernible rationale.
 
Further, canon is a poor controlling concept because it is too loose a term. “e end-
less repetition of the word ‘canon’ in canonical criticism is not accident, but necessity: for, as
seen from without, the continual reuse of this word is necessary in order to hold together sets
of arguments which would otherwise fall apart.”³⁰ Frankly, midrash would not likely serve any
better in this respect since its usage, too, is beset with imprecision. Probably we ought to be
searching for another hermeneutical paradigm altogether. (Barr, along with Barton, recom-
mends “criticism”—see chapter six.)
28. Barr, Holy Scripture, 152–153.
29. Ibid., 155–156, citing IOTS, 521 and Childs, Psalm Titles.
30. Barr, Holy Scripture, 147.
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Alternately, we should disallow canon in Childs’ sense because midrash, or the ﬂexibil-
ity inherent in scriptural tradition, is the operative paradigm. Sanders’ theology of canon is to
be preferred because there is no consciousness of canon deep within the formation of the liter-
ature. As Sanders and Lee McDonald have it, “With such a long delay in the church’s use of the
term ‘canon’ to describe a closed body of Christian scriptures, one may well ask why there was
an emergence of ‘canon consciousness’ in the church of the fourth century C.E. and little evi-
dence of it before?”³¹ Or in Eugene Ulrich’s words, being clear about the meaning of canon is
important, but “the deﬁnition of canon is a relatively minor matter. Much more important,
interesting, and ripe for analysis is the canonical process—the historical development by
which the oral and written literature of Israel, Judaism, and the early church was handed on,
revised, and transformed into the scriptures that we have received, as well as the processes and
criteria by which the various decisions were made.”³² A “consciousness of canon” is cotermi-
nous with the ﬁrst appearance of the word “canon,” well into the Common Era, and the ﬂuid
state of aﬀairs it belies constitutes the proper locus of attention, scholarly or religious.
 
Even if one accepts something like Childs’ notion of canon, it is an error to speak of a
“transformed” Old Testament because of the theological imperative for Jewish-Christian dia-
logue that arises from a Christian aﬃrmation of Jewish scripture in its canon. “It is of crucial
signiﬁcance that the church maintained Israel’s Bible unchanged,” insists Rendtorﬀ.³³ And in
this the church ought to perceive “an essential element of continuity between the Old and the
New Testaments.”³⁴ ere are ways of reading both testaments as a unity, but it is imperative
to avoid making the OT a Christuszeugnis on its own, which is what Childs’ position entails.
31. McDonald and Sanders, eds., Canon Debate, 13, my emphasis. Childs borrows Kanonbewußtsein from I. L.
Seeligmann but is responsible for bringing it into wider usage, especially in English.
32. Ulrich, Canon, 33, cf. 31.
33. Rendtorﬀ, CHB, 749.
34. Ibid., 755.
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Instead of aﬃrming a testament “continually transformed by the Spirit into the law of Christ,”
far better to strive “niemals Aussagen über das Alte Testament zu machen, die von einem
Juden nicht nachvollzogen werden könnten.”³⁵
Advocating the history of Israelite religion rather than OT theology, R. Albertz take
the point further. “Je mehr es die eologie des Alten Testaments zu ihrem Anliegen macht,
das Alte Testament in bezug auf das Neue auszulegen, um so mehr gerät sie in Gefahr, es
christlich zu vereinnahmen… Die eologie des Alten Testaments trägt somit den Keim des
Antijudaismus in sich.” e tendency is latent in Eichrodt or von Rad. “Die Einsicht von B.S.
Childs ist wohl unausweichlich: Die eologie des Alten Testaments ist ‘essentially a Christian
discipline’ und darum konfessionell begrenzt. Das macht sie ungeeignet für den christlich-
jüdischen Dialog.”³⁶
 
To identify midrash as Jewish will, for Childs, entail an embrace of allegory/typology
as a comparable but distinctly Christian intertextual reading strategy. Allegory and not
midrash is how the church addresses the unity of its two testaments. But allowing this, how
can Childs be sure he knows the diﬀerence between allegory and midrash, and thus know
what it is he banishes from Christian exegesis? For example, Childs faults Moberly for identi-
fying Moriah with Jerusalem, a move made by Jewish readers.³⁷ To this Moberly queries in a
private correspondence, “Is the identiﬁcation really (substantively) ‘midrashic,’ apart from the
fact that it was most fully articulated in classic rabbinic midrash? I think not, for my argument
… is not proposing a particular strategy of reading through the interaction of particular texts,
… [but] only that [the identiﬁcation with Jerusalem] is conveyed implicitly in a pregnantly
allusive kind of way (‘let the reader understand,’ ‘if you have ears to hear then hear’) rather
than explicitly.”³⁸ In other words, Philo knew the value of allegory too: will it not be the case
35. Rendtorﬀ, Rezension Childs, 368.
36. Albertz, Religionsgeschichte, 13, citing OTTCC, 7.
37. Childs, Critique, 183. Cf. Moberly, Bible, eology, Faith, 108–116, 177–183, 225–230.
38. Moberly continues, “I ﬁnd your point about the intrinsic logic of midrash and ﬁguration interesting and
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that the line between Jewish and Christian reading is fuzzy, even allowing for rudimentary
and binding diﬀerences between committed Jewish and Christian readers of the Tanak or Old
Testament?
 
Some of these objections are more easily addressed than others. I have already spoken
at length to shortcomings in Barr’s reading of Childs (objection 1). It is hard to imagine how
he fails to see the overlap between Childs’ early work on midrash, in 1971 and 1972, with the
arguments that culminate in 1979, and this chapter already gives ample evidence for the way
proto-midrash or canonical shaping is consistently interpreted by Childs as a partial warrant
for breaking with the tradition-historical school represented by von Rad (more will be
adduced before the end, too).
Objection 3 overlooks Childs’ argument from midrash for is own reasons, authorizing
a pseudo-von Radian approach which oen is not in the least concerned with problems aris-
ing from the shape of a two testament Bible. ere may be good historical rebuttals to the
dominant English-language moratorium on “canon” in the biblical period. As Chapman
points out, “Scholars who maintain that ‘canon’ only properly refers to a situation in which a
scriptural collection has obtained absolute literary boundaries are inevitably forced to concede
at some later point in their argument that the biblical canon has never really been completely
‘closed’ in an absolute sense… when did the canon ﬁnally meet with universal approval and
absolute consistency? e answer is: never.”³⁹ But the striking thing about the canon debate, as
argued in chapter one, is how the German-language context remains open to concerns Childs
labors to address, and thus his argument from midrash, for canonical shaping, has won more
than a few adherents. at is, a sound retort to objection 3 could simply be: how then do you
suggestive, and I will need to think about it. But whether or not it is right, it is ﬁguration much more than
midrash that my handling of the text embodies.” Personal letter from Moberly and Childs (11 August
2003). Unfortunately Childs’ reply does not address this issue. My thanks go to Professor Moberly for
supplying a copy of this correspondence, and for permission to cite it.
39. Chapman, Canon Debate, 14.
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propose to explain the material conditions for a Christian aﬃrmation of the Triune God? As
we shall see with Barr in the next chapter, Childs is not the only Old Testament scholar for
whom having a good answer to that question matters. is is not, of course, to deny the histo-
ry of religions perspective that could declare itself unwilling to aﬃrm dogma, and that would
have an alternative logic by which to account for historic Christian belief. But that is not the
question Childs raises. (Further, even from a strictly historical perspective one might doubt
how fully belief in the Trinity can be explained in terms of scripture without a testament.⁴⁰)
Also, contra those for objections 1 or 3 who aﬃrm a version of 2, doubting the viabili-
ty of canon as a cipher for an entire, ruled approach to Christian scripture, it is notable that at
least one Jewish scholar had made midrash into a comparable umbrella term. Midrash, writes
Jacob Neusner, “stands for at least three speciﬁc things, as well as a great many things in gen-
eral.”⁴¹ It is a book: “a compilation of biblical exegeses, ampliﬁcations, and compositions, as in
Midrash Rabbah.” It is an activity: the “explaining or applying the meaning of a biblical verse
(or group of verses).” It is “hermeneutics of a particular kind”: “people use the word midrash to
mean the reading of one thing in terms of some other. is usage is so general as to defy con-
crete application.”⁴² Mindful of these diﬃculties, Neusner opts not to use the term at all, or
only very rarely, in Midrash in Context (1983). But if the impression given is that a word
spread thin loses its meaning, this is in fact not the case here, as Neusner’s title corroborates.
“Since we are able to use the same word for three things, and since, moreover, the same word
is made to serve by others for many more things, I shall generally avoid the word midrash. But
I shall always mean it.”⁴³ For all its overexposure and potential for misunderstanding, midrash
retains enough semantic force that Neusner makes it his deﬁning category. e parallel to
Childs is obvious: Childs’ employment of canon is as Neusner’s of midrash. On the speciﬁc
issue of controlling terms it is as if Childs and Neusner are opposite sides of a swivel mirror—
40. See Seitz’s forthcoming book chapter, “e Rule of Faith, Hermeneutics, and the Character of Christian
Scripture: e Rule or Canon of Faith in the Period of the Ante-Nicene Fathers.”
41. Neusner, Midrash, xvi.
42. Ibid., xvi.
43. Ibid., xvii, my emphasis. In fact the three things named here are diﬀerent again to the three cited above; he
refers now to a sub-taxonomy within midrash as rabbinic book.
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one is concave, the other convex. e diﬀerence is whether the focal point is in front of or
behind the glass.
Objections 4 and 5 are more diﬃcult because they come from persons alive to the
indispensability of canon in biblical exposition. ey move us into a more robustly theological
debate about just how the church aﬃrms Jewish scripture in its confession of the biblical wit-
ness, and we will require the remainder of this chapter, and much of the next, to sort out the
issues that arise at this point for Childs. To anticipate, Childs’ considered position, subsequent
to the decisive shi in his thinking about midrash which I will tease out before the end,
includes an assumption very like one found throughout his work, and which many Christian
exegetes would wish to aﬃrm. It is this: “Wenn irgendeine biblische Auslegung ihre Sichtweise
nicht mehr auf den biblischen Text selbst gründen kann, sondern nur auf spätere Traditionen,
dann ist dies ein Zeichen einer ernsthaen Schwäche, sowohl im Judentum als auch im Chris-
tentum.”⁴⁴ Canon as a theological force obtains in modern Judaism and Christianity, and
indeed is a thing learned by the church from the synagogue in the ﬁrst instance. e rub is
that Jewish and Christian traditions hearken back to the plain sense (peshat, sensus literalis) of
a common body of scripture. e peculiar challenge for Christian faith is how to hear in
Israel’s testament to its God the One who in time raises Jesus Christ from the dead.
e two sections that follow will take up the question raised in this section with an eye
to known objections. Section two will contextualize the early lesson Childs draws from inner
biblical midrash, describing two roads Childs associates with midrash that from the beginning
he refuses to travel. Section three explores Childs’ reconsideration of midrash in the
mid-1980s, including how this pushes him toward a distinctly Christian aﬃrmation of allego-
ry in a canonical framework. I will conclude by pointing to some implications of this move for
Jewish-Christian dialogue on the basis of the shared scriptures of Israel.
44. Childs, Jüdischen Kanons, 281. Some Jewish scholars would seem to agree. Leiman, Canonization, 14: “To
an observant Jew in the 20th century, not only the Hebrew Scriptures, but the Mishnah, Talmud and
halakhic codes are also canonical in that they are authoritative and serve to guide him in his daily
behavior… e canonicity of the Hebrew Scripture, however, diﬀered in kind from the canonicity of extra-
biblical literature.”
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is section will look at what Childs’ gleans from Seeligmann, and then diﬀerentiate
two types of “modern midrash” Childs rejects from 1970. One is represented by Benno Jacob,
the other by James Sanders. An epilogue will set forth a possible intersection between inner
biblical exegesis and tradition history. But ﬁrst, to set the stage, we can let Childs explain the
arc of his investment in the study of midrash.
In regard to the subject of midrash, let me just repeat my own experience in the ﬁeld.
When I returned to America in 1954, I got a teaching job in Wisconsin at a little E&R
Seminary, Mission House. Aer a couple of years there, I started reading midrashic texts
with the local Jewish rabbi. en in 1958, when I was called to Yale, one of the require-
ments was that I teach a course on Judaism, about which I knew little. So I audited Judah
Goldin’s seminar for four years. He was reading the Mechilta on Exodus and it was very
exciting since I had started writing my own Exodus commentary. Golden was a major in-
ﬂuence and I realized that I had to train myself in a whole new ﬁeld. (In his class he only
wrote Hebrew on the blackboard in the form of the cursive script.) So I enrolled two sum-
mers in NYC Jewish eolog Seminary to learn Modern Hebrew and this prepared me for
a sabbatical to Israel in 1963–4. I worked terribly hard to gain written and spoken Hebrew
but was only partially successful. I even had private instructions in reading midrash and
listened to many Hebrew classes with at best only a partial understanding. en I began to
realize that I would need a decade more work if I continued down this track. I began to re-
consider. When I was at the Jewish Seminary, my roommate was Jacob (Jack) Neusner. We
had many talks, but his major interest at that time was trying to relate historical criticism
to traditional Jewish learnings.
Aer I returned from Israel, I decided that I would not pursue my study of midrash active-
ly. Actually Goldin’s inﬂuence remained important for me, but by the time Jacob Neusner’s
book appeared [Midrash in Context], I was already well out of the ﬁeld. Several factors
seemed to support my vocational decision. I soon discovered that Jewish scholars diﬀered
widely among themselves. Goldin and Neusner were always at odds. Neusner’s under-
standing of the relation of halacha to haggadah was the reverse of Goldin and most of the
ﬁeld. I learned from Alter’s work but thought he knew little of OT scholarship.
I also found that the Christian scholars who were focused on midrash were not very com-
patible. W. D. Davies was without theological interest. E. P. Sanders had a dubious inter-
pretation of Paul, although it was widely accepted in NT circles (Neusner was unim-
pressed). en the interest in the Dead Sea Scrolls exploded (e.g. Stendahl etc), and I did
not want to go down that route.
So I only returned brieﬂy to the subject when, for example, in my ZAW article of 2003, I
thought that W. Moberly’s understanding of intertextuality was inadequate and referred
him to some of the leading Jewish scholars.⁴⁵
45. Personal correspondence with Childs (21 November 2006). (e letter also states: “Although I remain
friends of James Sanders our understanding of the ﬁeld diﬀers widely.”) To this compare NTCI, xv: “two
summers at the Jewish eological Seminary, four years of attending Judah Goldin’s midrash seminars,
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For about a decade, Childs undertook to become a fully competent scholar of midrash, and
though he abandons the pursuit, he retains a deep appreciation for traditional Jewish exegesis.
As he states in the preface to Exodus, during the long period of writing “I have gone through
many diﬀerent stages in my own thinking. Somewhere en route I discovered that Calvin and
Drusius, Rashi and Ibn Ezra, belong among the giants. I have tried to show why these great
expositors—the term ‘pre-critical’ is both naïve and arrogant—need to be heard in concert
with Wellhausen and Gunkel.”⁴⁶ e time and energy he spends studying traditional Jewish
exegesis tapers oﬀ in the latter half of his career, judging by the contents of his output, and
comes to be supplanted by a more rigorous study of Christian foundations in patristic,
medieval and reformation exegesis. Undoubtedly, however, luminaries from both sets of tradi-
tional exegetes keep their seats among the “giants,” in Childs’ estimation.
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Childs met Seeligmann in Jerusalem in 1963, and he ﬁrst cites “Voraussetzungen der
Midraschexegese” (1953) aer returning to Yale from that sabbatical. e essay, as has been
suggested,⁴⁷ is a singularly important antecedent to Childs’ argument for canonical shaping
through IOTS (and by extension NTCI, Isaiah, and Corpus), but Childs’ early interaction with
it already realigns its thesis in view of other considerations. To show how Childs makes it his
own, it is appropriate to ﬁrst set out the argument of Seeligmann’s essay, in which the word
Kanonbewußtsein appears exactly once.
Seeligmann wants to explore the prehistory of midrash within the Bible. More speciﬁ-
cally, he focuses on the transition from biblical thinking into midrash (“der Übergang des bib-
lischen Denkens in das des Midrasch”). In fact there is a double goal, “das Verhältnis darlegen
zwischen den Ursprüngen der Midraschexegese und der biblischen Literatur und dadurch
and a year at the Hebrew University studying midrash gave me a rich background in Jewish studies.”
46. Exodus, x.
47. Above, and cf. Sheppard, Criticism, 863–864.
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einen Beitrag liefern zum besseren Verständnis von beiden.”⁴⁸ e preliminary remarks cul-
minate in a summary of the transition that will be described:
Wie erwähnen zuerst die ausserordentliche Geschmeidigkeit von Erzählung und literar-
ischem Motiv in der Bibel, dazu das Spielelement des semitischen bzw. hebräischen
Geistes, sodann eine ausgeprägte Neigung sich Gedanken und Vorstellungen, die einer
fremden Umgebung oder anderen Zeit entstammen, durch Umgestaltung der eigenen At-
mosphäre bzw. Epoche anzupassen, und schliesslich das Auommen eines Kanonbe-
wusstseins: der wandelbare Strom der Überlieferung gerinnt und wird zum heiligen Wort;
speziell der Begriﬀ orah wird beladen mit einem Inhalt, der Interpretation geradezu
herausfordert.⁴⁹
e changeable currents of tradition in transmission coagulate and become Holy Scripture.
What starts as a free-for-all thickens gradually as a sense of the tradition’s authority takes hold,
until at last interpretation breaks away from the text completely, becoming commentary in its
own right. e gradation is somewhat artiﬁcial, Seeligmann acknowledges; it is not always
possible to separate each stage from the next. But it has heuristic value, he insists, and it
undergirds the four-part structure of his discussion.
Stage one shows great ﬂuidity (e.g., the three variants of the ancestress in danger).
Conscious wordplay does sometimes occur at this level, such as in Psalm 8:5–6 and Job 7:17–
18,⁵⁰ but it is marked by the freedom which an existing theme, characteristically in oral tradi-
tion, can be taken up and altered for a diﬀerent purpose. Stage two, Seeligmann ﬁnds, has two
sub-classes of “associative meanings.” One encompasses “die Doppelsinn des Wortes, Gleichk-
lang und Wortspiel,”⁵¹ in which emerges a new concern to explore the full range of a word’s
meaning. Considerable play is still possible.⁵² e other sub-class concerns proverbs, where
clauses can be combined in diﬀerent contexts with very diﬀerent results.⁵³ Stage three, adapta-
48. Seeligmann, Midraschexegese, 150–151.
49. Ibid., 152.
50. Ibid., 153, 156.
51. Ibid., 157.
52. In Amos 8:2, for example, “Amos sieht Obst ץיק und das genügt dazu, bei ihm die Vorstellung des Endes
ץק aufsteigen zu lassen” (ibid., 157–158). Overall there there is “das Bewusstsein von der Mehrdeutigkeit
der Worte” (159) that anticipates typical maneuvers in rabbinic exegesis, such as the לאירקת formula. Cf.
Fishbane, Garments, esp. “Extra-biblical Exegesis: e Sense of Not Reading in Rabbinic Midrash,” 19–32.
53. Proverbs 13:1 reads, “A wise son loves the discipline of his father, but a scoﬀer אלעמשהרעג does not
listen to rebuke.” In 13:8 by contrast, “Wealth is a ransom for a man’s life, but the poor אלעמשהרעג does
not hear threats.” Seeligmann, Midraschexegese, 163–164. e same proverb is used in divergent ways in
canonical proximate contexts.
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tion, is a “völlig anderer Art” because it adds “ein Element der Bewusstheit in die Vorgänge”—
a consciousness of the processes.⁵⁴ “Ein späteres Geschlecht begnügt sich nicht mit der Über-
nahme des alten Wortes, sondern ändert den Sinn—seltener auch den Wortlaut—desselben,
um es den Denken und Fühlen einer neuen Zeit an zu passen.”⁵⁵ For example, Sirach 50:26–27
(37–38) directs the language of Deuteronomy 32:21 to a contemporary referent. e foolish
nation called “no people” in Deuteronomy is speciﬁed as the foolish nations in Shechem. Seel-
igmann calls this an instance of “proper actualizing midrash” and cites rabbinic parallels. e
point is that Jewish exegesis “wurzelt im Midrasch und das Ziel des Midrasch ist, den Bibel-
text zu aktualisieren, d.h. zu zeigen, dass das alte Bibelwort sich bezieht auf geschichtliche
Ereignisse in der Zeit des Erklärers.”⁵⁶ Finally, stage four is when true commentary comes into
its own. All the interpretive ventures and tendencies discussed before this initiate exegesis,
“aber noch nicht als Auslegung im eigentlichen Sinne gelten können. Das Spielelement färbt
die Motivabwandlung, das Zitat wird durch Adaptation transponiert, doch betreﬀen all’ diese
Erscheinungen eine sich noch im Fluss beﬁndliche, nicht ‘geronnene,’ zum Abschluss
gekommene Literatur.”⁵⁷ Torah become an entire complex, not just isolated instructions, in
which Jews immersed themselves (Sirach 24:20, cf. Proverbs 18:7). ose responsible for the
New Testament searched the prophets for deeper and deeper meaning. e psalms, through
the addition of psalm titles, came to be read as aggadah.⁵⁸ Importantly, the interest here is
“nicht der äussere Prozess der Kanonisierung, sondern der Wandel im Bewusstsein, der dem
alten Wort eine neue Bedeutung und Autorität beilegt.”⁵⁹ 
Seeligmann suggests in closing that midrash sits atop a paradox. e presuppositions
(Voraussetzungen) which underlie it are heterogeneous. Even aer midrash becomes a distinct
54. Ibid., 167.
55. Ibid., 168, my emphasis.
56. Ibid., 170. e burden to actualize scripture becomes particularly heavy in historical periods of crisis. In
addition to Seeligmann’s example, the targum of Pseudo-Jonathan identiﬁes “no people” with the
Babylonians. is draws attention to the fact that what might be called adaptation does not always align
texts with contemporary referents. In Pseudo-Jonathan the past event of Babylonian captivity is in view.
57. Ibid., 176.
58. Ibid., 176–180.
59. Ibid., 176, my emphasis.
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rabbinic genre, it retains its characteristic ﬂexibility in verbal play and actualization. “Einer-
seits will er einen abgeschlossenen Text erklären, der eben in dieser Gestalt die höchste
Autorität besitzt, anderseits ist er bestrebt denselben … oﬀenzuhalten, vor Versteinerung zu
behüten und mit immer neuen Leben zu erfüllen—für jede neue Situation und für jeden
neuen Tag!”⁶⁰ A conﬂict thus arises between Seeligmann’s two stated goals, to understand the
biblical literature and to illuminate its relationship to later midrashic exegesis, or in short,
between the dynamics of canon and midrash.
In this way Seeligmann adumbrates the two main positions in subsequent Christian
debate over the hermeneutical signiﬁcance of canon, both Sanders’ talk of stability and adapt-
ability (and midrash) on the one hand, as well as Childs’ articulation of the abiding signiﬁ-
cance of the decisions made by canon conscious tradents and redactors on the other. But lest
midrash be seen as yet another area in which Childs, by leaving the term behind aer Sanders
picks it up, substantively changes his views, it is worth explicating where and when Childs
parts company with Seeligmann’s analysis of the formation of biblical literature. e short
answer is: exactly where and when he parts with form criticism’s analysis. Seeligmann is well
versed in the critical views of his day and shares in much of the critical consensus that dom-
inated in the mid-twentieth century. So again, the contentious point for Childs has to do with
the adaptation or actualization of remote tradition.⁶¹ By way of illustration, consider the late
addition of superscriptions to some psalms.
 :   
Seeligmann ﬁnds a deep tension between the individual and communal consciousness
in the way individual psalms are brought into the life of a community. Psalm 30, he says, can
be understood in no other way except as the praise of an individual who has recovered from
illness—something the tradents’ historical consciousness was strong enough to preserve
60. Ibid., 181.
61. Childs mostly engages von Rad on Vergegenwärtigung, but although Seeligmann derives Adaptation from
S. Schechter, the concepts occupy much of the same conceptual space.
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intact. By aﬃxing in the title a reference to the dedication of the temple, however, the psalm
has been related to a historical moment in the life of Israel, and so this bit of interpretation
must have been done by the generation that rebuilt the temple aer the Babylonian exile.
Psalm 30, then, is a prime example of “adaptive exegesis” (stage three) in the psalms in which
“Midrasch liest und deutet [eine] Äusserung eines Individuums als das Zeugnis der
Gemeinscha von Israel.”⁶² But note that this is the work of and for a single generation.
At ﬁrst glance Childs’ 1971 study “Psalm Titles and Midrashic Exegesis” upholds with
the ﬂuid–solid trajectory toward canon that Seeligmann describes. A preparatory form critical
analysis of psalms in narrative settings ﬁnds that some psalms, such as Exodus 15 or Jonah 2,
were easily incorporated into narrative frameworks. Others caused more “friction” and were
less easily integrated.⁶³ e function of Isaiah 38:9 is noteworthy because “[t]he poem is no
longer regarded simply as a ‘song’ or ‘word.’ Again, Hezekiah is not the speaker, but the
author.”⁶⁴ “No attempt has been made to work the poem into the narrative of vv. 1–6. Rather,
the poem is retained apart from the narrative and provided with a title as a literary piece by an
author which was composed at a speciﬁc time in the historical past.”⁶⁵ In fact Isaiah 38 is the
only example outside the Psalter of a psalm title with the same form as the Davidic ascrip-
tions, Childs’ main focus. It “reﬂects a stage in the transmission of poetic tradition in which its
literary ﬁxation as an independent composition made it diﬃcult to incorporate within a larger
narrative setting. Nevertheless, the need to supply a setting resulted in the use of a stereotyped
form of the superscription which oﬀered the minimum information of author and historical
referent.”⁶⁶ Tradents at this stage could not adapt the psalm with the freedom that was exer-
cised in an earlier period. On this basis Childs argues for the lateness of the additions. e
Chronicler did not use the technique of superscriptions, so “it seems logical to set a terminus a
quo aer the Chronicler.” And “a terminus ad quem for the formation of the titles is provided
62. Ibid., 172.
63. Childs, Psalm Titles, 139.
64. Ibid., 141.
65. Ibid., 142.
66. Ibid., 142.
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by the Qumran Psalm scroll.” erefore, “the titles are an extremely late post-exilic
phenomenon.”⁶⁷
But something changes fundamentally in this process for Childs, something Seelig-
mann does not quite register. “e titles represent an early reﬂection on how the Psalms as a
collection of sacred literature were understood. e titles established a secondary setting
which became normative for the canonical tradition.”⁶⁸ Childs restricts his form-critical study
to psalms attached to the life of David (esp. Pss. 50–60, 68), making a direct comparison on
Psalm 30 impossible, but Childs turns out to be far less committed to the the individual–com-
munal dynamic Seeligmann employs to explain that superscription. Instead of positing a
moment of historical crisis underlying the adaptation, Childs focuses on the literary/exegetical
dynamic at work. He uses Sanders’ work on the Qumran Psalms Scroll to claim that the psalm
titles are not historical memories “but are the result of an exegetical activity which derived its
material from within the text itself.”⁶⁹ For instance, the superscription on Psalm 60 seems
aware of David in 2 Samuel 8 and of Joab in 1 Kings 11. “By introducing Joab into the passage
drawn from II Samuel, the author of the title appears to be drawing attention to his other
source which supplies the missing link for the Psalm. Once again a Psalm title reﬂects consid-
erable study of Scripture which goes much beyond noticing obvious allusions.”⁷⁰ More impor-
tant than whatever crisis or event might have provoked an author to pen a superscription are
the “signs … of scholarly study of the Psalms in relation to other Old Testament passages.”⁷¹
is is indeed the age of the Schrigelehrten, and their exegetical activity changes the course of
tradition permanently. Sharpening the contrast, Seeligmann sees that Psalm 30 has been
attached to a contemporary event, but for Childs the Davidic superscriptions aﬃliate psalms
with a wider body of scripture. 
67. Ibid., 148.
68. Ibid., 137.
69. Ibid., 143.
70. Ibid., 147.
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is is not to say that Childs ignores “history,” or biblical reference. Rather, he empha-
sizes an historic transformation, of various traditions into an aﬃliated textual corpus, with
long-lasting historical consequences. For “the titles functioned in a way completely diﬀerent
from the ‘pesher type’ midrash of Qumran, and they lack any concern to actualize past tradi-
tions by means of superscription. Again, the titles which relate to David’s life do not serve to
legitimate any later religious institutions, which is a characteristic tendency of midrashim
from Pharisaic circles.” All this intends (or manages despite itself) to convey a new way of
reading scripture, too. “By placing a Psalm within the setting of a particular historical incident
in the life of David, the reader was suddenly given access to previously unknown information.
David’s inner life was now unlocked to the reader, who was allowed to hear his intimate
thoughts and reﬂections. It therefore seems most probable that the formation of the titles
stemmed from a pietistic circle of Jews whose interest was particularly focussed on the nur-
ture of the spiritual life.”⁷² is descriptive observation, of which Barr approves in 1983, is also
clearly packed with contemporary theological implications.
As Childs puts it in 1972, “One way to reinterpret a text is to reshape it within a new
composition. Another equally eﬀective way is to change the context from that in which the
text originally functioned. e text itself is not altered, but a new framework is provided
which assigns to it a new role. e classic illustration of this second approach is to be found in
the superscriptions of certain psalms.” us begins a section entitled “Establishment of a New
Context.”⁷³ If a tradition is placed in a diﬀerent form, its function will also change. Rather
than reading psalms in the context of the cultus (Mowinckel), a precedent is established for
attending to the textualized, canonical context. “Psalms which originally functioned within a
cultic role for the community have been secondarily given a speciﬁc historical setting in the
life of an individual. Lying at the base of this process of ‘historization’ is the conviction that
Scripture can best be interpreted by Scripture (Scriptura sui ipsius interpres), which is a corol-
72. Ibid., 149.
73. Childs, Midrash, 57.
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lary derived from a consciousness of canon.”⁷⁴ e terminology stems from Seeligmann, but it
is now being deployed for diﬀerent, decidedly canonical ends.
 — ’  
A recurring section in Exodus, called “Old Testament Context,” which as Childs tells
us in the introduction “forms the heart of the commentary,” “attempts to deal seriously with
the text in its ﬁnal form, which is its canonical shape, while at the same time recognizing and
proﬁting by the variety of historical forces which were at work in producing it. In my judg-
ment, the failure of most critical commentaries to deal with the ﬁnal shape of the text without
falling into modern midrash is a major deﬁciency.”⁷⁵ One would be forgiven for thinking that
by “modern midrash” Childs means the midrash-allied hermeneutics of Sanders, whose Torah
and Canon he had recently criticized in a review. In fact this is not the kind of midrash Childs
rejects in his Exodus commentary. Rather, in 1974 it is a conservative instrument for the har-
monization of tensions and contradictions kicked up by historical critical research. e com-
mentators who come up most frequently in this connection are Umberto Cassuto and Benno
Jacob.⁷⁶ I will now look brieﬂy at Childs’ interaction with the latter.
In 1999 Childs wrote an appreciation of Jacob, hoping to draw attention to “the endur-
ing and genuine contributions of this largely forgotten scholar.”⁷⁷ Childs says he learned of
Jacob from von Rad in Heidelberg, but that he later had great diﬃculty locating Jacob’s com-
mentary on Genesis, even at Yale.
Soon I discovered that among my colleagues in the academic guild the name of Benno Ja-
cob was virtually unknown. en in 1963 I spent a sabbatical leave in Jerusalem and
74. Ibid., 57. A related article from 1976, Modern Study of Psalms, continues to push hard against traditional
form criticism—“the function of a secondary setting oen seems to be more signiﬁcant for exegesis than a
ﬁxation with an alleged original Sitz” (378)—with reference to Seeligmann: “the concept of a normative
scripture unleashed a new set of forces which were diﬀerent in kind from those inﬂuencing the
development of the oral tradition in the pre-exilic period” (382). Psalms have been “loosened from their
original cultic context” and have been given a “diﬀerent function” in their canonical form (383).
(Seeligmann is not the only important input; Hertzberg, Nachgeschichte, from 1936, also surfaces
frequently.) For a late (2005) use of “canon consciousness” see Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 32.
75. Exodus, xiv.
76. For good examples see Exodus, 364 and 614, respectively.
77. Childs, Benno Jacob, 275.
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learned that in Israel Jacob was far from unknown. Some of the older scholars, such as
Professor Isaac Leo Seeligmann, had known Jacob personally, and Seeligmann regaled me
with interesting stories concerning this remarkable scholar. I had gone to Jerusalem to
work on an Exodus commentary and to my delight and amazement I learned that the He-
brew University possessed a rare microﬁlm copy of an unpublished commentary on the
book of Exodus by Jacob. Seeligmann recounted that when Jacob was expelled from Ger-
man in 1938, he departed with the manuscript of his Exodus commentary clutched in his
arms, undoubtedly regarding it as his most precious possession. When I returned home
from Israel in 1964, the librarian of the Hebrew University generously provided me with a
microﬁlm of the Exodus commentary. I had it photocopied, bound in four large volumes,
and deposited in the Yale library as a rediscovered treasure.⁷⁸
Jacob seems to be a good illustration of the problem that arises for biblical interpreters in the
critical age.⁷⁹ His eﬀort to destroy the documentary hypothesis explains “why his work has
largely been ignored by modern biblical scholars.”⁸⁰ It prevents him from “[engaging] in a
mutually fruitful dialogue on the larger critical issues,” and it stayed with nineteenth century
interlocutors which the critical discussion had long since surpassed. Yet for Childs other
“aspects of his work remain highly impressive and uniquely worthy of careful scrutiny.”⁸¹ He
tries to illustrate this with Jacob’s Genesis commentary in 1999, though Childs’ own landmark
work on Exodus is the best place to get a sense of the extent of his regard for Jacob, who is ref-
erenced nearly as oen as Gressmann or Noth.
Illustrations could well be given of the insight about Exodus Childs gains from Jacob,
but in keeping with the concern to understand what Childs does and does not make of
midrash, the following shows simply what Childs typically means by “modern midrash” in
1974, and why he does not follow suit.
In recent years there have been several attempts to solve the literary problems within Ex.
16 by denying the presence of sources. Benno Jacob … begins with a sharp polemic
against critics who have “cut up the chapter without understanding its intention.” But
when Jacob oﬀers his own alternative solution it very much resembles a modern midrash.
He attempts to avoid the diﬃculties in the sequence of vv.1–12 by assuming a speech of
78. Ibid., 273. Cf. “e Life and Works of Benno Jacob” by his son W. Jacob, in Jacob, Exodus, xv–xxxiii, who
also translated the commentary for English publication in 1992. e German original was ﬁnally
published in 1997.
79. Again, it forces readers “to be critical, anti-critical, or postcritical, but the pre-critical option has been
forever lost” (Childs, Vitringa, 98).
80. Childs, Benno Jacob, 274.
81. Ibid., 275. One remark stands out in light of the fact that Childs never joined the digital revolution (he
worked on a typewriter): “Long before intertextuality had become a modern fad generated by computer
print-outs, Jacob listened for every possible resonance within the entire canon” (276).
  :   “  ” 
Moses before v.4. He interprets the verb in v.11 as a pluperfect which he assigns to a peri-
od prior to v.4. Finally, he suggests that the faulty Hebrew syntax in v.8 is intentional in or-
der to demonstrate that indeed Moses is not a good speaker and requires Aaron’s help!⁸²
It is surprising to see just how long this sense of midrashic hermeneutics, as a coping strategy
for those who reject the documentary hypothesis, lasts in Childs’ work. e same understand-
ing predominates in IOTS as well as Exodus. For example, concerning the canonical shaping
of Ezra-Nehemiah, “two pitfalls” must be avoided:
e one approach—call it modern midrashic—would rule out a priori the possibility of
any accidental factors at work and would evaluate the present composition consistently on
the same level of intentionality throughout. e weakness of this approach is its inability
to deal with the historical dimensions of the canonical process which established a scale of
intentionality… e other extreme of the spectrum, which is characteristic of the dom-
inant historical critical method, seeks to establish a historical sequence as normative and
thus disregards any theological intent which would override the concerns of the modern
historian.⁸³
Still in 1979, tradition history can be an opposite category to midrash. Wellhausen cast a very
long shadow, and for some time it must have seemed improbable that midrash could ever be
allied with the cause of liberal scholarship. at changed for Childs, however, over the course
of the so-called canon debate.
 — ’  
In 2005 Childs laments that Sanders became the spokes-person for the majority posi-
tion on canon’s hermeneutical (in)signiﬁcance in English,⁸⁴ and G. T. Sheppard’s 1992 sum-
mary of the diﬀerent ways midrash, understood as inner biblical exegesis, had been accom-
modated in work on canon, identiﬁes a line that was increasingly drawn. Sanders and M.
Fishbane (see the epilogue, below) place an emphasis on “continuity between the prebiblical
interpretation of the normative traditions and the later postbiblical interpretations of scripture
in Judaism and Christianity,” whereas “Childs, Rendtorﬀ and Sheppard have emphasized ele-
ments of discontinuity between the prescriptural functions of ancient traditions and the new
roles they play within ‘the canonical context’ of Jewish and Christian Bibles.”⁸⁵ How true this
82. Exodus, 275.
83. IOTS, 630, my emphasis. On intentionality, see the conclusion of chapter one.
84. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 36.
85. Sheppard, Criticism, 863. His most important contribution to the study of “canon conscious” redaction is
 . :    ’       
remains for Rendtorﬀ is diﬃcult to say, but for Childs and those who followed him more
closely, a new understanding of midrash fell in place alongside an established distinction
between the canonical approach and tradition history. Childs resists Sanders’ hermeneutics
from the start, all the while crediting his insight about the canonical function of Deuteronomy
at the close of the Pentateuch,⁸⁶ and yet only later identiﬁes Sanders with “Jewish midrash.” In
2005 he does not challenge Sander’s assessment, that early Judaism “developed the techniques
of midrash by which to exploit the ﬂuidity of its sacred text in order to reinterpret them into
new forms for regenerating its life,” but contends that this paradigm “is incompatible with the
New Testament’s understanding of the authoritative function of the Old Testament, which has
been continually transformed by the Spirit into the law of Christ.”⁸⁷ Sanders eventually repre-
sents another variety of “modern midrash”—almost the opposite of Jacob’s—and a second
road which Childs never takes.
Although Childs is highly complimentary when he reviews Torah and Canon in 1973,
he lodges a telling objection. “Sanders and I seem to diﬀer,” he writes, “in the theological
stance which one adopts when interpreting the signiﬁcance of the historical factors shaping
the canon.” Sanders’ interest lies in “the hermeneutics of that generation which gave the canon
its basic shape. In the process by which the ancient Hebrews shaped their tradition, we are giv-
en a key how to transform our own tradition in the light of changing situations. It is at this
point that I strongly diﬀer in theological approach.” In contrast, “I believe that the witness of
the Old Testament lies in the historical shape which the Jews gave their Scriptures, and not in
the historical processes which gave them a shape.”⁸⁸ It seems signiﬁcant, therefore, that the
phrase “ﬁnal form” ﬁrst occurs in 1974.⁸⁹ A form critical study of midrash—e.g., of Chroni-
cles’ use of Kings, or of the late addition of psalm titles—entails canon in the sense of a ﬁnal
Sheppard, Wisdom.
86. IOTS, 131.
87. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 34.
88. Childs, Review of Sanders, 90, Childs’ emphasis.
89. Exodus, xiv: “the historical development which lay behind the ﬁnal form” seems a rather wordy, though
more precise, circumlocution for what just two years prior was simply glossed as midrash. (Searchable
electronic versions of many of Childs’ titles, including 1970 and 1974, are available online.)
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literary deposit. at becomes the form in which it functions in the community of faith. Later
in that commentary we ﬁnd him committing to the “challenge to hear the Old Testament as
God’s word in a concrete and deﬁnite form for one’s own age.” e church’s diﬀerent use of
scripture from generation to generation “only demonstrates the function of the canon. Scrip-
ture is diﬀerent in kind from the church’s reﬂection upon it.”⁹⁰
Another bit of shorthand for this distinction will surface before long: we are not,
Childs insists, prophets and apostles. e late post-Exilic transformation of Old Testament
tradition, put into relief by Sanders and Seeligmann in their own ways, remains binding in the
Christian church, where a New Testament witness was fashioned on analogy with that ﬁrst
authoritative corpus.
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Another scholar whose analysis of psalm titles in the 1970s led to to a much more
comprehensive project was Michael Fishbane.⁹¹ His classic study of inner biblical exegesis,
Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (1985), remains unsurpassed in quality and extent, and
it would be impossible to do full justice to it here. Comments from Childs’ review of the book
serve as a ﬁtting epilogue to the above discussion, however, because they neatly recapitulate
themes I have been at pains to trace. Aer praising Fishbane for excellent research, Childs
makes a trio of queries. e ﬁrst upholds the textualization of oral tradition as the turning
point in the formation of biblical literature, a point made as early as 1967.
My ﬁrst query is whether Fishbane has blurred the sharpness of the break which occurred
in Israel when the traditions were transmitted in written form. In my judgment, Fishbane
has been led astray at the outset by taking over the terminology and historical patterns of
the traditio-historical critics, for example, in his use of D. Knight's distinction between
traditio and traditum. Admittedly this vocabulary is useful for understanding and describ-
ing the early oral stages of Israel’s development, but to extend these traditio-historical pat-
terns into the later period of Israel’s history, even when slightly modiﬁed, misconstrues the
very new dynamic which resulted from textualization and which Fishbane has so brilliant-
ly analyzed. e actualization of the Exodus traditions by Deuteronomy which von Rad,
for example, studied reﬂects a very diﬀerent process from the proto-midrashic, inner-bib-
90. Exodus, 438, my emphasis.
91. Fishbane, Torah and Tradition. Signiﬁcantly, it appears in a collection of essays dedicated to theology and
tradition history: Knight, ed., Tradition.
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lical exegesis of texts of the exilic and post-exilic periods.⁹²
Midrash or proto-midrash comes into play once actualization becomes an exegetical proce-
dure and not before. Israel deﬁned itself in terms of a book, thereby altering the context for
interpretation permanently. Second, with reference to Sandmel,⁹³ Childs claims that it is
anachronistic to ﬁnd biblical exegesis too early. “My query to Fishbane is whether he has also
tended to project inner-biblical exegesis of texts back to an early stage of Israel’s development
in which its traditions were largely unwritten and were actualized in a variety of diﬀerent ways
which cannot be encompassed under the rubric of inner-biblical exegesis.”⁹⁴ Related to the
ﬁrst point, Childs seems to want to protect the other main phase of the tradition, in which
considerable ﬂexibility in adaptation is possible. ere is an appreciable and important diﬀer-
ence between the use of tradition in Second Isaiah and ird Isaiah, Childs says. Finally, he
turns to the hermeneutical implications.
e third query is not a criticism, but a recognition that Fishbane has raised some impor-
tant hermeneutical issues whose theological implications have not as yet been fully ex-
plored. In the past, historical criticism of the OT as practiced by Christians has frequently
disparaged Jewish midrashic exegesis as a rabbinic distortion which has no genuine place
in the Hebrew Bible, but appears just on the outer perimeter as a sign of decay. One recalls
Wellhausen’s derogatory characterization of midrash in his famous chapter on Chronicles.
Fishbane has mounted an impressive case for the deep roots of an interpretive process
which reﬂects the strongest possible analogies with later post-biblical Jewish exegesis.
What are the theological implications of Fishbane’s work for the modern debate over
Scripture and tradition within an ecumenical context?⁹⁵
Fishbane’s study could advance religious dialogue between Protestant and Catholic, and
between Christian and Jewish belief. For Childs the ﬁrst common denominator is the result of
Israel’s textualized tradition, canonical scripture in its ﬁnal form. eological disagreements
would have to be arbitrated on whether they “auf den biblischen Text selbst gründen kann”;
when “spätere Traditionen” are the only justiﬁcation to be found for an article of faith, then we
have an “ernsthaen Schwäche, sowohl im Judentum als auch im Christentum.” But what if
the status of tradition as such is the point of contention? If Seeligmann correctly identiﬁes the
92. Childs, Review of Fishbane, 512.
93. Sandmel, Haggada. Recall the critique of this in 1972: Childs, Midrash, 48–50.
94. Childs, Review of Fishbane, 513.
95. Ibid., 513.
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paradox of tradition within the biblical literature, where and how should one seek a resolu-
tion? We turn now to Childs’ reconsideration of this perennial question.
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IOTS “seeks to describe the form and function of the Hebrew Bible in its role as sacred
scripture for Israel.”⁹⁶ In deﬁning historical and theological facets of his key term canon,
Childs maintains, contra Sanders, that the category “witness” is far more central than the bib-
lical tradents’ self-understanding. “Because the process of forming the scriptures came to an
end, canon marked oﬀ a ﬁxed body of writings as normative for the community rather than
attributing authority to the process itself. When Israel later reinterpreted its scriptures to
address its changing needs, it did so in the form of the targum, that is to say, commentary,
which was set apart sharply from the received sacred text of scripture.”⁹⁷ Childs then adduces
the following warrant for a study of the canonical process:
Seeligmann has described a process of interpretation within scripture which he correctly
derived from a consciousness of canon (Kanonbewusstsein). is process involved the skil-
ful use of literary techniques, word-plays, and proto-midrashic exegesis which emerged
during the ﬁnal stages of the formation of the canon and continued to be developed and to
ﬂower during the post-biblical period. Although such exegetical activity grew out of a con-
cept of the canon as an established body of sacred writings, it is a derivative phenomenon
which does not represent the constitutive force lying behind the actual canonical process.
Rather, the decisive force at work in the formation of the canon emerged in the transmis-
sion of a divine word in such a form as to lay authoritative claim upon the successive
generations.⁹⁸
Historically speaking, commentary and text do of course break apart. But the theological crux
is whether or not exegesis is “derivative” of scripture, and how one knows. As has been seen,
Seeligmann is rather more ambivalent about canon getting the upper hand on the exegetical
activity (midrash). For Childs the “constitutive force” which was unleashed in Israel’s late, reli-
gious use of its tradition leads inexorably toward canon. Ever aer text and commentary are
wholly distinct. Childs accommodates the untidiness of literary-historical processes by sepa-
96. IOTS, 16.
97. IOTS, 59, cf. 101, 370.
98. IOTS, 60, my emphasis.
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rating literary and canonical histories into two related but non-identical processes, and this
enables him to address the theological function of canon as a binding and closed body of liter-
ature before every last detail is locked in place. On the basis of the bond between church and
synagogue which this establishes, Childs argues for the MT as the vehicle for the recovery of
the canonical text in the church, not the LXX,⁹⁹ and even “for the priority of the Jewish tripar-
tite division—normative is now too strong a word—when dealing with the Hebrew Bible for
the same theological reasons which have been outlined before, namely to conﬁrm the role of
the Jews as tradents of the canonical tradition.”¹⁰⁰ Jews and Christians read their common
scriptures in diﬀerent contexts—for Jews tradition is “now codiﬁed in the midrashim, Mish-
nah, and Talmuds,” and Christians bring “the gospel of Jesus Christ found in the New Testa-
ment”—but the diﬀerence “does not sever the common link with the scriptures of Israel.”¹⁰¹
Summing up, canon identiﬁes an historical development which well pre-dates the
advent of Christ, though in literary terms the authoritative tradition is in a certain degree of
ﬂux. As canon, Israel’s scripture was (and is) received by the church from the hands of the
Jews. According to its testimony early Christians articulated their encounter with the risen
Lord. But the processes which eventually led to subsequent bodies of literature, to a split
between Tanak and Old Testament, do not obliterate the profound historical and theological
reality that connects synagogue and church. “e notion that the ‘real’ Old Testament is pure-
ly ‘Hebrew’ in character and was later distorted by Judaism is a legacy of Wellhausen which
cannot be sustained either from a historical or theological perspective.”¹⁰² Neither does the
construct of a single tradition history (Gese, through von Rad), which because of the promi-
nence of the LXX in the NT must cut ties with the parallel Hebrew canon, square with the way
99. IOTS, 100–103.
100. IOTS, 667. Childs of course recognizes that Christian orderings of OT books vary, and that early
Christians disregarded the tripartite version. But they “chose an order from among the variety of options
which best supported the Christian claim of a diﬀerent understanding of the Old in terms of the New”—
i.e., they did not redact a new OT to suit their purposes.
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authoritative tradition changed as oral became textual tradition in the post-exilic period.¹⁰³
is historical and theological link between church and synagogue in terms of a shared canon
despite literary diﬀerences is, in short, the mystery of Israel.
Yet aer setting variations on Wellhausen’s separation between Israel and Judaism to
one side, and on von Rad’s to another, Childs considers a “problem of relating the Hebrew
Bible to the Christian Old Testament which arises from the side of Judaism.”¹⁰⁴ e issue is
raised in a well-known article by L. B. Wolfenson (1924).¹⁰⁵ Wolfenson wants to separate two
distinct meanings of canon, according to Childs. One is the usual “classic collection of reli-
gious writings and is synonymous in Judaism with the term Bible.” e other “denotes a norm
of recognized regulations for faith and practice. Wolfenson denies that the whole Hebrew
canon ever had such a normative role for Judaism in this second sense of canon. Only the
Torah was considered normative, that is to say, legally and morally binding, and by the term
Torah was included the interpretation of the Mishnah and Gemara as well.”¹⁰⁶ Childs ﬁnds
reason to doubt if this is historically plausible. ere is also a “theological problem”: “if
Wolfenson’s description of the Jewish attitude towards the canon is correct even for later, post-
Talmudic Judaism then he has indeed focused on a basic theological diﬀerence toward the use
of the Bible which distinguishes Judaism from Christianity.” Again, if correct, Wolfenson
would signal major “elements of discontinuity between the two faiths.”¹⁰⁷ Addressing the issue
is important but beyond the scope of IOTS, Childs concludes.
As a matter of fact IOTS is built upon the assumption that Wolfenson is wrong. In
response to reviewers Childs writes,
e New Testament writers took over various hermeneutical techniques current in the Ju-
daism of the Hellenistic period (midrash, pesher). Of course, midrash focuses on one spe-
ciﬁc passage at a time—one looks in vain for broad topical summaries—but the assump-
tion undergirding the method is that of a ﬁxed and closed corpus of Sacred Scriptures
which constituted a unity. All the various hermeneutical rules which were later articulated
by the sages assumed a ﬁxed canon. e freedom of the Jewish homilist in actualizing his
103. IOTS, 669.
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105. Wolfenson, Ruth.
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texts does not undercut the concept of an established, authoritative text, but rather proves
just the opposite.¹⁰⁸
Is “the assumption undergirding the method” really of a closed canon? How can such a free
operation testify to a ﬁxed unity? Childs begins to sound like he protests too much. But note
that he accepts and aﬃrms the place of midrash in the NT. Within a few short years he will
quietly issue a retraction: the NT is no midrash on the OT. When exactly, and above all, why?
In NTCI Childs observes that it has become common to characterizes the NT’s use of
the OT as midrashic. Of course, the NT shares “many of the formal conventions of Jewish exe-
gesis” at that time. “Nevertheless, I have a growing conviction that the use of the term
‘midrash’ can be very misleading.”¹⁰⁹ As with tradition history, though not in the same way,
the decisive point turns on a distinction between oral and textual tradition. “Crucial to Jewish
midrash is a particular hermeneutical understanding of the biblical text which implied not
only a closed corpus of canonical literature, but a dogmatic construal of the written text’s rela-
tion to Jewish oral tradition.” A heightened sensitivity to Oral Torah’s weight in Jewish theolo-
gy begins to make midrash constitutively Jewish. e formal technique factors into the forma-
tion of the NT, and it remains an ally in the theological concern to take the the textual
authority of scripture seriously, but an awareness of what midrash is introduces a serious dis-
analogy. “Jewish midrash is, therefore, text-oriented in a very diﬀerent manner from that of
early Christianity.”¹¹⁰
Childs does not say if or how Judaism is like or unlike Christianity in separating text
from commentary, but he is adamant that there is a “qualitative diﬀerence between apostolic
tradition and subsequent church tradition which the canon sought to establish.”¹¹¹ Further, in
an excursus on NT text criticism, Childs points out many diﬀerences between the develop-
ment of OT and NT literature despite the more recent trend to see a generally similar situa-
tion, of a gradual move from great ﬂuidity to increasing stability, and these diﬀerences
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impinge on the emerging historical and theological separation of church and synagogue.
“ere are some important diﬀerences between the development of the Hebrew text within
the Jewish synagogue and the Greek New Testament text within the Christian church.”¹¹² e
early church sat more loosely to the Hebrew text than did the early synagogue, and in Chris-
tendom no universally oﬃcial text ever emerged on par with the MT text tradition. at the
church was willing to translate the NT “resulted in a diﬀerent dynamic of textual transmission
from that of the Hebrew text.” And in terms of the canonical process, “the understanding of
the process was not identical. For the Christian church canonization was derivative of
christology. e New Testament scriptures gained their unique authority in their role as the
apostolic and prophetic witness to Christ’s death and resurrection which was also uniquely
tied to the one speciﬁc period of his earthly life.”¹¹³ Jewish interpretation was Torah-centric,
whereas Christian interpretation was christocentric. Extrapolating slightly, insofar as the latter
entails a certain approach to the scriptures of Israel, one can appreciate how in the course of
his ﬁve-year venture into NT scholarship Childs moves away from the language of midrash
and the OT, and toward the language of a christologically transformed Old Testament.
So what if Wolfenson was on to something aer all? What if Judaism focused not
exclusively on the narrower textual Torah, but equally or even primarily on Oral Torah? e
historical shi from oral to textual tradition which Childs develops out of a form critical per-
spective, with an eye to the subsequent and ongoing theological function of scripture, is not
the same thing as the Jewish articulation, solidiﬁed in the rabbinic period, of an oral tradition
reaching back to Moses. But if one had an eye to canon in that religious context, as opposed to
its Christian setting, might not the sparse historical evidence be read very diﬀerently, with a
fundamentally diﬀerent understanding of canon? It seems quite possible that Seeligmann was
doing more with tradition history in the early 1950s than giving a neutral, religiously disinter-
ested account of the historical origins of Jewish midrash.
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e 1983 book Midrash in Context raised this challenge in a forceful way for Childs. A
look at Neusner’s thesis quickly shows why. “Exegesis is not Torah. But books of exegeses
became part of Torah. How come? Is the category ‘canon’ ever relevant to Judaism?”¹¹⁴ Based
on a taxonomy of rabbinic texts from 200–600 , including case studies of Mishnah, Talmud
and Midrashim, Neusner concludes that the relationship of Talmud to Mishnah is formally
identical to the relationship compilations of exegeses (the Midrashim) have to scripture. e
Mishnah, therefore, becomes part of Torah. “Receiving the Mishnah meant setting it into rela-
tionship with the ancient Scriptures. Let me now, in a single sentence, report what they did.
e sages totally reformed the meaning of the word Torah, thereby, in the literary framework,
reopening the canon of Judaism, and, in the theological setting, redeﬁning the meaning and
limits of revelation.”¹¹⁵ e reform had palpable results. In literary terms, it created the Tal-
mud. In theological terms it brought about “Judaism as we know it: a living and enduring faith
of everyday encounter with God through Torah and its holy way of life.”¹¹⁶
e “measure of midrash”¹¹⁷ Neusner seeks goes beyond Seeligmann’s paradox at the
end of the biblical period in historical and theological respects, centering on the post-biblical
revisioning of canon as such. For Neusner, the exegetical activity called midrash changes in
kind when rabbinic sages reform Torah. “As we know full well, Israelite thinkers—whether
lawyers and philosophers, like the heirs of the Mishnah in the Talmuds, or visionaries and
prophets, like the Essenes at Qumran, or messianists and evangelists, like the members of the
school of Matthew—routinely read one thing in relationship to something else, old Scripture
in the setting of fresh concerns and sure knowledge of new truth.”¹¹⁸ Midrash proper does not
introduce a new technique. Neither is it in essence technique—in Seeligmann’s words, associa-
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tive exegesis or crisis-provoked adaptation. “What captures our attention is not the techniques
of exegesis but, in particular, the place and purpose assigned to the larger labor of exegesis.”¹¹⁹
Neusner defends a change in consciousness of another order: midrash does not inhere in the
paradoxical closing of the text it opens; rather, “the heart of the matter [is] the standing of the
sage.”¹²⁰ When a rabbi gave an opinion on a verse, what was the status of his judgment? His
view was clearly seen as authoritative, but at the same time his view would have been easy to
distinguish from the ancient words of scripture. “Did the distinction between media make a
diﬀerence?”¹²¹ ere are only two options, Neusner decides. “Either there is torah [revelation]
which is not part of the Torah, the canon of revelation. Or there is no such thing as a canon at
all.” For: “e entire thrust of the exegetical process is to link upon a single plane of authority
and reliability what a rabbi now says with what the (written) Torah said, or what the Tosea
says with what the (written) Torah said.”¹²² His simple conclusion could not be more contrary
to Childs’ view. “Interpretation and what was interpreted, exegesis and text, belonged together.
In so vivid a world of divine address, what place was there for the conception of canon? ere
was none.”¹²³ Neusner even goes so far as to call the rabbi “the word of God … made ﬂesh.
And out of the union of man and Torah, producing the rabbi as Torah incarnate, was born
Judaism, the faith of Torah: the ever-present revelation, the always-open canon.”¹²⁴
Neusner does allows that traditional Christianity had an entirely diﬀerent orientation
to sacred scripture. “e contrast to the standing for Jerome’s biblical commentaries” jumps
out in view of his conclusions, he writes. “Jerome treated books of the canon; his commen-
taries were not canonical. e earliest midrash compilations spoke not for an individual but
for the collectivity of the sages; they demanded and gained a place with the canon of rabbini-
cal writings, thus entering the Torah. e diﬀerence is fundamental.”¹²⁵ If Neusner correctly
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describes the standing of the Jewish sage, Childs would have to occupy Jerome’s space in order
to maintain the distinction between scriptural text and commentary. He would almost have to
claim a Christian canon without analogy to the Jewish understanding.
 “  ”
Childs confronted the implications of Neusner’s position in January 1985 at a Bern
symposium on “Biblische eologie und jüdische Auslegung des Tanach.” A translation of
Childs’ paper appears alongside other conference proceedings in the volume Mitte der Schri.
He begins with an address to his “Christian colleagues,” and he ends with a call to serious dia-
logue between Jews and Christians over their common scriptures, albeit from a distinctly
Christian point of view. Most remarks in the ﬁrst half of the essay appear to be aimed at Chris-
tian scholars—those invested in Old Testament theology of some stripe—but they serve dou-
ble duty, setting the stage for a deep contrast Childs draws between Jewish and Christian exe-
gesis. First, it is a category error to extract theological justiﬁcation for textual freedom from
Jesus’ or Paul’s use of the Old Testament. When P. Stuhlmacher or U. Luz attempts to draw a
direct analogy between modern exegesis and the New Testament’s use of the Old, they over-
look the essential function of the Christian canon (throughout Childs almost never invokes
canon without the modiﬁer “Christian”). Its function is to sharply distinguish “dem ersten
apostolischen Zeugnis und jeder folgenden kirchlichen Tradition.”¹²⁶ As he insists here and
elsewhere, “I am neither Jesus Christ nor an apostle.” Text is distinct from commentary. Sec-
ond, the two-testament Christian canon provokes some form of dialectic. Canon functions as
a normative witness in the prophetic and apostolic form which was built and has been
received. It is a closed unity (“eine abgeschlossene Einheit”).¹²⁷ Consequently, searches for an
original sense do not do justice to the theological task. Neither do quests for a “Mitte der
Schri,” whether thematic (e.g., covenant) or developmental (e.g., prophecy and fulﬁllment in
tradition history). Rather, beginning with an aﬃrmation of the formal arena of Christian
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scripture, a unitive canon requires a dialectic on at least two planes, one historical and another
intertextual. ird, the theological foundation for an aﬃrmation of Christian canon is christo-
logical. OT theology is a Christian discipline in essence, subsidiary but integral to the broader
Christian theological enterprise.¹²⁸ Characteristically, all Old Testament theologies assume a
relationship of some kind between Christ and the history of Israel. ough this is talked about
in diﬀerent ways—“sei es ein Wesen, ein Kerygma oder eine historische Entwicklungslinie, die
o durch ein philosophisches System (Idealismus, Existentialismus, Ontologie) mitbestimmt
sind”—it inevitably conﬁrms a basic Christian standpoint; far better when such undertones
are made explicit from the start. is is an obvious departure from Judaism: “Für das Chris-
tentum, um [sic] Unterschied zum Judentum, wurzelt der Kanon in der Christologie.”¹²⁹
Fourth, the priority of the literal sense in Christian exegesis is presupposed. e OT must be
allowed to speak on its own terms rather than too quickly identifying its Christuszeugnis with
Christ. e sensus literalis also cuts against modern schemes of salvation history as well as
medieval and modern allegorizing.¹³⁰
A point implicit in NTCI becomes quite explicit here. Now canon is inseparable from
christology, and thus canon’s relation to Judaism is a more troubling and more open question
than IOTS would lead one to expect. It is not by chance, Childs remarks with newfound con-
viction, that Jewish scholars are little interested in biblical theology. Religious adoption of
Hebrew scriptures by Jews happens in a diﬀerent way, it seems, a way that does not require the
dialectics of biblical theology.¹³¹
Admitting his limitation as a Christian scholar in trying to describe characteristics of
Jewish exegesis, Childs nevertheless attempts a few summary points in the latter part of his
Bern essay. “Erstens werden die Hebräischen Schrien nicht als geschlossene Grösse ver-
standen und auch nicht als in einer dialektischen Beziehung zur späten rabbinischen Tradi-
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tion stehend, sondern es gibt eher eine ungebrochene Kontinuität zwischen Schri und Tradi-
tion, die zu einem verschiedenen Verständnis von Schri-Autorität führt.”¹³² ree clauses in
this ﬁrst point are exact opposites of the distinctives of Christian biblical theology Childs has
just defended. e scriptures are not a closed unit, they are not in a dialectical relationship to
later tradition; text and commentary stand in continuity. Secondly, he continues, “bewirkt das
jüdische Verständnis der Rolle der mündlichen Tradition als eines massgeblichen Kommentars
zur schrilichen Tradition eine sehr unterschiedliche Dynamik gegenüber der des Christen-
tums (in Gestalt des Midrasch).”¹³³ On the face of it, this is a near reversal on his position from
1967, that midrash obtains only aer the oral tradition becomes a textual tradition. However,
it needs to be emphasized that the theological dynamic Oral Torah introduces in a Jewish
interpretive context is by no means identical with a form critical study of biblical tradition in
historical development. ird and ﬁnally, the core of the Bible for Judaism is Torah rather
than Christ.¹³⁴
Only aer these remarks have been made are we told what precipitates them. “Meine
Position, der Gegenstand der biblischen Disziplinen seien die kanonischen Schrien der
jüdischen Synagoge, gesehen aus der Perspektive christlicher eologie, hat kürzlich einen
recht starken Angriﬀ durch Jacob Neusners neuestes Werk Midrash in Context hinnehmen
müssen.”¹³⁵ e book opens up a new phase in the discussion of the Bern conference theme,
he suggests. Without too much modiﬁcation Childs may still be able to say, as he does in 1980,
that with midrash “the assumption undergirding the method is that of a ﬁxed and closed cor-
pus of Sacred Scriptures which constituted a unity.” But he has had to rethink entirely the
bounds of scripture’s authority in Jewish faith. Is the corpus closed? Is it textual?
at said, Childs lodges a pair of reservations about Neusner’s thesis. First, the tradi-
tional history of midrash traces lines of continuity into earlier eras, including the biblical peri-
od. Neusner, however, has proposed something as revolutionary as Wellhausen’s inversion of
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Pentateuchal sources, turning the accepted line of development upside down. Childs feels
Gunkel’s criticism of Wellhausen applies to Neusner. “Muss man nicht deutlicher unterschei-
den zwischen der Entstehungszeit der Stoﬀe und der Zeit ihrer endgültigen literarischen Fix-
ierung?”¹³⁶ Second, even granting that the rabbinic situation is as Neusner describes it, was
canon not an important category in Judaism nearer the turn of the eras? Was not a distinction
drawn with books that “tarnished the hands”? “Die Idee eines Kanons, d.h. einer begrenzten
Sammlung autoritativer Schrien, ist nicht einfach eine christliche, sondern auch eine jüdis-
che, auch wenn ihr Inhalt und ihre Rolle recht verschieden aussahen.”¹³⁷ And in fact Neusner
does talk of the sages reopening a closed canon, though he has considerably less interest in the
hermeneutical signiﬁcance of Kanonbewußtsein among late post-exilic tradents.
e upshot is that Childs becomes more explicit about the confessionally Christian
foundation of his proposed approach to scripture. From the mid-1980s he struggles to express
the witness of the Old Testament not just as scripture, but more acutely as Christian scripture,
even as Christuszeugnis. And yet working hard to preserve the theological tie Jews and Chris-
tians have in a common scripture, considerable diﬀerences notwithstanding, Childs strongly
opposes two possibilities. On the Christian side, there is the Marcionite temptation to dissolve
any connection with the Old Testament. On the Jewish side, there is the danger of completely
relativizing the distinctive authority of the Hebrew Scriptures through “spätere rabbinische
Tradition.” “Beides führt dazu, die Möglichkeit eines ernsthaen theologischen Dialogs zwis-
chen Juden und Christen auf der Grundlage einer gemeinsamen Schri zu untergraben.”¹³⁸ In
the end, however, contra Rendtorﬀ, for Childs it will not be possible to restrict Christian dis-
course on the OT to claims that will be “verständlich und akzeptabel” to Jews. is is so even
though, for historical and especially for theological reasons, Childs refuses to simply chris-
tianize the witness of Jewish scripture to the God of Israel.¹³⁹
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e adjustment is essentially in place in OTTCC, which incorporates a brief summary
of the Bern paper.¹⁴⁰ As in IOTS, the ongoing life of the synagogue furnishes Childs’ strongest
theological argument for a Hebrew rather than a Greek Old Testament: “the theological issue
of how Christians relate to Jewish scriptures cannot be decided biblicistically by an appeal to
New Testament practice, but must be addressed theologically.”¹⁴¹ Only a minor point is of
additional note here. In one place “midrash” is said to be an irrelevant category because the
text in question is not interpreting another text.¹⁴² It seems Childs does not rescind the form
critical distinction between oral and textual tradition which reaches back to 1967. Midrash
remains text-centric, even if as a Jewish approach to scripture it admits an oral tradition with-
out parallel in Christianity. Childs’ mid-career reconsideration of midrash, prompted especial-
ly by Neusner, pertains more to the hermeneutical and theological measure of midrash than to
the historic proﬁle of (proto-)midrash as an exegetical technique.
“ ’      ”
Without “Die Bedeutung des Jüdischen Kanons in der Alttestamentlichen eologie”
for background, it is easy to misunderstand a number of Childs’ later statements about the
peculiarly Christian challenges of biblical theology. For example, the second section of
BTONT, “A Search for a New Approach,” begins with a chapter titled “e Problem of the
Christian Bible.”¹⁴³ It is a revision of a piece that appeared in German four years earlier, pre-
serving a number of near-verbatim parallels. Each text suggests that the problem of the Chris-
tian canon must be addressed by “the church’s ongoing search for the Christian Bible.”¹⁴⁴
Childs is concerned to show why Sundberg’s argument for an open canon in the ﬁrst century
 is unsustainable (in part because of a Kanonbewußtsein¹⁴⁵), and to explore the theological
140. OTTCC, 7–8. Neusner’s book is not cited. Neither is the Bern paper, though several direct parallels show
that some version of that essay lies behind OTTCC here, or is anticipated by it.
141. OTTCC, 10.
142. OTTCC, 193.
143. BTONT, 55–69.
144. BTONT, 67; Childs, Biblische eologie, 27; emphasis original in each.
145. Ibid., 14.
  :   “  ” 
problem raised by the fact of the Septuagint’s prevalence in the New Testament. His answers,
in four interrelated theses, reﬂect his deepened sense of the “mystery of Israel.”
First, in contrast to Judaism, the church’s “basic stance towards its canon was shaped
by its christology.”¹⁴⁶ BTONT summarizes what this entails, including how Sundberg fails to
recognize the diﬀerence, but “Biblische eologie” gives a fuller explanation that makes the
relation to the argument in “Jüdischen Kanons” more obvious. e early church saw in the
Jewish holy scriptures not just historical background, but a living witness to Jesus Christ. Later
the New Testament was juxtaposed with the Old, and while the three-part ordering of the
Tanak was relativized somewhat, giving higher priority to the prophets, it is highly signiﬁcant
that the Old Testament was preserved as a witness in its own right.¹⁴⁷ An important conse-
quence is that the New Testament concept of fulﬁllment does not suppose “einfache Kontinu-
ität.”¹⁴⁸ A complex dialectic is introduced. Similarly, a single tradition-history does violence to
the shape of a two testament canon.¹⁴⁹ In short, as in the Bern piece, making canon about
christology signals imperatives for Christian exegesis which set it apart from Judaism: discon-
tinuity in the tradition, at least in some measure; a sharp distinction between the prophetic/
apostolic eras and all subsequent eras; a dialectic arising from a two testaments canon; the
Christuszeugnis of the Old Testament.¹⁵⁰
Second, the New Testament is diﬀerent in kind from later rabbinic traditions, and
therefore, so is the entire Christian canon. e evangelists’ confrontation with Christ as the
resurrected Lord produced a diﬀerent dynamic altogether. “Das Neue Testament is kein
Midrasch zum Alten Testament.”¹⁵¹ e power driving the New derives not from the Old, but
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and Qumran exegesis. e canonical continuity established by the shape of the Christian Bible is of a
 . :    ’       
from the new encounter with Christ. Still, it must not be overlooked that New speaks with the
words of the Old. “Die Identität Jesu wird mit der Begriﬄichkeit des Alten Testaments gän-
zlich verständlich gemacht. Doch wurde die Kontinuität der einen umfassenden Erlösung
Gottes ausschließlich vom Standpunkt des Neuen Testaments aus entdeckt und allein von ihm
aus die Brücke zum Alten Bund geschlagen.”¹⁵² e one-time arrival of Christ in history
divides Christianity from the continuity sought by rabbinic sages. Yet the shape of the Christ-
ian canon also makes “radical discontinuity” inadequate. at two diﬀerent testaments testify
to the one will of God requires a “kunstvolle Dialektik” in biblical theology. “Die sorgfältige
Beachtung des christlichen Kanons führt zu einem theologischen Nachdenken über beide
Testamente, das sich weder mit Kategorien einer ungebrochenen Kontinuität noch mit denen
einer radikalen Diskontinuität zufrieden gibt; und nur die theologische Reﬂexion, die beide
Kategorien freimütig gebraucht, stimmt mit der einen christologischen Mitte überein.”¹⁵³ us
scripture’s “Mitte” in Christ emerges out of the complex dialectic evoked by a two testament
canon.¹⁵⁴ is dynamic in turn feeds into the dialectic of biblical witness and its subject mat-
ter (res), which is Christ.
ird, the christological Sachkritik required by the Christian Bible in no way unravels
the integrity of the Old Testament as a witness to Christ in its own right.¹⁵⁵ Harmonizing the
witnesses is therefore not an option. But neither can the Christuszeugnis of the Old Testament
be avoided. “Der moderne Christ liest das Alte Testament genau wie die Urkirche als Hinweis
auf Jesus Christus. Das Alte Testament ist Teil der Schri der Kirche, weil es Zeugnis für den
einen Herrn ablegt.”¹⁵⁶ Obviously this distinguishes Christian from Jewish exegesis, but para-
diﬀerent order” (76).
152. Childs, Biblische eologie, 22, my emphasis. In a sense, he adds, Bultmann was right that the Old
Testament witnesses to its failure; he overlooked the fact, though, that for the evangelists this was a witness
to Christ (cf. BTONT, 77).
153. Ibid., 22.
154. Cf. BTONT, 25, which reiterates the skepticism about Jewish biblical theology earlier expressed in OTTCC
and “Jüdischen Kanons.”
155. Childs, Biblische eologie, 25 addresses problems arising “aus dem kanonischen Rang des Alten
Testaments als eines unabhängigen Zeugnisses Jesu Christi in eigenem Recht.”
156. Ibid., 24. Hence we have “Israel’s confessional witness” (BTONT, 100).
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doxically it ties the church indelibly to the literal sense of Jewish scripture. Just how the Old
Testament is to be a Christuszeugnis is an enormous problem, as Childs well knows. “Allerd-
ings bleibt es schwer bestimmbar, was es bedeutet, im Alten Testament einen Hinweis auf
Christus zu ﬁnden, und das Ringen mit diesem Problem führt ins Herz der Biblischen
eologie.”¹⁵⁷
e fourth thesis concerns the scope of the Bible in relationship to scripture and tradi-
tion.¹⁵⁸ Facing the problem of multiple Christian Bibles, Childs ﬁnds that “two diﬀerent prin-
ciples appear to have been at work in the history of the church.”¹⁵⁹ One was the criterion of
apostolicity. Jerome’s insistence on the Hebrew scriptures is the Old Testament equivalent of
this. He rightly saw “the theological argument that the Jews … were the proper tradents of this
tradition.”¹⁶⁰ e other criterion was “catholicity … which was expressed in an unbroken conti-
nuity of sacred tradition.”¹⁶¹ e larger canon of the Vulgate is evidence of this principle.
Childs acknowledges that the question of the canon’s scope has not been settled to this day,
and he grants that each side (now Protestant, Roman Catholic) has strengths and limitations,
which is why he ultimately speaks of “the church’s ongoing search for the Christian Bible.” But
it is also conspicuous that a completely “unbroken continuity” between text and tradition is
not a Christian option. I quote from the German because of an important phrase that disap-
pears in BTONT:
Die Gefahr der katholischen Position, in reichlichem Maß in der Kirchengeschichte ver-
anschaulicht, lag natürlich in der Drohung, das Wort Gottes—o im Namen der Fröm-
migkeit—zum Gefangenen der kirchlichen Traditionen zu machen. Läu nicht letztlich
eine Berufung auf die Tradition an sich, ohne daß der vom Inhalt des biblischen Zeugniss-
es ausgeübte kritische Maßstab berücksichtigt würde, dem einzigartigen christlichen Ver-
ständnis des Kanons, das es vom jüdischen unterscheidet, zuwider?¹⁶²
157. Ibid., 24.
158. Compare ibid., 25–26 with BTONT, 64–66.
159. BTONT, 64; Childs, Biblische eologie, 25.
160. BTONT, 65. Cf. Childs, Biblische eologie, 26. Jerome is not discussed, but: “Ein ebenso wichtiges
Argument war der theologische Anlaß zur Solidarität mit den Juden, den auserwählten Tradenten dieser
Tradition.” In both places, Romans 9:5 is referenced. Romans 1:4 is added in BTONT.
161. BTONT, 65, my emphasis.
162. Childs, Biblische eologie, 26. Compare BTONT, 67: “However, the danger of the Catholic position
which emerged in the course of the church’s history lay in the temptation to render the Word captive to
more easily adaptable human traditions, oen in the name of piety. Any appeal solely to tradition or praxis
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e italicized line demonstrates how the Christian position at which Childs arrives has yet
again been sharpened by the mysterious like and unlike of church and synagogue. Broken
continuity is an imperative for Christian biblical theology, in contrast to Jewish exposition of
the scriptures of Israel. Christ and not Torah became incarnate.
Let me summarize Childs’ position by 1988. (1) Christology drove the church’s “basic
stance towards its canon.” (2) We know this because the stance of the apostles to the Old Tes-
tament is diﬀerent in kind to the stance of rabbinic sages to Tanak. Old and New have been
juxtaposed, not brought into alignment. A dialectic results. (3) Yet because the church did not
impose a christological redaction on the Old Testament, but received a form of it from the
hands of the Jews, the dialectic does not sever the link between church and synagogue, but
rather is founded on it. Like the early church, the modern church receives the OT as a witness
to Christ according to its literal sense, and yet the ongoing life of the synagogue remains a
strong theological argument for preferring the Hebrew Old Testament to the Greek. (4) But
again, the scope of the canon is very much at issue. Canon does not require a resolution of the
debate, but it does present one imperative to all interested parties: scripture is distinct from
commentary. Its textual authority is ineluctable. Indeed, it may even fall to the church to
pressure the synagogue on this point.¹⁶³ Scripture governs tradition, not the reverse.
  
In 1996 Childs gives his fullest and most careful deﬁnition of midrash, complete with a
reprise on Seeligmann (who argued that the roots of adaptive midrash in the late biblical peri-
apart from the critical norm exercised by the content of the biblical witness eventually runs counter to the
essence of a Christian theology of canon.”
163. Childs, Critique, 177: “Judaism distinguished sharply between text and commentary. Christianity
continued this position in setting apart apostolic witness (text) from later church tradition. To retain this
distinction both synagogue and church assigned a unique value to the text’s plain or literal sense.” On the
other hand, Sheppard, Criticism, emphasizes that historic Christianity and Judaism took fundamentally
diﬀerent approaches to a common scriptural heritage. Midrash was formative in rabbinic Judaism, but
Christians tended to prioritize “a nonmidrashic, ‘plain’ or ‘literal sense’” (864).
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od “assumed a quasi-stable biblical text which established ﬁxed parameters”¹⁶⁴). e deﬁnition
occurs in a discussion of the misapplication of midrash, especially in Wellhausen’s mode.¹⁶⁵
e concept of midrash had its origins within the speciﬁc historical context of rabbinic Ju-
daism during the Tannaite and post-Tannaite periods. In the early 19th century Jewish
scholars such as Zunz and Geiger found the warrant for this approach to interpretation al-
ready present in the late books of the Hebrew Bible, especially in Chronicles, but the tech-
nical use of the term is rabbinic in origin. e midrashic approach to exegesis worked with
a variety of assumptions. It assumed a largely stable text of the Hebrew Scriptures which
formed a coherent corpus of authoritative writings. e written text was complimented by
a body of equally authoritative oral tradition. Scripture thus provided an inexhaustible re-
source for the interpreter to draw from the text religious wisdom for the continuing in-
struction of the community in Torah. Tensions which arose in the text were to be resolved
with the help of oral tradition by a form of intertextuality in which one passage illuminat-
ed another according to a pattern of holistic reading. In sum, the midrashic method
worked within carefully articulated restraints which were grounded in certain religious
precepts of orthodox Judaism and which had been shaped by careful philological and con-
textual rules.¹⁶⁶
By emphasizing constraints and parameters on historic Jewish midrash, Childs also implicitly
guards against misapplications by modern liberal Christians. But the Schrigelehrte intertextu-
ality seen in OT prophets (e.g., ird Isaiah) yet attests the authoritative “function of the bibli-
cal text. e text is the tradent of authority in establishing a link with speciﬁc prophetic ﬁg-
ures. e literature has no life apart from Israel’s life, institutions, and oﬃces.”¹⁶⁷ It is simply
that this authority functions diﬀerently in church and synagogue. Intertextuality (a species of
ﬁguration) will thus also be a diﬀerent animal in Jewish exegesis. And yet a warrant for inter-
textual reading derives from the shape of the prophetic literature. “A prophetic text is speciﬁc
and concrete, yet its imagery continues to reverberate within the tradition. It continues to
exert a coercion on future generations of recipients and gives evidence of its force in the way
in which a text is actualized to remain highly existential even in changing historical contexts.”
An “echoing eﬀect arises from a widespread conviction that the authority of a single text
extends to the larger story and partakes in the selfsame reality.” is exegetical activity was
164. Childs, Retrospective Reading, 362.
165. e use of “midrash” in Clements, Isaiah, is “an unfortunate aberration akin to Wellhausen’s
characterization of the Chronicler’s distortion of the book of Kings” (Childs, Retrospective Reading, 370).
It smacks of “naïve supernaturalism or arrid [sic] historical rationalism” (371). In 1967 Childs had of
course covered much of the same ground as Clements in 1980.
166. Ibid., 369–370, my emphasis. Cf. OTTCC, 213.
167. Ibid., 375.
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extended or retrojected in the formation of biblical prophecy, though in either case the “inter-
textuality rests on the same the inner logic of Scripture’s textual authority.”¹⁶⁸
We have seen how Childs criticizes Christian reliance on the hermeneutics of “Jewish
midrash” (Sanders, Steins, Moberly, Frei). It should now be clearer why this is felt to be
“incompatible with the New Testament’s understanding of the authoritative function of the
Old Testament.” As Childs will emphasize in his Isaiah commentary in a few years, inner bibli-
cal exegesis is deictic, not midrashic.¹⁶⁹ at is, for the church OT intertextuality points not
primarily to other OT texts, or to Torah; it points to God and Christ. Childs early study of
midrash, combined with his research for NTCI, and catalyzed by an encounter with Neusner’s
provocative Midrash in Context, leads Childs to revise his understanding of “midrash” so as to
leave space for both Jewish and Christian understandings of the ongoing religious function of
OT intertextuality, but also (even by retaining the designation OT) to mount a case for the ﬁt-
tingness of Israel’s Christuszeugnis in Christian confession. e Old Testament has been and is
“continually transformed by the Spirit into the law of Christ.”
For an explanation of this conclusion in 2005 we were referred to an article in 2003 in
which we are told why “it is not by chance that rabbinic Judaism interprets its Scriptures by
means of midrash while Christianity has always found the form of allegory most compatible
along with its traditional ﬁgurative subdivisions.” As Childs explains,
the major point to make is that midrash and allegory, in spite of large areas of overlap, are
two very distinct and diﬀerent interpretive strategies, reﬂecting very diﬀerent hermeneuti-
cal understandings of how intertextuality functions. While midrash works at discerning
meaning through the interaction of two written texts, allegory—I am using the term in its
broadest sense—ﬁnds meaning by moving to another level beyond the textual. It seeks to
discern meaning by relating it referentially to a substance (res), a rule of faith, or a hidden
eschatological event. Christian exegetical use of intertextuality moves along a trajectory
between promise and fulﬁllment within a larger christological structure.¹⁷⁰
In fact one has to look back much further in Childs’ corpus to get a sense of what he means by
this. Belief in the advent of God the Son in the God of Israel’s providentially ordered time
pushes him to adopt allegory rather than midrash. is is a gradual realization. e “mystery
168. Ibid., 376.
169. Isaiah, 442, 445, 462, 479. See chapter three, above.
170. Childs, Critique, 182–183.
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of Israel” seen already in 1970¹⁷¹ thickens considerably for Childs through the 1980s as he
gears up to write his magnum opus. In response to Rendtorﬀ ’s aﬀronted review of it he writes,
“For the Christian church the continuing paradox of faith lies in its encounter through the
Jewish Scriptures with the selfsame divine presence which it confesses to have found in the
face of Jesus Christ.”¹⁷² us the phrase “mystery of Israel” surfaces again in the Isaiah com-
mentary of 2001,¹⁷³ and the concept is integral to Childs’ subsequent struggle alongside the
church to understand Isaiah as Christian scripture, in 2004.
is is the context in which Childs’ remarks on ﬁguration and biblical intertextuality
have to be understood. When Steins, for example, says the “interpretatorisch relevante
Bezugspunkt ist der Text,”¹⁷⁴ he steps in a direction that Childs associates with midrash, and
therefore cannot follow. e Jewish technique has a number of formal characteristics. For one,
“it focuses on the surface irregularities as signaling a tension to be overcome in reaching a
new coherent understanding.” For another, it “is an exegesis of biblical verses, not of books,
which means that each verse is in principle connected to the most distant text as much as to
its adjacent neighbor.” It “remains concrete in its focus in moving between two texts rather
than in seeking a hidden semantic level below or above the written corpus.” In Jewish reading
this may be appropriate and justiﬁable. Aer all, “proto-midrashic techniques had already
appeared in the post-exilic biblical period and provided a biblical warrant for seeing a strong
element of continuity between the earlier and later periods.”¹⁷⁵ But as a ﬁgural technique,
171. Crisis, 122.
172. Childs, Witness to Christ?, 64. Cf. Childs, On Reclaiming, 13: the canonical approach “initially agrees with
the Enlightenment in aﬃrming that the Old Testament should be understood in its own right.
Nevertheless, it interprets this move in a very diﬀerent manner. e Old Testament is to be understood in
its own right because it has its own Jewish voice, which was never altered by the coming of Jesus Christ.”
e mystery has more to do with a regard for Israel present than Israel past, although both considerations
come into play.
173. Isaiah, 59, 326. For a discussion of these and related passages, see the next chapter.
174. Steins, Bindung, 73. Although I am not entirely convinced Childs has the measure of Steins (see chapters
one and three), Steins oﬃcial focus on the text in 1999 is quite explicit. I am even less sure the criticism,
insofar as it applies to Steins, can be transposed to Moberly. See his remarks under Objection 5, above.
175. Childs, Critique, 182. And: “Midrash as Oral Torah is a program of preserving the old by making it
constantly new.”
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midrashic intertextuality is insuﬃciently christological on Childs’ reading. Bound to the literal
sense, Christian allegory “ﬁnds meaning by moving to another level beyond the textual.”
:    - 
James Kugel has recently expressed gratitude for Childs’ theologically minded work,
and initially he is well-disposed toward the canonical approach.¹⁷⁶ But Kugel asserts that
“Childs does not go far enough” in defending the ﬁnal form over its earlier stages.¹⁷⁷ Describ-
ing the transformation of biblical literature that transpired late in the biblical period does not
suﬃciently account for the status of scripture as such. For Kugel “it was not principally the
rearranging and interpolating done by editors that turned these ancient writings into Scrip-
ture, but the whole tradition of interpretation that emerged toward the end of the biblical
period.” e emphasis on canon is selective (it smacks of the “Protestant allegiance to the
Bible alone”), and it underplays the traditional rules of interpretation which in a sense also
became “canonical”: “It does not seem to realize that the earliest ‘community of believers’ can-
onized not only the text but their own peculiar way of reading and interpreting it.”¹⁷⁸
Unfortunately, Kugel overlooks the full implications of canon for a ruled, Christian
approach to scripture, visible in hindsight no later than 1969 (symptomatically, he neglects
Childs’ work aer 1979, and he leaves the secondary literature with Barton in 1984). More
importantly, however, he raises the issue of scripture and tradition from the perspective of
Jewish faith steeped in critical biblical scholarship. In contrast to the Protestant aﬀection for
sola scriptura, Kugel sees that the “situation in Judaism is quite the opposite.”¹⁷⁹ Traditional
interpretation was codiﬁed alongside the Torah as Oral Torah. “Although these two bodies of
writings were, and are, said to be of equal authority, in practice, the Oral Torah always
176. Kugel, Guide, v, lists Childs’ name at the top of a list of former teachers and colleagues whom he wished to
thank, along with Frank Cross and Isadore Twersky of Harvard. Kugel also stood up at the small memorial
session for Childs in Vienna (International SBL, 25 July 2007) to oﬀer remembrances and to praise “that
wonderful piece on the literal sense” (i.e., 1977).
177. Ibid., 768n36 (the footnote numbering is oﬀ by one; this is note 35 in the body of the text, page 678).
178. Ibid., 679.
179. Ibid., 679.
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wins.”¹⁸⁰ And this is what makes traditional Jewish belief fundamentally irreconcilable with
critical biblical scholarship, since the latter expunges traditional interpretation from the text’s
original meaning. Kugel’s solution to this impasse as an observant Jew and former Starr pro-
fessor of Hebrew at Harvard may or may not satisfy. (Of course the same goes for Childs’ solu-
tion, in the end.) But the point to underscore here is that Kugel pushes Childs to go further
than he thinks he does. My thesis in this chapter is that he goes a good deal further, starting
precisely when he canvases the New Testament’s witness to Christ en route to his biblical the-
ology of 1992. What are the implications of this turn for Jewish-Christian dialogue in global,
academic, intra- and inter-confessional settings?
In a way not necessarily incompatible with Kugel’s position, Childs opts for highest
common denominator Jewish-Christian dialogue. As I said at the start of this section (chapter
three), the inner logic of scripture’s textual authority has an outer logic for Childs as well—or
better, a broader inner logic. Childs spends the back half of his career charting a more overtly
Christian response to the challenge to faith posed by critical scholarship, and one should have
to think twice before striking this route—in this day perhaps truly the road less travelled—
from the map. Rendtorﬀ voices a keenly felt objection (is not the Christuszeugnis mutually
exclusive of the “mystery of Israel”?), but he exhibits a sad failure of ecumenical imagination at
this point. And if aﬃrming the Christian witness of the OT is somehow constitutive of his-
toric Christian faith, the latter-day plea for Religionsgeschichte by Albertz, inter alia, would
actually make Jewish-Christian dialogue impossible by deﬁnition, denying the second class its
historical and theological foundation and so its right to exist.
Perhaps Jews and Christians should pressure one another in their readings of the Bible
on the basis of their mutual and competing claims to inherit its testimony. “Reﬂections on an
Era” closes by applauding the German canon debate for its focus on the central relationship of
the testaments and the implications for Jewish-Christian dialogue, yet the piece voices “strong
disagreement” over two issues. One, theological compromise with criticism is not an option.
180. Ibid., 680.
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To strike the right balance between the “theological reading” of the Bible as a “witness to
God’s divine revelation in Jesus Christ,” and “a historical critical reconstruction of the biblical
text,” both aspects are required. Scripture is a “human, fully time-conditioned” witness, and
“the Holy Spirit unlocks its truthful message to its hearers in the mystery of faith.”¹⁸¹ Two, so
ecumenism must be avoided. “e gospel is neither simply an extension of the old covenant,
nor is it merely a commentary on the Jewish Scriptures, but it is an explosion of God’s good
news. e theological paradox is that the radically new has already been testiﬁed to by the Old
(cf. Mk. 1:12; Heb 1:1).” What is more, “there remains a dark side of the New Testament’s wit-
ness”: “all Israel will be saved” (cf. Rom. 9–11), but “hardening has come on part of Israel.”
Israel will be saved, though not “by religious pluralism or ecumenical inclusivity, but by a
divine eschatological event.”¹⁸² As Childs summarizes elsewhere,
A major point to emphasize is that Christianity can make no proper theological claim to
be superior to Judaism, nor that the New Testament is of a higher moral quality than the
Old Testament. Human blindness envelops the one as much as the other. Rather, the claim
being made is that the divine reality made known in Jesus Christ stands as judge of both
religions. is assertion means that Judaism through God’s h ̣esed has indeed grasped di-
vine truth from the Torah, even when failing to recognize therein the manifestation of
God in Jesus Christ. Conversely, Christianity, which seeks to lay claim on divine truth in
the name of Christ, repeatedly fails to grasp the very reality which it confesses to name. In
a word, two millennia of history have demonstrated that Jews have oen been seized by
the divine reality testiﬁed to by their Scriptures, but without recognizing its true name,
while Christians have evoked the name, but failed to understand the reality itself.¹⁸³
It goes without saying that this is a decidedly Christian take on the relationship of church and
synagogue (and possibly a discernibly Protestant one, too). Maybe one should not expect less.
181. Childs, Reﬂections on an Era, 44.
182. Ibid., 45. Cf. also Struggle, 306–308.
183. Childs, Witness to Christ?, 63–64, cf. idem, Toward Recovering, 25–26.
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C     : 
   
Where there is no critical interpretation of Scripture, there will be a mystical or
rhetorical one. If words have more than one meaning, they may have any meaning.
Instead of being a rule of life or faith, Scripture becomes the expression of the ever-
changing aspect of religious opinions. —Benjamin Jowett
Without a form of allegory that at least allows for analogy, the biblical text can only be
an object of archaeological interest. —Frances Young
Allegory furnishes a way of talking about biblical reference. Of course in the modern period
the method has been roundly criticized and rejected. Did it not allow pre-critical interpreters
to impose a dogmatic overlay on the true, real or plain meaning of scripture? For a classic
expression of this concern one would be pressed to ﬁnd a stronger representative than Ben-
jamin Jowett, who was troubled by the way scripture could be made to mean anything. Like
the wind-vane on the belfry, it turns wherever the winds of dogma blow. Counteracting this,
in 1860 Jowett appeals to scripture’s “plain and obvious meaning,” to its “one sense”: “For
many remains of the mystical interpretation exist among ourselves; it is not the early fathers
only who have read the Bible crosswise, or deciphered it as a book of symbols.” It does not
matter if the departure from the plain sense is slight. Frankly, any foray into the “mystical and
allegorical” is treacherous. “A little more or a little less of the method does not make the diﬀer-
ence between certainty and uncertainty in the interpretation of Scripture. In whatever degree
it is practised it is equally capable of being reduced to any rule; it is the interpreter’s fancy, and
it is likely to be not less but more dangerous and extravagant when it adds to the charm of
authority from its use in past ages.”¹ Adherence to the one true meaning of a biblical text, crit-
ically arbitrated, is the best and indeed the only safeguard.
1. Jowett, Interpretation, 369.
Rules and creeds, whether Catholic or Protestant, unitarian, binitarian or trinitarian,
are forever overriding, overruling, the one sense of scripture. No rule is better than any other
in this respect—except (of course) the rule of common sense. For Jowett this does not destroy
the Bible’s privileged and authoritative status, as one might suppose, but actually restores its
occluded power. “When interpreted like any other book, by the same rules of evidence and the
same canons of criticism, the Bible will still remain unlike any other book; its beauty will be
freshly seen, as of a picture which is restored aer many ages to its original state; it will create
a new interest and make for itself a new kind of authority by the life which is in it.”² To get
there, however, one must banish the ﬁgurative methods which sponsor established rules and
canons. “Where there is no critical interpretation of Scripture, there will be a mystical or
rhetorical one. If words have more than one meaning, they may have any meaning. Instead of
being a rule of life or faith, Scripture becomes the expression of the ever-changing aspect of
religious opinions.”³ Applicative steps may follow criticism, and should, but only on the condi-
tion that they build upon the bedrock of honest, reasonable inquiry which truth demands.
Critical interpretation rules allegorical or ﬁgural interpretation out of bounds because the lat-
ter contrives meanings and referents foreign to scripture’s native voice.
Jowett also believed that allegory was on the decline. “e mystical explanations of
Origen or Philo were not seen to be mystical; the reasonings of Aquinas and Calvin were not
supposed to go beyond the letter of the text.” Yet in a new day these revered interpretations
“are no longer tenable.” (e proof is that those who uphold them resort to apologetic.) ey
“belong to a way of thinking and speaking which was once diﬀused over the world, but had
now passed away.”⁴ Surely in just a little time multi-level readings of the Bible would be noth-
ing more than a faint memory.
By the late twentieth century that outcome began to look much less inevitable. In 1981
Andrew Louth delivered a paper in defense of allegory, even at Oxford.⁵ At the end of that
2. Ibid., 375.
3. Ibid., 372.
4. Ibid., 419.
5. See now “Return to Allegory” in Louth, Mystery.
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decade Louth’s colleague James Barr concluded that allegory had not only not been expelled
from the canons of criticism, but in fact was alive and well in critical biblical scholarship.
Moreover, for Barr this was not altogether lamentable. en Childs, who discovered Louth’s
call slightly later than Barr, began to consider its implications from another point of view.
Although Barr and Childs arrive at contrary understandings of allegory’s bearing on the inter-
pretation of scripture, in the end both will disagree with Jowett that allegory had outlived its
time. us in this chapter, in order to reﬁne the contrast between two almost perfect contem-
poraries, I will look at two modern-day measures of allegory, one by a thing called criticism,
another by the rule or canon of faith. To anticipate, my thesis will be that in each case, for Barr
and for Childs, allegory has rules.
As a point of departure, it will be helpful to introduce a simple deﬁnition of allegory.
Allegory, for Childs and Barr in diﬀerent ways, means locating the true meaning of scripture
at another level than the level of the text. For Childs’ part, in the previous chapter we saw that
he aﬃrms Christian allegory (as opposed to Jewish midrash) for the way it moves biblical
interpretation to a “level beyond the textual.” is is not an entirely new idea to him in 2003.
As we saw in chapter two, at the Yale colloquium for Barth in 1969 he draws a very similar
conclusion: “Where the Jews were saying, read the text! read the text!, the Christians said,
there’s something behind the text. It’s what the text points to, namely: Jesus Christ. And there
was a dialectic between the reality and the text.”⁶ So to claim that the Old Testament is a wit-
ness to Christ, which Childs does in 1992, he ﬁnds himself having to rethink the modern ban
on allegory. e dialectic involved in expositing Christian scripture as a witness to the one
God could well require allegory, or something very like it.
Barr does not actually think Childs’ approach moves beyond the text and in criticizing
“canon criticism” for this he reveals how important it is in his own program. Childs is literalis-
tic because he makes the text a closed system, “an intellectual ghetto separated from all other
truth by the walls of relevance.”⁷ is is fatal since theology “comes into existence only when
6. Childs, Barth as Interpreter, 56.
7. Barr, Holy Scripture, 168.
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one moves out of the plane of the text itself and begins to ask about the extrinsic realities to
which the text refers.” For Barr “no step in the actual operation of canonical criticism can be
described as genuinely theological. It does not attempt to wrestle with the question of truth.”⁸
And truth, for reasons I will develop below, requires that biblical interpretation move away
from the text to some other level of meaning. Barr may share more with Jowett at this point
than with Childs, but it is intriguing that Barr and Childs both move toward an aﬃrmation of
allegory later in their careers, that in qualiﬁed senses they accept this traditional term, and
that diﬀerences between them here correspond to the ways they understand the Bible and the
realities to which it refers.
In the ﬁrst section I will look at Barr, and in the second, at Childs. en in a ﬁnal sec-
tion I will contrast the way their approaches to the OT as Christian scripture impact their
doctrines of the Trinity, which correlate directly to their views on the nature of biblical refer-
ence. Before proceeding, a few more introductory remarks about literature are in order.
    :    
e best-known exchange between Barr and Childs turns out to be fairly one-sided.
Subsequent to reviewing IOTS, which permanently altered his opinion of Childs’ project, Barr
took a diﬀerent look back at Childs’ piece in the 1977 Festschri for Walther Zimmerli (both
had contributed essays). “e Sensus Literalis of Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem”
became the occasion for Barr’s “Jowett and the Reading of the Bible ‘Like Any Other Book’”
(1982), in which he challenged Childs’ emphasis on historicism in appraising biblical criti-
cism. Jowett was not really a historical critic as alleged, although he was indeed a critic, and a
(liberal) theologian. is prominent case does not ﬁt Childs’ description of criticism and thus
casts doubt on his wider diagnosis. In fact, Jowett oﬀers a salutary alternative vision to the dis-
torting one cast by Childs. Childs never directly responded, however. Barr resumed the oﬀen-
sive in “e Literal, the Allegorical, and Modern Biblical Scholarship” (1989), quoting some of
8. Ibid., 102, my emphasis (thought the emphasis on truth is original).
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the same oﬀending lines that he had in 1982 and widening his counter-analysis of the literal
sense in biblical scholarship to include allegorical and theological senses, which on his read
are far more integral to biblical criticism than typically held. Two issues later, JSOT featured
Childs’ brief, six page response (1990). Barr replied twice more. In 1993 he wrote of Wilhelm
Vischer, whose name emerged as yet another “link in the (seemingly endless) chain of dis-
agreements between the writer and Professor Childs,”⁹ arguing this time that Vischer operated
not in an allegorical mode, but in a literal-historical mode (or quasi-historical—Vischer seems
not to have been very critical on Barr’s reading). Finally, “Allegory and Historicism” appeared
in 1996, in which Barr again took Childs to task for his devaluation of the Enlightenment and
his attendant failure to come to terms with the theological challenge posed by truly critical
biblical scholarship.
Childs did address this front of Barr’s attack on other occasions, such as in a few pages
of OTTCC and in his review of Barr’s Holy Scripture. Inferences can also be drawn about the
Festschri items each wrote in honor of the other. Barr sketched what he supposed to be the
theologian’s case against biblical theology,¹⁰ whereas Childs wrote of an almost forgotten era
whose biblical scholars, despite their reputation for polemics, achieved a surprisingly broad
“interconfessional and international range” of engagement, possible in part because of a
shared language (Latin), but also, signiﬁcantly, because of a shared commitment to the literal
sense.¹¹ Multi-level readings of scripture were permissible in the seventeenth century but
clearly to be distinguished from scripture’s plain sense. Consensus was destroyed by loss of
this in the rise of historical criticism, not enabled by it.¹² Given the paucity of direct rebuttal,
however, it appears that Childs largely turned away from the long chain of disagreements with
9. Barr, Vischer, 38.
10. Barr, Against Biblical eology.
11. Childs, Seventeenth Century, 326; cf. 333: “the literal sense was considered by all to have the greatest
authority and not to be abused when moving to a diﬀerent level of interpretation.”
12. Ibid., 333: “Few would wish to deprecate the enormous gains in understanding which emerged from the
new historical methods. Yet perhaps one of its greatest ill eﬀects was that it initially nourished and
exacerbated the disharmony between Catholics and Protestants which has only recently begun to heal.”
Contrast Barr, Bibelkritik, 37–38, or Holy Scripture, 150.
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Barr to spend his energy on other pursuits.¹³ Barr sought twice to discount the story told in
“Sensus Literalis,” an anticipatory stand-in for the thesis across IOTS and one that required
less digging to undermine,¹⁴ and he got a single public reply. He probed that response twice
again, but the improbable provocation with which his fourth rebuke closed—“What else did I
say?”—ﬁnally went unanswered.
Perhaps because of Childs’ silence, which is even more conspicuous following Concept,
Paul Noble once attempted to referee. “e Sensus Literalis: Jowett, Childs, and Barr” (1993)
surveys the debate up to that stage,¹⁵ examines Jowett again, and sides by and large with
Childs. Noble points to precarious foundations underlying Barr’s treatment of Jowett and then
argues positively that Childs’ focus on Jowett’s interest in the original meaning, as one index of
how history somehow acquired prominence in the critical era, is justiﬁable. Barr introduces
an important qualiﬁcation or two, but “interpreting the Bible ‘like any other book’ was a
rubric that had strong anti-canonical, pro-original connotations.”¹⁶
I do not intend to re-open the question of Jowett’s signiﬁcance for trends in biblical
scholarship, except insofar as it is a link in the chain under consideration. I do wish to revisit
this Childs/Barr exchange, however, for two main reasons. First, it acts as a coda to the ﬁrst
chapters of this thesis. I hope to sharpen the theological and hermeneutical contrasts between
these scholars, both giants in their time. Second, Barr serves well to introduce, largely by
inversion, Childs’ thought on the sensus literalis, allegory, the rule of faith, the value of tradi-
tional exegesis in contemporary scholarship and theology—all of which I gloss as Childs’
13. It is worth pointing out that Childs always remembered some of Barr’s contributions favorably. For
instance, aer reviewing Semantics in 1961 (where he expresses appreciation and “frequent disagreement”
[377]), he invariably aﬃrms the core of that book’s critique. Childs’ criticism of Moberly for the fallacy of
“totality transfer” in 2003 is a dramatic instance of this, and it is not an isolated one.
14. Barr, Allegory, 109–110: “I make no pretense of having done the extensive study of past exegesis that
Childs has done. I only say that, at various points where I have made soundings, my impression has been a
very diﬀerent one.” Barr’s obstinate refusal to credit Childs’ wide reading is bewildering. Has Childs really
“forfeited the right to instruct us about history”?
15. Barr acknowledged the piece in 1996 but seems not to have been aﬀected by its argument, unless it
prompted him to declare Mark Brett’s earlier account “the best discussion published” (Concept, 392).
16. Noble, Sensus Literalis, 7. Barr’s argument about Jowett has been invoked recently by Barton, Nature, 40,
69–71, who unfortunately shows no awareness of Noble’s challenge.
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sourcing of the tradition. In this Noble oﬀers a better reading of Childs than does Barr, but he
too overlooks the full, programatic signiﬁcance of traditional discourse for Childs.
Finally, a word of caution. e danger of terminological slippage between Barr and
Childs can be severe. I have already argued that Barr is not a reliable guide to Childs’ thought
in general—frequently because Barr operates with narrower deﬁnitions, e.g. of canon (a list of
books) or of history (the truth about what really happened)—and this is no less true when
they conﬂict over traditional categories like spirit and letter. I fully agree with Noble “that Barr
has largely missed the point that Childs is making” in 1977,¹⁷ as with his identiﬁcation of the
reason for Barr’s misunderstanding of Childs on the sensus literalis. Aer comparing Barr and
Childs on of creation in Genesis, Noble summarizes,
Barr is here using “literal” in a quite diﬀerent sense from Childs. Childs’ use of “literal,”
when characterizing critical studies, aﬃrms that Gen. 2 f. was interpreted as evidence for a
positivity behind the text. But whether, when interpreted literally in this sense, it informed
one of speciﬁc (purported) facts about a historical Adam and Eve—i.e. whether it is also
“literal” in Barr’s sense—or whether it is a witness to general truths about man’s creaturely
status—i.e. is “allegorical” in Barr’s sense—is a diﬀerent question entirely.¹⁸
us in what follows I will not trouble much with Barr’s complaints against Childs but will
concentrate instead on each scholar’s distinct understanding of letter in relation to spirit. Barr
has set himself as Childs’ foil on things literal and allegorical, and so we will explore further
contrasts between them before attempting a fuller articulation of why and how Childs sources
the Christian tradition.
.    ()    
If a statement equivalent to Childs’ seminal “Sensus Literalis” exists for Barr, it would
almost certainly be his “Bibelkritik als theologische Aulärung,” an essay presented in 1981 at
a Vienna conference on the Enlightenment’s theological legacy. In it the impact of the then-
recent IOTS is muted but palpable. One senses that Barr is still swimming in the wake of that
argument but that he has found his bearings and plotted a course. He sets forth a bracing revi-
17. Noble, Sensus Literalis, 9, cf. 12.
18. Ibid., 13.
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sion of biblical criticism which, as a theology of biblical authority, must have been honed as an
alternative to the one associated with canon. “Bibelkritik” grounds what he will eventually say
about the canonical approach in 1983 and beyond. emes in the essay recall Barr’s earlier
work, too, but have been marshalled to a new, clearer purpose. At its core, Barr now claims,
criticism is not a method, nor a mode of historical inquiry, but rather a world-view in its own
right: biblical criticism is “auch eine Weltanschauung, die in genau demselben vielseitigen
Verhältnis zur Philosophie, zur Literaturanalyse, und besonders zur Geschichte der eologie
steht.”¹⁹ Freedom is its most essential characteristic; its most important task, to liberate God’s
people from dogmatic systems that threaten powerfully to imprison their minds.
John Barton, in a recent book dedicated to Barr’s memory, signals the importance of
“Bibelkritik” by citing the essay as one of two core stimuli to his own thinking over decades
(the other is Holy Scripture). e Nature of Biblical Criticism dovetails again and again with
themes discussed below, even as Barton’s earlier work echos Barr at many points. Since Barr’s
foundations remain my primary concern I will reference Nature only as necessary. Yet its title,
adapted for the present section heading, serves well as an epithet for the Barr/Barton counter-
oﬀensive. I choose it aware that Barton selects for a similar purpose Reclaiming the Bible for
the Church, a collected volume with a name parallel though not quite identical to Childs’ title
essay.²⁰ Barton’s declaration that “[t]here is a battle going on at the moment between those
who believe that biblical criticism is too much in the grip of a secular and skeptical spirit and
those who think it has still not managed to escape the hand of ecclesiastical and religious
authority” is a touch dramatic, and his report on the munitions of theological exegetes lacks
nuance,²¹ yet he succeeds in underlining and extending the line Barr begins to draw in the
sand in 1981. For Barton as for Barr, the stakes of war are nothing less than religious and intel-
lectual freedom.
19. Barr, Bibelkritik, 30.
20. Childs, On Reclaiming, cf. Barton, Nature, 142.
21. Ibid., 185. For an extensive review see Moberly, Biblical Criticism. Moberly ﬁnds much to commend, but
he observes “that Barton, despite his professed concern not to distort the case for ‘theological reading,’ has
in fact patently distorted it. For some reason, when he comes to theological issues, Barton loses both the
nuance and the eirenic spirit of the preceding discussion” (76).
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e hallmarks of Barr’s proposal, then, are as follows. It begins with a semantic shi.
Rather than the typical designation “historical-critical method,” current among its advocates
and opponents, the older designation “biblical criticism” is much to be preferred. Advocates
should welcome the shi as a move to territory less vulnerable to the sniping of those who
resist. Yet not so much a retreat from the embattled term “history,” it recognizes the properly
basic characteristics of biblical criticism, especially “Literaturverständnis.”²² (Hence the aller-
gy to Introduction—the genre focuses too exclusively on historical matters which, although
possessing real importance, are ancillary to the critical enterprise.) eology is a basic ingre-
dient as well, of which the essence, again, is freedom. Barr struggles a bit to identify the theo-
logical heritage of criticism, vacillating from Luther’s reformation ideals, where a congruence
with Paul is considered, to the Renaissance, where Aristotle or John Dryden might be named,
to the Enlightenment, when critical ideals ﬁrst blossomed.²³ Yet there can be no doubt that
criticism is a theological category. Barr explains,
Kritik ist kein neutraler Begriﬀ, auch keine Methode, auch kein Forschungsbereich wie die
Einleitungswissenscha. Die Idee Kritik verweist auf die Freiheit. Sie ist keine Methode,
sondern die Freiheit, die Ergebnisse der Methode anzunehmen. Man kann sogenannte
“moderne Methoden” anwenden, ohne im geringsten vom Geiste der Kritik berührt zu
werden. Kritik bedeutet die Bereitscha, nicht nur Methoden anzuwenden, sondern ihnen
zu folgen, wohin immer sie führen mögen. Auf die Bibel angewandt, bedeutet das beson-
ders: die Freiheit, zu exegetischen Ergebnissen zu kommen, die von der früheren theolo-
gischen Exegese abweichen. In diesem Sinne ist die Kritik ein Kind der Aulärung; aber
zugleich auch ein Kind der Reformation, denn die eologie der Reformation war in
diesem Sinne ausgesprochen “kritisch.” Die theologische Tradition war nicht mehr im-
stande, die Möglichkeiten der Interpretation vollkommen zu bestimmen.²⁴
Barr thus asserts Christian grounds for an ideal that long predates freedom’s secular pedigree,
that has ﬁrst-order consequences for any understanding of the Bible’s place in religious dis-
course, and that impacts directly (positively, though oen by negation) on the well-being of
believing communities.
22. Barr, Bibelkritik, 31. Or in Barton’s formulation of 1984: genre competence.
23. Ibid., see 33, 32 and 34, respectively.
24. Ibid., 32. To say one can wield critical tools without having the critical spirit is likely a dig at Childs, and it
may contextualize Barr’s intransigent use of the phrase “canon criticism” over and against Childs’ express
preference for “canonical approach.”
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en again, there is clearly something pivotal about post-traditional scholarship. Barr’s
title already indicates the centrality of the Enlightenment in his critical paradigm. As he wor-
ries in his review of IOTS, Childs seems not to see that “critical study” makes “a quite decisive
diﬀerence to our understanding of scripture.”²⁵ Over time Barr only becomes more adamant
about our need to hearken the sea change. As in “Bibelkritik,” so in 1999 one ﬁnds the belief
that criticism emerged to counterbalance the weight of tradition, a burden which threatens to
overwhelm scripture’s essential meaning to this very day. 
eological interpretation is already there in the mind of the student before any exegetical
courses are undertaken. eology has priority. It comes from the religious tradition and is
inculcated as the essential meaning of scripture before any academic exegesis is done. Exe-
gesis therefore does not work by initiating, in the absence of theology, a move which
should eventually lead to some sort of theological interpretation. On the contrary, it oper-
ates as a critical force, questioning the theology that is already there, asking whether it re-
ally has a biblical basis, enriching it with new information and perspectives.²⁶
Against pre-critical retrenchment on the one hand (Childs on Barr’s read), and post-critical
revolt on the other (Brueggemann), Barr insists that a critical paradigm remains the best
option. In the history of ideas, the Enlightenment ﬁrst secured a vantage from which to evalu-
ate scriptural truth—to interrogate what we might now call theological exegesis—and the hard
lesson taught in that Age has not yet been learned, let alone surpassed.
So we can see a certain ambivalence about the tradition. Barr’s model claims kinship
with the greatest successes of the American experiment. It also wants to own classic theologi-
cal texts like Galatians 5. Since tension can arise between secular and religious warrants, Barr
seems to recognize that Joseph II’s edict of religious tolerance in 1781 supplies one of his best
precedents, an event of religious moment with a ﬁrm setting in the Age of Enlightenment. Yet
25. Barr, Childs’ Introduction, 17, original emphasis. Cf. Concept, 553, where Barr has Childs compete with
Walter Brueggemann for the obviously undesirable “prize” title “greater hater of the Enlightenment.” It is
awarded to Brueggemann on a technicality.
26. Barr, Concept, 79, original emphasis. For an early rendition of the same theme, see Barr, Old and New, 170.
As an aside, Barton’s allegation in 1984 that “canon criticism” is parasitic, that without criticism proper it
would cease to exist appears to be internally inconsistent. (For Barr, too, biblical theology “depends for its
existence upon that with which it is contrasted”: Concept, 5.) Is the watchdog criticism any less dependent
on the intruders whom he warns with his bark? Without a collar and an estate, even a pit-bull is just a
stray. As Barton puts it, “One of the most basic functions of criticism is to criticize, not the Bible itself, but
people’s understanding of the Bible. And one aspect of this is by showing that texts do not mean what they
have commonly been taken to mean” (Nature, 102). Without misunderstanding, criticism, or at least one
of its most basic functions, would cease to exist.
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if it ever comes to a serious contest between the the received religious understanding of a text
and that text’s native meaning—which happens only rarely, Barr assures us, criticism as a rule
having upheld traditional beliefs in practice—but when such a conﬂict arises, the critical
impulse plays trump. Every conceivable secular investigation of the Bible should be welcomed
as potentially enriching—but again, such openness is manifestly for the health of the church.²⁷
e energy Barr spends thinking about the good of faith communities, especially (as a minis-
ter ordained in the Church of Scotland) Christian ones, points to an unfeigned theological
motivation to his theory, and to a conﬂicted one.

To better appreciate the distance that opens between Barr and Childs aer IOTS, it is
worth teasing out some of the ambiguities arising from Barr’s dual commitment to the church
and the academy.
 ’ 
Barr’s ﬁrst interaction with IOTS carries the not entirely ironic title “e Bible as a
Document of Believing Communities.” e companion keynote to Gerhard Ebeling’s “e
Bible as a Document of the University,” it was delivered at the University of Chicago in 1979.
In it Barr should more or less be taken at face value when writing, “e eﬀectiveness of the
Bible as a document of the believing community is related to the extent to which the study of
it is shared by the believing community with the academic world.”²⁸ From one perspective the
Bible is the church’s book, he concedes—except the only way to keep the book is by giving it
away. As we have just seen, Barr reﬂects on how the church’s misuse of scripture hinders its life
so that he can commend its health. But he is also aware that Ebeling’s title captures the spirit
of his argument better than the one he was (presumably) assigned.²⁹ “It was a major aspect of
27. One good example of this concern at work is a surprisingly long discussion of criticism’s practical use to
preachers (Old and New, 188–200). Similarly, cf. Holy Scripture, 92.
28. Barr, Believing Communities, 36–37.
29. Barr cites Ebeling, whom he reads as collateral support for his own thesis, repeatedly in the chain of
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the Protestant Reformation that it sought to liberate scripture from its bondage to traditional
doctrine; and this was a correct insight. But of course, as manifold experience has shown,
Protestantism is fully as capable as was medieval Catholicism of imprisoning the variety of the
biblical message within a rigid doctrinal system.”³⁰ Because of this very present danger, the
church must forego any exclusive right to scripture and acknowledge its need for competent
academic input. Short of this, “the Bible will be imprisoned in the categories of the present reli-
gious community and will cease to have any new message to deliver.”³¹ Barr himself once saw
that this extreme result does not follow necessarily from the church’s claim to a privileged rela-
tionship with her scriptures.³² But henceforth for Barr, the church must ﬁnd by losing.
Elsewhere the implication is even more overt. “Mit dem Aureten der Bibelkritik war
also eine Verlagerung der Kriterien für die Richtigkeit einer Exegese eingetreten. Denn die
Antworten auf kritische Fragen erforderten als Maßstab nicht mehr die kirchliche Lehre, son-
dern die Forschung.”³³ Once criticism came of age, the rules of arbitration changed for good.
e Bible is the church’s book, but not.
   
An extension of this paradoxical view falls under the rough heading “Word of God,”
which includes aspects of inspiration and revelation. Barr’s position invites comparison with
Jowett’s, with whom I shall begin.³⁴ Jowett makes two distinctions about inspiration, word
disagreements he forges with Childs: Bibelkritik, 32; Literal, Allegorical, 7; Allegory, 108. But then again so
does Childs: Barr’s Understanding, 4 (for a gauge of Childs’ views on the relationship of church to
academy see: Search). Cf. also Barton, Nature, 121.
30. Barr, Believing Communities, 36.
31. Ibid., 37, my emphasis. e deduction is spurious.
32. In a slightly earlier essay on a similar theme (Barr, Biblical Study?, originally his inaugural lecture as Oriel
Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford, 26 May 1977) he greets the 20 century
separation of biblical studies from the domain of theology but concludes modestly: “eological study of
the Bible does take place in the context of the church; but that is not the only context is has” (29). He
rejects only the extreme views that would either rule out theological conviction in interpretation, or non-
theological conviction. e new emphasis in 1979 recalls Concept, in which Barr wants a mandatory
separation of disciplines (see chapter two).
33. Barr, Bibelkritik, 33–34.
34. Barr says Jowett is wrong about some things (e.g., Barr, Jowett and Reading, 38–39), but also holds Jowett
up as the prime example of a non-historicist critic. Cf. Barr, Jowett and Original. What follows should
justify a limited comparison.
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with a thousand faces. First, sound ideas about inspiration must derive from scripture. “ere
is no other source to which we can turn for information; and we have no right to assume some
imaginary doctrine of inspiration like the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church.” Seen as
a whole, the book itself attests considerable diversity, even outright contradiction. A doctrine
of inspiration must therefore comprehend “imperfect or opposite aspects of the truth as in the
book of Job or Ecclesiastes,” and “inaccuracies.”³⁵ How do all these divergences hold together?
“A principle of progressive revelation admits them all.”³⁶ Other, a priori or supernaturalistic
doctrines mute scripture’s testimony. Worse, they are culpably blind to its internal discrepan-
cies. Second, “any true doctrine of inspiration must conform to all well-ascertained facts of
history or of science. e same fact cannot be true and untrue.” From science we know that
many supposed facts in scripture, such as those pertaining to the formation of the world, are
false. It would be foolhardy to pit biblical “truth” against scientiﬁc truth. Rather, “[a]s the idea
of nature enlarges, the idea of revelation also enlarges; it was a temporary misunderstanding
which severed them.”³⁷ Just so with enlightened historical results. ese “cannot be barred by
the dates or narrative of Scripture; neither should they be made to wind round into agreement
with them. Again, the idea of inspiration must expand and take them in.”³⁸ In short, the com-
bined investigation of scripture and the natural universe requires a dynamic, expansive doc-
trine of inspiration.
Barr agrees on both points with little qualiﬁcation. First, approaches to scripture must
on no account be deductive, he argues in 1983. ey cannot work top down from a theory of
inspiration. An inductive approach, on the other hand, rightly observes how little the Bible
actually says about its authority, and it notes the diversity of content that inherently resists sys-
tematization. In this way, attention to the Bible guards against all forms of presuppositional-
ism, including that confused manifestation of it, “canon criticism.”³⁹ As for progressive revela-
35. Jowett, Interpretation, 347.
36. Ibid., 348.
37. Ibid., 348.
38. Ibid., 350.
39. Barr, Holy Scripture, 22, 112, 166.
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tion, there is a sense in which one can appreciate how the words of man to or about God
became the words of God to man, but this concession is set ﬁrmly in a historical (sequential,
horizontal) trajectory—“the primary direction of movement is not from God to man, but from
earlier to later.”⁴⁰ e most obvious departure from Jowett is in Barr’s abandoning, rather than
merely expanding, dogmatic categories like revelation. As Barr writes already in 1966, “revela-
tion … introduces as a controlling theological concept one the function of which is quite out
of harmony with the problems existing in the biblical situation.” Belief in revelation might
once have been excusable, but not in the critical age: “when modern theologians like Barth
tried both to rehabilitate biblical authority in the Church and to do this on the basis of a con-
trolling centrality of the concept of revelation, understandable as it was on the basis of older
custom…, they were introducing a damaging contradiction.”⁴¹ Indeed, for Barr there are few
better illustrations of theology’s diminution of biblical realities.
Second, the critically enlightened do not shy from untruth in scripture. At the heart of
Barr’s argument that modern scholars have not in fact been driven by a commitment to the lit-
eral sense is the premise that the literal sense is sometimes, perhaps oen, false: “biblical criti-
cism, taken in a broad sense, showed that the Bible, or some signiﬁcant elements within it, was
not literally true.”⁴² Critics have been “allegorical” in that they have continued to seek the
truth of scripture at some level, that is, at a level diﬀerent from the literal sense. Note that it is
the failure of the text at the literal level that thrusts the pursuit of truth into an “allegorical”
mode. Why adhere to the literal sense when the Bible is “literally” false at so many points?
is would make the text a ghetto—and it makes moving “out of the plane of the text” an
imperative. In all this Barr is not at all unlike Jowett on his own reading: “Jowett was a critic in
the sense that the diversity of the Bible, and the diversity and indirectness of its relation to fact
40. Barr, Believing Communities, 29, my emphasis. For a discussion of this quote’s context, see the the
introduction to section two, below.
41. Barr, Old and New, 90.
42. Barr, Literal, Allegorical, 8.
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and to theological truth, were obvious to him from the beginning.”⁴³ Is Barr speaking for
Jowett, or for himself?
    : ,       
Along with making truth non-literal, Barr sometimes appeals to the situation of “men
in biblical times” who did not have a Bible as we do. e Protestant principle of sola scriptura
has a kind of logic but is actually a troubling anachronism given what we now known about
the transmission of biblical tradition. Unlike many in the guild Barr’s response to this knowl-
edge does not focuses on the literary strata, or on the process itself; instead it invests exclu-
sively in those “men” of but without the Bible. Criticism teaches that they broker biblical
authority, not the text. “It no longer makes sense to speak of the authority of the Bible as if it
meant the authority of the written documents, quite apart from the persons and lives that lie
behind them.”⁴⁴ Biblical books are conduits of authority, but incidentally, not essentially.
“Christianity as a faith is not directed in the ﬁrst place towards a book, but towards the persons
within and behind that book… e church is founded ‘upon the foundation of the apostles and
prophets’ (Eph. 2:20), not upon the foundation of the books named aer them.”⁴⁵ In so saying,
of course, Barr could hardly take a stance more directly opposite Childs.⁴⁶
Now why Barr sets and makes a choice between the literal and the personal is diﬃcult
to say. I doubt that in drawing the contrast this starkly Barr shares in the romanticism of
Jowett, who declared famously, “e true use of interpretation is to get rid of interpretation,
43. Barr, Jowett and Reading, 31, my emphasis. Again, “Biblical criticism … was preoccupied not with
discovering the history or the origins but with evaluating the character of the truth expressed in the Bible”
(37).
44. Barr, Holy Scripture, 47; cf. Barr, Believing Communities, 38–39.
45. Barr, Holy Scripture, 48, my emphasis. Of the italicized line Kugel, Guide, 698, comments: “is statement
would be true if, in place of ‘Christianity,’ one were to substitute the words ‘Liberal Protestantism.’”
46. Childs warns against easy identiﬁcation with prophet or apostle. For a representative example see OTTCC,
137 (cf. Crisis, 130, Struggle, 312, and numerous places in between), and see Seitz, Not Prophets. As for
Eph. 2:20, the nagging critical question is, who actually wrote the epistle? If not Paul, what could it mean
to direct our attention to the “mind” purporting to be him? Contrast the analysis in NTCI, 311–328, esp.
323, 326, 328.
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and leave us alone in company with the author.”⁴⁷ Barr must have appreciated why getting rid
of interpretation sounds naive in our time, and he will have had a distinct matrix of personal
and cultural reasons for siding with biblical persons over and against biblical texts. One does
wonder how he knows he has made the correct choice when faced with the non-identity of
text and truth, and of text and person, but regardless, the initial point is simply that he makes
it. Even if he prefers to call this “plain sense” exegesis, as Barton will, the curious result is that
Barr leverages a response to the literal sense’s displacement (thereby providing yet another
conﬁrmation of Frei’s thesis in Eclipse). Although one misses Jowett’s pathos, by traveling the
old liberal path to biblical men Barr keeps company with Jowett and others (e.g., Gunkel) who
dispense with the text for the sake of biblical religion. Jowett’s thinks “Scripture has one
meaning—the meaning which it had to the mind of the prophet or evangelist.”⁴⁸ While Barr is
neither warm nor cold toward Jowett’s notion of the “one sense,”⁴⁹ he agrees entirely on the
location of a text’s meaning, namely, in the mind of the author. Recall from chapter two, for
example, that Barr believes “pan-biblical” theology is fated because “theology exists only in the
minds of persons.”⁵⁰
Prophetic in this regard is an early statement of Barr’s on the relationship of scripture
and theology. I quote from e Semantics of Biblical Language:
No doubt there will always be some use of biblical language in theology, and I would not
suggest it should be otherwise. But surely the most sound a reliable use will be that in
which ample and unambiguous evidence from usage leads us to suppose that we use a
word in a way that adequately conveys a deliberate and conscious purpose of communica-
tion performed in the sentences spoken or written by the men of the Bible.⁵¹
Here already is Barr’s approach to scripture in nuce. Biblical language bears theological
meaning in semantic or wider literary units—not at the level of individual words or syntax—
because of its relationship to the generative theological mind. ere are many diﬀerences
47. Jowett, Interpretation, 384.
48. Ibid., 378.
49. Barr, Jowett and Reading, 35–36; cf. Barr, Jowett and Original, 343.
50. Barr, Concept, 214, cf. 4.
51. Barr, Semantics, 281.
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between Barr and Jowett, naturally, but they are quite alike in their singular focus on the
minds of biblical authors as the absolute control on biblical interpretation.
To illustrate, we can sketch a rough parallel between “On the Interpretation of Scrip-
ture” and e Semantics of Biblical Language. Jowett protests the freighting of biblical Greek
with later theological developments. Acts 16 cannot by itself support the practice of mandato-
ry infant baptisim. e odd occurrence of επισκοπος is no warrant for the Episcopacy.⁵² To
borrow Barr’s words, “e eﬀect that disturbed him was a semantic one… Words of the Bible
then came to be read as if the meanings of these same words, as they were used within later,
theologically deﬁned, usage, were the meanings within the Bible itself.”⁵³ Barr’s own argument
in Semantics is similar because, by challenging a facile identiﬁcation of language and thought,
it debunks an erroneous method of supporting theological systems. Linguistic evidence must
not be strained beyond what may reasonably be supposed to have given rise to the expression,
and this appeal to best linguistic practice is like the call to read the Bible “like any other book.”
As a matter of fact Barr will criticize Jowett for failing to keep to his ideal. Jowett upholds the
one sense to oppose many senses, yet he generates spiritual-philosophical readings in which
the ties to scripture are just as dubious. “He was a critic in the sense that the meaning of scrip-
ture, as he believed, was very diﬀerent from what traditional interpretations had maintained,
and also in the sense that the relation between scripture and truth was not a constant but a
variable one.” At other times he was “remarkably traditional.” e “weakness lay above all in
the failure to produce a convincing picture of what St Paul—or any other biblical writer—may
probably have thought. is weakness derives … from a lack of historical perspective, and,
above all, from the domination of a philosophical set of interests.” Jowett rejected traditional
interpretation, but he held to the idea of “the Bible as a special world” which, as “[t]wentieth-
century biblical theology” has shown, can be taken in very traditional directions.⁵⁴ Jowett,
Barr seems to say, was not fastidious enough about reading the Bible like any other book.
52. Jowett, Interpretation, 360.
53. Barr, Jowett and Original, 434. Very like Barr and Barton, with Jowett the “emphasis again was not
basically historical: it was semantic and literary.”
54. Ibid., 437. Cf. Jowett, Interpretation, 419, 421, 416.
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Barr’s 1989 essay “e Literal, the Allegorical, and Modern Biblical Scholarship” got a
trial run in the conclusion of e Bible in the Modern World (1973), absent the suggestion that
modern scholarship is furtively allegorical. Actually, the chapter “Word and Meaning, Letter
and Spirit” tends to come down in favor of the literal over the allegorical, the very reverse of
1989. Source critics, for instance, in discovering J, E, D and P, “broke through the screen of
ancient harmonizing and allegorizing interpretations.”⁵⁵ Irrational people wrongly keep these
old unifying strategies alive. “Literality, then, is only in part a fundamentalist characteristic; it
is also an ingredient in critical scholarship.”⁵⁶ en again, seeds of Barr’s creative redeﬁnition
of allegory in 1989 are also present. One concerns referentiality. “e normal use of ‘literal’ is
referential in scope… Allegory is also referential in scope; the diﬀerence is that the referent is
other than that suggested by the direct sense of the language, being in fact known only by an
indirect process working from hints and hidden signals in the language.”⁵⁷ Allegory, Barr sees,
has to do with indirect rather than direct reference. Another concerns the relation to linguistic
signals. e relationship of letter and spirit is highly complex because allegory oen “coexists
with a very minute interest in the detailed verbal form of the text.”⁵⁸ It is not always easy to
diﬀerentiate the interests of allegorical and critical exegesis. 
Another common thread running through Barr’s remarks on the letter and the spirit
in 1973 and 1989 is the imperative to know the mind of writers.⁵⁹ Intentionality get priority (it
is the critical mode), though here again there is some overlap with allegory.
e verbal form of the text is being used as evidence from which the mind and circum-
stances of the writers and traditionists is reconstructed. Considerations which may be
valid for any purely referential use of the Bible may now be reversed, or may become
entirely irrelevant. e question is not whether Jesus walked on water, but why the Gospel
tradition depicted him as walking on water…
When we look at things in this way, we immediately see that the verbal form of the text as-
55. Barr, Modern World, 170. e book was reissued in 1990.
56. Ibid., 171.
57. Ibid., 171–172.
58. Ibid., 173.
59. Ibid., 61–62.
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sumes much greater positivity and importance. Even on the referential level it had, as we
have seen, much more positive importance than is usually supposed… But on the inten-
tional level, working towards the minds of the tradition and of the writers, its positive im-
portance is even greater… [For] we can be sure that we have no clues for the discovery of
[a writer’s] theology and his character as a writer other than these very patterns of verbal
behaviour…
is fact in turn is a main reason for the technical concern of biblical scholarship with the
details of language, illustrated in the grammars of Hebrew and Greek, the concordances,
the dictionaries, the monographs discussing patterns of parallelism and verse-structure,
the word counts, and so on. e detailed verbal evidence is the route to the mind of the
writer.⁶⁰
Barr’s intentionalism shares with allegorical-referential reading an acute interest in the
detailed verbal form of the text, and this in a greater measure than is common in historical-
referential reading. Still more, intentionalism and allegorism agree on the indirectness of the
path from text to referent. In Barr’s words, “we today in general do not move directly from
biblical texts to external referents, but from biblical texts to the theological intentions of the
writers and only from there indirectly to external referents. us the modern interpretative
pattern is seldom or never a direct referential relation between the text and the entities
referred to.”⁶¹ Formally, then, Barr’s move from text to mind parallels the allegorist’s move
from letter to spirit.
Barr does not draw attention to this parallel in 1973, if he sees it. But in the chain of
essays he writes contradicting Childs’ 1977 claim that modern scholarship works with a “total
commitment to the literal sense,”⁶² it is a simple matter of re-connecting dots in his earlier
work for Barr to claim that, insofar as literal and allegorical suit the modern situation (they
may not very well), the essence of biblical scholarship aligns better with allegory. us in 1989
the modern scholar is allegorical in his pursuit of a theological meaning. He is only rarely pre-
occupied with historical reference, with what really happened. Taking creation as an example,
it would be hard to know what such a thing could even mean.
What he wants to get at is the theology, the ideas and mind of the writers. e question is
not: what exactly happened; but what was in their mind, what theology did they have, that
led them to express their ideas about creation… e precisions, the details, the literality of
the story are supremely important, because they provide the hints and clues which lead us
60. Ibid., 173–174, my emphasis.
61. Ibid., 175.
62. Childs, Sensus Literalis, 88.
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to this theology. But it’s the theology, in the last resort, that explains the story and makes
sense out of it. at’s how the scholar works.
But as soon as we put it this way, we see that the operation of the scholar is, in terms of the
older formulas, closer to allegorical exegesis than to literal or historical.⁶³
It should be suﬃciently obvious that “allegory” here is not primarily a negative label with
which to brand biblical theologians like, say, von Rad. As Barr comes to deﬁne it, allegory in
modern scholarship encompasses all his own exegetical ideals.⁶⁴
Barr’s allegory is not medieval allegory. (Nor is it Childs’ allegory, as will be seen.) It
does operate, however, on the conviction that the letter, because false, or oen false, is ingredi-
ent in criticism only insofar as it points to truth at another level. We are in fact dealing with a
multi-level reading of scripture. To repeat, the analogy is this: literal meaning is to spiritual
meaning (the traditional view) as semantics to the author’s mind (Barr’s intentionalist view).
e twist in Barr’s case is that the letter, as a conduit of theological truth, fails.
       
In Modern World Barr notices that the revival of concern for biblical authority in the
post-war period, associated chieﬂy with the name Karl Barth and sometimes involving dubi-
ous eﬀorts to revive typological methods, had entered a state of decline. e turn is welcomed.
“We may perhaps hope,” he writes, “that more people will come to experience the Bible as lit-
erature, partly because the pressure for a ‘theological’ reading of the Bible will begin to fade as
memories of the older cultural state die away.”⁶⁵ is is not unlike Jowett’s conﬁdence that “a
way of thinking and speaking which was once diﬀused over the world” has “passed away,” and
like Jowett on the future of allegory, Barr’s hopes for the demise of confessing, theological exe-
gesis have proven misplaced. e reversal of tides can with some certainty be dated to the
publication of IOTS in 1979, at least for Barr personally if not for a wider audience, which
63. Barr, Literal, Allegorical, 12.
64. His conditions for allegory suggest as much: “All valid understanding of a passage as having allegorical
features must depend on contextual considerations within the linguistic semantics, the literary context, the
cultural background and the historical setting. ese are exactly what the tradition of modern scholarship
has provided” (ibid., 16, cf. 13–15).
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seems also to have precipitated Barr’s invocation of allegory a decade later. I want now to sug-
gest a reason why the coincidence is no accident.
Like Jowett, Barr and Barton uphold “plain sense” interpretation. Barr pursues “a
probable understanding based on the plain sense of the texts as they stand.”⁶⁶ And Barton,
drawing on Barr’s work, has made an extensive defense of the concept in biblical criticism.⁶⁷
Barr and Barton also relativize literal sense interpretation: it must not upstage the plain sense.
Barton makes the point more emphatically than Barr, although it is implicit in Barr’s work.
“Critical inquiry does oen involve taking the biblical text literally, but not taking it to be liter-
ally true,” writes Barton in 2007.⁶⁸ Plain is a better designation than literal because, among
other reasons, “plain sense” is more recoverable from “counterintuitive” use by theological
readers (Kathryn Greene-McCreight as well as Childs) for a usage more in line with “what the
average reader will understand by the term.”⁶⁹ In like manner Barr, in the wake of IOTS, paints
the retention of the sensus literalis in a critical era with the stripes of obsolescence.
We approach a telling departure from Jowett, however, who defends the “plain and
obvious meaning” of scripture.⁷⁰ It is true that puts some distance between the plain sense and
a literal application of scripture, which either has been or would be injurious to society at
large. He denigrates “literal and servile habits of mind.”⁷¹ But nowhere does Jowett set plain
66. Barr, Holy Scripture, 66–67. Elsewhere he claims, with more than a hint of disparagement, that in so doing
he is more faithful to the canonical ﬁnal form than Childs. He is the true practitioner of the canonical
approach! In his reading of Genesis 2–3, for example, he claims to be “following present fashion and
taking a ‘canonical’ approach, giving full value to the ‘ﬁnal text’”—except that in his hands it “results in a
more surprising and untraditional interpretation than canonical approaches are commonly expected to
do” (Barr, Eden, 59, my emphasis, cf. 19). e book is an outstanding example of Barr’s theory in practice.
It also part of another chain of disagreements, with Moberly this time, the initial link of which is Moberly,
Serpent? For a full history of this debate see its ﬁnal installment: Moberly, Interpreters?
67. Barton, Nature, esp. 69–116.
68. Ibid., 95.
69. Ibid., 101.
70. Jowett, Interpretation, 369. Cf. 340–341: “Educated persons are beginning to ask, not what Scripture may
be made to mean, but what it does. And it is no exaggeration to say that he who in the present state of
knowledge will conﬁne himself to the plain meaning of words and the study of their context may know
more of the original spirit and intention of the authors of the New Testament than all the controversial
writers of former ages put together.”
71. Ibid., 426. Instead of the literal mindset “of Oriental nations” there is “a more enlightened use of Scripture”
in “Christian missions” by the Christian “teacher … more … penetrated with the universal spirit of
Scripture.”
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sense interpretation over and against literal sense interpretation, understood technically and
on some analogy with its historic cast. Neither does he divorce “plain” and “obvious.” To the
contrary, he uses the words synonymously. Barton, on the other hand, writes with equal conﬁ-
dence: “‘Plain,’ aer all, does not mean ‘obvious.’”⁷² Granting for the sake of argument that
“plain” is not “literal,” why should “plain” also not be “obvious”?
One diﬃculty in preferring common sense deﬁnitions of plain and literal is that the
answer to this question is not at all self-evident.⁷³ Another is that, to the extent that the plain
sense encompasses a true sense of scripture that people do not perceive, it includes a secret
sense. Fundamentalists do not perceive the real meaning Barr and Barton are aer. Neither, it
would seem, do widely read, critically trained people like Childs. For Barr, the change in tone
and emphasis from 1973 to 1989 may come down to whether or not he feels he is losing
ground in the war for sound, semantically controlled exegesis. Aer Childs’ Introduction,
pressure for a confessing, theological reading of scripture must have appeared to be on the rise
again; the older cultural state associated with Barth was not dying away; dogma was again
threatening to take away our freedom and so (in Barton’s language) to carry us back into
bondage in Egypt. e more obscure one’s own position becomes, the more like allegory it
must feel. In this way Barr’s theological end for semantics may be doubly allegorical, counter-
intuitive (depending on whose intuition gets sampled), or esoteric. His incentives for identify-
ing criticism and allegory include at least two basic perceptions: the literal sense is corrupt,
and too many people are (willfully) ignorant of that fact. In the ﬁnal analysis Barr’s attachment
to an elite, secret sense of scripture may be what makes his method profoundly allegorical.
72. Barton, Nature, 111.
73. Against the eﬀorts of Childs (“Sensus Literalis”) and Greene-McCreight (Ad Litteram) to develop an
understanding of sensus literalis in dialogue with its varied historical deployment—and Barton accepts the
historical judgments of both—Barton thinks it better to work from the pragmatic notion, with a rather
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ere is another sense in which Barr’s allegory is not at all like traditional allegory, and
it has to do with whether or not the church’s book is the word of God (see above). Barr puts it
this way in Modern World:
e modern scholarly expositor of the Bible … concerns himself not with the ﬂat literary
relations on the surface of the biblical texts as it is, but with the intentions of the writer in
his historical setting. It is within this process of study that historical [!] criticism has come
into being, and one of its implications has been the breakdown of the old typological and
allegorical interpretations, and therefore the breakdown of the unity of the Bible as it was
once conceived.⁷⁴
Allegory, here the traditional handmaiden of dogma, has broken down. Can biblical unity be
reconstituted? Certainly not with a Barthian or neo-Barthian resuscitation of “revelation.” But
why not? Barr conceptualizes three approaches to the Bible as nodes on a triangle, thus:
Referential
A
B C
Intentional Poetic or aesthetic
Node (A) includes the search for historical entities (the kings of Judah) and theological enti-
ties (God, heaven) referred to by the text. At (B) we have “a study of the persons who wrote
the books, and the quest for what was in their minds.”⁷⁵ And (C) designates some literary
trends in biblical study, such as the study of myths and images in the text as it stands. Only in
the modern era have these nodes come apart. “is triangular distinction between diﬀerent
modes of study of the Bible is, however, comparatively new. e Bible oﬀered a unity of myth
74. Barr, Modern World, 63, cf. 178.
75. Ibid., 62. We have seen ample evidence that this is not only a description of where modern scholars work,
but where they ought to work in Barr’s view.
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and aesthetic pattern, extended throughout the Bible and the world by the typological and
allegorical style of interpretation; but it was not supposed that anyone would savour this myth
and pattern as a purely aesthetic experience.”⁷⁶ Undoubtedly the pre-modern unity of the cos-
mos has dissolved, but Barr means much more than this. For him the dissolution is necessary,
inevitable. Any eﬀort to reconstitute the unity—that of the universe under scripture—would
be a grave mistake.
Barr’s eventual claim that allegory lives on in criticism should not be seen as a so-
ening of his anti-traditionalism. “Traditionally,” he writes, “theology was primarily a referen-
tial form of study” (node A). eology “sought to understand the entities like God and man,
the events like creation and redemption. Its emphasis in using the biblical text was corre-
spondingly referential: its interest lies in that to which the text refers, that of which it speaks. In
modern times this point of view receives its most towering restatement in the Barthian theol-
ogy.” For Barr this order has passed away, permanently. But again, why? First, “the work of
theologians is increasingly dependent on, and concerned with, the apex B of our triangle, the
question of intention, the search for understanding of the mind of the writers.” Here we
encounter “one of the great diﬀerences in modern theological practice: even when theology is
very deﬁnitely based on the Bible, it does not proceed from biblical texts straight to the enti-
ties referred to; rather, it proceeds indirectly, and adumbrates its referential interpretation only
aer consideration of the mind and purpose of the writers.”⁷⁷ Barr even takes the appeal to a
biblical/Hebrew mentality as evidence that a watershed has occurred: that habit signals “a
drastic shi of emphasis from the referential use of language to the mentality from which it
issued, from point A of our triangle to point B.”⁷⁸
One could call this shi the death of providence. Once upon a time “the Bible was tra-
ditionally tied up with a whole view of the world as God’s world; and through this it furnished
a worldview, a total orientation for life.” Symptoms of the present crisis include the “demand
76. Ibid., 62.
77. Ibid., 91, original emphasis.
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for biblical theologies, and other kindred approaches, and the whole modern reassertion of
biblical authority.” But the old order has died. It must die. e triangle is not to be reconstitut-
ed. For “in fact the attempt to reassert biblical authority in modern times is a nostalgia for the
good old days.”⁷⁹ Today, then, in the modern world, “can anything rational be said about the
status of the Bible in the church?” One can only hope, because hope is the last remaining
option. e alternatives are “either that we abandon the whole concept of any special status of
the Bible and admit that it no longer matters very much; or that we continue to aﬃrm for it
the sort of special status that it used to have, but do so in an essentially irrational way.”⁸⁰ e
second is not an option, obviously. (Leave Barth in peace.) e ﬁrst course, on the other hand,
remains open to Barr, should hope ever falter. How far does he go down this road?
I have said that allegory has rules. By this I mean at least three diﬀerent kinds of rules.
One would aﬃrm dogmatic rules in the form of church creeds and confessions. Jowett, Barr
and Barton reject this emphatically.⁸¹ Another would aﬃrm a rule of common sense, or rea-
son. Barton, Barr and Jowett all embrace some version of this (hence for Barr the Bible is not
the church’s book, except in surrender to the university). A third would aﬃrm scripture itself
as a rule of life and faith. As seen at the beginning, this is Jowett’s ﬁrm preference. Barr makes
another signiﬁcant departure from Jowett at this point, however; thinking of “the Bible as a
special world” is a mistake conﬁrmed by the theology of the confessing church and the biblical
theology movement which ensued. Mercifully Jowett was not dogmatic, but he was inconsis-
tent and uncareful, and he le himself open to the return of dogma.
In other words, truthful reference in the interpretation of scripture is much less direct
for Barr than for Jowett. (Is it by chance that one vouches for allegory while the other does
not?) To put it in terms of Barr’s triangle, only one part of one node is disqualiﬁed from mod-
ern discourse. Reference (A) is admissible—it is actually theologically requisite—but direct
79. Ibid., 110. On this reading Childs is nostalgic. For my case against this assessment see Driver, Later Childs.
80. Barr, Modern World, 111, original emphasis.
81. “Except in extremely conservative circles, however, people would now be unwilling to think that these
creeds and confessions, however worthy of respect, are the right hermeneutical keys and dispose of the
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reference is not welcome, either as an overlay of philosophical interests, or of church dogmat-
ics. at I quote Semantics shows just how far back this conviction lies. Karl Barth, writes Barr
in 1961, has generally encouraged “the interpretations of linguistic phenomena which I have
criticized [and which] are attempts to make such phenomena not ‘merely’ words or linguistic
mechanisms but to make them ‘point to’ something beyond their linguistic function”:
e language Barth uses about “pointing to” and about “immanent linguistic context” and
so on is purely philosophical-theological and entirely distorting when referred to units of a
language system… All such units have a “pointing” or semantic function; they have no fur-
ther function beyond this; but what Barth means by “pointing to” is something beyond the
normal semantic function of linguistic units; he is therefore certainly referring to some-
thing other than such units, or he is making nonsense of them.⁸²
Sense and nonsense is very much at issue. If the one non-negotiable rule for biblical interpre-
tation is that one must never overstep the bounds of what was probably in the mind of an
author, then allegory in traditional dress must also go, for the same reason that Barthian refer-
ence must go. Each makes folly of semantics. Anything that distorts the linguistic evidence for
patterns of verbal behavior in time is in danger of being “used as an instrument in the imperi-
alism of dogmatic method toward biblical exegesis.”⁸³
. ’   -   
Canon provides no hermeneutical guidance, no rule for exegesis, according to Barr in
1983. “e essential hermeneutical guide did not come from within the canon, but from with-
out, from the priorities of the various directions that the religion might take and did take.”⁸⁴
Scripture and religion developed in parallel yet did not necessarily have anything to do with
one another. Scripture could change while religion remained constant, or religion’s structures
could alter but leave the literary deposits of older traditions untouched. “us the canonical
text of scripture is not a faithful index of the religious changes which aﬀected its own develop-
ment… And, most importantly of all, … the essential hermeneutical guides, which deter-
82. Barr, Semantics, 277, my emphasis.
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mined the modes in which scripture might be understood, did not lie within the canon at all
but outside it, in the religion.”⁸⁵ e disconnect between scripture and religion was unaﬀected
by the closing of the canon, and all essential hermeneutical guidelines remain outside the text
to the present day.
In reporting this as a defeater for the canonical approach, Barr sweeps subtle and
unmissable aspects of Childs’ argument under the rug. To take a subtle example ﬁrst, Childs
also posits a track parallel to but not identical with the literary history. Since for Childs and
Barr this invisible history explains the relationship of scripture to religion, it is regrettable that
instead of interacting with Childs’ very diﬀerent account Barr merely oﬀers a rival interpreta-
tion of scripture alongside religion. ere is a far more glaring oversight in Holy Scripture, too.
Barr feels imprecision in Childs’ use of “canon” is his ﬁrst mistake, so he deﬁnes three diﬀerent
senses of canon in Childs’ work: canon 1 (a list of books), canon 2 (the ﬁnal form) and canon
3 (the authority principle). Reviewing Holy Scripture Childs writes that “the level of misunder-
standing” is “disturbing”: “It is troubling when an author scarcely recognizes his own proﬁle in
another’s mirror.” Childs sees that none of these three deﬁnitions of canon get at “the major
phenomenon for which the term is used,” namely, the process of canonical shaping.⁸⁶ is is
indeed alarming. How can Barr have overlooked this ubiquitous fourth use of canon in IOTS?
“Bibelkritik” outlines Barr’s alternative approach, but “Believing Communities” shows
the workings of his screed against Childs more clearly than anything else. So far as I can tell it
is the only place Barr countenances Childs’ argument for canonical shaping in the Old Testa-
ment. Barr rejects the joining of scripture and canon. “Contrary to some recent opinion, the
category ‘canon’ is not essential to the category ‘scripture.’”⁸⁷ is aligns well with later com-
ments: “Scripture is essential, but canon is not.”⁸⁸ But contrary to the assertion in 1983 that the
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authority of canon (3) has nothing intrinsic to do with canons 1 and 2, at this earlier time Barr
identiﬁes yet another sort of canon. He writes,
the Bible is not a mere collection of varying and contrary opinions that happened to be
held. Rather, it is a graded and selected presentation… It is not just tradition as it hap-
pened to be, but tradition shaped and edited in such a way as to present to the believing
community an adequate and necessary presentation of that tradition, as the older commu-
nity wanted it to be know to the later community. In this sense it is a sort of canonical tra-
dition. From this point of view the older idea, that scripture was something that came
from God through his own appointed and inspired representatives and was given as an ad-
dress to the community, was not so wrong aer all.⁸⁹
Conservatives set entirely too much weight on this perspective for Barr’s taste, but it ﬁnds at
least some justiﬁcation. Scripture, as it was collected, shaped and edited, accrued real authori-
ty that was intended to guide subsequent generations. In some acceptable sense of the word,
scriptural tradition became canonical. Still, a little further down he writes, “If … we take the
word ‘canon’ in another sense, as the standard or basis for the life of the community and its
interpretation of its written sources, then this is a function provided, within in the early com-
munity, not by a list of accepted books but by the essential religious structure, by the funda-
mental faith of the believing community.”⁹⁰ Here we can see a split opening up between what
Barr will soon call canon 3 and canon 1. “at structure of faith [canon 3] remains aer scrip-
ture is in existence, and theological interpretation of scripture works with this structure,
arranging and ordering the biblical materials in relation to it. us the principal ‘canon’ of the-
ological interpretation in this sense is not the canon of scripture [canon 1?] but something
more like the regula ﬁdei.”⁹¹ But this forecloses on a basic question: just what is the relation of
canon (regula) to scripture?
On the surface Barr actually accepts Childs’ interpretation of the evidence for canoni-
cal shaping—at times “Believing Communities” sounds like a paraphrase of IOTS, as we have
just seen. Barr never refutes this by reasoned argument. Rather, he quietly rejects the notion of
the canon as a rule by subordinating it to an externalist account of biblical authority. Barr’s
denial (canon ≠ rule) crystalizes almost at the moment he glimpses the theological implica-
89. Barr, Believing Communities, 29, original emphasis.
90. Ibid., 34, my emphasis.
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tions of Childs’ proposal (canon ≈ rule). us at the root of Barr’s case against canon we seem
to have the raw assertion of a diﬀerent rule, a rule with no intrinsic relation to the canon of
scripture.
To understand what it means for Childs to move toward allegory, it is imperative to see
the positive work he attempts by invoking the canon or rule of faith. It is not nearly so blunt
an instrument as Barr would lead one to expect. Also in his response to Holy Scripture, Childs
explains why his use of canon should not be dumped into a tributary of Reformation ortho-
doxy, now channeled by Barth:
my understanding of canon was oﬀered as a major criticism of late seventeenth and eigh-
teenth century Reformed orthodoxy which tended to place the authority of a divinely in-
spired book apart from its reception in the community through the work of the Spirit. By
deﬁning canon as those sacred writings which were received, treasured, and shaped by a
community of faith, I proposed a very diﬀerent dynamic from that, say, of Charles Hodge,
but one which was akin to the early Church Fathers’ view of a rule-of-faith. In my opinion,
the discussion … is thus skewed from the start.⁹²
Similarly, in OTTCC Childs feels that Barr misses the mark because of deﬁnitions: Barr posits
a “simple, common-sense” hiatus between revelation and reason and then rejects revelation as
untenable, where as Childs accepts the term revelation, for lack of a better one, as “an inade-
quate shorthand expression which seeks to encompass an enormous range of activities related
to God’s relation to his people.”⁹³ e word has been overburdened in its past usage. Yet its
continued use ﬁnds a warrant in the way the literature was transformed in the biblical period.
Revelation for Childs “is not set in an appositional relationship to tradition, reason or experi-
ence. Indeed one of the central goals of emphasizing the role of the canon is to stress the hori-
zontal dimension of the reception, collection and ordering of the experiences of the divine by
a community of faith. A canonical approach would be equally critical of a stance which
stressed only the vertical dimension of divine truth, as if word and tradition were always in
tension,”⁹⁴ although a vertical dimension, understood here as reﬂection on the divine referent,
92. Childs, Review of Holy Scripture, 67.
93. OTTCC, 22.
94. OTTCC, 23. Childs makes remarkably little use of terms like revelation and inspiration, preferring canon.
But see now the important discussion in Chapman, Reclaiming Inspiration.
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propels Childs beyond merely social explanations. e Bible has a human form, and yet as
such it is inseparable from the divine address it carries, which must not be domesticated.
In sum, when Barr says “the principal ‘canon’ of theological interpretation … is not the
canon of scripture but something more like the regula ﬁdei,” he denies from the outset the
transfer between regula and κανών—at a crucial stage in church history, prior to the ﬁxing of
the NT, they are translational equivalents—which Childs employs to get scripture and norma-
tive theology back under the same umbrella. is is a large part of the advantage to Childs in
selecting the cipher “canon,” and it is in place remarkably early (1970). For him it became
increasingly evident that the process (canon 4) by which an earlier generation gave all later
generations the ﬁnal form of scripture (canon 2) had everything to do with the Bible’s authori-
ty (canon 3). Contra the intuitions of not a few biblical scholars, canon as list (1) on this
understanding turns out to be canon’s least important aspect.
I will unpack Childs’ sense of the rule of faith at the end of this section, and in the
third, concluding section I will take the contrast between Childs and Barr to their respective
biblical theological reﬂections on trinitarian dogma. Meanwhile, my purpose in this section is
to outline the way Childs’ work handles the compunction to hear the literal sense of the OT as
Jewish scripture and at the same time to hear the OT as a witness to Christ, which for him
involves a turn from midrash (chapter ﬁve) to allegory. Later in his career Childs undertook
an earnest study of allegory in historic Christian exegesis and developed alongside it a similar-
ly earnest proposal for the recovery of allegory in the modern world.
  
e preface to Struggle attests Childs’ increased regard for allegory. Upon the comple-
tion of his Isaiah commentary he felt he had not done justice to the history of that book’s
interpretation. Struggle is an eﬀort to close that gap. Aer working on the project for several
months he “discovered a major hermeneutical problem that increasingly cried out for atten-
tion. One component of exegesis common to all the Church Fathers has been the application
of ﬁgurative meanings—call it allegory.” us Childs “became convinced that unless one could
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gain a new understanding of allegory, the enterprise of recovering a usable exegetical Christ-
ian tradition was doomed from the outset. To put it bluntly: for better or worse, allegory is
constitutive of patristic interpretation. But then how is one to proceed when starting at the
beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century?”⁹⁵ Addressing this question emerges as a major task in
e Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture.
Childs delivered an earlier version of these remarks in April 2000 at the University of
St Andrews, in an unpublished paper entitled “Allegory and Typology within Biblical Interpre-
tation.” Much of this made its way either into the preface of Struggle (above) or into the book’s
chapter on Origen, and its articulation of the basic problem is identical.⁹⁶ e paper highlights
the centrality of ﬁguration to the problems Childs addresses, and it serves as a benchmark for
his “new understanding of allegory.” Childs distinguishes his work from the vulnerable revival
of typology in the post-war period, over which “Barr pronounced an obiturary,”⁹⁷ and aligns
himself instead with advances in the study of typology made by Catholic theologians and
patristic specialists. In this newer research he summarizes “several lines of consensus,” though
his comments read every bit as much as an articulation of his hermeneutical ideals.
ere are four points. First, the distinction between allegory and typology is a recent
invention without roots in the tradition. Distinctions were made and can still be appreciated,
but the relationship is more subtle. Allegory is not necessarily fanciful or arbitrary. Instead—
here Childs, following Louth, speaks more programmatically—“the function of allegory is
related to the struggle to understand the mystery of Christ. It is a way of relating the whole of
Scripture to that mystery.”⁹⁸ Second, a “distinction between the so-called literal sense and the
95. Struggle, x.
96. “Had the Christian church simply been led astray during all these years [of Isaiah’s use] and stumbled in
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Lampe and Woollcombe, Hanson, and others) in 1966 is about where Barr’s contribution to the modern
appreciation of allegory ends for Childs. Barr’s articles of 1989, 1993 and 1996 are not discussed.
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ﬁgurative/allegorical cannot correctly be deﬁned in terms of historicity… Rather, the heart of
the problem of allegory turns on the nature of referentiality of the biblical text.”⁹⁹ Origen, for
example, saw that multiple senses means multiple referents. ird, allegory has a context. “e
appeal to allegory is not a device by which to avoid diﬃculties in the text, as oen suggested,
or to allow unbridled use of human imagination. Rather, its use functions within a rule of
faith (its theoria in Greek terminology) as the language of faith seeks to penetrate into the
mystery of Christ’s presence.” It is “a means of appropriation” by which “the Holy Spirit con-
tinued to address each new generation.”¹⁰⁰ Finally, the old contrast between Antiochene and
Alexandrian exegesis has needed reevaluation. e Antiochenes were not literalists per se,
much less historicists. ey “resisted a type of allegory that destroyed textual coherence, that
is to say, which distorted the overarching framework (its theoria) and thus failed to grasp its
true subject matter, its hypothesis.”¹⁰¹ At each point the incidence of distinctive Childsian
vocabulary (“struggle,” “referentiality,” “context,” “rule of faith,” “generation,” “mystery,”
“framework,” and “subject matter”) reveals an overlap of his description of the ancient situa-
tion with the thrust of allegory under canonical hermeneutics.
is is not to suggest a straightforward identiﬁcation of Childs with traditional allego-
ry. Far from it. e bulk of “Allegory” interacts with Origen’s spiritual exegesis, a world
“strange and even bizzare [sic],” yet with much to teach modern exegetes. ree lessons are
drawn: ﬁrst, for Origen scripture is “a living and continuous vehicle of divine revelation,” one
which, in contrast to the Enlightenment legacy, supposes that the text can “transcend its single
historical context”; second, Origen keeps the literal sense and the spiritual sense in tension;
and third, Origen’s ﬁguration is vertical as well as horizontal—“Scripture, as it were, provides a
keyboard for each new hearer to play and to receive new variations on the one uniﬁed story of
God in Christ to be rendered in liturgy, private devotions, music, and art.”¹⁰² Childs then con-
cludes: “I strongly feel that there is a family resemblance in the responses of the Church in
99. Childs, Allegory, 6–7.
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spite of the enormous diversity with the Christian exegetical tradition. Obviously much hard
work still needs to be done, not least in recovering the richness in the use of the Bible oen
forgotten.”¹⁰³ In the case of Isaiah, fortunately, he lived to see some of this work through.
e most basic point is that Childs comes to agree wholeheartedly with Frances
Young, whom he cites twice to this eﬀect: “Without a form of allegory that at least allows for
analogy, the biblical text can only be an object of archaeological interest.”¹⁰⁴ He is content to
call it allegory because of the mistaken mid-twentieth century compromise between history
and typology, and because this is oen what the Christian tradition called its ﬁgurative exten-
sion of the literal sense. Under the next four sub-headings I will trace the way allegory, or ﬁg-
ural reading, becomes incorporated into Childs’ approach.
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Little in OTTCC would lead one to expect a revival of ﬁguration in Childs’ later work.
For the most part, allegory and typology surface in discussions of the shape of the text itself—
Moses is a type, David is a type—or as characterizations of traditional readings.¹⁰⁵ However,
there is newfound clarity about how diﬀerent the dynamics of midrash are when contrasted
with the christologically centered function of scripture in the church: “much of the confusion
in the history of Old Testament theology derives from the reluctance to recognize that it is a
Christian enterprise.”¹⁰⁶ Also, the book shows an openness to variety in the biblical text’s con-
temporary appropriation, which is a natural extension of IOTS’s argument that the Old Testa-
ment became a self-actualizing document. “e canonical process thus built in a dimension of
ﬂexibility which encourages constantly fresh ways of actualizing the material.” Canon “pro-
vides a warrant for applying a similar element of ﬂexibility in its modern actualization which
is consonant with its shape.”¹⁰⁷ An illustration latent with such ﬁgural possibilities surfaces in
103. Ibid., 14.
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a discussion of the theological role of priesthood. e ﬁnal form subordinates the underlying
pre-history of priesthood and instead
the post-exilic form of the Israelite priesthood has been made normative. e canonical
shape reﬂects a variety of moves by which to render its witness, such as schematizing, ide-
alizing and typologizing the tradition. For this reason an interpretation which is directly
dependent on a historically referential reading is theological inadequate. It reorders the
text diachronically and in so doing misses the Old Testament’s unique message.¹⁰⁸
To paraphrase, sometimes letter contains ﬁgure; types and other actualizing tropes have been
built into the literal sense. Hence a sensitive theological exposition would have to make some-
thing of them (a strict “historically referential reading is theological inadequate”). All on its
own, the literal sense of scripture pressures theological readers to consider a ﬁgural sense.
Rather than allegory or typology, however, the most common ﬁgurative concept deployed in
OTTCC is “intertextuality,” which will prove too imprecise.
  
In 1989 Childs revised his 1969 lecture on Barth for another occasion at Yale.¹⁰⁹ It too
is unpublished. ough the revisions are fairly signiﬁcant, the recollections and personal tone
still come through, especially in the ﬁrst quarter of the lecture. Childs clearly continued his
reading of the Church Dogmatics in the intervening years. Some of the most basic points of
agreement between Childs and Barth—the Bible’s reference, its living voice—remain:
Barth continually reminds the exegete that the primary task is to penetrate to the Sache—
to its subject matter. e witness of Scripture points beyond the text to its object, and
therefore exegesis can never rest content with talking about the “Deuteronomic view of
covenant,” or of “Paul’s concept of faith.” Rather the goal is to move from the witness to its
content—to talk about covenant, and faith, and love—the reality itself. Of course, once exe-
gesis has understood that it is not an antiquarian exercise, but a struggle with the truth of the
Christian faith, then preaching is no insurmountable problem. ere is no impassible, ugly
ditch separating the ancients from the present, but the temporal walls separating the ﬁrst
century from the 20th are collapsed by the power of the proclaimed Gospel.¹¹⁰
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As for the move toward allegory, Barth’s exegesis (the small print) does and does not resemble
multi-level readings of scripture. On the one hand, Barth commonly assumes “that the text
makes one point,” a point “not diﬀerent from the text.”¹¹¹ is is why his exegesis oen simply
retells the story. On the other hand, Barth can seem to work with multiple levels, multiple con-
texts for interpretation. “He oen assumed that an incident in the life of Jesus had been
retained by the evangelists in a form close to its original occurrence, but that the original nar-
rative had been transmitted within a larger and subsequent narrative framework.” Barth was
not quite a redaction critic; he did not reconstruct the motives of editors. Instead “he envi-
sioned the larger framework as a transmission of the story within the broader apostolic wit-
ness which reﬂected a deeper grasp of the content of the Gospel. His exegesis of a given pas-
sage received its great vitality by allowing, as it were, these two levels of the story—the original
level and its larger canonical reﬂections—to interact with each other.” In a sense we do have
multi-level reading in Barth. “Moreover, there was a certain compatibity [sic] of his interpreta-
tion—a family resemblance—with the whole Christian exegetical tradition. Much as one
might react to Augustine’s treatment of the Psalter, even when one could not accept much of
his detailed exegesis, one still sensed that Augustine was oﬀering a profoundly Christian
reﬂection on some level of the Gospel.”¹¹² Seen with hindsight, then, Barth becomes a pro-
totype of the search for a family resemblance in Struggle, and an indicator that something—
Childs does not yet voice the word allegory—reﬂects a need to hear the Bible in multiple con-
texts. Barth takes seriously the challenge of hearing the Hebrew scriptures as an evangelical
witness.
Since, as was seen in chapter two, Barthian reference is a crucial point of diﬀerence
between Childs and Barr, here we can add a note on Childs’ solitary response to Barr’s revi-
sioning of the literal and the allegorical. Childs cites Origen as an example of the radical
diﬀerence between historical critical and traditional scholarship.
e biblical text possessed for him diﬀerent levels of meaning by which divine truth was
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reached. ese levels stemmed intentionally from the divine author who had so formed
Scripture as to provide a multiple entry into the mysteries of the faith. Regardless of which
level of the text was being heard, the mode of revelation was immediate and truthful. Ori-
gen remains a classic example of an exegete who held to a theory of verbal inspiration.
Precisely at the point of referentiality biblical scholars of the Enlightenment broke sharply
with the tradition. e biblical text was no longer considered to be a direct channel of di-
vine revelation, but rather and foremost a product of human culture… e task of inter-
pretation was, therefore, to employ newly won historical tools to discover the author’s
meaning by setting him within his age…¹¹³
Barth and Childs, quite in contrast to Barr, retain a sense of the immediate, direct and truthful
witness of scripture in Christian life. Barr’s use of allegory is therefore, if one takes a long view
of the notion’s provenance, highly unusual. As Childs sees it in 1990, “Barr is correct when he
sees a certain analogy between traditional allegory and the work of some … post-critical
scholars. However, I would argue that the similarity between the two is superﬁcial and is an
almost accidental congruence arising from very diﬀerent assumptions. Any identiﬁcation
obscures the fundamental diﬀerences which separate traditional allegory from modern exege-
sis.¹¹⁴ e issue turns on the directness of biblical reference, the perspicuity of the letter, or the
plainness of the plain sense.
:   
BTONT addresses “the question of understanding the unity of the Bible’s witness to the
reality of divine redemption in Jesus Christ.”¹¹⁵ e unity of the two testaments does not have
to do with threads of continuity in religious development. Nor is it primarily formal. Neither
is the Bible a self-contained universe that refers only to itself and not to divine reality. For lack
of a better word, Childs falls back on “dialectic” to encompass all the problems with which
gesamtbiblische theologians must wrestle.¹¹⁶ Yet the unity of Christian scripture is real. “e
task of Biblical eology is therefore not just descriptive, but involves a Sachkritik which is
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called forth by the witness to this reality.”¹¹⁷ e very identity of God compels a confrontation
with ontic as well as noetic dimensions of scripture.
Hermeneutically the issue has oen turned on the relation of literal and ﬁgural. e
Reformers appealed to the literal sense over and against what they saw as excesses in the
church’s evocation of the ﬁgurative. “However, what was oﬀered as a defense of the truth of the
gospel in the sixteenth century took on a diﬀerent face in the nineteenth.”¹¹⁸ e literal sense
came to be limited to one sense closely bound to an investigation of the author. “e result
was that the opposite error was committed. If the traditional exegesis had falsely pulled apart
the ﬁgurative sense from its literal meaning, now only the literal sense of scripture was recog-
nized as legitimate, and this sense was increasingly identiﬁed with a historical meaning.”¹¹⁹
Historically the church has needed to strike a balance between attention to the text and to its
theological content. Both prove necessary.
e productive epochs in the church’s use of the Bible have occurred when these two
dimensions of scripture constructively enrich and balance each other as establishing an ac-
knowledged literal sense. Unfortunately, the history of exegesis has more oen been char-
acterized by severe tension between a ﬂat, formalistic reading of the text’s verbal sense
which is deaf to its theological content—this was Luther’s attack on Erasmus—or by a the-
ological and ﬁgurative rendering of the biblical text which ran roughshod over the lan-
guage of the text to its lasting detriment—this was Calvin’s attack on the Libertines
(Inst.I.IX.i). However, when the ﬁgurative sense is grounded on the literal and is a faithful
rendering of both the content and witness of the written word, there is no theological reason
for denying the legitimacy of multiple senses within the ongoing life of the church.¹²⁰
Figural extensions of the text are permissible, and probably even essential, so long as the letter
provides the foundation of the spirit. Figurative meanings must attach.
Still more, Childs advances the canonical approach as a natural home for ﬁgural read-
ing in the modern day. Canon, as a rule of faith, bounds interpretation. “It establishes parame-
ters of the apostolic witness within which area there is freedom and ﬂexibility.” is means it
admits more than just one sense.
e role of the canon as scripture of the church and vehicle for its actualization through
the Spirit is to provide an opening and a check to continually new ﬁgurative applications
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119. BTONT, 724. Cf. Struggle, 64 and also Frei, Eclipse.
120. BTONT, 724–725.
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of its apostolic content as it extends the original meaning to the changing circumstances of
the community of faith (cf. Frei, Eclipse, 2–16). ese ﬁgurative applications are not held
in isolation from its plain sense, but an extension of the one story of God’s purpose in Je-
sus Christ.¹²¹
Canon is in fact directly related to Christ, “God’s true man, who is testiﬁed to in both testa-
ments, [and] is the ultimate criterion of truth for both testaments.”¹²² is is why the canoni-
cal approach is not a form of biblicism. Childs resists mimicry of Paul’s interpretation, of the
New’s use of the Old, on ﬁgural grounds. He wants to reﬂect on the entire two testament
canon in light of the fullness of God’s reality in Christ, but his “reasons are far diﬀerent from
the biblicist attempt to recover the one true interpretation in which the Old Testament’s hid-
den agenda was always Jesus Christ.” Childs’ reasons involve
the ability of biblical language to resonate in a new and creative fashion when read from
the vantage point of a fuller understanding of Christian truth. Such a reading is not in-
tended to threaten the sensus literalis of the text, but to extend through ﬁguration a reality
which has been only partially heard. It is for this reason that allegory or typology, when
properly understood and practised, remains an essential part of Christian interpretation
and reﬂects a diﬀerent understanding of how biblical reality is rendered than, say, midrash
does within Judaism.¹²³
us the consummation in BTONT of Childs’ turn from midrash, coupled with a sharper
apprehension of the entire Christian Bible’s subject matter as God in Christ, ﬁnally produces
an aﬃrmation of and return to the ancient technique of ﬁguration—allegory or typology—
within a canonically ruled domain. It appears quite suddenly under that name, but then again,
its theoretical contours are nothing especially new for Childs.
     
In about 1997 Childs produced three versions of an outline for a multiple level
approach to the interpretation of scripture, one in response to Rendtorﬀ ’s review of BTONT,
one in “Toward Recovering eological Exegesis”—reprinted in 2000, this is perhaps the best
statement overall—and one at a conference sponsored by Scholarly Engagement with Angli-
can Doctrine (published in 1998). Despite variations in all three, there is much verbatim repe-
121. BTONT, 724.
122. BTONT, 591.
123. BTONT, 87–88. For Childs’ take on Richard Hays’ more sophisticated attempt to capitalize on the NT’s use
of the OT, which is resisted as an illegitimate form of allegory, see 84.
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tition and so I will quote them interchangeably.¹²⁴ It is notable at the outset that ﬁguration, as
in BTONT, invariably arises in connection with the problem of the Old Testament’s relation to
the New. Just so a fourth essay from the 1990s, “On Reclaiming the Bible for Christian eolo-
gy,” which comments on the two testaments and their one Sache without mentioning the need
for multi-level readings, nonetheless pleads for a “recovery of the church’s exegetical tradi-
tion.”¹²⁵ is too entails the recovery of at least an appreciation for allegory.
Although Childs would “defend the need for a multilevel reading of Scripture accord-
ing to diﬀerent contexts,” he does not advocate the simple resuscitation of medieval allegory.
“I am not suggesting for a moment that we merely return to a traditional fourfold interpretive
scheme of the Middle Ages, which continually dissolved the biblical text into fanciful allego-
ry.”¹²⁶ e Reformers were right to criticize these excesses. “Nevertheless, in spite of its short-
comings, traditional medieval exegesis correctly sensed the need for interpreting Scripture in
ways that did justice to its rich diversity in addressing diﬀerent contexts, and in serving a vari-
ety of functions when instructing the Church in the ways of God.”¹²⁷ e most basic context
for Childs is of course the canonical context, though this is by no means the only point of
entry. Childs in fact delineates three main “contexts” or “entrances.” He lists them in order of
more to less familiar, insisting that no principle establishes a ﬁxed order in actual operation:
for “the unity of one interpretation is assumed throughout.”¹²⁸
(1: res₁) e ﬁrst set of contexts involves the sensus literalis. “In order to hear the voice
of the Old Testament’s witness in its own right, it is essential to interpret each passage within
its historical, literary, and canonical context.” Prophecy does not equal fulﬁllment; the biblical
witnesses are discrete witnesses. Yet “even when restricting oneself to the to the Hebrew Bible
according to its canonical shape, the serious interpreter is still constrained to relate the text’s
124. ere is also an earlier form of the proposal in BTONT, 379–383. is will be discussed in the conclusion.
125. Childs, On Reclaiming, 17.
126. Childs, Christian Bible, 122.
127. Ibid., 122, cf. another address at the same session, Childs, Christ the Lord, 12.
128. Childs, Christian Bible, 122.
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verbal sense to the theological reality which confronted historical Israel in evoking this wit-
ness.”¹²⁹ e sensus literalis is no sensus trivialis.¹³⁰
Far and away the most important statement of Childs’ here remains “e Sensus Liter-
alis of Scripture,” which among other things argues that historical criticism reduced the sensus
literalis to the sensus originalis. e study even makes allowance for ﬁguration. “Viewed from
the context of the canon the literal and the ﬁgurative sense of the text are not in stark tension,
but serve diﬀerent functions as a uniﬁed text within the community of faith. e literal sense
of the text is the indispensable key for the hermeneutical task of actualizing the tradition
because in its shaping of the tradition it has critically rendered the material into a form suit-
able for future accommodation.”¹³¹ In the background one can only suppose further conversa-
tions with Frei.¹³²
(2: res₂) A second point of entry extends the literal/historical without contradicting it.
is level “seeks to pursue a relationship of content.”
For example, in terms of an understanding of God, it inquires as to what features the two
Testaments hold in common respecting the mode, intention and goal of God’s manifesta-
tions. A comparison is made, but not just on a conceptual level. Instead, a theological enter-
prise is engaged in which neither witness is absorbed by the other, nor are their contents
fused. Once again, a theological relationship is pursued both on the level of textual witness
and that of the discrete subject matter (res) of the two collections.¹³³
It is not clear to me whether OTTCC could be classed at this level since, although its structure
is more thematic or systematic than IOTS,¹³⁴ it conﬁnes itself fairly exclusively to the Old Tes-
tament’s ﬁrst context. It seems likely that much of Childs’ work falls under the pursuit of res₁,
though far from all of it. Numerous illustrations of res₂ and res₃ are on oﬀer in part six of
BTONT, which constitutes about half the tome. We will look at one of these in closing.
129. Childs, Witness to Christ?, 61.
130. Childs seems to have coined the latter term. It appears at least twice in his work (Barth: Exegete, 20 and
On Reclaiming, 16; conceptually cf. Elijah).
131. Childs, Sensus Literalis, 93.
132. See Frei, Literal.
133. Childs, Toward Recovering, 23, my emphasis.
134. But see OTTCC, 15–16.
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(3: res₃) A third and ﬁnal avenue to the biblical text reverses direction. Instead of
moving from the text to the theological reality, it moves from the reality back to the text.
ere is a need “for the interpreter to encounter the biblical text from the full knowledge of
the subject matter gained from hearing the voices of both Testaments. e interpreter now
proceeds in a direction which moves from the reality itself back to the textual witness.”¹³⁵
Here Childs tends to speak of an ongoing “pressure” or “coercion” of scripture, and he names
two examples especially. One is trinitarian dogma. e other is the Christuszeugnis of the Old
Testament.
To clarify, one way in which Childs’ approach is ontic as well as noetic surfaces in the
second and third contexts. “e text of Scripture, when infused by the Spirit with the full
ontological reality of God, resonates with a fresh voice and evokes from its readers the
response of praise and wonder. is voice, which transcends historical origins, calls forth the
hymns, liturgy, and art of the Church in ever-changing forms of grateful response.”¹³⁶ Biblical
interpretation is ontic by virtue of the fact that it is pneumatic, and this is what it means to
claim the Bible as the church’s book. “Its genre is confession, not apologetics; its function is
worship, not disputation; its content is eschatology, not time-bound history; and its truth it
self-aﬃrming, not analytical demonstration.”¹³⁷ It is in these ecclesial modes that Childs’
recurrent metaphor of scriptural witnesses as voices in a choir, or as notes in the score of a
symphony which is replayed in diﬀerent houses, most fully applies. us Childs’ brand of ﬁgu-
ration is irreducibly Christian. Moreover, not one of his three entrances to theological inter-
pretation—hearing the literal sense of the Old apart from New, pursuing the one res common
to Old and New, returning from the subject matter back to the two testaments—makes any
sense if the exegete is strictly conﬁned to Tanak, Mikra, or that scholarly construct, Hebrew
Bible. As formulated here, each stage depends on the double shape of a canon shared and
embraced by diverse communities of a catholic faith.
135. Childs, Christian Bible, 124.
136. Ibid., 124–125.
137. Ibid., 125.
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One of the disagreements Barr has with Childs turns on whether or not Wilhelm Vis-
cher read the OT allegorically or not: to Childs’ yes Barr said no.¹³⁸ Stefan Felber, whose 1999
monograph about Wilhelm Vischer (1895–1988) was the ﬁrst of its kind, ﬁnds that Barr is
strictly correct. Vischer renounced allegory. Felber adds, however, that it is another question
“ob damit Childs wirklich widersprochen ist.”¹³⁹ Childs sees that to speak of Christuszeugnis is
to speak in a form of allegory, and even though he and Vischer do not classify this move the
same way, they appear to be on the same page. In fact they are not quite, though Childs
mulled over Vischer’s legacy oen in the 1990s, and though it is no accident that Felber opens
with a block quote from Childs and concludes the central section of his study, “Wilhelm Vis-
cher als Ausleger der Heiligen Schri,” with a comparison of Vischer and Childs.¹⁴⁰
e title of Vischer’s controversial Das Christuszeugnis des Alten Testaments neatly cap-
tures the apparent link between Vischer and Childs. Of course, Eichrodt and von Rad also
maintain that Christ is somehow the subject matter of the Old Testament—each also gets spe-
cial consideration by Felber¹⁴¹—though it was von Rad who did much to damage Vischer’s
reception in an early review of Christuszeugnis.¹⁴² But if Childs from 1992 begins to invite
comparison with Vischer, and if through the 1990s Childs revisits a dispute which would have
138. Childs, OT in Germany, cf. Barr, Vischer, who decides—not unlike his damning verdict on Childs—that
Vischer probably did “not have a method, but rather a mixture of quite contradictory methods, held
together by the fact that they appeared to produce a Reformational Christ. [Porteous said his theology was
muddled.] … He was muddled” (53, original emphasis, cf. 50).
139. Felber, Vischer, 335, cf. 204.
140. Ibid., 14, 292–304. In the comparison Felber ﬁnds a “weitreichenden Konsens” (304) but concedes that a
major diﬀerence involves whether the NT’s hearing of the OT is secondary (Childs) or more direct
(Vischer). Childs takes a stronger position against christologizing the OT (that Childs’ solution has to do
with multiple levels of interpretation arises as if by accident, in the middle of a long citation from BTONT).
And Childs takes a more historical route on Felber’s reading: “Vischers alttestamentliche Hermeneutik ist,
obwohl er auf historisch-kritische Arbeit nicht verzichtet hat, entschieden einfacher” (302). Childs’
reasons for parting company with Vischer are theological as well as historical, however; see below.
141. In total there are six “confrontations” between Vischer and other prominent exegetes; the remaining three
are Delitzsch, von Hofmann, and Calvin.
142. Rad, Christuszeugnis. en again, von Rad concludes his lecture on typology by saying that we must speak
of a Christuszeugnis in the OT aer all. See chapter two, and compare Moberly, Bible, eology, Faith, esp.
143: with Vischer, von Rad agrees that “the historical sequence from Israel to Christ may be reversed
hermeneutically when it comes to reading Israel’s scripture as Christian scripture.”
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been more current in his student days,¹⁴³ one should add immediately that, like Eichrodt and
von Rad before him, he departs from Vischer in crucial respects. In “a postscript of a personal
nature” at the end of his study of the OT in Germany from 1920–1940, Childs writes,
Only aer I had completed this essay did it occur to me how much my own attempt to re-
solve the hermeneutical problems of Old Testament interpretation according to a new
canonical approach has been unconsciously inﬂuenced by the German struggle of the 30s.
Along with many confessing Christians I too felt the full force of the powerful challenge of
Barth, Vischer, and Hellbardt for the Old Testament to be heard as a theological witness to
Christian Faith. Yet I was also forced to agree with von Rad, Eichrodt, and Zimmerli that
Vischer’s solution was seriously ﬂawed and that there must be another alternative between
the sharp polarity which he set up between modern historical critical exegesis and a
repristination of 16 century Reformation theology.¹⁴⁴
Somewhere in the process of writing BTONT, however, Childs came to the realization that his
approach sat atop an old controversy about the signiﬁcance of biblical criticism for Christian
theology, acutely felt in OT studies, and furthermore that his own answers put him some-
where between Vischer and von Rad. “It would be the height of arrogance and sheer folly to
suggest that the canonical approach oﬀers the correct solution, but I would argue that the
issues included under the cipher ‘canonical’ raise those basic theological factors, strangely
missing in the previous debates, without which no truly theological solution between the
church’s Scripture and modernity can ever be reached.”¹⁴⁵ In other words, as he puts it in a
reprise essay on “OT in Germany,” today’s context is very diﬀerent compared to that in Europe
between the wars, but “many of the hermeneutical issues that evoked such controversies in the
1920s and 1930s still remain unresolved, and, with the erosion of the post-World War II con-
sensus, have returned with a vengeance.”¹⁴⁶
us the outline of multi-level readings that responds to Rendtorﬀ, “Does the Old Tes-
tament Witness to Jesus Christ?,” centers on Vischer to aﬃrm part of his vision, and to push
back against it. e “recently renewed interest in Biblical eology”—presumably Childs
143. Note Childs’ discussion of Vischer in 1958, in one of his very ﬁrst publications: Childs, Prophecy and
Fulﬁllment, esp. 270. Vischer is defended for recognizing that both testaments share the same reality in
Jesus Christ, but is criticized for the abstract manner in which Christ is discovered in the OT.
144. Childs, OT in Germany, 245, cf. Childs, On Reclaiming, 4.
145. Childs, OT in Germany, 245. It is probable that Childs means to include von Rad in the period of
“theological compromise” here.
146. Childs, On Reclaiming, 4.
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means his own above all—is only “superﬁcially” a “throwback to the Vischer era.”¹⁴⁷ Entry at
res₁ insists on hearing the OT on its own since “to read back into the story the person of Jesus
Christ, as Vischer did, or to interpret the various theophanies as manifestations of the second
person of the Trinity, is to distort this witness and to drown out the Old Testament’s own
voice.”¹⁴⁸ And “to speak of the Christuszeugnis in the sense being proposed is … far removed
from Vischer’s.”¹⁴⁹ But one must in the end speak of the Christuszeugnis. Rendtorﬀ ’s Doktor-
vater saw this, too, in a limited way.
Von Rad initially agreed with Vischer’s call for a new theological approach, and later in life
he freely admitted that Vischer had indeed sounded the alarm, especially in light of the
threat from National Socialism aer 1933. However, in his review he attacked Vischer as
harshly as any of Vischer’s liberal detractors, and concluded that his exegetical approach
was quite hopeless. Moreover, it was signiﬁcant that von Rad did not really attack him theo-
logically, but from the perspective of the historical-critical method.¹⁵⁰
Von Rad’s theological compromise with historical-critical method fails, but his instinct about
the christological scope of OT exegesis is correct.¹⁵¹ e God of the Old is not diﬀerent than
the God of the New.
On his own account Childs departs from Vischer in two respects: he does not ignore
the genuine advances of the critical era (here he stands closer to von Rad), and so he refuses to
repristinate a bygone era.¹⁵² at said, by returning to multiple senses Childs departs from the
Reformers—for almost exactly the same reason he departs from Vischer: it is a mistake to
“christianize” the Old Testament’s voice. Calvin dealt with the unity of the testaments by
deﬁning the one sense of scripture so broadly that he did not require allegory.¹⁵³ is makes
Calvin’s eﬀort to unite the witness of the two testaments unsatisfactory. He is right about “an
147. Childs, Witness to Christ?, 57.
148. Ibid., 61.
149. Ibid., 63.
150. Childs, On Reclaiming, 2, my emphasis. For Rendtorﬀ ’s take on Vischer and von Rad, see Canon and
eology, 76–91.
151. See the epilogue to chapter four.
152. I argue elsewhere that Childs is no arcadian. See Driver, Later Childs. Somewhat like Barth (cf. Smend,
Nachkritische) Childs is genuinely post-critical.
153. Struggle, 211: “Calvin’s notion of the literal sense is deep enough not to need another textual level to carry
a spiritual meaning by means of allegory. Rather, the literal sense is the true and genuine meaning of
scripture. In contrast to Luther, Calvin does not related the two aspects of the literal sense in a dialectical
fashion between the spiritual and the carnal.” Cf. Childs, Sensus Literalis, 87.
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overarching unity between the two.” But Childs’ “exegetical caveat is that Calvin’s approach
runs the danger of projecting backward into the biblical narrative a meaning that is not
derived from the Old Testament. e eﬀect is that he christianizes the Old Testament by a
form of psychologizing the unexpressed motivation of its characters.”¹⁵⁴ It is not wrong to
engage the Bible at the level of res₂ or res₃ prior to res₁, but it would be a serious error to factor
res₁ out of the equation. e canonical OT is a pre-Christian witness to Christ.
In sum, Childs’ mature theory blends the traditional—multiple senses of scripture—
with the critical—historical criticism teaches a lesson about the sensus literalis that oﬀers a
corrective to Reformation understandings, even though in the end criticism took the lesson
too far. Childs’ late return to Vischer mirrors a broader eﬀort to be informed by past mistakes,
not to repeat them, but to work beyond them.
 : ’     
e one who reads Struggle for instances of modern allegory is bound to come away
disappointed. It is much more a modern appreciation of traditional allegory than a modern
allegorical reading of Isaiah—though as will be seen in section three Childs proﬀers a muted
multi-level reading of his own in his Isaiah commentary. I will therefore discuss Struggle
before Isaiah. e 2004 book rounds out this discussion of the hermeneutics of allegory on
Childs’ understanding. It revisits these in service of “the enterprise of recovering a useable
exegetical Christian tradition” in the twenty-ﬁrst century and is a reading of the tradition
reading Isaiah, a search for a “family resemblance” in the church’s accommodation of the
prophet.¹⁵⁵ And Childs does ﬁnd “some basic and constitutive features” in the church’s recep-
tion of Isaiah, which he catalogues in a sentence that comes as close as possible to a thesis
statement: “the authority of scripture, its literal and spiritual senses, scripture’s two testaments,
154. Struggle, 217. Cf. Childs, Genre of Commentary, 191.
155. Wittgenstein employed the term Familienähnlichkeit, as did Nietzsche, and presumably others in turn
before him (Needham, Polythetic, 367n1). I do not see that this pedigree has much impact on Childs’
usage. In all likelihood the term is learned from Frei, who seems to have read Wittgenstein in greater
depth (e.g., Eclipse, 27 and cf. Dawson, Figural Reading, 146, 151, 157).
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its divine and human authorship, its Christological content, and the dialectical nature of histo-
ry.”¹⁵⁶ Typically, whether or not an exegete struggles (wrestles) with these six challenges deter-
mines whether the exegesis belongs to the family not.
In a way Struggle is an exercise in typology of another sort: it dras a typology of
Christian readers. A given proﬁle can either be one of continuity or of breach.¹⁵⁷ Also, though
Childs does not abandon the Jewish exegetical tradition,¹⁵⁸ he is preoccupied with the partic-
ular challenges arising from the aﬃrmation of a two-part Christian Bible; Christian resources
naturally come to the fore. e Jewish voice of Isaiah must be heard, but the driving question
here is how to read its testimony to God’s work in Christ. Another characteristic of Childs’
typology is the way it spans the entire Christian tradition. Although the advent of criticism
(the Enlightenment) is undeniably a watershed, its relative importance over against a loose
continuity across the Christian exegetical tradition permits Childs to move freely between
modern and pre-modern interpreters. No wall blocks a comparison of Hengstenberg or
Brueggemann to, say, Origen or omas. So it is possible to assess traditional readers from a
modern perspective. Jerome is criticized for “historical rationalism”; omas conducts “an
ontological interpretation” (this phrasing is acknowledged to be anachronistic); Luther was on
the brink of recognizing a break in Isaiah between chapters 39 and 40; Calvin overly christian-
izes the Old Testament.¹⁵⁹ But it is equally possible to do the reverse—to weigh a modern
exegete against a traditional perspective. Gerhard von Rad’s typology, to take a poignant
example, has been compared by some with eodoret’s. For Childs the comparison is sugges-
tive—there is a “family resemblance” between them—even though von Rad appears not to
have been directly informed by eodoret. ere are notable diﬀerences, however. For exam-
ple, “eodoret spoke of the active and supernatural role of the Holy Spirit in illuminating the
sacred Word to faithful recipients. Conversely, von Rad spoke of the spirit more in terms of
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157. For an example leading up to Struggle, see Childs, Vitringa.
158. In the same year as the Vitringa piece see Childs, Benno Jacob. Cf. idem, Interpretation in Faith, 449n26,
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the charismatic dimension of human interpretation seeking to reinterpret the past through
fresh and creative applications. In sum, one can only surmise that von Rad might have been
aided in his hermeneutical reﬂections if he had had the occasion to probe deeply into the writ-
ing of eodoret.”¹⁶⁰ Von Rad would have done better had he read eodoret!
By way of such cross-comparison Childs hovers around certain hallmarks of good
interpretation. Time and again he touches on the relationship of letter and spirit. Justin
sounds mystical notes foreign to the historical, or economic character of the OT, thus threat-
ening the relationship of the testaments and giving rise to a “serious misunderstanding of
Judaism.”¹⁶¹ Clement of Alexandria’s faults parallel Justin’s, though he can follow the literal
sense more closely.¹⁶² Origen understands that allegory has to do with the nature of reference
(so F. Young) and can honor and extend the literal sense without contrivance.¹⁶³ Jerome made
a kind of advance by placing letter before spirit, but his extensions are oen “arbitrary” and
have the eﬀect of “weakening the unity” of OT and NT.¹⁶⁴ John Chrysostom made few
hermeneutical advances, yet he models the way allegory can aid preaching when restrained by
the proper rules.¹⁶⁵ Cyril of Alexandria, despite a reputation to the contrary, takes an interest
in the spiritual sense, and he constructs a “tight morphological ﬁt” between both testaments.
He seeks not to impose doctrine on scripture, but to facilitate a fresh hearing of the word of
God in the present.¹⁶⁶ eodore of Mopsuestia is critiqued even more harshly than Jerome for
failing to connect OT and NT.¹⁶⁷ eodoret breaks out of this legacy, however, and manages
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non-arbitrary ﬁgurative extensions.¹⁶⁸ omas, via Augustine, brings the res or coercive
pressure of scripture into the foreground. He works with the literal sense, and yet of equal
importances is his non-literal mode of interpretation.¹⁶⁹ Nicholas of Lyra lacks an organic link
between his two literal senses.¹⁷⁰ Luther changed allegory by means of “dialectic” and, like
omas, still managed to heed the existential and ontological force of res. Calvin majors on
the plain sense of scripture, though his is large enough to accommodate a ﬁgural dimension.
Echos of these traditional eﬀorts to extend the letter reverberate into the post-Refor-
mation period, to be sure (Vitringa). Generally, though, in the wake of the Enlightenment
things fall apart. e christological center cannot hold. Severed from typology, the ontology of
scripture becomes increasingly strained. In the modern period generally, the dissolution of
struggle becomes a serious setback. Despite his failings, von Rad is one of a few important
exceptions.¹⁷¹
Childs recognizes that he oﬀers a spiritual reading of spiritual reading. is comes
through most clearly in his discussion of Cyril.
I am fully aware that this interpretation of the rationale behind the spiritual sense remains
an eschatological ideal, and largely unrealized within the Christian church throughout
much of its history. Perhaps the most troubling failure of all lies in the persistent attacks
on Judaism throughout the centuries, illustrated in a particularly painful form by Cyril.
Crucial to the hermeneutical analysis above is the point that the church’s spiritual reﬂec-
tion on scripture according to its ontic wholeness falls into the genre of praise, worship,
and self-criticism rather than apologetics and polemics. Only in the light of a deeper en-
gagement with the substance of God’s will disclosed in scripture will the repentant church
be prepared to speak meaningfully on the faith it shares with Judaism.¹⁷²
More precisely what is the rationale? Cyril shows this too, despite his anti-Semitism. He
“comes to the text from a holistic understanding of the theological substance of Christian
scripture”—we could call this res₃—and he “then seeks to ﬁnd further illumination of God’s
correspondence between the testaments.” is contradicts a common view of eodore as a front-runner
of things historical critical or ecumenical (for example, see the discussion of Brunert chapter seven).
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revelation by rethinking the subject matter from within as he intertwines Old and New Testa-
ment texts into new conﬁgurations”—res₂ with some regard for res₁. “Lying at the heart of this
exegetical procedure is the conviction that scripture is a living Word continually activated by
the Spirit to speak to each generation of a faithful church.”¹⁷³ As in the 2000 essay on allegory,
Childs’ hermeneutical ideals drive his sourcing of the tradition. e procedure of spiritual
reading described here belongs to Childs every bit as much as to Cyril of Alexandria.
 
We can close with a word about how Childs deﬁnes allegory in Struggle. To begin with,
Childs accepts Jon Whitman’s deﬁnition: “allegory says one thing, and means another.”¹⁷⁴ e
core issue lies elsewhere, however. When discussing Luther, Childs negotiates some of the
attempts to pin down Luther’s understanding of ﬁguration. Ebeling, following Jülicher, puts it
as follows:
Allegorical interpretation is the rendering of a text under the assumption that what it says
clearly hides something else which obtains its meaning from somewhere else. e eﬀect is
that the actual words and larger units of the text have been replaced more or less com-
pletely by a comparative rendering by means of concepts which belong to a foreign sense
of the text and derive from an intention independent of its literary composition.¹⁷⁵
But clearly this will not do. “It is one thing to make a literary judgment that allegory says one
thing but means something else.” Luther goes this far himself. “It is quite another to suggest
that the allegorical rendering is by deﬁnition ‘foreign’ to the text.” To say this is to import prej-
udices foreign to the concept. “In contrast, the Church Fathers measured the truth of the ﬁgu-
rative sense not as foreign, but as stemming from the res (substance) of the text itself. e
source of the ﬁgurative was not separated from the text and assigned to an alien ‘from some-
where,’ but rather regarded as a diﬀerent and true dimension of the selfsame reality.” is time,
perhaps in contrast to Cyril, Childs’ reading ﬁnds some good support in the secondary litera-
ture (see Christine Helmer’s sophisticated exploration of “Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic
173. Struggle, 125, my emphasis.
174. Whitman, Allegory, 2. Cf. Struggle, 66, 183–184.
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and the Old Testament”). Allegory on Ebeling’s understanding wrongly suggests “that the lit-
eral/historical is the one true interpretation, and the ﬁgurative is a substitute and alteration
falsely imposed from some other source than the text.”¹⁷⁶ Probably for Luther, and certainly
for Childs, this is not the case.
And the res is Christ. Allegory or ﬁgurative reading carries readers from the canonical
testaments to the very reality of the triune God. Precisely here Louth’s plea for a modern
return to allegory resonates most strongly with Childs. “e literal meaning is the fundamen-
tal meaning,” Louth explains. rough this “allegory is ﬁrmly related to the mystery of Christ,
it is a way of relating the whole of Scripture to that mystery, a way of making a synthetic vision
out of the images and events of the Biblical narrative.”¹⁷⁷ Naturally, it “does not prove anything,
but it is not meant to.”¹⁷⁸ In Childs’ words, the genre is confession, not apologetics; its truth
self-aﬃrming, not an analytical demonstration. By the Holy Spirit it provides those inside the
community of faith with a means of access to the reality they confess. In short, to move from
res₁ to res₂ to res₃ and back again is not an evasion of the text, nor necessarily a warping of the
same; ruled rightly, allegory penetrates into the very depths of signiﬁcation.
: “     ”¹⁷⁹
A ﬁnal comment needs to be made about how canon as a rule of faith governs Childs’
proposed multi-level reading, at least in theory. If allegory is mystical, how does one know
when it verges on fanciful? Is not the danger always that it becomes uncontrolled, unruly?
Childs has a very clear answer. Up to now I have avoided the most central plank in canonical
ﬁguration, the regula ﬁdei. Since it is one of the ﬁrst traditional concepts to wind up in Childs’
proposal (canon ≈ rule), it is a good place to end a discussion of Childs’ sourcing of the tradi-
tion. We end near to where he began. at is, in all versions of multi-level proposals from
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1992 onwards Childs emphasizes the priority of the rule of faith over ﬁguration, and suggests
that the rule is a counterpart to the foundational sensus literalis. e Bible’s “salviﬁc meaning
is not esoteric or hidden, but plain and forthright. Careful attention must be paid to its syntax
and style. Yet the literal sense is to be balanced by a rule reading—a reading informed by its
subject matter and its confessional content.”¹⁸⁰ Figural extensions of the literal operate within
this more basic framework and are never independent of it. is rule enables him to speak of
the “unity of one interpretation.” It is also why for Childs—in marked contrast to Barr—the
secret sense of allegory is an open secret.
“In its original sense,” writes Childs in 1970, “canon does not simply perform the for-
mal function of separating the books that are authoritative from others that are not, but is the
rule that delineates the area in which the church hears the word of God.”¹⁸¹ e normative
dimension of canon remains its most important sense because the exact shape of the canon
has always ﬂuctuated. Canon is thus rightly seen as a kind of confession. “In speaking of
canon the church testiﬁed that the authority of its Scriptures stemmed from God, not from
human sanction. Canonicity as the ‘rule of faith’ was a confession of the divine origin of the
gospel that had called the church into being.”¹⁸² Here for the ﬁrst time one sees the close cor-
respondence of canon and rule.
Scalise rightly points to Barth as a source for this idea (see chapter two), but the move
to join them also occurs in the context of a discussion of of Hans von Campenhausen’s Die
Entstehung der christlichen Bibel (1968), from which Childs appears to have gleaned a prelimi-
nary understanding of Irenaeus’ interpretive framework.
e one rule and guideline, the only “canon” which Irenaeus explicitly acknowledges, is
the “canon of truth,” that is to say: the content of the faith itself, which the Church received
from Christ, to which she remains faithful, and by which she lives. By this is meant neither
a Summa of dogmatic propositions nor an unchangeable confessional formula nor even
the sacred Scripture as such, however certain it may be that the latter teaches and contains
truth.¹⁸³
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Another important source, chased up by Childs following the publication of Crisis and under-
girding von Campenhausen’s analysis, is Bengt Hägglund’s “Die Bedeutung der ‘regula ﬁdei’
als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen” (1958). Childs ﬁrst discusses the article in 1972, in
connection with von Campenhausen.¹⁸⁴ rough the patristic era, Hägglund explains, “Es ist
nicht von ungefähr, dass das griechische Wort für ‘regula,’ κανών, mehr und mehr zu einer fes-
ten Bezeichnung für die heilige Schri wurde. Das ursprüngliche Zeugnis ist nicht nur
deshalb ‘kanonisch,’ weil es mit der Authorität der Propheten und Apostel ausgestattet ist,
sondern auch weil es Träger der Oﬀenbarung, Vermittler der Heilswirklichkeit ist.”¹⁸⁵ Accord-
ing to von Campenhausen and Hägglund, for Irenaeus and for Tertullian the rule of truth or
faith is prior to the Bible, larger than the Bible, and therefore not strictly identical with the
Bible, but nonetheless works only when coupled with the Bible’s prophetic and apostolic witness.
In Hägglund’s words again, “Die Aufgabe, eine ‘fundamentum’ der Lehrüberlieferung zu sein,
erfüllt die ‘regula’ nur durch die Vermittlung der heiligen Schri.”¹⁸⁶ It is in this context that
Childs’ use of Barth-like language of canon as vehicle, witness, transparency to the divine real-
ity begins to make sense.
From the very ﬁrst time “canon” is proposed as a better context for biblical theology in
the critical era, it binds theological reﬂection on scripture to a living God who, by the
prophets and apostles, still speaks to God’s people, thus making scripture’s textual authority
indispensable, but ancillary. e best analogy is the interpretive framework developed in the
patristic period. As Tertullian puts it, “It is your faith, says Christ, which has made you whole,
not busying yourself with the scriptures.”¹⁸⁷ By this Tertullian does not mean
that the exegesis of Scripture must be subjected to an external norm, laid down by the
Church, but that Scripture is to be read from within the faith with which the believer is al-
ready familiar, and that when it is so read scripture [sic] itself simply conﬁrms that faith
184. Childs, OT Scripture of Church, 713, cf. 711. e ﬁrst thing Childs aﬃrm in the ancient church is their
confession of canon: “A particular set of writings is judged to contain the church’s living tradition—the
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over and over again. e closest modern counterpart to this deﬁnition of the regula veri-
tatis is the concept of the “canon within the canon”—but only if this is understood as a
“guide” to a right understanding, and not as a critical principle by which to scrutinize the
Scripture. e indestructible unity and homogeneity of the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments is for Tertullian, as for all the Fathers from Irenaeus onwards, the fundamental
biblical dogma in their ﬁght against the gnostics. It is a dogma which was not seriously
imperilled until the rise of modern historical criticism, and it gave Tertullian, like most of
the theologians of the early Church, relatively little trouble.¹⁸⁸
In view of the rise of historical criticism, having gained from it a keen sense of the diversity
and historical shape of the biblical material, Childs seeks to recover an ancient understanding
of the unity of scripture in its witness to the one true God. It is why for him κανών and regula
are always coextensive, and why biblical theology nonetheless entails a modiﬁed kind of
Sachkritik of the text of κανών with an eye to its divine subject matter.
Apart from Seeligmann’s essay on midrash, I suspect that no other single article has
more impact on Childs than Hägglund’s, and its importance only grows in the allegory phase
of Childs’ career. “Die Bedeutung” is listed in IOTS,¹⁸⁹ footnoted occasionally in articles,¹⁹⁰
referenced in a discussion of Irenaeus in NTCI,¹⁹¹ named at the start of a longer discussion of
Irenaeus and the rule in BTONT,¹⁹² and featured in a chapter on Irenaeus as a biblical theolo-
gian (the ﬁrst) in Struggle.¹⁹³ (Finally, the phrase “rule of faith” appears seven times in Corpus,
and “regula ﬁdei” twice more.¹⁹⁴) Harnack and other nineteenth century church historians
tended, mistakenly, to identify the rule of faith with a baptismal rite. In fact it had more to do
with the grounding of biblical hermeneutics. According to Hägglund,
Die “regula ﬁdei” ist nicht mit dem Symbol, auch nicht mit einer bestimmten Auslegung
dieses Symbols identisch. Der Begriﬀ—der nicht konkret, sondern abstrakt zu fassen ist—
bezieht sich auf die ganze Lehre der Kirche, die Lehre die von den Aposteln und
Propheten verkündigt worden und in der heiligen Schri niedergelegt ist. Tauekenntnis
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(als kurze Zusammenfassung des Inhalts der Oﬀenbarung), heilige Schri, apostolische
Überlieferung—alles ist in der “regula ﬁdei” oder “regula veritatis” inbegriﬀen. Deshalb
kann diese “regula” mit der einen oder der anderen Grösse gleichgestellt werden, ohne
dass doch beide ganz identisch sind.¹⁹⁵
For Irenaeus, according to Childs, “the rule of faith was a summary of the apostolic faith that
was held as central to the church’s confession. It provided the grounds of the church’s faith and
worship over against deviant Gnostic speculation. e rule was not identical with scripture, but
was that sacred apostolic tradition, both in oral and written form, that comprised the church’s
story… [It] was a holistic rendering of the apostolic faith according to its proper order.”¹⁹⁶
Within the rule Irenaeus is free to employ a variety of interpretive techniques and methods.¹⁹⁷
But the rule is prior.
Hägglund’s study makes a fascinating biblical theological proposal in itself, recom-
mending a return to such a rule in dogmatic and historical theology. e correspondences
with Childs’ approach cannot detain us, however. e point for Childs is that the space
between rule and letter establishes the space in which ﬁguration can be tried. In 1977 we see a
hint of this possibility. Figure and letter are “not in stark tension,” although letter is “indis-
pensable.” Other moves are out of bounds—allegory must not disﬁgure the letter, criticism
must not destroy the way that letter has been conﬁgured. “In terms of classic Christian theolo-
gy, the church’s regula ﬁdei encompasses both text and tradition in an integral unity as the
living Word of God.”¹⁹⁸ In 2004 the point is stronger still. “e canonical shape provides the
larger framework of scripture—a rule of faith—within which the interpretive function of exe-
gesis is guided.”¹⁹⁹ In aid of the “multiple textual meanings” that the church increasingly pur-
sued, the “great strength of Irenaeus, in spite of certain ambiguities in his approach, was in
providing a rule of faith (regula ﬁdei) as a framework for Christian interpretation that empha-
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sized the theological content of scripture.”²⁰⁰ Today, I scarcely need to add, the canonical
approach hopes to restore this early insight about scripture to the church.
e rule of faith also helps explain why Childs speaks of a framework instead of a
method. Rowan Greer, a Yale colleague who wrote on the rule, argues that in the early church
all roads lead to Irenaeus because he was the ﬁrst to work out a framework within which to
read the scriptures of the Jews. “e quest for a framework of interpretation is a quest not as
much for method as for a way of ﬁnding coherence between the Hebrew Scriptures and the
Christian story.”²⁰¹ is, according to Greer, kept one eye on the unity of the Christian story
and one eye on the reality of Christ, and Irenaeus called it the rule of faith. “Irenaeus oﬀers a
Christian transformation of the Hebrew Scriptures that makes them wholly integral to a
Christian Bible.”²⁰² Once established, the framework was not questioned. “e church aer
Irenaeus accepts his basic platform and remains committed to what we should call theological
exegesis by regarding the church’s faith as the key to unlock the meaning of Scripture.”²⁰³
Obviously this le a great many particulars undecided, as controversies over the Trinity or the
nature of Christ would shortly demonstrate. e ﬁrst method also came later. Applied within
Irenaeus’ basic framework, the method was devised by Origen.²⁰⁴
Seen in this light, Childs spent decades laboring to re-establish an approach to scrip-
ture that had been imperilled (von Campenhausen) and inverted (Frei) in the critical era.
Only later in his career did he develop the hermeneutical implications of the ﬁgural or allegor-
ical method which had traditionally been used within a framework to unite the two testa-
ments in detail. In a sense, then, the move from IOTS to BTONT follows the move from Ire-
naeus to Origen—though of course Childs has the beneﬁt of standing this side of Nicea.
Signiﬁcantly, Greer also observes that the function of the rule of faith was largely negative. It
said “no” to heresy and, somewhat more positively, established the bounds of faithful interpre-
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tation. However the needfulness of Childs’ critique is judged, it is hard to avoid the impression
that his “sustained polemic” bears a certain family resemblance to early church controversies.
As with the Fathers, however, this does not mean Childs’ actual exegesis is parasitic on his
opponents, nor that preoccupation with the text is a byproduct of a supposed heterodoxy, nor
again that his approach fails to invite further endeavor. Childs saw a diminishment of tacit
rules that set a more basic challenge—total overhaul, or short of that, to sound a whistle
reminding the ﬁeld, and Christian exegetes in particular, why certain rules and not others
have traditionally been in play.
A ﬁnal point. In addition to establishing a regulative framework within which the liter-
al sense can be heard, another advantage of the rule of faith is its ability to organize what
Childs so oen calls a holistic rendering of scripture’s witness. While the rule’s foundation is
quite absolute, it has a degree of abstraction which arises from the ﬂawed human perception
of its content and that accommodates the great variety of the biblical material without requir-
ing its harmonization. What can this unity mean? A trend in some of the more recent litera-
ture has been to equate the rule of faith with the storied world of scripture or the Christian
metanarrative, as if the rule’s purpose is “to capture the narrative wholeness of Scripture.”²⁰⁵
is has rightly been challenged and does not do justice to Childs’ understanding of regula
anymore than biblical narrative (Frei) does to canonical shape.²⁰⁶ Childs does at times speak
of the rule in terms of the church’s story, perhaps under the tutelage of Greer. But the rule is
larger than salvation history. Its purpose as canon is to govern human access to scripture’s
framework (theoria) and true subject matter (hypothesis) as well as to testify to dispensations
in the divine economy (oikonomia, which Childs can interchange with Heilsgeschichte). e
church’s acts of praise and repentance partake in the “ontic wholeness” of scripture which
transcends and encloses the church’s cognition of economic realities.
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In this third and ﬁnal section I will bring the two measures of allegory discussed in
this chapter into dialogue on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. e question is: what impact
does each approach to scripture (regardless of whether or not one ﬁnally terms it allegory)
have on the Christian aﬃrmations Barr and Childs each make of trinitarian dogma? We will
take Barr ﬁrst.
:    
Immediately aer Barr describes modern, post-war typology as “a bridge which reach-
es neither side of the river” (1966),²⁰⁷ he considers the function of the two testaments in the
work of salvation. He contends that a Christian approach to the Old Testament needs to be
“Trinitarian rather than Christological.”²⁰⁸ is is not meant to deny that Jesus Christ and the
God of Israel are the same God. Indeed, the argument begins with an aﬃrmation that “Christ-
ian use of the Old Testament seems to depend on the belief that One God who is the God of
Israel is also the God and Father of Jesus Christ. All our use of the Old Testament goes back to
this belief.”²⁰⁹ But this is also not an aﬃrmation of a direct path from the Old Testament to
Christ, let alone the opposite. In some sense “the God of Israel … foreknew his Son,” Barr
explains. “But there is no actual prediction or prophecy of which we can say that Jesus is the
intended content. Our use of the texts should relate to the intended content because it was
through the intended content that his purpose was moved forward, even if the intended con-
tent does not comprehend that purpose.”²¹⁰ Barr’s intentionalism compels him to voice a
strong “not yet” which excludes any talk of the Old yearning for its fulﬁllment in the New.
“is may be prejudiced,” he writes, “but I have always found this language of ‘looking for-
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ward to,’ ‘pointing towards’ and so on, very unconvincing. It at once leads us into questions of
purpose and intention, and purpose and intention cannot really be otherwise expressed than
as the purpose and intention of the writers at the time of writing.”²¹¹ So then, even though we
see that the God of Israel is the Father of Christ our Lord—all language Barr embraces—the
mind of the Old Testament is so closely identiﬁed with the minds of its human authors that its
purpose and intention cannot directly reveal anything about the purpose and intention of the
God of Israel, including the purpose of the Father with respect to the One who is Son.
ere are diﬃculties with this view. How does Barr suppose he has access to the pur-
poses of God to begin with? Barr’s theological reason for excluding Christ from the “intended
content” of the Old Testament is “because it was through the intended content that his pur-
pose was moved forward.” Who is “his”? God the Father? In that case what does the Son have
to do with the Father’s purpose? Do the Father and Son share the same purpose? And just who
or what is the passive subject moving the divine purpose forward? e next clause is even
more confusing: “it was through the intended content that his purpose was moved forward,
even if the intended content does not comprehend that purpose.” Is Barr suggesting that the
humanly intended content of the Old Testament could get caught up in a purpose it did not in
the ﬁrst instance comprehend? If so, one could begin to doubt the adequacy of a strict inten-
tionalist model. When Barr says interpretation of the Old Testament is trinitarian rather than
christological, he emphasizes the (human) lack of the knowledge of Christ before His birth.
How then does he connect the testimony of the Old to the one divine work of salvation wit-
nessed to by the New?
Barr ampliﬁes his doctrine of God in terms of “reality” and encounters more problems.
e Old Testament touches the real because it records “the reality of God’s original contact
with Israel.” But to what extent is the Old Testament caught up in the reality of Christ which
the church now confesses? Barr states:
God was known in Israel. We believe that his work with Israel worked also for the purpose
which we see fulﬁlled in Jesus Christ. But the way he worked for this purpose was by con-
tacts with Israel which were real in themselves. ese contacts worked also aerwards
211. Ibid., 152.
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through the aer-eﬀects in later interpretation of the texts which they produced. But our
interest in the original setting of the texts is an interest in the reality of God’s original con-
tact with Israel.²¹²
Is Jesus Christ diﬀerent from the God who was known in Israel? How? Is the Father’s purpose
fulﬁlled in Christ diﬀerent from the work of Christ itself? On what basis would one know?
And if the text is a by-product of “situations of actual contact with God,”²¹³ whatever that
might mean, why did the text have aer-eﬀects in the life of Israel and beyond? Conversely, in
view of the text’s aer-eﬀects, why is “our interest” so obviously limited to the “original set-
ting”? What makes the original setting of the words more real?
oughts about the nature of the real in Christianity lead Barr to comment on the
indirect applicability of the Old Testament to the Christian life. For him, we delude ourselves if
we think that the NT is more proximate to reality, more immediately accessible in the life of
faith, than the OT.²¹⁴ Both testaments are distant, though the OT is slightly more distant from
modern Christians. “ere are, indeed, even from a theological point of view, reasons why the
Christian’s relation to the Old Testament is less direct than his relation to the New. is has to
be balanced by his recognition that the achievement of our salvation depends, if we may so
put it, on those aspects which to us are less direct as much as on those which are more
direct.”²¹⁵ If this view mitigates some perceived inter-faith crisis, it does little to explain why
the Old and New Testaments should be considered together in the work of salvation. True
enough, in historical terms the world of the Old established the matrix into which the incar-
nation supposedly appeared. Yet theologically Barr wants “to suggest a way in which the Old
Testament and the humanity which it by its religious-historical aermath has conditioned are
taken up into the incarnation and become a functional agent in atonement through rejection
and cruciﬁxion,”²¹⁶ while at the same time insisting that our “direction of thought is from God
to Christ, from Father to Son, and not from Christ to God.”²¹⁷ In what sense is the Old Testa-
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ment a functional agent in the church’s knowledge and experience of Christ’s atonement? Does
the functionality of the OT or the humanity in it continue today? Nothing suggests that the
noetic-historical sequence, Old to New, should ever be reversed for Barr. But assuming OT
sacriﬁce and redemption have a real integrity apart from the NT, why would a person want to
talk of the work of salvation in Old and New Testaments, work in the singular, and with a deﬁ-
nite article, as in the title of Barr’s chapter?
Barr’s commitment to intentionalism, to certain limits on the real, to an indirect read-
ing of biblical texts, and at the same time to at least a semblance of unity in the Godhead,
informs his thesis “that the growth and development of the tradition is soteriologically func-
tional.”²¹⁸ Salvation history could function this way. But if it did, on what basis would one
speak of the unity of God, much less of His salvation? Can one say that salvation functions
thus and still meaningfully call Christian reading of Jewish scripture trinitarian?
’ 
e above interrogation is of course my own. Childs addresses Barr’s theology in “Old
and New Testaments in the Work of Salvation” more tersely. “In my opinion,” writes Childs in
the Prolegomena to BTONT,
Barr has mounted a strong case against the sharp methodological separation of typology
and allegory and demonstrated its relation to a peculiar modern theology of divine acts in
history. Yet I am far from convinced that Barr’s analysis has really touched to the heart of
the theological problem related to biblical typology. e issue turns on the nature of the
biblical referent and the eﬀort of both the Old Testament and the New Testament authors
to extend their experience of God through ﬁguration in order to depict the unity of God’s
one purpose (cf. especially H. Frei’s illuminating discussion in Eclipse, 2ﬀ.). Barr’s own
treatment of the relation of the testaments (Old and New in Interpretation, 149ﬀ.), correct-
ly emphasizes the role of the Old Testament as a testimony to the time before Christ’s com-
ing, but fails to deal adequately with the theological claim of an ontological as well as sote-
riological unity of the two testaments, which lies at the heart of the New Testament’s
application of the Old (cf. John 1.1–5; Col. 1.15–20; Heb. 1.2–3). Barr speaks of his “Trini-
tarian” approach, but seems to conﬁne himself to the “economic” rather than also to the
“immanent” Trinity as well.²¹⁹
218. Ibid., 156. e quote continues, “We do not only have a series of divine acts, the interpretation and
presentation of which constitutes the tradition; we have a growth of tradition, the existence of which
provides the matrix for the coming divine acts and the impulse for their very occurrence.” What does Barr
mean that a growing tradition impells the “very occurrence” of divine acts?
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Note again that the relationship between the testaments is a ﬁgural issue for Childs. Whatever
attenuated form of allegory Barr winds up with, however, does not do justice to the ontological
unity of the testaments. Barr does not grasp “the nature of the biblical referent,” which, as
Childs maintains with Origen’s precedent, can legitimately be multiple, and can be fully real in
senses not contained by the mind of an author. at is how the OT functioned and functions
in the church.
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In identifying Jesus Christ as the one scope of the Old and New,²²⁰ Childs puts forward
a fundamentally diﬀerent doctrine of the Trinity. He ﬁrst addresses the OT understanding of
God, which of course shows variety and complexity, focusing on God’s name, his covenant
with his people, his transcendence (“monotheism” is not wrong but “theologically inert”²²¹),
and his passibility. He gives a preliminary nod to the subject matter.
It is not by chance that the early church struggled with the Old Testament when it sought
to bear witness to the sheer mystery of the God of Israel who in Jesus Christ “emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant, and became obedient unto death.” Jesus brought no
new concept of God, but he demonstrated in action the full extent of God’s redemptive will
for the world which was from the beginning.²²²
In contrast to Barr, Childs takes care not to transfer observations about the historical unfold-
ing and development of concepts in time directly to the identity of God Himself, though noet-
ic diﬀerences in the biblical reports are duly noted. Aer a brief look at Jewish understandings
of God in the second temple period, Childs turns to the New Testament’s understanding of
God’s identity. Here one ﬁnds both continuity and discontinuity with the Old. In many cases
the original contexts of NT material have been subordinated to the canonical context in the
“shape of the whole collection. e result is that the diversity shown between early communi-
ties has been relativized and later readers of the New Testament saw tensions more as comple-
mentary than as antagonistic.”²²³ As in the OT there are many complications in detail. Some-
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times the Old seems to be “using” the New, shaping its understanding and idiom, but
sometimes the trajectory works in the reverse: “the doctrine of God in the New Testament is
frequently developed as a coeﬃcient of christology which strongly aﬀects how the Old Testa-
ment was heard and used.”²²⁴ Yet before the canonization of the NT the early church
expressed its confession of Christ largely in terms of Israel’s faith, understood through Israel’s
scriptures. is was part of its “struggle to understand the relationship between Jesus Christ
whom it confessed as Lord, and God who had revealed himself to Israel,” and the same chal-
lenge “lay at the heart of the development of Trinitarian theology.”²²⁵ e reality of the
church’s confession entailed “serious wrestling” with the witness and content of the Old.
Childs then moves into biblical theological reﬂection which deals with the historical,
discrete forms of the testaments but is not hamstrung by sequence. In older forms of Biblical
eology “it was a fatal mistake … when dealing with the identity of God to feel that it could
reﬂect on the subject only in terms of its historical sequence. is appeal to the so-called ‘eco-
nomic Trinity’ would restrict the doctrine of God to the divine workings within a historical
trajectory of past, present and future: God, Christ, Spirit.”²²⁶ is does not deny the impor-
tance of economic workings (Heb. 1:1) but seeks to preserve necessary conditions in the rea-
soning by which “the church’s reﬂection on God found itself inexorably drawn into Trinitarian
terminology.”²²⁷ Otherwise it becomes very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to talk about the God
of Old and New as a uniﬁed being. (is is principally what Childs means when he invokes an
“ontological” dimension. Ontology, as Childs deﬁnes it in another context, “refers to a mode
of speech in relation to a subject matter which disregards or transcends temporal
sequence.”²²⁸) And surely it only helps Childs’ case that the tradents, or canonical shapers in
his terminology, so oen appear to have made sequence a secondary or tertiary concern.
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Having summarized a number of points at the biblical theological level, Childs steps
into the arena of trinitarian dogma (res₃). God has spoken in many and various ways; howev-
er: “e church’s struggle with the Trinity was not a battle against the Old Testament, but
rather a battle for the Old Testament, for the one eternal covenant of God in both unity and
diversity.” In historical terms, the church’s initial christological confession eventually lead to a
fuller understanding of the Trinity; so, for example, “when the church lost interest in the doc-
trine of the Trinity during the course of the nineteenth century as if it were idle speculation,
its christological focus was also blurred and suﬀered serious distortion.”²²⁹ Barr does not fea-
ture in Childs’ treatment of “e Identity of God,” but the inherent relatedness of christology
and trinitarianism is precisely why Barr cannot have an approach to the Old Testament that is
“Trinitarian rather than Christological.” Even in sheer developmental terms, you do not get
one without the other.²³⁰
   - 
Childs concludes his discussion of God’s identity with his ﬁrst defense of “the need for
a multiple-level reading of scripture according to diﬀering contexts.”²³¹ is leads to remarks
on Vischer, the sensus literalis, and other topics we have touched on already. Scripture’s wit-
ness is not identical with the reality itself, and therefore (contra Vischer) promise and fulﬁll-
ment must not be fused. In other words, the ontic leaves space for the noetic.²³² A ﬁrst level of
entry to the text is the literal/historical, the canonical context of Old before New—very rough-
ly, what might probably have existed in the minds of the people who wrote and complied the
scriptures of Israel. A second level of entry extends the ﬁrst, relativizing sequence. Traditional-
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ly called typology, here “[a] comparison is being made, but neither witness is absorbed by the
the other, nor their contexts fused.” Can one go further? “Is there a level of interpreting the
biblical text in which the full-blown reality of God gained from a reading of the entire Bible is
used? It is not constitutive to Christian faith to confess that the God revealed in the Old Testa-
ment is also the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Indeed God is known as Father only in the
Son.” Why then cannot a knowledge of the Trinity have some place in actual exegesis of OT
texts? Is this always an “allegorical trap”?²³³
In partial answer, Childs suggests that the “fact that the Christian church has contin-
ued to be drawn back to allegory in a way that is not the case for Judaism, could well be an
indication of a genuine search for a level of exegesis which has not been satisfactorily met.”²³⁴
Triunity sets “monotheism” down a new but old path. As Barth has it,
faith in that Word means faith in the One whom this very Judaism with its monotheism
rejected as a sinner against its monotheism, a blasphemer against God. is is the gulf
which separates Christian monotheism, if we can use the term, from Jewish monotheism
and monotheism of every other kind. It is strange but true that confession of the one and
only God and denial of Him are to be found exactly conjoined but radically separated in
what appears to be the one identical statement that there is only one God.²³⁵
So the mystery of Israel has further iterations within a pursuit of the mystery of Christ. e
diﬀerences between midrash and allegory are only symptoms of a paradoxical ri. A decision
for one “monotheism” or the other would, for Childs, have to be textually mediated and self-
authenticating. “ere is no objective criterion by which this knowledge [of a living God] can
be tested beyond that of the reality of God himself. If the church confesses that the spirit of
God opens up the text to a perception of its true reality, it also follows that the Spirit also
works in applying the reality of God in its fullness to an understanding of the text. e two
movements cannot be separated.”²³⁶ Readers have to be converted to the open secret.
us, contra Barr, the Bible is not a book the church keeps only by giving away to a
global community of elite readers. Fundamental to Childs’ approach is the church’s receptive
233. BTONT, 380.
234. BTONT, 381.
235. CD II/1, 453–454, cited in BTONT, 373.
236. BTONT, 382.
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posture. “Scripture accrues its proper authority when it is read and celebrated in the commu-
nity of the church. e Bible is the book of the church, but not in the erroneous sense that it
belongs to the church; rather, when received as a divine gi to believers, the Bible becomes a
guide for faith and practice.”²³⁷ Allegory is not an acrobatic means of salvaging the text for
theological purpose. It is part of a response to God that moves toward deeper understanding
of a received text, according to its canonical rule, from faith to faith.
 “ ”   
Let me conclude with an example. For Childs in 1992 the testimony of Isaiah 53 “can-
not be correctly heard if this witness is directly identiﬁed with the passion of Jesus Christ…
Yet to know the will of God in Jesus Christ opens up a profoundly new vista on this prophetic
testimony… For those who confess the Lordship of Jesus Christ there is an immediate
morphological ﬁt.”²³⁸ In his Isaiah commentary Childs works hard to do justice to the discrete
voice of Isaiah, and yet does not hesitate to speak of the divine reality which for him gives rise
to this ﬁgural or morphological ﬁt. It is worth teasing out how he does this.
Generally speaking, in 2001 Childs restricts his comments to issues pertaining to Isai-
ah in its own historical context—entry at res₁. Occasionally he addresses Isaiah’s message from
the context of the larger Christian Bible, and at these points one spots a readiness to speak in
terms appropriate to res₃ or res₂. Moreover, on two such occasions Childs rehearses a turn of
phrase used three decades prior, namely, “the mystery of Israel.” e phrase ﬁrst accompanies
a discussion of Isaiah 6. e prophet’s diﬃcult commission involves a “mystery of divine hard-
ening” lodged ﬁrmly “with God in the mystery of his inscrutable will.”²³⁹ “How long?” asks
Isaiah, but there is no limit. “All of Israel must perish: ‘houses without people.’ … ere is no
continuity from the old to the new.” Yet Isaiah himself experiences death and rebirth, outlives
total destruction, names his son appropriately (7:3). “us the mystery of the remnant contin-
237. Childs, Cultural Change, 210.
238. BTONT, 382.
239. Isaiah, 56.
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ues, and these ancient readers saw in the stump that remained standing when felled (cf. 11:1)
the hope of the new.”²⁴⁰ Isaiah is one “whose cleansing by ﬁre and whose restoration makes
him the paradigm of new things arising from the old.” Mingled with the unbelief of Ahaz
“there appears a testimony to the emergence of a faithful remnant, which springs from the
ashes of Israel’s destruction, a new creation of God and his Messiah.”²⁴¹ Turning to the New
Testament, Childs sees that although the hardening motif is rendered variously, it “is seen as
an integral part of the selfsame struggle of God with Israel already witnessed to in the entire
Old Testament. e rejection and cruciﬁxion of Jesus was the ultimate climax to a history that
extended through Israel’s history (Acts 7). Indeed, the mystery of Israel remains the death of the
old and the rebirth of the new.”²⁴² If the shi to the present tense signals a deeper claim—not
about a perception in Paul or John or Acts, a claim at the conceptual level, but a theological
claim of the ﬁrst order—it derives as nearly as possible from a holistic reading of the Isaianic
corpus, the wider prophetic corpus, and the full canonical scriptures of ancient Israel. is for
Childs provides the soundest basis for Christian reading of the Old Testament.
Later, confronting the contested servant texts in Isaiah 41:8 and 42:1, Childs insists
that their juxtaposition leads to “the obvious implication that in some way Israel is the servant
who is named in 42:1.”²⁴³ In what way? Childs defers his answer: “the mystery of Israel as the
servant remains yet unresolved up to this point in the book.”²⁴⁴ e discussion is resumed
aer the exposition of Isaiah 53, at which point an excursus is again made for the New Testa-
ment witness. Scholarly literature on the problem falls into two camps. “Both sides argue pro
and con about the ‘mind of Jesus’ on the issue. Moreover, both sides distinguish between Jesus’
own self-understanding and that voiced by the various witnesses of scripture. Both therefore
seeks to ground their positions on a historical-critical reconstruction of the history of tradi-
tion.” One camp argues that the Old Testament texts were determinative, the other that New
240. Isaiah, 58.
241. Isaiah, 59.
242. Isaiah, 59, my emphasis.
243. Isaiah, 325.
244. Isaiah, 326.
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Testament understandings were “retrojected back into the Old Testament.”²⁴⁵ In a sense, both
sides have a point. Nonetheless, the real function of Isaiah 53 has been obscured. First, “the
authority of the biblical witness is not determined by its being anchored in ‘the mind of Jesus.’”
Neither is the text a clairvoyant prediction of Christ. Does that make the text’s Wirkung, its
historic reception in the church, merely a specious, “imaginative construal”?²⁴⁶
Childs argues to the contrary “that the canonical shape of the book of Isaiah shows a
suﬀering servant ﬁgure who was not simply viewed as a ﬁgure of the past, but assigned a cen-
tral and continuing theological role in relation to the life of the redeemed community of
Israel. us, there was a coercion exerted by the biblical text itself, as authoritative scripture,
that exercised pressure on the early church in its struggle to understand the suﬀering and
death of Jesus Christ.”²⁴⁷ is is not really the movement of prophecy to fulﬁllment.²⁴⁸
Rather, an analogy was drawn between the redemptive activity of the Isaianic servant and
the passion and death of Jesus Christ. e relation was understood “ontologically,” that is
to say, in terms of its substance, its theological reality. To use classic Christian theological
terminology, the distinction is between the “economic” Trinity, God’s revelation in the
continuum of Israel’s history, and the “immanent” Trinity, the ontological manifestation of
the triune deity in its eternality.²⁴⁹
Childs then holds that various New Testament witnesses participate in this understanding.
Revelation 13:8 is a prime example—“the lamb slain before the foundation of the world.”
en, lest there be any doubt about whether the mind of an apostle evangelist is his terminus,
Childs modulates once again into ﬁrst-order, biblical theological discourse. “e morphologi-
cal ﬁt between Isaiah 53 and the passion of Jesus continues to bear testimony to the common
subject matter within the one divine economy.” And: “e suﬀering servant retains its theo-
logical signiﬁcance within the Christian canon because it is inextricably linked in substance
245. Isaiah, 421.
246. Isaiah, 422. Cf. Struggle, 322.
247. Isaiah, 422–423.
248. Or not in the ﬁrst instance: “in a broad sense, Isaiah 53 does continue to function as prophecy since the
chapter is bracketed within the eschatological framework of an unfolding divine economy” (423, my
emphasis, cf. 191–192).
249. Isaiah, 423.
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with the gospel of Jesus Christ, who is and always has been the ground of God’s salvation of
Israel and the world.”²⁵⁰
To say this is to make a christological and a trinitarian judgment, and on Childs’
understanding, a judgment in a ﬁgural or allegorical mode. As Seitz concludes in another con-
text, “To study the Old Testament, therefore, is not like visiting a museum (however much the
historicism in vogue since the late nineteenth century has encouraged such a view). Rather, to
open the Old Testament is to encounter the living God!”²⁵¹ If true, if the Bible in the modern
world is more than an object of archaeological interest, should one not expect to ﬁnd the
direct transformations of ﬁgural practice even in the more technical, academic commentary of
Christian expositors?
250. Isaiah, 423.
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is about transformation: “Figural reading in the Christian tradition seeks to express the dynamic process
of spiritual transformation in ways that respect the practitioners’ commitment to both past and future,
both old identity and newly refashioned identity. Imbedded in ﬁgural practice is all the drama of
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“On whatever day I call upon you, hear me quickly.” Peter prayed, Paul prayed, the
other apostles prayed, the faithful prayed in those early days, the faithful prayed in the
ages that followed, the faithful prayed in the time of the martyrs, the faithful pray in our
own time, and the faithful will pray in the day of our descendants.
—Augustine, on Psalm 102:2
In lieu of concluding remarks, which in any event I have oﬀered at numerous turns along the
way, I wish to close with a short example.
Psalm 102 has been worked quite heavily of late. In addition to articles and commen-
taries, the text has been the subject of no less that two monographs, in 1992 and 1996.¹ At
present, I restrict myself to the question of the scope of Psalm 102, though even this must be
highly selective and abbreviated. e term “scope” of course has resonances within patristic
and reformation commentary.² To begin with, however, I use it simply to index perceptions of
the compass of the biblical text in time and subject matter. How far does Psalm 102 reach? As
per the title, “generation” in verse 19 is my focal point.
.   
For the last century, consider a pair of contrasts. About a hundred years ago Hermann
Gunkel began to apply the logic of forms to the Psalter. Previous psalms research had stagnat-
ed, in his view, because ancient poetry had not yet been set in its proper context: “if someone
researching the past wants to obtain the true picture of what happened, that researcher ﬁrst
1. Brüning, Mitten im Leben and Brunert, Psalm 102, respectively.
2. See Sheppard, Scope of Biblical Books and idem, Scope of Isaiah.
has to disregard the context in which the items came to us more or less accidentally. Rather,
the researcher’s goal is to observe things in the contexts in which they were originally found.”³
e problem is especially acute in the canonical Psalter, where principles governing internal
arrangement are diﬃcult to come by, if indeed they can be discerned at all.⁴ Israel’s literary
witnesses come down to us in an intrinsically secondary, artiﬁcial context, because their true
provenance is “nicht auf dem Papier, sondern im Leben.”⁵ For Gunkel this ties into a theory of
the rise of cultures, wherein primitive nations such as Israel had not yet attained literary
expression conceivable “on paper” in the ﬁrst instance.⁶ On the whole, psalms had their living
context in the cult.
Concerning Psalm 102, however, Gunkel sees a certain distance from the cult. It is
classed as an individual complaint song, but as a later and freer instance of the type and at
some remove from the oldest rites. As Gunkel’s Auseinandersetzung with Mowinckel makes
clear, this understanding has quite a bit do to with the triumph of the poetic individual. e
“I” of the psalmist in the ﬁrst section (1–12) must on no account be explained as the “I” of the
liturgical community supposed to lie behind the second section (13–23).⁷ Again, although the
Psalm is one of the best examples Gunkel ﬁnds to show that הָלִּפְתּ (verses 1, 2, 17) is a termi-
nus technicus for the individual complaint song as a genre, he predicates: “It is only question-
able whether the superscription intends the original use of the complaint song or whether it
3. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 3 = Einleitung, 4. at the canon is in view is made explicit in the next
sentence: “it should be irrelevant initially whether these songs are found inside the canon or outside the
canon, or even whether they are found within Israel or outside Israel.” But on Gunkel’s own “Gefälle”
toward Israel, and ultimately toward canon, see chapter four.
4. See esp. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, §13, “e Collection of the Psalms.”
5. RGG², 3:1679.
6. “e literary witness of the natural times and environments can be distinguished from those of more
developed nations. ose literary witnesses of more developed nations are only conceivable on paper, but
these witnesses arise in the real life of persons and have their setting therein. In real life women sing the
victory song to those returning, triumphant armies. In real life some of the professional mourners strike
up the moving dirge over the one who has passed away” Ibid., 7 = 10.
7. Compare Ibid., 122–123 (= 173–175) with Mowinckel, Psalms, 1:221, 223–227. “Rather,” Gunkel explains,
“it is quite natural that the pious poet would also consider his own people when he had ﬁnished with
himself, or that he ﬁrst speaks of Israel and then himself, or that he mixes the two together” (Gunkel and
Begrich, Introduction, 123 = 175). It is only a short step from here to what Gunkel feels is the Psalter’s
enduring value—the creative expression of the pious individual.
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characterizes the psalm according to its usage in later worship services where the more origi-
nal life setting and the later performance type need not correspond.”⁸
As for the scope of Psalm 102, since Gunkel ﬁnds prophetic inﬂuences at work this
derives almost wholly from his estimation of the prophets. “Sometimes,” he explains,
“eschatology appears in trace amounts in the complaint song. e singer in Ps 102 comforts
himself in the hope which is already granted to Israel in the present.”⁹ When a psalmist express-
es his faith in future deliverance, we are not to understand the plaintiﬀ as one “gaining com-
fort and certainty for the present by a deduction based upon YHWH’s assurance for his people
in the distant future… Rather, the context is spontaneous and immediate.”¹⁰ Gunkel ﬁnds sup-
port for this general characterization in Psalm 102:14—“You will rise up and have compassion
on Zion, for it is time [תֵע] to favor it; the appointed time [דֵעוֹמ] has come.”
us when Gunkel comments on verse 19—“Let this be recorded for a generation to
come, so that a people yet unborn may praise the Lord”—emphasis falls on the salvation “das
sicherlich nun bald hereinbrechen wird.”¹¹ A record is made for posterity based on the exu-
berant conviction that the hour is nigh. e people about to be created [ םַעאָרְבִנ ] are identi-
ﬁed with the next generation [ רוֹדּ ןוֹרֲחַא ], for indeed the next generation is also the last.
Fast forward to 1990. In contrast to Gunkel, Odil Steck argues that Psalm 102 instanti-
ates “Fernerwartung”—expectation for the distant future. Aer advancing a careful reading of
time in the Psalm, in which the psalmist in the present (“Redegegenwart”) perceives God’s
permanence and salvation, Steck argues against seeing the Psalm as collective adventism
(“kollektive Naherwartung”). Individual and collective threads correlate to the individual’s
complaint and the anticipated collective salvation. According to Steck, the Psalm’s argument
8. Nogalski’s translation is in error here (Ibid., 193 = 259). He renders “decken” as “be hidden” without
recognizing that the verb is being used reﬂexively—i.e. “sich decken” means “to correspond” or “to
coincide.” I have modiﬁed his translation accordingly.
9. Ibid., 192 = 258, my emphasis.
10. Ibid., 270–271 = 353. e quote continues, “e present time grows increasingly gloomy as its particular
references approach the gruesome image that the prophets have presented for the days before ’s
intervention. When this happens, then far from letting itself be discouraged and oppressed, eschatological
faith sees a majestic conﬁrmation of that which it believes. Speciﬁcally, it sees an undeniable sign that the
last days have begun” (271 = 354).
11. Gunkel, Psalmen übersetzt, 437. For what follows see 439–440.
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turns on the contrast of a single person in jeopardy of death and the durable God who secures
the fate of the sons of His servants (verse 29).
Wenn Jahwe bei der Heilswende Jerusalems dereinst kollektiv so handeln wird, wie V. 18
erwartet, kann er auch in der Zeit davor das jetzige Bitten des Beters um dessen Lebens-
länge nicht ungehört lassen… Die an der Gewißheit kollektiver Fernerwartung exempliﬁ-
zierte Lanzeitigkeit Jahwes (V. 13, 14–23) wird als Gegensatz zum Beterschicksal mit sei-
ner vorzeitigen Todesnähe vorgebracht.¹²
Accordingly, יִכּ in 14b must be translated “when” rather than “for”—“have compassion on
Zion when it is time to favor it, when the appointed time has come.”¹³
Unlike a great many critics, Gunkel and Steck think Psalm 102’s apparent
“Uneinheitlichkeit” nevertheless arose from a single conceptual universe.¹⁴ But rather than a
certain mixing of genres, Steck sees the conﬂuence of two streams of tradition, late prophecy
and late wisdom.¹⁵ Religious-historically, it stems in part from the world of Trito-Isaiah.¹⁶
at the psalmist is aware of prophetic visions of a new heavens and a new earth, but yet prob-
ably stands outside the circles that developed the prophetic literature in this direction, may
explain why, in line with late wisdom circles, eschatological hope has been deferred from the
next to a much later generation.
Verse 19, then. What is written for a future generation is “die Gewißheit dieser küni-
gen Rettung jetzt, wie sie prophetische genährt in der Gegenwart V. 14ﬀ. ausspricht, damit die
Heilsempfänger das Widerfahrnis der Heilswende als Erfüllung der Rettungsgewißheit ihrer
Vorfahren, die in der Redegegenwart des Psalms leben, wahrnehmen.”¹⁷
12. Steck, Ps 102, 364.
13. e same adjustment would seem to be required in 20a. Hossfeld counters this move in Hossfeld and
Zenger, Psalmen 101–150.
14. For Steck the view is consistent with his position that we should assume biblical texts to be coherent until
proven guilty, “despite our impressions to the contrary” (Steck, Prophetic Books, 30).
15. Steck, Streams, 371: “In Psalm 102 stehen also nicht verschiedene literarische Schichten zusammen,
sondern zwei nebeneinander gegebene, traditionelle Sprachfelder—späte Weisheits- und späte
prophetische Tradition—tregen in einem einheitlichen Text zusammen.” Psalm 102 is thus unlike Psalms
22 or 69, which do contain primary and secondary individual and collective strata.
16. 102:26f provides a striking intertext for the vision of a new heaven and a new earth, if indeed it is not
explicitly drawing on the language of Isaiah 66:22 and 65:9, 17. An allusion to Isaiah 59:19 in 102:16 seems
especially probable because of the shared constellation of וּאְריִיְו + םֵשׁ־תֶא הָוהְי  + ֹדוֹבְכּ־תֶא.
17. Steck, Ps 102, 362.
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It is doubtful whether this ﬁrst contrast, “Fernerwartung” vs. “Naherwartung,” has any
straightforward correlation to the most obvious contrast between Steck and Gunkel, namely,
their point of departure vis-à-vis the ﬁnal form. Steck represents well the turn from man to
text, yet in the case at hand Gunkel and Steck both accept Psalm 102 as more or less a unit.
eir disagreements turn on how to read the intent of its author, and where to locate his
notion of eschatology in its historical development. Does Steck admit a broader scope for the
Psalm? Perhaps. His psalmist certainly takes a more forward-looking view. But what sort of
further associations does the text have? For Gunkel, ancient literature was immature—some-
times childlike, sometimes childish. On balance it bears little analogy for the mature indi-
vidual reading today, although it does occasionally “transcend itself ”: the Psalter, which “is
not a contemporary book and therefore cannot possibly voice modern thoughts and feelings,”
can sometimes teach the modern man how to pray in a proper spirit of piety.¹⁸ Steck’s con-
trasting emphasis on the textuality of the Psalm opens up a broader range of aﬃliation in the
ancient context. But at ﬁrst glance Steck’s reading is equally archaeological. Elsewhere he
argues that late prophetic “Fortschreibung” advanced on the conviction of a “surplus value” in
the sacred text that invited new readings.¹⁹ If one were so inclined, one could perhaps
approach biblical prophecy similarly today without contravening the tradents’ intent. As he
hazards once: “within the canon, in the ﬁnal versions of the prophetic books, material that is
not contemporary again becomes contemporary material in a higher sense for all later genera-
tions who wish to orient themselves toward the Bible.”²⁰ An analogous point is not explicitly
drawn with respect to Psalm 102, however.
At this juncture a second contrast can be drawn, between Steck and Brevard Childs.
Childs mentions Psalm 102 in 1979.²¹ He then discusses it at more length in an article-length
study of the formula “it shall be recorded for a future generation,” a “canonical formula” as he
has it, in 1990, the same year Steck’s article appeared. For Childs Psalm 102 attests the way in
18. Gunkel, Water, 161; see a fuller discussion of this quote in chapter four.
19. Steck, Prophetic Books, 47, 148–190.
20. Ibid., 186; my emphasis.
21. IOTS, 518.
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which Israel’s traditions acquired an enduring signiﬁcance as scripture. His essay’s thesis “is
that the process of the canonization of the Hebrew Bible was closely related to the concern to
render the sacred tradition in such a way as to serve future generations of Israel as authorita-
tive Scripture.”²² is relates immediately to the question “What is the status of the Hebrew
canon for the Christian church?”²³ Note the present tense: the scope of verse 19 extends
directly to the contemporary debate about the hermeneutical signiﬁcance of canon. Lest this
maneuver be too quickly dismissed as a dogmatic imposition, a look at Childs’ reading is in
order.
Not just the psalms chapter but all of IOTS is written under the same thesis as the
essay of 1990. e Introduction explores the various ways biblical material has been transmit-
ted and shaped “in such a way that its authoritative claims be laid upon all successive genera-
tions of Israel.”²⁴ Childs argues against critical research on the psalms in general because of its
doubly negative outcome: increasingly it locked the psalms in their ancient context, a move
which had the eﬀect of making “traditional use of the Psalter by the synagogue and church
[appear] highly arbitrary and far removed from the original function within ancient Israel.”²⁵
His positive argument to the contrary sees a variety of impulses shaping the literature, but also
discerns a unifying result: “psalms do not need to be cultically actualized to serve later genera-
tions. ey are made immediately accessible to the faithful.”²⁶ e Psalter, like the rest of the
Hebrew Bible, was sown with the seeds of its own continuing actualization.²⁷ Hence a “mod-
22. Childs, Generation, 358.
23. Ibid., 357.
24. IOTS, 78.
25. IOTS, 510.
26. IOTS, 521. In the context Childs is discussing psalms ascribed to David, especially through
superscriptions, but the point is quite consistent with his overall thesis. Hence he concludes, “e
canonical shape of the Psalter assured future generations of Israelites that this book spoke a word of God
to each of them in their need. It was not only a record of the past, but a living voice speaking to the present
human suﬀering” (523). Or again, he sees “a growing consciousness of the Psalter as sacred scripture” (521).
See the discussion of Kanonbewußtsein in chapter ﬁve.
27. Compare IOTS, 79 and passim.
 . :    ’       
ern interpreter” has “a warrant for breaking out of the single, narrowly conceived mode of
exegesis which is represented by most modern critical commentaries.”²⁸
In 1990 Childs presumes the same analysis as advanced in IOTS but comes at Psalm
102 from an angle more reminiscent of his early form-critical studies. He ﬁrst covers the
semantic range of the word רוֹדּ. e next step is to identify the stereotyped formulas in which
the term typically functioned. is leads to a reiteration of Childs’ most foundational insight:
If in early Israel the transmission and actualization of Israel’s sacred tradition occurred in
the context of the cult, increasingly in the late pre-exilic and post-exilic periods Israel’s tra-
dition was given a written form and transmitted by scribal schools… [T]here was a grow-
ing tendency toward the textualization of the tradition.²⁹
In a third, exegetical step, verse 19 is taken as the key to the Psalm. “Although the promise was
addressed originally to the exilic community, the dimension of the promise had already
transcended that generation.”³⁰ Finally, hermeneutical implications are drawn, one of which
revisits the challenge critical scholarship made to Scripture’s continuing relevance. “e divine
promise is not a coeﬃcient of the past, but a witness recorded for future generations. e con-
cern of the psalm is not ‘traditional,’ that is, simply preserving the past, but rather ‘kerygmatic,’
a bearing of testimony to the enduring power of God’s promise for the future.”³¹ In this mann-
er Childs feels he “follows the Old Testament’s witness beyond itself to its subject matter, who
is God, and thus provides a critical basis for genuine theological reﬂection.”³²
To summarize, despite sharing with Steck an emphasis over against Gunkel on the tex-
tuality of biblical traditions, Childs has a unique sense of Psalm 102’s immediate applicability.
Steck is probably open to an analogical extension of the text into the present, but his analysis
of the text in question lacks any proof. What separates Childs and Steck could, in a word, be
called the perspicuity of Scripture. e scope of Psalm 102 for Childs includes the long history
of traditional interpretation in the church and synagogue and extends right up to the present
generation.
28. IOTS, 522–523.
29. Childs, Generation, 360.
30. Ibid., 361.
31. Ibid., 363.
32. Ibid., 363–364.
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Now to the tradition.³³ Augustine is a suitable representative among Christian readers
and must suﬃce at present. Of verse 19 (Latin 101:18) he writes, “At the time of writing [the
things written] were not proﬁtable to the people among whom they were written, for their
purpose was to foretell the New Covenant among people who were living under the Old.”³⁴
Yet the Old Covenant (Vetus Testamentum) pertains to one generation, the New to another. In
all generations God’s promise holds for the just. As Augustine’s second exposition of Psalm
102 demonstrates beautifully, generations of the righteous in created time (like so many
“dried-up leaves … underfoot”) begin with Adam, include Abel, Seth and Enoch, then Noah
and his oﬀspring, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the patriarchs, the prophets, and at last Christ
himself; and aer Christ the apostles, then other saints; “and now today all who are holy are
holy in the name of Christ, as will all those be who aer us will be saints, even to the world’s
end. From all these innumerable generations you may pick out all the holy oﬀspring in each,
and make of them one generation, and in this generation of generations, says the psalm, your
years abide.”³⁵ Why then does Psalm 102 pertain to generations under the New Testament
more than to those under the Old? e explanation is exegetical: because it was written for a
33. ere are of course special reasons to turn here in a study of Childs, who associates Gunkel’s view that the
Psalter has nothing immediate to say in our time with Gunkel’s underrating of pre-critical exegesis. “One
of the major reasons for working seriously in the history of biblical exegesis is to be made aware of many
diﬀerent models of interpretation which have all to frequently been disparaged through ignorance. With
all due respect to Gunkel, the truly great expositors for probing the theological heart of the Psalter remain
Augustine, Kimchi, Luther, Calvin, the long forgotten Puritans buried in Spurgeon’s Treasury, the haunting
sermons of Donne, and the learned and pious reﬂections of de Muis, Francke and Geier. Admittedly these
commentators run the risk, which is common to all interpretation, of obscuring rather than illuminating
the biblical text, but because they stand ﬁrmly within the canonical context, one can learn from them how
to speak anew the language of faith” (IOTS, 523).
34. Augustine, Expositions 99–120, 61–62; CCSL, 1438; PL, 1304–1305. “Quando scribebantur haec, non ita
proderant eis inter quos scribebantur; scribebantur enim ad prophetandum Novum Testamentum, inter
homines qui vivebant ex Vetere Testamento. Sed et illud Vetus Testamentum Deus dederat, et in illa terra
promissionis populum suum collocaverat. Sed quoniam memoriale tuum in generationem et generationem,
non iniquorum est, sed justorum: in una generatione pertinet ad Vetus Testamentum; in alia autem
generatione pertinet ad Novum Testamentum.”
35. Ibid., 72.
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people yet to be created. And who are these? It can only mean those who are in Christ, Augus-
tine explains, the same new creation to whom the apostle refers in 2 Corinthians 5.
ough Augustine clearly wants to work by means of the “plain sense”—per litter-
am³⁶— he is alive to multiple dimensions of the psalm. He does not immediately identify the
poor man praying in the ﬁrst part with Christ, for the man seems at times too poor to be so
great and exalted a Lord. Augustine does indeed call the man Christ, but reluctantly: “It is he,
yet it is not he.”³⁷ In this manner Christ speaks with and on behalf of his bride, the Church.
e two become one ﬂesh, and so they also become “one voice” (voce una). Christ is the head,
the Church his members, but they speak with the same voice. “Let us listen, then, to the prayer
oﬀered by the head and the body, the bridegroom and the bride. Christ and the Church
together are one person, but the Word and ﬂesh do not form one nature.”³⁸ Augustine frames
it dramatically in his exposition of the previous psalm: “We are Christ”!³⁹ But lest the suppli-
cant in Psalm 102 speak words too base for the head, Augustine qualiﬁes, “I have prefaced my
sermon with these remarks so that if you do hear anything of the kind, you may discern in it
the sound of the body’s weakness and realize that the head is speaking in the voice of its mem-
bers.” e invitation is for the Church to enter the psalm through Christ. “Let us listen; and,
more than that, let us hear ourselves in these words. If we perceive ourselves to be outside
them, let us do our best to be within.”⁴⁰ So the three voices of the Psalms, the “I,” Christ and
the Church, are all in fact one voice.
Michael Cameron comments aptly,
Augustine thus awakened his hearers to themselves as subjects of the paschal mystery and
participants in its dynamic of charity. Unwittingly, he also gave an intriguing reply to the
hermeneutical conundrum created by the modern division between participant and ob-
36. As Cameron, Enarrationes in Psalmos, explains, “His custom was not to focus on ‘the letter,’ or the literal
sense, of the psalm (solemus non ad litteram atendere), but to reach ‘through’ the letter, as it were, to search
out the mysteries within (sed per litteram scrutari mysteria: 131.2)” (291). Cf. Greene-McCreight, Ad
Litteram.
37. Augustine, Expositions 99–120, 47; CCSL, 1426; PL, 1295.
38. Ibid., 47; CCSL, 1427; PL, 1295. “Jam ergo audiamus quid oret caput et corpus, sponsus et sponsa, Christus
et ecclesia, utrumque unus: sed Verbum et caro non utrumque unum; Pater et Verbum utrumque unum;
Christus et ecclesia utrumque unus.”
39. Ibid., 33.
40. ExP, 48; CCSL, 1427; PL, 1295–1296.
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server, subject and object, positing their conjunction not by mere ﬁat but by uncovering
the engine of participation in the structure of redemption itself.⁴¹
Such a mechanism led to a text having multiple senses as a matter of course. If the attendant
allegory sounds odd or even perverse on modern ears,⁴² it hardly needs to be said that Augus-
tine has none of the problem with application that we saw in the previous section. e epi-
graph vividly articulates Augustine’s sense of Christ and the Church praying together in all
generations, past, present, and to come. For Augustine, and with very few exceptions for
Christian readers before the rise of critical method, scripture’s scope comprehends the exposi-
tor’s generation immediately. e seismic crisis of relevance that marks the present age, Childs
not excluded, had not yet transpired.
. 
In a seventy page survey of the reception history of Psalm 102, Gunild Brunert aﬀords
an example of how someone fully engaged with critical research might understand the tradi-
tion, and so can help draw together threads from sections one and two in this chapter. Brunert
credits Augustine with developing a theological foundation for signiﬁcant Christian reception
of the Psalter, but he adds a serious charge: “Das ändert aber nichts daran, daß er die
christliche Tendenz fortgesetzt hat, den jüdischen Psalmen jeden Eigenwert abzusprechen. Er
hat sie im Gegenteil verstärkt.”⁴³ So whatever relevance issues Psalmus vox totius Christi,
41. Cameron, Enarrationes in Psalmos, 293.
42. Taking just one example, Augustine oﬀers a double reading of the psalm’s three birds (pelican, owl,
sparrow) in three habitats (solitary places, ruined walls, rooop). In the ﬁrst instance they represent an
aspect of Christ’s body. Christian ministers have three tasks in three diﬀerent locations: one goes to non-
Christians, another to the backslidden, another to those near the Church but lukewarm. en again, the
same ﬁgures can refer to Christ, who was alone like the pelican in being born of a virgin, who like the owl
in the ruins was cruciﬁed, and who like a sparrow on the roof was resurrected.
43. Brunert, Psalm 102, 27. Brunert cites verse 19 as his only example, but see above. Augustine’s comments
are driven by intertextual associations with a later generation, yet to be created, which on his logic
resonates across the the Testaments with apostolic indicators of a new creation. Fiedrowicz, Introduction,
23–24, seems not to mark the diﬀerence either. On the other hand, even if this is not what happens at verse
19, other remarks are more egregious. At the Christological reading of the owl among the ruins, for
instance, Augustine suggests Christ was cruciﬁed “by the Jews’ benighted ignorance and in the tottering
walls of their ruin” (Augustine, Expositions 99–120, 54; CCSL, 1432; PL, 1300: “tanquam in nocte
ignorantiae ipsorum, et tanquam in parietinis ruinae ipsorum”).
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capitis et corporis may solve,⁴⁴ one cannot sidestep the thorny legacy of Christian superses-
sionism. is, in fact, this is the standard against which Brunert weighs traditional readings.
Does a Christian reader accord the Jewish psalm any independent value (jüdischen Eigen-
wert)?⁴⁵ Augustine fails the litmus test. So does virtually everyone else.
Prior to the world wars Brunert names just four exemplars: eodore of Mopsuestia,
Calvin and Hengstenberg in restricted senses, and Delitzsch. Gunkel opens up fresh debate
and sets the critical agenda for much of the 20 century, but like Wellhausen and others fails
roundly on the Jewish question. To aﬃrm even these few Brunert must perform some precari-
ous acrobatics—for Calvin as for Luther the subject matter, literal sense and scope of the Old
Testament actually is Christ.⁴⁶ It could be wondered, too, what lasting value there is in Heng-
stenberg, whose messianic-revelation-historical exegesis has christological accents anyway, or
Delitzsch.⁴⁷ Intriguingly, though, Brunert has less trouble with contemporary application than
many others, and he does not neglect to draw out the signiﬁcance of his work on Psalm 102
for the church. She is neither the new people of God, nor even a new people; rather, alongside
Israel she is half of the people of God:
solange Israel glaubt, daß sich die in diesem Buch konzentrierten Hoﬀnungen in der lau-
fenden Geschichte noch nicht erfüllt haben, daß also Jesus von Nazareth nicht der Heils-
könig war, auf den es wartet, so lange sollte die Kirche sensibel genug sein, in den Texten
über ihr eigenes Selbstverständnis (vor Israel, vor dem gemeinsamen Gott und vor den
Völkern) Formulierungen zu wählen, die die Glaubensentscheidung Israels respektieren
und die Würde dieses Volkes nicht verletzen… [Die Kirche] wartet nicht allein auf den
Tag, an dem alle Völker mit einer Stimme den Herrn anrufen (nostra aetate 4), sondern sie
darf darauf vertrauen, daß Israel diesen Tag auch erwartet; sie ist nicht allein auf dem Weg
zu Gott, sondern sie geht ihn gemeinsam mit Israel. Das ist die theologische Botscha des
44. In addition to literature already cited see Cameron, Totus Christus; Fiedrowicz, Introduction; Müller and
Fiedrowicz, Enarrationes.
45. See Brunert, Psalm 102, 27, 28–29, 30, 33, 35, 39, 42, 47, 58–60, 62, 63, 293–294, 307.
46. For Brunert, “Die reformatorische Rückbesinnung auf die Schri und ihre Betonung des Litteralsinnes setzt
sich bei der Auslegung dieses Psalmes also nur zögernd durch. Erst Calvin nimmt auf der Basis des sensus
litteralis eine historische Deutung vor, während Luther an der allegorischen Interpretation festhält” (ibid.,
35, original emphasis).
47. Ibid., 47: “Dem Grundkonsens, der sich bei allen Diﬀerenzen im einzelnen in Bezug auf die
Notwendigkeit zeitgenössisch-jüdischer Deutung gebildet hatte, versucht sich seit der zweiten Häle des
19. Jahrhunderts noch einmal eine hier durch Hengstenberg und Delitzsch vertretene Linie
entgegenzusetzen. Ihre Versuche, die Ergebnisse der kritischen Forschung durch messianisch-
oﬀenbarungsgeschichtliche Exegese wieder stärker in den kirchlichen Umkreis zu integrieren, haben sich
aber nicht durchgesetzt.”
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vierten Psalmenbuches an die Kirche…⁴⁸
Little wonder that Erich Zenger guided Brunert’s dissertation.⁴⁹ How to treat the Scriptures of
Israel as a Christian reader, what even to call them, have, aer Auschwitz, become hermeneu-
tical problems of the ﬁrst order.
Childs’ ruled approach moves in a very diﬀerent direction. In Brunert’s view, following
Manfred Oeming, Childs’ theological approach to Psalm 102 amounts to a “dogmatische
Flucht aus den Schwierigkeiten des historisch-kritischen Geschäs.”⁵⁰ (If he had noticed the
christological apparatus supporting and surrounding Childs’ reading he surely would have
added a strong theological objection as well: Childs gives too much play to traditional, supers-
essionist readings of Jewish scripture.) Brunert does not follow Oeming in making another
criticism, however. Oeming comments:
Wenn Childs die Notwendigkeit des hermeneutischen Geschäs des “Wiederverständlich-
machens” von der ﬁnal form her für überﬂüssig hält, vermag ich ihn nicht mehr zu be-
greifen. Wie kann man angesichts der tiefgreifenden Entfremdung des säkularen Zeitalters
von der Bibel und angesichts des bedrückenden Unverständnisses für die Normativität
heiliger Schrien gerade auch des Alten Testaments glauben, eine Rückwendung zur
kanonischen ﬁnal form löse alle Probleme?⁵¹
Can the Bible, especially the Old Testament, say anything immediate to our day at all? Or in
terms of Psalm 102:19, which generation to come—which people “being created”—falls within
the scope of the text? For Brunert, what is written refers to the fourth book of psalms, lives on
48. Ibid., 307.
49. To the claim that “Psalm 102 vor allem ein jüdisches Gebet ist” (ibid., 14), compare the programmatic
statements in Zenger, Nach Auschwitz.
50. Brunert, Psalm 102, 72, citing Oeming, Gesamtbiblische, 209 [= ³216]; on Oeming see further chapter one.
Brunert seems not to recognize that Childs posits the same two literary strata in 1979 as he does in 1990.
is leads him to make the implausible but not altogether atypical suggestion that Childs lapses into
historical-critical mode in 1990. It is simply not true that in the later article “geht er insofern über sein
ausschließliches Interesse am kanonisierten Endtext hinaus.” Interest in a so-called depth dimension is
there from the beginning. Neither is Childs “indiﬀerent” (“gleichgültig”) to the details of the Psalm’s
prehistory. Earlier stages of the tradition are of course subordinate to the ﬁnal form for Childs, but they
also have an important place in establishing a warrant for continuing re-application of Israel’s traditions as
they have been scripturally rendered. Still, remarks made toward the end of the IOTS chapter on the
psalms voice a diﬃcult question: “e question arises, did the later refashioning do violence to the original
meaning? One’s answer depends largely on how one construes ‘doing violence.’ Certainly the elements of
continuity between the earlier and later interpretations are evident. Nevertheless, the original meaning is
no longer an adequate norm by which to test the new” (IOTS, 522). Widespread agreement on this old
crux has not been forthcoming.
51. Ibid., ²208 [= ³215].
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quite naturally and appropriately in post-biblical Israel, but is killed almost without exception
by the church. He must in essence reject the Christian tradition to save Jewish scriptures from
the church, for the church.⁵² Yet the strategy requires that he salvage at least part of the tradi-
tion, I think, for the following reason: if Brunert’s were the ﬁrst Christain generation to hear
the Psalm’s true message, he would have no reason to include himself in its implied reader-
ship, as one of the םַעאָרְבִנ . Without a eodore, on what basis could Brunert make the subtle
but signiﬁcant switch to the present tense, as above? e truly perplexing dilemma here is
whether a person expressly standing inside the church can so easily presuppose the perspicu-
ity of Scripture and at the same time reject the Christuszeugnis of the Old Testament. Again, if
the Jewish signiﬁcance of Psalm 102 was consistently thwarted throughout Christian history,
would not a more likely deduction be that the church simply has no title to it whatsoever? is
would seem to be a more consistent application of Brunert’s chief criterion, which in any event
sits uneasily alongside an important, tacit recognition that for the Psalm to speak in the
church, it must also have spoken.
52. On his own understanding, this is where his real contribution lies. “Das wirklich Neue an der christlichen
Form der holistischen Psalmenexegese scheint jedenfalls nicht der Blick über den Einzelpsalm hinaus bzw.
auf den Gesamtpsalter zu sein, sondern das Bemühen, potentielle übergreifende Botschaen (innerhalb)
des Psalters nicht christlich zu vereinnahmen” (Brunert, Psalm 102, 294).
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